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Abstract 
 
People are increasingly using the Internet and mobile phone technology to communicate 
with others in their daily lives. Despite researchers‟ claims that cyber-harassment is 
becoming increasingly widespread, little is known about the phenomenon. This thesis 
adopted a mixed methods approach to gain a holistic understanding of the experience of 
cyber-harassment, how it is perceived by non-victims, and police officers‟ perceptions of, 
and role in combating the crime.  
 
Although cyber-harassment is a crime within the UK, prosecuted using the  Protection 
from Harassment Act (1997), few may perceive it as such due to the virtual nature of the 
perpetrator‟s behaviour. Using data gathered in an online survey completed by 320 
undergraduate students, principal axis factoring revealed three dimensions underlying 
perceived criminality of 18 cyber-harassing behaviours – deception/disclosure, harassing 
messages, and malicious software. Sending malicious software and harassing messages 
were perceived as criminal but participants were unsure about more ambiguous acts 
associated with deceiving or disclosing information to the victim. High Internet self-
efficacious individuals (i.e., those who feel more in control of online interactions) were 
more likely than low Internet self-efficacious individuals to perceive malicious software as 
criminal. Low-agreeable individuals were more likely than high-agreeable individuals to 
perceive harassing messages as criminal. Whilst personality and Internet self-efficacy 
influenced perceived criminality for some cyber-harassing behaviours the findings were 
not consistent. However, females were more likely than males to perceive harassing 
messages and behaviours associated with deception/disclosure as criminal. Males were 
more likely than females to perceive sending malicious software as criminal. 
 
Participants reported experiencing a range of cyber-harassing behaviours and males were 
more likely than females to receive malicious software, be subscribed to unwanted 
services, receive abusive/threatening messages via the Internet, or to report that someone 
sent their friends/family/work colleagues email messages in an attempt to damage their 
reputation. Internet self-efficacious individuals were less likely to receive harassing 
messages via the Internet or be subscribed to unwanted services. Agreeable individuals 
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were less likely to receive harassing messages to their phone, and neurotic individuals were 
unlikely to be subscribed to unwanted services. 
 
Participants‟ ratings of upset following their experience of cyber-harassing behaviours 
were positively associated with the number of behaviours they experienced, and females 
were more upset than males. Personality and Internet self-efficacy were not associated with 
ratings of upset but upset was associated with specific behaviours, indicating that the 
nature of cyber-harassment was problematic for participants. Furthermore, interpretative 
phenomenological analysis of 12 victims‟ experiences revealed the impact of cyber-
harassment resembled PTSD-like symptoms, highlighting the detrimental impact cyber-
harassment can have on victims. 
 
Despite the impact of cyber-harassment reported by victims, the qualitative research 
conducted for this thesis revealed that the virtual nature of their experiences caused 
confusion, as they struggled to understand whether their experiences were real in 
comparison to their offline experiences. The views of 17 non-victims and 8 police officers 
were subjected to thematic analysis which revealed victim-blaming tendencies. Non-
victims were likely to blame the victim for their experiences and would offer support if 
they had adequate knowledge of the victim and evidence of cyber-harassing incidences. 
Police involvement in cyber-harassing cases was dependent on threats being made to the 
victim, and victims were perceived as unhelpful in providing evidence and following their 
advice. Non-victims viewed perpetrators more sympathetically than victims, and there was 
little understanding about the impact that cyber-harassment can have on victims. The 
findings from this research are discussed in terms of psychological theory, and suggest that 
„just world‟ beliefs may play an important role in perceptions of cyber-harassment. A 
caveat is raised that the findings from this research are drawn from small, qualitative 
studies but the research provides some interesting insights to cyber-harassment, and it is 
hoped that the findings will be transferable to future research investigating the 
phenomenon. 
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Chapter 1:  Overview 
 
1.1 Overview of the Thesis 
 
The past three decades have witnessed the explosion and rapid evolution of the Internet. 
Dutton, Helsper and Gerber (2009) reported that 70% of households within England and 
Wales had Internet access within their homes. This figure is rising every year with a rise of 
3% between 2007 and 2009 (Dutton & Helsper, 2007; Dutton et al., 2009, respectively), 
suggesting that Internet access will continue to rise in the future. This illustrates the 
Internet is becoming more affordable and accessible, and has many advantages for users. 
For example, Turkle (1995) proposed the Internet provides individuals with the 
opportunity to play with their identity, and are likely to actualise their „true self‟ during this 
play. Furthermore, Whitty and Carr (2003) proposed the Internet is a „safe place to play at 
love‟ (p. 884). In addition to the Internet providing a safe place for individuals to engage in 
identity play, the Internet provides individuals with greater opportunity to keep in touch 
with friends and relatives (especially those who do not live geographically close), establish 
new relationships, and increase efficiency within the work place. However, there are 
disadvantages to using the Internet, which include the potential to be harassed in 
cyberspace. 
 
Unlike offline harassment, which is recognised as existing prior to the introduction of the 
first piece of anti-harassment legislation in California 1990 (Meloy, 1998; Skoler, 1998), 
the potential to engage in cyber-harassing behaviours has existed (by definition) since the 
evolution of the Internet (Bocij, 2004). As the Internet becomes more accessible, 
perpetrators are provided greater opportunity to locate, and harass their victims. With the 
number of Internet users increasing every year (Dutton & Helsper, 2007), it is likely that 
instances of cyber-harassment will also increase (Cupach & Spitzberg, 2004), with some 
proposing that instances of cyber-harassment will surpass instances of offline harassment 
(e.g., Bocij, 2004; Whitty & Carr, 2006). This indicates that cyber-harassment may 
represent a significant social problem in the future, providing justification for research in 
this area. 
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However, it is concerning that relatively little is known about cyber-harassment in 
comparison to offline harassment. For example, research investigating offline harassment 
has revealed patterns in terms of who perpetrates harassment, who is vulnerable to 
becoming a victim of harassment, the context surrounding instances of harassment, and 
proposals have been made to identify intervention strategies likely to cease certain types of 
perpetrators. In relation to cyber-harassment, little is known about perpetrator and victim 
characteristics, how to prevent victimisation and the impact on victims. Whilst there is a 
paucity of research in this area, the few studies that have been conducted suggest that 
cyber-harassment impacts on victims to the same degree as offline harassment on victims 
(Bocij, 2003; Sheridan & Grant, 2007). Whilst these studies focused on the impact of the 
perpetrators‟ behaviour on victims, it is possible that cyber-harassment will have wider 
implications for victims. For example, victims may fear stigmatisation from their peers, as 
the impact of cyber-harassment may be trivialised because it occurs in a virtual world. It is 
important for psychologists to better understand why, and how, cyber-harassment impacts 
on victims. By gaining a better understanding of these issues, psychologists will be in a 
better position to identify strategies that can be used to prevent individuals from being 
victimised, and to help victims cope with cyber-harassing experiences. 
 
In conjunction with recruiting cyber-harassed victims, researchers need to cast a wider net 
to provide a more complete understanding of the phenomenon. This thesis recruited cyber-
harassed victims, their peers, and police officers because the perceptions of victims‟ peers 
and police officers will contribute to individuals‟ experiences of cyber-harassment. For 
instance, if the impact of cyber-harassment is trivialised, victims may be unlikely to seek 
help to help them cope with their experiences.  
 
Whilst the perceptions of police officers and victims‟ peers will contribute to their cyber-
harassing experience, their perceptions are also important as they contribute to the success 
of the judicial system when prosecuting perpetrators. Victims‟ accounts of cyber-
harassment indicate that police officers do not take their allegations of harassment 
seriously (e.g., Wood & Wood, 2002). However, researchers have not recruited police 
officers to evaluate their perceptions, and such reports are dated in relation to the fast pace 
of the evolution of the Internet. It is important to further understanding of police officers‟ 
perceptions of cyber-harassment. If police officers trivialise cyber-harassment, research 
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can contribute to better training for police officers. However, if police officers do not 
trivialise cyber-harassment, research can contribute to strategies to better educate the 
public about police procedures. Increased awareness of cyber-harassment may contribute 
to greater instances of reporting of instances to the police, which ultimately may contribute 
to reducing the prevalence of cyber-harassment. 
 
Should cases involving cyber-harassment proceed through the judicial system and be 
brought before court, the perceptions of victims‟ peers will be crucial in the prosecution of 
perpetrators. Within the UK, perpetrators are prosecuted using the Protection from 
Harassment Act (1997), which applies the test of reasonableness. This means that the 
perpetrator‟s behaviour will be judged by the reasonable person‟s standard. However, 
current research has failed to illustrate how peoples‟ perceptions of cyber-harassment may 
affect the prosecution of perpetrators. 
 
This thesis contributes to existing research in this field by providing a more complete 
picture of cyber-harassment. Quantitative methods have predominantly been used to 
examine cyber-harassment. However, to provide a more complete understanding of the 
phenomenon, this thesis has incorporated quantitative and qualitative methods. In 
conjunction with quantitative methods, qualitative methods are deemed suitable as cyber-
harassment is a relatively new area, and qualitative research is needed to fully explore the 
phenomenon. Furthermore, the majority of research conducted in this thesis has been 
conducted online. Therefore, the thesis will contribute to understanding about conducting 
qualitative research using Instant Messenger as a research tool. Four studies will be used to 
describe and evaluate the meaning of cyber-harassment to victims, and non-victims‟ 
perceptions of the phenomenon, with particular focus on perceived criminality of cyber-
harassing behaviours.  
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
 
This thesis explores victim and non-victim perceptions of cyber-harassment within the UK. 
The aims of the thesis are: to determine whether people perceive cyber-harassing 
behaviours as illegal; to determine whether Internet self-efficacy and the „Big Five‟ 
personality characteristics predict perceived criminality of cyber-harassment; to further the 
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understanding of the experience of cyber-harassment by exploring victims‟ perceptions of 
cyber-harassment and evaluating the impact of cyber-harassment; and to identify and 
evaluate the support available to cyber-harassed victims by exploring non-victims‟ 
perceptions of the phenomenon.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
The following research questions were examined to fully address the aims and objectives 
of the research: 
 
1. Are cyber-harassing behaviours perceived as criminal? 
2. Does gender, Internet self-efficacy and the „Big Five‟ personality characteristics 
predict individuals‟ judgements about the criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours? 
3. Does gender, Internet self-efficacy, or the „Big Five‟ personality characteristics predict 
the likelihood of experiencing cyber-harassing behaviours? 
4. What gender differences exist in the experience of cyber-harassment? 
5. What are undergraduate students‟ experiences of cyber-harassment, and what meaning 
do they attach to those experiences? 
6. How do undergraduate students cope with cyber-harassment, and how do they evaluate 
help they received in dealing with their experiences? 
7. What are undergraduate students‟ perceptions of cyber-harassment, and in particular, 
cyber-harassed victims? 
8. How do police officers perceive cyber-harassment, and what do they perceive their role 
to be in dealing with cases involving cyber-harassment? 
 
1.4 Outline of Chapters 
 
Chapter 1 provides an overview to the topic investigated in this thesis, and provides a 
rationale for conducting research in this field. The chapter outlines the aims and objectives 
of the research, and presents the research questions used to address the aims and 
objectives. The chapter concludes with an outline of the following chapters in the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 presents a review of existing literature examining online and offline harassment. 
Throughout the chapter, consideration is given to legal and definitional issues, and anti-
harassment legislation is described and evaluated. The chapter presents current 
understanding of the nature and extent of offline and online harassment, and describes 
perpetrator and victim characteristics.  
 
Chapter 3 evaluates the mixed methods approach in psychological research, and considers 
the philosophical issues associated with positivism and interpretivism in conducting 
quantitative and qualitative research. The chapter illustrates considerations of this thesis in 
conducting internet-mediated research, and concludes by outlining ethical considerations. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the first empirical study that utilised quantitative methods to determine 
whether cyber-harassing behaviours were perceived as criminal, whether participants 
experienced any of the behaviours, and who participants imagined they would tell if they 
experienced cyber-harassing behaviours. The study examined the role of Internet self-
efficacy and the „Big Five‟ personality characteristics in predicting judgements of 
criminality and the experience of cyber-harassing behaviours. 
 
Chapter 5 presents a qualitative study conducted with undergraduate students who had 
experienced cyber-harassing behaviours. Using Instant Messenger to conduct in-depth 
interviews, the study explored participants‟ cyber-harassing experiences. The chapter 
provides in-depth accounts of cyber-harassment, and explores the impact of cyber-
harassment on victims. 
 
Chapter 6 presents a qualitative study conducted with undergraduate students who reported 
they had not experienced cyber-harassment. The study explored participants‟ perceptions 
of cyber-harassment, with particular focus on participants‟ perceptions of cyber-harassed 
victims, and their evaluations of the impact of cyber-harassment. 
 
Chapter 7 presents a qualitative study conducted face-to-face with police officers in the 
Nottinghamshire Police Force. The study explored participants‟ perceptions of cyber-
harassment, and explored their role in dealing with cases involving cyber-harassment. 
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Chapter 8 provides a general discussion of the findings from empirical studies in this 
thesis. The main findings are discussed across each of the four studies in relation to the 
aims and objectives of the thesis. The implications of this research are discussed, and 
suggestions are made for future research in the area. 
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Chapter 2: A Psychosocial Overview of Stalking and Cyberstalking 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter has two distinct parts with the first dealing specifically with offline 
harassment and stalking, and the second part focusing on cyber-harassment and 
cyberstalking. The terms „harassment‟ and „stalking‟ are often used interchangeably 
throughout the harassment literature as stalking is a severe form of harassment. 
Furthermore, in the UK, the Protection from Harassment Act (1997) does not mention the 
term „stalking‟. Yet, stalking can be prosecuted using section four of the Act as a more 
serious form of harassment. This thesis has a particular focus on the perceived criminality 
of harassing behaviours within the UK. Therefore, in keeping with previous literature, and 
in the interest of brevity, the terms „stalking‟ and „harassment‟ are used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis. 
 
The first section of this chapter deals exclusively with issues relating to offline harassment. 
The section begins with consideration of academic definitions of harassment, and 
illustrates authors‟ motivations for utilising different definitions of harassment in their 
research. This thesis focuses on anti-harassment legislation within the UK, and in order to 
fully evaluate the UK legislation, the evolution of US-based legislation is described and 
evaluated. This discussion progresses to evaluation of UK-based anti-harassment 
legislation. When evaluating the Protection from Harassment Act (1997), the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Act are discussed. Of specific interest is the test of reasonableness, the 
focus on the impact of the perpetrator‟s behaviour on the victim, and the application of the 
Act within the judicial system. The literature review provides discussion on the nature and 
extent of harassment to illustrate the significance of the problem, and explain what 
harassment is. The section concludes by illustrating victim and perpetrator characteristics. 
 
The second section of this chapter deals exclusively with issues pertaining to cyber-
harassment, and similarities and differences with offline harassment are considered 
throughout the section. The section evaluates the application of the Protection from 
Harassment Act (1997) in combating cyber-harassment and discusses academic definitions 
of the phenomenon. In order to explain what cyber-harassment is, the nature, extent, and 
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victim and perpetrator characteristics are described and evaluated. Anonymity is 
considered as a major difference between offline and online harassment, and theoretical 
explanations are provided to explain why perpetrators may choose to engage in harassing 
behaviours via the Internet. The section concludes by reviewing the literature relating to 
individuals‟ perceptions of cyber-harassment. 
 
2.2 Stalking: Legal and definitional issues 
 
At present, there is no single, universal definition of harassment or stalking. However, 
various definitions have been offered, which differ in emphasis on the threat posed by 
perpetrators, the range of behaviours engaged in by perpetrators, or the impact harassment 
has on victims. Focusing on the threat posed by stalkers, Meloy and Gothard (1995) coined 
the term „obsessional follower‟ to describe individuals who engage in stalking behaviours. 
The term „stalking‟ was specifically avoided, as the authors argued the term has been 
sensationalised in the media, and conjures stereotypical representations of stalking. They 
defined „obsessional follower‟ as „an abnormal or long term pattern of threat or harassment 
directed toward a specific individual‟ (p. 259). Similarly, Kienlen (1998) defined stalking 
as „an individual‟s persistent and unwanted pursuit or obsessional harassment of another 
person causing him/her fear of bodily injury‟ (p. 51). Whereas, Mullen, Pathé, Purcell and 
Stuart (1999) emphasised the range of behaviours used by stalkers and defined stalking as 
„a constellation of behaviours involving repeated and persistent attempts to impose on 
another person unwanted communication and/or contact‟ (p. 1244). Focusing on the impact 
harassment has on victims, McGrath and Casey (2002) defined stalking as „the repeated 
uninvited monitoring and/or intrusion into the life and activities of a victim that is usually 
but not always, undertaken for the purpose of frightening or intimidating the victim or 
those around the victim‟ (p. 88). 
 
Definitions of stalking that have been proposed have been criticised for not fully 
encapsulating the notion of stalking. Definitions focusing on threats to the victim (e.g., 
Meloy & Gothard, 1995; Kienlen, 1998) have been criticised because they exclude threats 
made towards the victim‟s friends and/or family, and damage to the victim‟s property 
(Spitzberg & Hoobler, 2002). Furthermore, Pathé and Mullen (1997) reported that 42% of 
stalked victims were not overtly threatened by their harassers, indicating that almost half of 
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victims are not threatened and may be more ambiguous. Thus, definitions which focus on 
threats made to the victim exclude many victims of stalking. Definitions that focus on the 
harasser‟s behaviour (e.g., Mullen et al., 1999) fail to incorporate the impact of harassment 
on the victim. Arguably, this is one of the most crucial determinants of harassment and 
failure to include this variable in definitions excludes a fundamental element of 
harassment. Arguably, the definition offered by McGrath and Casey is one of the most 
inclusive definitions. The definition includes the possibility of third party harassment of 
the victim‟s friends and/or family. Whilst other definitions stipulate the perpetrator must 
contact or intrude on the victim‟s life, McGrath and Casey‟s definition allows for the 
perpetrator to monitor the victim from a distance. Finally, their definition emphasises the 
importance of the impact of harassment on the victim.  
 
2.2.1 The Evolution of Anti-Harassment Legislation 
 
Media interest in what it called „stalking‟ was increased following the stalking of 
celebrities (Perez, 1993). In the USA, actress Teresa Saldana was stalked by obsessive fan, 
Arthur Jackson, who travelled from Arizona to California to stab her (Saunders, 1998). 
Saldana was rushed to hospital and required twenty-six pints of blood but survived the 
attack. Jackson was arrested in 1982 and found guilty of attempted murder. Similarly, 
American actress, Rebecca Schaeffer, was stalked by Robert Bardo for two years before 
travelling from Scotland to America to murder her (Perez, 1993). Actress Jodie Foster was 
also stalked by John Hinckley Jnr., who shot US President Ronald Reagan in 1981 to gain 
her attention. Hinkley was arrested but found not guilty for the murder by reason of 
insanity. The media‟s portrayal of these cases of celebrity stalking sparked public concern 
about stalking, and legislation offering protection to potential victims was called for. 
 
Amidst growing public concern and media interest, California enacted the first piece of 
anti-harassment legislation in 1990 (Saunders, 1998; Sheridan & Davies, 2001b). Whilst 
US anti-stalking legislation varies from state to state in terms of what constitutes stalking, 
the majority include credible threat, intent, and fear requirements (Saunders, 1998). The 
inclusion of these requirements has resulted in criticism, based on the use of narrowly 
defining terms. For example, Sheridan and Davies (2001b) note that stalkers often engage 
in behaviours that are innocuous, and Saunders (1998) described the case of „Jane‟, whose 
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stalker deliberately engaged in behaviours that were within the law. Furthermore, 
Dennison and Thomson (2002) defined actus rea (i.e., intent) as the „accused intended to 
bring about a particular outcome by engaging in those acts‟ (p. 544). However, intent can 
be difficult to prove, particularly in cases involving harassment or stalking. For example, a 
stalker may pursue a relationship with the victim, and in doing so may send the victim 
letters, and follow the victim. Whilst the victim may be frightened by someone following 
them, it would be difficult to prove the stalker intended to cause the victim harm during 
their pursuit. Furthermore, individual differences exist in the experience of fear. As part of 
the National Violence Against Women survey conducted between 1995 and 1996 in 
America, Tjaden, Thoennes and Allison (2000) interviewed 8,000 men and 8,000 women 
about their experiences of stalking. They developed four categories of respondents: 1) non-
victims; 2) self and legally defined victims; 3) self but not legally defined victims; and 4) 
legally but not self defined victims. They reported 61% of individuals who considered 
themselves victims of stalking did not meet the fear requirements of legislation. By 
narrowly defining credible threat, intent and fear requirements, US legislation has been 
criticised as perpetrators may evade prosecution (Petch, 2002). 
 
Within the UK, anti-harassment legislation was not introduced until 1997, and benefitted 
from the criticisms made against US legislation (Petch, 2002). The Protection from 
Harassment Act (PfHA) 1997 was introduced in the UK to combat harassment and 
stalking. When discussing the introduction of the PfHA, it was noted in Parliament that 
perpetrators of harassment and stalking engage in varied and continuously evolving 
behaviours (Salter & Bryden, 2009). Thus, to evade the problems of perpetrators evolving 
their behaviour beyond the scope of legislation, the PfHA did not define harassment or 
stalking. The Act stipulates that „a person must not pursue a course of conduct a) which 
amounts to harassment of another, and b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to 
harassment of the other‟ (s. 1). The Act requires a „course of conduct‟ which is defined as 
behaviours that occur on one or more occasions (Salter & Bryden, 2009). Section 4 of the 
Act holds a provision for the prosecution of more serious forms of harassment, whereby 
the victim has been put in fear of violence.  As the Act does not define harassment or 
stalking, it has a variety of uses, and has been used in cases involving harassment, nuisance 
neighbours and racially motivated crimes (Petch, 2002). 
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However, the PfHA has been criticised on the basis that failing to define harassment results 
in ambiguity, as measures of harassment are unclear (Dennison & Thomson, 2002; Petch, 
2002). In a review of 12 studies, Sheridan and Davies (2001b) found that behaviours were 
common to all stalkers, including repeated communications, intrusions, property damage, 
threats to the person and actual assaults. These findings contradicted the Parliamentarian 
view that perpetrators do not adhere to a list of behaviours (Salter & Bryden, 2009). 
However, the studies reviewed by Sheridan and Davies focused on erotomanic 
participants, and the list of behaviours may be only applicable to this sub-group of stalkers. 
Furthermore, Tjaden, Thoennes and Allison (2000), found convergence between the public 
perception and legal definitions of stalking among 16,000 American participants. 
Therefore, whilst the PfHA has been criticised for being ambiguous, the convergence of 
public opinion with legal definitions of stalking suggests that harassment does not need to 
be rigidly defined. Thus, by not defining harassment, the PfHA avoids the problem 
whereby perpetrators amend their behaviours to remain within the confines of the law. 
 
2.2.2.1 The Test of Reasonableness 
 
In an attempt to avoid the problems associated with US legislation, the PfHA does not 
require intent to be proved. Rather, the reasonable person‟s standard (i.e., the test of 
reasonableness) is applied to the perpetrator‟s behaviour. This is evident as the Act 
stipulates „the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts 
to harassment if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the 
course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other‟ (s.1). However, the test of 
reasonableness has been criticised (Smartt, 2001) on the basis that individuals differ in 
their perceptions of stalking (Cupach & Spitzberg, 2004). For example, Hills and Taplin 
(1998) presented 172 participants with a vignette survey designed to measure their 
attitudes towards stalking. They reported gender differences in perceptions of stalking. For 
example, females were likely to report that if they were the victim depicted in the scenario, 
they would be worried, annoyed, concerned, and angry, whereas males reported they 
would be flattered by the perpetrator‟s behaviour. Females, compared to males, were more 
likely to perceive the perpetrator‟s behaviour as frightening, and report they would call the 
police regardless of the perpetrator making direct threats. Furthermore, all participants 
were more likely to contact the police if the perpetrator was a stranger compared to a prior 
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intimate. However, Hills and Taplin‟s study was criticised as male participants were asked 
to imagine being stalked by a female perpetrator, which contradicts research illustrating 
that male victims are more likely to be targeted by male perpetrators (e.g., Tjaden & 
Thoennes, 1998).  
 
In another study, Phillips, Quirk, Rosenfield and O‟Connor (2004) reported gender 
differences in a series of vignette studies with a total of 496 undergraduate students. The 
second study was similar to the first study but the vignettes were redesigned to reflect the 
New York state anti-harassment legislation. Both studies indicated gender differences in 
perceptions of stalking similar to the findings of Hills and Taplin. Females were more 
likely than males to perceive the vignettes as examples of stalking. Furthermore, all 
participants were more likely to perceive the perpetrator‟s behaviour as stalking if the 
perpetrator and victim were strangers prior to the onset of stalking.  
 
The existence of gender differences in perceptions of stalking indicate that individuals hold 
stereotypical views of stalking, which may be informed by media portrayals of the 
phenomenon (Spitzberg & Cadaz, 2002). As illustrated at the beginning of this chapter, the 
media played an important role in labelling „stalking‟, reporting high-profile cases, and 
raising public awareness and concern about the phenomenon. According to Spitzberg and 
Cadaz (2002), media reports have contributed to a stalking myth: stalking affects women, 
and usually involves a man who suffers from mental illness, is a stranger to the victim, and 
is unrelated to courtship behaviours. However, media reports focus on atypical, news-
worthy, sellable topics, which are reported in a typical manner. Furthermore, gender 
stereotyping may contribute to the perceived greater risk from males towards females than 
from females towards males. Media reports on stalking result in the creation and 
reinforcement of stalking stereotypes.  
 
The just world hypothesis may also explain why a case is more likely to be labelled as 
stalking if the perpetrator and victim were strangers prior to the onset of stalking 
behaviours. Lerner and Miller‟s (1978) „just world‟ hypothesis stipulates that people have 
a need to believe in a world that is just, and people get what they deserve. Belief in a just 
world is adaptive because it allows individuals to perceive their environment as safe and 
controllable. If individuals are faced with injustice, cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) 
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motivates them to address the imbalance between their belief in a just world and the 
injustice. This is achieved by either compensating the victim, or convincing themselves 
that the victim is responsible for their own fate. Sheridan, Gillett, Davies, Blaauw and Patel 
(2003) tested the just world hypothesis in relation to perceptions of stalking. They recruited 
168 undergraduate students to participate in a vignette survey, with the vignettes varying in 
terms of the victim‟s gender, and the prior victim-perpetrator relationship (i.e., ex-intimate, 
acquaintance, or stranger). In line with previous research, vignettes were more likely to be 
labelled as stalking when the perpetrator was a stranger or acquaintance, rather than when 
the perpetrator was an ex-intimate. The authors concluded victims were perceived as more 
to blame if they had a previous relationship with the perpetrator as they had the 
opportunity to give the perpetrator some cause for instigating stalking. More recently, 
Scott, Lloyd and Gavin (2010) presented vignettes to 315 undergraduate students in the 
UK and Australia. The prior relationship between the perpetrator and victim was 
manipulated to depict stalking by an ex-partner, acquaintance or stranger. They reported 
similar findings to Sheridan et al. as participants were more likely to perceive the vignette 
as stalking when the perpetrator was a stranger or acquaintance of the victim than if an ex-
partner.  By perceiving stalking to occur between strangers, individuals can protect 
themselves from the possibility of stalking occurring to them. Individuals can justify that 
stalking will not occur if they do not engage with strangers, or by adjusting their behaviour 
in ways they believe will diminish the chances of being stalked. 
 
In relation to the test of reasonableness, the research described suggests females are more 
sensitive to harassment than males. Furthermore, individuals have prototypical ideas that 
stalking victims are female, with a male perpetrator, who is a stranger to the victim. This 
has serious implications for jury members who judge whether a perpetrator is guilty of 
harassment (Dennison & Thomson, 2002). If the case presented to jury members does not 
fall in line with the stereotypical view of stalking, jury members may not perceive the case 
as stalking. For example, cases involving a male ex-intimate of a female victim may not be 
perceived as stalking. This evidence has resulted in a principal criticism of the PfHA. 
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2.2.2.2 The Victim-Defined Crime 
 
Whilst harassment is not defined within the PfHA, the impact of the perpetrator‟s 
behaviour on the victim is a crucial determinant of whether a crime has taken place (Petch, 
2002). This is evident as the Act stipulates any behaviour that causes the victim alarm or 
distress, or fear of violence (PfHA, 1997). Petch (2002) notes the emphasis on the victim‟s 
response to harassment is a unique feature within UK criminal law, and deviates from US-
based legislation that relies on the perpetrator‟s behaviour and intent to harass the victim. 
Arguably, the emphasis on the victim‟s response is a major strength of the Act. 
 
Indeed, there is consensus that stalking has a detrimental impact on victims, and the impact 
of stalking has been referred to as „emotional rape‟ and „psychological terrorism‟ (Pathé & 
Mullen, 1997; Cupach & Spitzberg, 2004). Table 1 provides a summary of evidence of the 
impact of harassment on victims. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Research evaluating the Impact of Stalking on Victims 
Authors Sample Symptoms Reported by Stalking Victims 
Ashmore, Jones, Jackson & 
Smoyak (2006) 
Mental Health Nurses 
(n = 112, of which 50% 
self-defined victims of 
stalking) 
22 – 60 years 
54% Felt afraid 
46% Increased anxiety 
43% Felt less relaxed 
34% Decrease in happiness 
30% Felt less healthy 
30% Increased stress 
29% Felt less outgoing 
25% Felt less confident 
25% Sleeplessness 
21% Felt helpless 
18% Felt irritable 
16% Depression 
13% Nightmares 
13% Felt less competent 
13% Emotional numbness 
11% Lost friendships 
Blaauw, Winkel, Arensman, 
Sheridan & Freeve (2002) 
Self-defined victims 
(n = 241) 
19 – 82 years 
13% Anxiety & Insomnia 
12% Somatic symptoms 
11% Social dysfunction 
7% Severe depression 
Budd & Mattinson (2000) General Population 
(n = 9,988, of which 
12% were victims of 
stalking) 
16 – 59 years 
92% Felt annoyed/irritated 
75% Fairly distressed 
59% Avoided places/people 
42% Increased personal security 
35% Socialised less 
31% Fear of violence against them 
27% Fear of violence against friend/relative 
17% Fear of sexual offence against them 
Nicastro, Cousins & Victims of Stalking & 80% Fearful 
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Spitzberg (2000) Domestic Violence 
(n = 55)  
Age unavailable 
43% Felt threatened 
38% Feared minor physical harm 
33% Increased nervousness 
29% Felt anger 
20% Felt annoyed 
11% General stress 
11% Physical illness 
9% Depression 
5% Sleeplessness 
5% Feared major physical harm 
4% Nightmares 
4% Loss of appetite 
4% Headaches 
2% Anxiety attacks 
Pathé & Mullen (1997) Stalked Victims 
(n = 100) 
83% Heightened anxiety 
82% Changed their usual activities 
75% Feelings of powerlessness 
74% Chronic sleep disturbance 
73% Increased personal security 
70% Decreased social outings 
65% Aggressive thoughts towards the perpetrator 
53% Decrease/cessation in work/school 
attendance 
55% Excessive tiredness/weakness 
55% Intrusive recollections and vivid flashbacks 
47% Increased severity and frequency of 
headaches 
45% Appetite disturbances 
39% Moved home 
37% Post-traumatic stress disorder 
37% Changed work/school/career 
30% Persistent nausea 
27% Problems with indigestion 
24% Seriously considered/attempted suicide 
23% Increased alcohol/cigarette consumption 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, victims of harassment report a variety of social and 
psychological symptoms. Pathé and Mullen (1997) propose that changing lifestyle habits is 
a universal response to being stalked, and is indicative of the impact of stalking. Stalked 
victims tend to increase their personal security, reduce social outings, lose days at work, 
stop going to or change their place of work, relocate home, avoid places and/or people, 
attend self-defence courses, have access to weapons, and increase their alcohol and/or 
tobacco consumption (Budd & Mattinson, 2000; Pathé & Mullen, 1997; Tjaden & 
Thoennes, 1998). Some changes to one‟s lifestyle are more severe than others (e.g., 
relocating home in comparison to avoiding places the perpetrator may be). These findings 
may suggest a positive correlation between stalking severity and the lifestyle changes made 
by victims. 
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Many of the symptoms listed in research investigating the impact of harassment on victims 
are listed in the DSM-IV criteria of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (APA, 2000). 
According to the DSM-IV, there are two criteria for PTSD, and both of the criteria must be 
met in order for a diagnosis of PTSD. The first criterion involves exposure to a traumatic 
event that involves a serious injury or threat to one‟s physical integrity. The second 
criterion is that it caused the victim intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Symptoms of 
PTSD include re-experiencing the event, avoidance and emotional numbing, mistrust, 
reduced self-esteem, and fear of violence. 
 
Pathé and Mullen (1997) reported that 37% of stalked victims met the DSM-IV criteria of 
PTSD; they noted a further 18% of victims reported PTSD symptoms but did not meet the 
DSM-IV criteria. Whilst participants in the studies summarised in Table 1 may not have 
had PTSD, the symptoms reported by participants fall along the PTSD spectrum. For 
example, Ashmore et al. (2006) and Nicastro et al. (2000) reported victims experienced 
nightmares (13% and 4%, respectively) following their experiences of stalking. 
Furthermore, Pathé and Mullen (1997) reported 55% of victims experienced intrusive 
recollections and vivid flashbacks of stalking events. These symptoms are indicative of re-
experiencing the event described in the DSM-IV as a symptom of PTSD. Avoidance and 
emotional numbing is evident in participants suffering from depression, and avoiding 
places and/or people (Ashmore et al., 2006; Blaauw et al., 2002; Budd & Mattinson, 2000; 
Niccastro et al., 2000). Ashmore et al. reported participants felt less outgoing, less 
confident, and less competent, which is indicative of reduced self-esteem, and fear was 
reported by participants in all studies depicted in Table 1. Reductions in self-esteem have 
also been found among victims of domestic violence (Douglas & Dutton, 2001; Zosky, 
1999), and rape (Kahn, Jackson, Kully, Badger & Halvorsen, 2003), indicating that 
reduced self-esteem is a common reaction to crime victimisation. However, it is difficult to 
make comparisons between studies as the target populations varied from the general 
population to victims identified in forensic case files of stalking, and some studies included 
self-defined victims. Furthermore, Tjaden, Thoennes and Allison (2000) noted as part of 
the National Violence against Women survey, that when participants were allowed to self-
define as victims, prevalence rates tripled for men and doubled for females. Consequently, 
victims may have differed across studies in terms of the severity of stalking they 
experienced. 
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Despite problems in making comparisons across studies, it is clear that harassment causes 
victims stress. Stress is defined as „a particular relationship between the person and the 
environment that is appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources‟ 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 19). According to their stress model, Lazarus and Folkman 
(1984) theorise that individuals engage in a dynamic interplay of primary and secondary 
appraisal processes when evaluating the cost and benefits of all environmental encounters. 
Primary appraisals can be irrelevant, benign or stressful, with stressful appraisals 
consisting of harm/loss, threat and challenge appraisals. When encounters are appraised as 
stressful, individuals evaluate how, and whether, they can cope with the situation. These 
coping evaluations are part of the secondary appraisal processes. 
 
Pathé and Mullen (1997) suggested that lifestyle changes stalked victims make are 
universal, regardless of the severity of harassment, and are indicative of coping strategies 
victims use to cope with harassment. Drawing from Lazarus‟ work on coping strategies, 
Spitzberg and Cupach (2003) identified five coping strategies used by stalked victims. 
Pathé and Mullen (1997) found that 23% of victims increased their alcohol and/or tobacco 
consumption, which reflects Spitzberg and Cupach‟s first coping strategy of „moving 
inward‟ (i.e., focusing on oneself). „Moving outward‟ involves victims seeking help or 
assistance from third parties. However, gender differences exist as research suggests 
females are more likely to seek help than males (e.g., Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). „Moving 
with or toward‟ involves victims trying to negotiate his/her relationship with the 
perpetrator. „Moving away‟ occurs when the victim engages in avoidance strategies to 
ignore the perpetrator. Pathé and Mullen noted that 82% of victims changed their activities 
to avoid the perpetrator, indicating „moving away‟ is a common strategy among victims. 
Finally, „moving against‟ involves victims trying to hurt or intimidate the perpetrator. 
Arguably, victims who enrol in self-defence courses or carry make-shift weapons would 
fall into this category. 
 
Whilst the studies described illustrate that harassed victims are negatively impacted by 
their experiences, measures of harassment include those individuals who have been 
harassed for a minimum of four weeks (e.g., Budd & Mattinson, 2000; Pathé & Mullen, 
1997). However, this four week requirement may be restrictive as it may neglect victims 
who have been harassed for a shorter period of time. For example, Budd and Mattinson 
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(2000) noted, as part of the British Crime Survey (1995/1996), that one third of self-
defined stalking victims were stalked for less than four weeks. This is a sizeable quantity 
of potential victims and failure to include this group of individuals may result in sampling 
bias.  
 
In an attempt to identify the period at which the perpetrator‟s behaviour moves from being 
intrusive to harassing, Purcell, Pathé and Mullen (2004) recruited 2,257 participants to 
complete a survey measuring their experiences of harassment, and Goldberg and Hillier‟s 
(1979) General Health Questionnaire. The sample was representative of the Australian 
population, with the exception that individuals over 56 years were over-represented. 
Twenty-three percent of participants had been stalked and met the legal definitions of 
stalking in Australia. The researchers found that two weeks was a critical period, with 45% 
of victims being stalked for less than two weeks. After the crucial two week period, 
victims were subjected to more severe behaviours (including receiving unsolicited 
telephone calls, letters, faxes and emails, being followed or kept under surveillance), and 
were more likely to receive overt threats, have their property damaged, experience third 
party stalking, and be physically assaulted. Furthermore, victims targeted for more than 
two weeks reported a greater range of social and psychological symptoms compared to 
those targeted for less than two weeks. Purcell et al. concluded that two weeks is a critical 
period, after which the behaviours used by the perpetrator increased in range and severity, 
and the experience was more likely to negatively impact on victims. This study raises the 
question as to why the majority of studies use a lengthier cut-off point in determining 
whether individuals have been harassed. Consequently, studies that use the four-week cut-
off point may result in sampling bias. 
 
Despite this, the evidence described demonstrates that harassment has a wide range of 
socially and psychologically negative effects on victims. Arguably, the symptoms reported 
by victims in research illustrate they meet the requirements of the PfHA that harassment 
must cause the victim alarm or distress. However, gender differences have been found in 
relation to the self-reported impact of harassment. Budd and Mattinson (2000) found that 
females were more likely than males to report being distressed or upset by their harassing 
experiences. Furthermore, Tjaden and Thoennes (1998) found females were more likely 
than males to seek counselling, and Bjerregaard (2000) found females were more likely to 
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call the police than males. Males may perceive seeking help, or stating that they are 
distressed by a harassing experience as a sign of weakness or may experience different 
forms of harassment compared to females. For example, Bjerregaard noted that male 
victims were less likely to be threatened or physically harmed during a campaign of 
harassment. 
 
Gender differences have also been reported in the experience of fear, which is applicable to 
section 4 of the PfHA, as the Act stipulates the victim must be put in fear that violence will 
be used against them. Bjerregaard (2000) noted that among a student population, females 
were twice more likely to report feelings of fear than males. Furthermore, fear is not 
experienced by all victims of harassment. For instance, Budd and Mattinson (2000) 
reported that 31% of harassed victims reported they feared violence would be used against 
them, 27% reported fear of violence against a friend or relative, and 17% reported fear that 
a sexual offence would be committed against them. Furthermore, the Act does not stipulate 
the severity of violence the victim may fear, and this may be problematic when prosecuting 
perpetrators. For example, Nicastro et al. (2000) reported that 80% of victims recruited 
from a forensic sample stated they experienced fear after they had being stalked. However, 
only 38% reported fearing minor physical harm, and 5% reported fearing major physical 
harm. Whilst the differences between minor and major physical harm are unclear, the 
evidence suggests the degree to which victims are placed in fear is variable, and this may 
impact on the effectiveness of the Act in protecting victims from harassment. 
 
2.2.2.3 The Application of the Protection from Harassment Act 
 
Since the introduction of the PfHA, the Act has been used extensively, and resulting 
prosecutions indicate the effectiveness of the Act. When victims report harassment to the 
police, the case is presented to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) who ultimately 
decides whether a case should proceed to court. Petch (2002) warned that most cases do 
not result in prosecution, and Harris (2000) warned the Act was rarely being used to 
prosecute stalking. However, Smartt (2001) noted that during the first nine months 
following the introduction of the Act, 4,989 cases were presented to the CPS, and within 
the first year 2,148 cases had resulted in prosecution. Furthermore, Salter and Bryden 
(2009) noted that in 2006, the PfHA had been used to prosecute 5,446 perpetrators of 
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harassment. The discrepancy between the number of cases presented to the CPS and the 
resulting prosecutions confirms Petch‟s warning that not all cases result in prosecution. 
Research conducted with the CPS would be beneficial to determine the criteria used to 
determine whether a case should proceed to court. However, likely reasons may include 
failure to provide evidence. Notably, the number of cases presented to the CPS has risen 
between 1999 and 2006. This may reflect growing public awareness of the Act, and that 
harassment is a crime, rather than indications of increasing prevalence. 
 
Sheridan and Davies (2001b) criticised the Act because normal behaviours that cause 
annoyance are not distinguished from more serious harassing behaviours, and this may 
potentially lead to high numbers of cases presented to the CPS. However, Salter and 
Bryden (2009) note that within court, the usefulness of the Act is being „reined in‟ to cover 
serious cases only. Furthermore, precedents have been set in court which defines the 
seriousness of cases. They describe Mr Conn‟s case, who accused his line manager of 
harassment after his manager shouted at him in front of other members of staff, threatened 
to smash a window, and threatened to assault Mr Conn. However, the manager‟s behaviour 
was not classed as harassment. Whilst this example contradicts the concerns of Sheridan 
and Davies, it serves to illustrate the ambiguous nature of the measurements of harassment, 
including severity, and fear. This has important implications for victims of harassment, and 
there is a need for legislators and the CPS to clarify what constitutes harassment when a 
case is presented to the CPS and the courts. 
 
In conjunction with the problems in pursuing a harassment case within the judicial system, 
evidence suggests that some victims do not report their experiences to the police. In a 
sample representative of the UK general population, Budd and Mattinson (2000) reported, 
as part of the British Crime Survey 1995/1996, that 33% of victims reported their 
experiences to the police. Within the US, slightly higher rates were reported by Tjaden and 
Thoennes (1998) as 55% of females and 48% of males reported harassment to the police. 
Sheridan, Davies and Boon (2001a) reported that 92% of harassed victims reported their 
experience to the police. However, the sample from the latter study was drawn from 
individuals who contacted the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, a charity set up to help stalked 
victims. As participants in the study sought help from the charity, they may represent 
severe cases of stalking. Thus, the rates of reporting to the police are likely to be highly 
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inflated. With the exception of Sheridan et al.‟s study, research indicates many victims do 
not report harassment to the police. Therefore, the cases presented to the CPS do not 
represent all victims of harassment. 
 
Whilst it is concerning that some victims of harassment do not report their experiences to 
the police, few studies have addressed why victims choose not to do so. Tjaden and 
Thoennes (1998) reported that victims who did not report their experiences to the police 
choose not to because they believed the police would be unable to prevent the harassment. 
The discrepancy between the number of cases presented to the CPS and the number of 
prosecutions under the PfHA suggest there may be some degree of truth in victims‟ 
concerns. Furthermore, when victims report their experiences to the police, they tend to be 
dissatisfied with how their case is dealt with (Pathé & Mullen, 1997; Sheridan, Davies & 
Boon, 2001a). Reasons for dissatisfaction include refusal to help on the basis that the case 
is a „domestic issue‟, disbelief or powerlessness of police officers in preventing the 
harassment from progressing, and ineffectiveness of warnings, arrests, and restraining 
orders (Blaauw, Winkel, Arensman, Sheridan & Freeve, 2002; Draucker, 1999; Morris, 
Anderson & Murray, 2002; Roberts & Dziegielewski, 1996; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998).  
Victims may anticipate these problems and decide not to report their experiences to the 
police. 
 
In conjunction with believing the police cannot prevent harassment, victims may fear 
judgement from their peers and this may contribute to the under-reporting of the crime. 
Kenney (2002) note that „secondary victimisation‟ occurs when victims are treated 
differently, often negatively, by members of their community, friends, and family. People 
may judge the victim‟s lifestyle, behaviour, and personality, and blame the victim for the 
crime occurring. „Secondary victimisation‟ may be explained by the just world hypothesis, 
where people believe that individuals get what they deserve (Lerner & Miller, 1978). 
Consequently, victims may fear stigmatisation, and this fear may explain why victims are 
reluctant to report their experiences to the police. 
 
Victims may also engage in self-blaming strategies which may negatively correlate with 
reporting harassment to the police. Victims of crime (such as domestic violence, stalking 
and rape) are often left with a feeling of powerlessness (Douglas & Dutton, 2001; Kahn, 
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Jackson, Kully, Badger & Halvorsen, 2003; Pathé & Mullen, 1997), which indicates 
feelings of reduced control. According to Thompson (1981), people are driven by a need to 
understand why stressful events occur to them. By understanding why stressful events 
occur, people can feel more in control of their situation. According to Folkman, Lazarus, 
Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis and Gruen (1986), self-blame involves accepting responsibility 
for causing a stressful event, and is indicative of a coping style. Furthermore, Janoff-
Bulman (1979) suggests that self-blame is an adaptive coping strategy. By blaming oneself 
for past negative events, one can control the occurrence of future negative events. In 
relation to harassment, some victims may blame some aspect of their own behaviour or 
character for causing or allowing themselves to be harassed.  If victims engage in self-
blaming strategies, they would be unlikely to report their experiences to the police. Whilst 
it is beyond the remit of this thesis, harassment research would benefit by determining 
whether self-blame predicts the likelihood to report harassment to the police. 
 
2.2.3 The Nature and Extent of Stalking 
 
In an attempt to evolve the understanding of stalking, research has sought to provide 
prevalence rates and descriptions of the behaviours that perpetrators engage in. 
Establishing the percentage of victims of stalking, within a given population, provides an 
indication of the extent of the problem, and identifies particular groups who may be 
vulnerable to stalking. Table 2 shows the prevalence of stalking found among different 
studies. 
 
Table 2: The Prevalence of Stalking 
Author Sample Population Prevalence Rates  
(in lifetime) 
Ashmore, Jones, Jackson & 
Smoyak (2006) 
Mental Health Nurses 
(n = 199) 
50% of sample 
Finney (2006) General Population 
16 – 59 year olds 
(n = 24,498) 
23% females 
15% males 
Budd & Mattinson (2000) General Population  
16 – 59 year olds 
(n = 9,988) 
16.1% females  
6.8% males 
Tjaden & Thoennes (1998) General Population  
18 – 80 year olds 
(n = 16,000) 
8% women 
2% men  
Fremouw, Westrup & 
Pennypacker (1997) 
Undergraduate Students  
18-29 year olds 
(Study 1 – n = 294) 
Study 1: 
26.6% females 
14.7% males 
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 (Study 2 – n = 299) Study 2: 
53.2% females 
18.4% males 
 
The prevalence rates for stalking victimisation range from 8% for women and 2% for 
males (Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998) to 53% for females and 18% for males (Fremouw, 
Westrup & Pennypacker, 1997). The sampling strategy of studies may account for the 
difference in prevalence of stalking victimisation. Budd and Mattinson (2000) and Tjaden 
and Thoennes (1998) derived their sample from the general population in the UK and USA 
(respectively). Although the prevalence rates found in the UK were slightly elevated 
compared to the US, the rates are similar. Sheridan, Blaauw and Davies (2003) argue the 
prevalence rates of the studies by Tjaden and Thoennes, and Budd and Mattinson, are 
reliable and stable. Whilst the prevalence rates found in the studies highlight the pervasive 
nature of stalking, it is argued here that the findings are not reliable or stable. For instance, 
in a later version of the British Crime Survey (04/05), Finney (2006) reported that 23% of 
female and 15% of male participants had been stalked. These rates are higher than the 
earlier version of the British Crime Survey reported by Budd and Mattinson. Finney argues 
the rates from the 2004/2005 survey cannot be compared to earlier version because the 
design was different, and survey items were ordered differently. Another explanation may 
be that as awareness of stalking grows, victims are more able to label their experiences.  
 
Whilst stalking appears to be relatively common among the general population, students 
appear to be especially vulnerable to stalking victimisation. Fremouw, Westrup and 
Pennypacker (1997) conducted two studies aimed to investigate the prevalence of stalking 
among students. In their first study, 299 participants completed a questionnaire reporting 
on their experiences of stalking either as a victim or a perpetrator. Few people (only 2% of 
males and no females) admitted to engaging in stalking behaviours suggesting the study 
was influenced by socially desirable responding. However, 27% of females and 15% of 
males reported being stalked. A second study was conducted using a revised version of the 
survey used in the first study and focused on the reporting of stalking victimisation. 
Results showed that 35% of females and 18% of males reported having been stalked. In 
both of these studies, the prevalence for stalking victimisation was slightly higher than 
found in studies targeting the general population and highlights the vulnerability of 
students to stalking victimisation. It is also possible that younger participants may differ 
from older participants in their perceptions of stalking and may regard certain behaviours 
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as stalking whereas older participants would not. Morewitz (2002) suggests that students 
represent a unique group because they are at an age where they are experimenting with 
romantic relationships, and potentially have more free time to engage in stalking than those 
employed in full-time jobs. 
 
Notably, the largest prevalence rate reported here was a study conducted with mental 
health nurses. Ashmore, Jones, Jackson and Smoyak (2006) reported that 50% of mental 
health nurses had at least one experience of stalking. Of those who were stalked, 71% had 
been stalked within the year previous to the study. The researchers concluded that mental 
health nurses are placed at greater risk to stalking incidents because their profession 
exposes them to mentally ill people who may be more likely to engage in stalking 
behaviours. The finding that 50% of mental health nurses were stalked in this sample 
contrasts the rate of 12% found by Budd and Mattinson (2000). This serves to highlight 
that prevalence rates should be treated with caution, as methodological considerations have 
important outcomes on the research findings. 
 
Providing estimates of the prevalence of stalking has been further complicated by instances 
of reports of false victimisation (Pathé, Mullen & Purcell, 1999; Sheridan, Blaauw & 
Davies, 2003). Pathé, Mullen and Purcell (1999) reported instances of people (n = 12) 
judged by the researchers to have falsely claimed stalking victimisation, and were referred 
by the courts, medical practitioners, and by themselves. The authors suggest that false 
claimants typically report a shorter duration of stalking, are more likely to seek help and 
less frequently report receiving letters or third party assaults by the perpetrator. False 
reports were judged to be provided by stalkers pre-empting victims‟ complaints, those with 
severe mental disorders, those who were previously stalked who were hypersensitive, 
factitious victims and malingerers. Factitious victims were those individuals who were 
seeking attention by adopting the victim status. Malingerers were individuals who were 
trying to manipulate their own court cases, where they were being deemed as engaging in 
criminal behaviour. By reviewing case files, the identification of false reports of stalking is 
a highly subjective process. Whilst the study is small, it does suggest that people may 
falsely report being victims of stalking. The majority of research on stalking in the general 
population relies on self-report and quantitative methodologies. In such studies, it would be 
virtually impossible to determine whether the study is affected by false reporting, and this 
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may lead to greater prevalence rates. However, it is argued here, that whilst false reporting 
occurs, it occurs to a very small degree and would not affect prevalence rates to any great 
extent. 
 
The prevalence of stalking is unclear, with rates differing, to a large extent, depending on 
the sampling strategy employed by researchers. However, if we take the smallest rate 
provided by Tjaden and Thoennes (1998) to be a cautious estimate, it indicates that 
stalking is not an uncommon phenomenon. The rates discussed illustrate that education 
about stalking should be targeted to certain groups (such as students, or those in some 
professions who may be exposed to stalkers) who are vulnerable to experiencing stalking. 
Whilst it is beyond the remit of this thesis, qualitative research may be necessary to 
determine why some victims of stalking experience fear whilst others do not, as fear is a 
legal requisite differentiating stalking and harassment. 
 
Although the prevalence of stalking is indicative of the extent of stalking, descriptors of 
the types of behaviours engaged in by perpetrators have been necessary to explain the 
nature of stalking. Quantitative studies have typically provided participants with checklists 
of possible stalking behaviours, and have asked participants to indicate which behaviours 
they had experienced. Table 3 details the stalking behaviours reported in various studies 
aimed at describing the nature of stalking. 
 
There is no uniform way of investigating the behaviours engaged in by stalkers, making it 
difficult to make comparisons across studies. For instance, Budd and Mattinson (2000) 
report the widest range of behaviours reported by victims of stalking. On one hand, 
researchers have reported the types of unwanted phone calls (such as silent and obscene, as 
reported by Budd and Mattinson). Yet, other researchers have grouped certain behaviours 
together (such as public approaches, as reported by Mullen, Pathé, Purcell and Stuart). 
However, the most common behaviours reported include receiving unsolicited telephone 
calls, being approached by the perpetrator, being followed or placed under surveillance, 
receiving written messages and gifts (Budd & Mattinson, 2000; Mullen, Pathé, Purcell & 
Stuart, 1999; Pathé & Mullen, 1997).  
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It is clear that threats made, or carried out, occur to victims of stalking. Threatening 
behaviours have included being physically intimidated, being touched and/or grabbed, 
being forced into sexual acts (Budd & Mattinson, 2000), threats made to third parties, 
being physically attacked, a third party being physically attacked (Mullen, Pathé, Purcell & 
Stuart, 1999), and having property damaged, including threatening to and/or killing a pet 
(Mullen, Pathé, Purcell & Stuart, 1999; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). This highlights that 
stalkers can be dangerous, and stalking as a crime should be taken seriously. 
 
Table 3: Stalking Behaviours 
Authors  
Behaviours ↓ 
Budd & Mattinson 
(2000) 
Tjaden & 
Thoennes (1998) 
Mullen, Pathé, 
Purcell & Stuart 
(1999) 
Pathé & 
Mullen (1997) 
Phone calls % 
Females 
45 (silent) 
25 (obscene) 
61 78%  
[overall sample] 
78% 
[overall 
sample] % Males 44 (silent 
14 (obscene) 
42 
Written 
communication 
& Gifts  
% 
Females 
27 (written) 
19 (gifts) 
33 (written & 
gifts) 
65% (written) 
48% (gifts) 
[overall sample] 
62% 
(written) 
50% (gifts) 
[overall 
sample] 
% Males 27 (written) 
16 (gifts) 
27 (written & 
gifts) 
Direct 
approaches 
% 
Females 
52 (forced to talk to 
perpetrator) 
36 (refused to take no 
for an answer) 
34 (outside house) 
28 (outside work) 
35 (touched or 
grabbed) 
 86% public 
approaches 
[overall sample] 
79% (at 
home, 
workplace, 
or school) 
[overall 
sample] 
% Males 39 (forced to talk to 
perpetrator) 
22 (refused to take no 
for an answer) 
30 (outside house) 
22 (outside work) 
30 (touched or 
grabbed) 
 
Followed and/or 
surveillance 
% 
Females 
43 (followed) 82 73% 
[overall sample] 
71% 
[overall 
sample] % Males 30 (followed) 72 
Threaten or use 
of violence 
% 
Females 
45 (physically 
intimidated) 
27 (threatened 
violence) 
19 (physical violence) 
9 (sexual violence) 
29 (vandalised 
property) 
9 (threatened to 
or killed family 
pet) 
58% 
(threatened 
violence against 
victim and a 
third party) 
40% (damaged 
property) 
36% 
(physically 
attacked) 
36% 
(property 
damaged) 
58% (overt 
threats) 
% Males 33 (physically 
intimidated) 
32 (threatened 
violence) 
24 (physical violence) 
3 (sexual violence) 
30 (vandalised 
property) 
6 (threatened to 
or killed family 
pet) 
 
Budd and Mattinson (2000), and Tjaden and Thoennes (1998), reported the behaviours 
experienced by both male and female victims, and identified a gender effect on the 
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behaviours experienced. For example, Budd and Mattinson reported that female victims 
were more likely than males to be forced to talk to the perpetrator (52% and 39%, 
respectively), to be physically intimidated (45% and 33%, respectively), to be followed 
(43% and 30%, respectively), and to receive obscene phone calls from the stalker (25% 
and 14%, respectively). Similarly, Tjaden and Thoennes reported that female victims were 
more likely than males to receive unwanted phone calls (61% and 42%, respectively), and 
to be followed or placed under surveillance (82% and 72%, respectively). However, there 
were also similarities in the behaviours experienced by both male and female victims. For 
example, Budd and Mattinson reported that male and female victims experienced receiving 
silent phone calls (45% and 44%, respectively), and receiving written communications 
(27% and 27%, respectively), and being threatened with violence (27% and 32%, 
respectively). Tjaden and Thoennes also reported that male and female victims were both 
likely to receive unwanted written communications or items (27% and 33%, respectively). 
The gender differences and similarities found in victims‟ experiences of stalking indicate 
the types of behaviours male/female victims are likely to experience. This may be useful 
when educating people about the course of stalking. However, some of the behaviours 
reported (such as “refused to take no for an answer” or “being forced to talk to the 
perpetrator”) are vague and do not provide much information on the nature of such 
behaviours. For example, it is unclear how someone is forced to talk to another person. 
Future research would benefit from making descriptions of the perpetrators‟ behaviour 
clearer. 
 
Asking victims to use a checklist to indicate the behaviours they experienced fails to show 
how perpetrators use a variety of methods during their stalking campaign. Indeed, Mullen, 
Pathé, Purcell and Stuart (1999) have referred to stalking as a “constellation of behaviours” 
(p. 1244), and this may be portrayed more clearly by case studies. A case study reported by 
Draucker (1999) serves to illustrate the escalation in stalking behaviours that is regarded as 
being typical of stalkers. Mary met Harry when she was employed by him to complete her 
taxes. Initially, Harry‟s behaviour was limited to phoning her at home, and bringing her 
gifts. As his behaviour escalated, he made Mary aware that he had been recording her 
conversations, sent threatening letters, entered her home while she was out, and left nails 
on her driveway in an attempt to damage the tyres of her car. This case study illustrates 
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that a stalker‟s behaviour may initially appear benign. The more serious behaviours, such 
as threatening letters, may not appear as threatening if it was a one-off incident.  
 
In another case, Jill met John at a party and they had a short but intimate relationship 
(Roberts & Dziegielewski, 1996). John stayed a night at Jill‟s house and when she returned 
from work the next evening he was still there. When Jill asked John to leave he threatened 
to hurt himself. John only left because another person became involved. John began to 
leave numerous telephone messages and, as his behaviour escalated, he visited Jill‟s 
workplace. These examples illustrate that a stalker‟s behaviour may not appear to be 
threatening unless the perpetrator‟s behaviour is considered as a whole. 
 
2.2.4 Perpetrator and Victim Characteristics 
 
Typologies of perpetrators have been proposed by several researchers to categorise who, 
and why, individuals engage in harassing behaviours. The purpose of typologies is to 
predict the severity of harassment posed by certain types of perpetrators, and intervention 
strategies best suited to types of perpetrators. Early research was based on the assumption 
that harassing perpetrators were erotomanic (Spitzberg & Cupach, 2003), and the first 
typology by Zona, Sharma and Lane (1993) drew from knowledge of erotomania. 
Erotomania involves the delusional „belief the target of attention, generally a person of 
higher social and economic status, bears genuine love for the erotomanic individual‟ 
(Sheridan & Davies, 2001b, p. 135). Erotomania involves fate-based delusions, whereby 
the perpetrator believes that it is only a matter of time before their target realises that 
he/she is in love with the perpetrator (Perez, 1993). Furthermore, erotomanic individuals 
will have no prior relationship with the victim (Sheridan & Davies, 2001b), and will „go to 
great lengths to contact the person of their delusion‟ (Zona et al., 1993, p. 894). With the 
exception of their delusion, erotomanic individuals behave normally (Zona et al., 1993). 
 
Zona et al. (2003) analysed the forensic files of the first 74 cases involving harassment that 
were brought to the Threat Management Unit of the Los Angeles Police Department. They 
analysed the perpetrators‟ characteristics and formulated three categories of perpetrators. 
The first category was „erotomania‟, with perpetrators (n = 7) diagnosed with primary 
erotomanic delusions. The majority of erotomanic perpetrators were female (n = 6), who 
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targeted older males (n = 5). All perpetrators in this sub-category wrote letters to, and 
threatened, their victims. Furthermore, the majority (n = 5) visited the victim‟s home 
during their pursuit. „Love obsessional‟ formed the second category of perpetrators (n = 
32), some of whom were judged to be similar to erotomanic individuals. However, 
erotomania was one of several delusions, with erotomania being symptomatic of another 
primary mental illness. Other perpetrators within this category were „in love‟ with the 
victim, but did not hold a delusion that the victim loved them. Love obsessional 
perpetrators were likely to be male (n = 28), and victims tended to be younger females (n = 
30). Perpetrators were likely to write letters to their victim (n = 26), and visit the victim‟s 
home (n = 6), but least likely to threaten the victim (n = 6). The final category was „simple 
obsessional‟ (n = 35), comprised mostly of male perpetrators (n = 25) and female victims 
(n = 25). Simple obsessional perpetrators were most likely to threaten their victims (n = 
23), and least likely to write letters to (n = 12), or visit their victim‟s home (n = 12). 
Perpetrators did not differ in terms of age (M = 35 years), but erotomanics (M = 125 
months), and love obsessional (M = 146 months), engaged in harassing behaviours for 
significantly longer durations than simple obsessional (M = 5 months). These findings 
suggest that perpetrators who have relational goals are least likely to cease their harassing 
behaviours, and engage in a lengthier pursuit patterns, which may cause greater harm to 
victims. Contrary to previous speculation that stalkers suffered from erotomanic delusions, 
the study illustrated that erotomania forms a small sub-group of harassing perpetrators 
(Spitzberg & Cupach, 2003).  
 
Another typology was proposed by Kienlen, Birmingham, Solberg, O‟Regan and Meloy 
(1998), and comprised of psychotic (n = 9) or non-psychotic (n = 16) perpetrators. Kienlen 
et al. analysed the forensic case files of 25 perpetrators referred by forensic examiners in 
Missouri between 1990 and 1995. On the basis of the forensic examiners‟ evaluations of 
the perpetrators‟ mental health, participants were categorised as either psychotic or non-
psychotic, and all were facing criminal charges for stalking. Like Zona et al., Kienlen et al. 
reported no significant differences in the demographic characteristics of psychotic and 
non-psychotic perpetrators. Kienlen et al. noted that differences between psychotic and 
non-psychotic perpetrators in terms of who they harassed (e.g., psychotics less likely to 
pursue ex-partners), and behaviours they engaged in (e.g., psychotics more likely to visit 
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the victim‟s home). Furthermore, when psychotic perpetrators engaged in violence, the 
violence was less organised and unplanned in comparison to non-psychotic perpetrators. 
 
The typologies offered by Zona et al. (1993) and Kienlen et al. (1998) have been criticised 
for being too simplistic (Boon & Sheridan, 2002; Sheridan, Blaauw & Davies, 2003). For 
example, psychotic perpetrators in Kienlen et al.‟s typology were less likely to harass ex-
intimates. However, evidence suggests that victims are most likely to be pursued by an ex-
partner (see Budd & Mattinson, 2000; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). Thus, the majority of 
harassers would likely fall into the non-psychotic category. If the majority of harassers fall 
within one category, the explanatory power of a two-tiered typology would be significantly 
reduced, as it would fail to explain the majority of harassers. 
 
In an attempt to provide a more comprehensive typology, Mullen, Pathé, Purcell and Stuart 
(1999) proposed a five category typology following their analysis of the forensic case files 
of 145 perpetrators convicted of stalking between 1993 and 1997. In their typology, 
Mullen et al. categorised perpetrators as rejected (n = 52), intimacy seeking (n = 49), 
incompetent (n = 22), resentful (n = 16), and predatory (n = 6). Rejected perpetrators 
wanted to reconcile with, or seek revenge against, the person who rejected them. 
Perpetrators in this category used significantly more methods of harassment than any other 
category, and were most likely to telephone their victim, and issue threats. Rejected 
perpetrators were most likely to cease harassment when issued with fines or when facing a 
custodial sentence. Intimacy seeking perpetrators were seeking to establish a relationship 
with the victim, but were likely to become jealous and enraged if their romantic advances 
were rejected by the victim. Intimacy seeking perpetrators were most likely to send the 
victim letters. Mullen et al. advised perpetrators within this category were unlikely to 
respond to legal intervention, and required psychiatric intervention. Incompetent 
perpetrators were similar to intimacy seeking perpetrators, but differed as they did not 
believe the victim reciprocated romantic feelings towards them. Incompetent perpetrators 
were described as intellectually limited and socially incompetent which hindered their 
ability to initiate a romantic relationship. Perpetrators were attracted to the victim, but were 
not infatuated, and were likely to have a history of harassing other individuals. Mullen et 
al. explained these perpetrators are easily dissuaded from harassing individuals. However, 
their history of harassing other individuals suggested they may acquire a new target. Half 
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of the resentful perpetrators held vendettas against individuals they believed had wronged 
them, and half were reported to have a general sense of grievance. Similar to rejected 
perpetrators, resentful perpetrators were also most likely to threaten their victims. 
However, resentful perpetrators were most likely to be enraged by legal intervention, 
resulting in an escalation of harassment towards the victim. Finally, predatory perpetrators 
were motivated by the desire to sexually attack the victim. They were likely to have 
previous convictions for sexual offences, and were least likely to telephone the victim. 
Considering previous convictions, perpetrators in this category were unlikely to cease their 
behaviour following legal intervention, and Mullen et al. suggested they should receive 
psychiatric intervention.  
 
Mullen et al.‟s (1999) typology has advantages over the earlier, more simplistic models 
proposed by Zona et al. (1993) and Kienlen et al., (1998). First, their typology involves a 
more diverse range of categories that can be used to explain a greater range of harassing 
perpetrator‟s motivations, the types of behaviours they engage in, and the threat posed to 
victims. Boon and Sheridan (2002) note that Mullen et al.‟s typology is devised from the 
analysis of a greater number of participants in comparison to previous typologies. 
Consequently, Mullen et al. benefitted from a larger amount of data, which increases the 
validity of their research in comparison with earlier studies (Boon & Sheridan, 2002). 
Importantly, unlike earlier typologies, Mullen et al. describe legal and psychiatric 
intervention strategies that are most applicable to each category of perpetrators. This is an 
important benefit to psychiatrists and police officers who may deal with perpetrators in 
their daily working life.  
 
Typologies have appeal as they appear to provide clear-cut illustrations of who perpetrates 
harassment, what to expect from certain types of perpetrators, and how to deal with them. 
However, Douglas and Dutton (2001) argue that typologies are often based on speculation, 
and a universal typology of harassing perpetrators has not been devised. Furthermore, 
harassing perpetrators may not fit neatly into a single category (Boon & Sheridan, 2002), 
which may reduce their explanatory power, or cause confusion among police officers or 
clinicians who are asked to intervene in cases involving harassment. Importantly, all of the 
typologies described are derived from clinical and forensic samples. However, individuals 
are unlikely to voluntarily admit to harassing another person (Fremouw, Westrup & 
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Pennypacker, 1997), rendering the empirical study of perpetrators limited to forensic 
samples. However, perpetrators who come to the attention of the criminal justice system 
are likely to over-represent perpetrators with mental illness, and are likely to be limited to 
severe cases of harassment. Consequently, typologies cannot be applied to all perpetrators 
of harassment, and descriptions of the more „typical‟ harassers have been gained from 
victim‟s accounts of harassment. 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of Perpetrators and Victims of Harassment 
Author Sample Perpetrators % Victims % Prior Relationship % 
    Males Females 
Sheridan, 
Davies & 
Boon (2001a) 
Self-defined 
victims  
(n = 95) 
(2 – 70 years) 
87 Male 
7 Female 
5 Multiple 
perpetrators 
92 Females 
7 Males 
1 Couple 
48 Ex-intimate 
37 Acquaintance 
12 Stranger 
 
Budd & 
Mattinson 
(2000) 
General 
Population 
(n = 9,988) 
(16 – 59 years) 
81 Men 
19 Female 
73 Females 
27 Males 
27 Ex-intimate 
8 Relative 
36 Acquaintance 
28 Stranger 
30 Ex-intimate 
4 Relative 
30 Acquaintance 
35 Stranger 
Nicastro, 
Cousins & 
Spitzberg 
(2000) 
Stalking case 
files  
(n = 55) 
93 Male 
7 Female 
93 Females 
7 Males 
60 Dating relationship 
20 Married 
9 Acquaintances 
6 Separated/Divorced 
2 Other relative 
4 Strangers 
Mullen, 
Pathé, Purcell 
& Stuart 
(1999) 
Stalkers 
(n = 145) 
79 Male 
21 Female 
(15 – 75 years) 
[Not 
reported] 
30 Ex-intimate 
23 Professional relationship 
11 Fellow employees 
19 Acquaintances 
14 Strangers 
Kienlen, 
Birmingham, 
Solberg, 
O‟Regan & 
Meloy (1998) 
Stalkers  
(n = 25) 
(24 – 69 years) 
84 Male 
16 Female 
81 Females 
19 Male 
58 Ex-intimate 
20 Acquaintance 
12 Relative 
8 Celebrity 
1 Stranger (non-public) 
Tjaden & 
Thoennes 
(1998) 
General 
Population 
(n = 16,000) 
(18 – 80+ 
years) 
87 Males 
13 Females 
78 Females 
22 Males 
13 current/former 
spouse 
13 current/former 
cohabiting partner 
10 current/former 
girlfriend 
2 Other relative 
34 Acquaintance 
36 Stranger 
38 current/former 
spouse 
10 current/former 
cohabiting partner 
14 current/former 
boyfriend 
4 Other relative 
19 Acquaintance 
23 Stranger 
Pathé & 
Mullen 
(1997) 
Stalked victims 
(n = 100) 
 83 Females 
17 Males 
29 Ex-intimate 
25 Professional relationship 
21 Casual social encounter 
16 Stranger 
9 Work colleague 
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Table 4 illustrates the percentages of perpetrators and victims, and the prior relationship 
between perpetrators and victims reported during empirical investigation of harassment. 
The percentages of male perpetrators range from 79% (Mullen, Pathé, Purcell & Stuart, 
1999) to 87% (Sheridan, Davies & Boon, 2001a; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998), with 
differences attributable to different sampling strategies and definitions of harassment. For 
example, Sheridan et al. recruited self-defined victims who contacted the Suzy Lamplugh 
Trust for help with harassment, and evidence suggests females are more likely than males 
to seek help following harassment (e.g., Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). In conjunction with 
help seeking, evidence suggests that females are likely to be harassed by males (e.g., 
Bjerregaard, 2000). Furthermore, the definition used by Mullen et al. did not stipulate the 
perpetrator had to threaten the victim, whereas the definition used by Tjaden and Thoennes 
mentioned the perpetrator‟s behaviour could threaten the victim. The inclusion of threats 
may have prompted more females to report harassment as males are more likely to threaten 
their victims than females (Budd & Mattinson, 2000).  
 
However, there is evidence of females engaging in harassing behaviours, with percentages 
ranging from 7% (Sheridan et al., 2001) to 21% (Budd & Mattinson, 2000). This evidence 
contradicts the stereotypical perception that stalkers are males, and may have arisen 
because of methodological differences between the studies. As Sheridan et al. recruited 
self-defined victims, their considerations of their harassing experiences may have, in part, 
been due to conforming to stereotypical views on harassment. However, as part of the 
British Crime Survey, the words „stalking‟ and „harassment‟ were not used when asking 
participants to report their experiences. By excluding these terms, the authors may have 
avoided triggering stereotypical representations of harassment. Thus, participants may 
have felt more comfortable in reporting harassment perpetrated by females. 
 
Evidence suggests harassed victims that are females range from 81% (Kienlen et al., 1998) 
to 93% (Nicastro, Cousins & Spitzberg, 2000), whereas, male victims are reported to range 
from 7% (Nicastro et al., 2000) to 27% (Budd & Mattinson, 2000). In a similar vein to 
percentages of perpetrators, percentages of victims are attributable to differences in 
sampling strategies. For instance, the sample used by Nicastro et al. included victims of 
stalking and domestic violence, whereas Kienlen et al.‟s sample was restricted to victims 
of stalking. The inclusion of domestic violence victims is likely to have over-represented 
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females within Nicastro et al.‟s study compared to Kienlen et al.‟s findings. Over-
representation of females within Nicastro et al.‟s study would have lead to inflated rates of 
female victims and under-inflated rates of male victims. 
 
There is consensus that the majority of perpetrators are known to their victims prior to the 
onset of harassment (Cupach & Spitzberg, 2004; Pathé, 2002). Evidence suggests the 
largest single category illustrating the prior perpetrator-victim relationship is the ex-
intimate category, with percentages ranging from 29% (Pathé & Mullen, 1997) to 86% 
(Nicastro et al., 2000). Whilst ex-intimates are the largest single category, the range of 
percentages provides little information. Furthermore, studies have not consistently defined 
„ex-intimate‟ prior relationship between perpetrators and victims of harassment. For 
example, Purcell et al. (2004) included relatives other than husbands or wives within the 
ex-intimate category. Furthermore, some studies have divided the category further (e.g., 
Budd & Mattinson, 2000; Nicastro et al., 2000; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). For example, 
Nicastro et al. reported that 60% of perpetrators were dating the victim, 20% were married, 
and 6% were separated or divorced prior to the onset of harassment.  
 
Evidence suggests there are gender differences within the ex-intimate category of the 
perpetrator-victim relationships. Budd and Mattinson (2000) reported females were 
marginally more likely than males to be harassed by an ex-partner. Furthermore, males 
were more likely than females to be harassed by a relative. Similarly, Tjaden and Thoennes 
(1998) reported females were more likely than males to be harassed by a current or ex-
spouse or girlfriend. Furthermore, males were more likely than females to be harassed by a 
current or former girlfriend/boyfriend. However, the differences in percentages portray 
small gender differences.  
 
Despite the differences in percentages across studies of ex-intimates to engage in 
harassment, ex-intimates form the largest single category within each study, suggesting a 
link between harassment and domestic violence (Douglas & Dutton, 2001). Coleman 
(1997) noted that leaving an abusive partner is dangerous, as the abused partner may 
experience harassment as a result. Tjaden and Thoennes (1998) reported that perpetrators 
who were ex-intimates of the victim were more likely to engage in harassment following 
the dissolution of the relationship than during the relationship. Furthermore, victims who 
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are harassed by ex-intimates are more likely to be emotionally abused, and physically 
and/or sexually attacked by the perpetrator (Sheridan & Davies, 2001a; Tjaden & 
Thoennes, 1998). Pathé and Mullen (1997) explain that perpetrators who had an intimate 
relationship with the victim prior to the onset of harassment are highly emotionally 
invested in the relationship. When perpetrators are invested in their pursuit of their victim, 
the pursuit tends to be more severe, dangerous, and persistent. Similarly, Jason, Reichler, 
Easton, Neal and Wilson (1984) explain that sex-role stereotypes may account for the 
occurrence of females being targeted by ex-partners. They highlight that females are 
stereotyped as inferior to males, and when females end a relationship, the male will 
become angry and frustrated with the female‟s assertive behaviour. Although sex-role 
stereotyping may explain why females are targeted by males, it does not explain why 
males become the targets of harassment or why the perpetrator may display anger or 
frustration towards the victim.   
 
Attachment theory has also been applied to explain stalking between ex-intimates. 
According to attachment theory, secure early attachments with the caregiver contribute to 
healthy development in adulthood (Bowlby, 1980). In contrast, the failure of a caregiver to 
meet a child‟s needs results in the development of working models of the self as unworthy 
(Bowlby, 1973), and psychopathology in adulthood (Ainsworth, 1989). Meloy (1998) 
argues that stalking behaviours are a consequence of insecure attachment. When a 
relationship ends, feelings of unworthiness are reinforced in the insecure perpetrator, and 
triggers psychopathological attachment behaviours that are designed to regain proximity to 
the attachment figure (Kamphius, Emmelkamp & deVries, 2004). However, attachment 
theories have been criticised for explaining stalking as a pathological reaction to rejection, 
which stems from investigations into clinical and forensic samples (Cupach & Spitzberg, 
2004; Spitzberg & Veksler, 2007). 
 
In an attempt to explain the more typical cases of stalking, Spitzberg and Cupach (2003) 
applied Bagozzi‟s (1992) goal pursuit theory to stalking. According to goal theory, 
decisions about the achievability of goals occur in a three-stage process. During the first 
„appraisal of means‟ stage, individuals consider the behaviours required to achieve the 
goal. The second stage involves „the formation of instrumental beliefs‟, which involves the 
consideration of whether the behaviours identified will result in goal attainment. Finally, 
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individuals evaluate their own self-efficacy in achieving their goal (Bagozzi & Edwards, 
2000). The desirability of goal attainment is evaluated by considering the consequences of 
achieving the goal (Bagozzi, Baumgartner & Pieters, 1998). The consequences of goal 
attainment include evaluation of the emotions that are perceived to accompany goal 
attainment. Furthermore, goals are considered to be hierarchical in nature, with higher-
ordered goals being associated with feelings of self-worth and happiness. In contrast, 
lower-ordered goals can be abandoned more easily as they are not linked to one‟s self-
worth. 
 
In application of goal theory to stalking, Spitzberg and Cupach (2003) refer to relational 
goal pursuit to describe how and why stalking may occur when a relationship ends. In 
relation to stalking, the perpetrator‟s end goal is to have a relationship with the victim, and 
the stalking directed behaviours are the means by which they believe the goal can be 
achieved. The stalker associates highly positive emotions with having a relationship with 
the victim and non-attainment will result in highly negative emotions (Cupach & 
Spitzberg, 2004). Furthermore, relationship attainment (a lower-ordered goal) becomes 
linked with higher-ordered goals of self-worth and happiness, and a relationship with the 
victim becomes of crucial importance. When rejected by the victim, the perpetrator 
experiences rumination and negative emotional flooding, which serve as a reminder of the 
consequences of non-attainment of the relational goal and threatens the perpetrator‟s self-
worth. It is argued here that this theory better explains perpetrators‟ reactions of anger to a 
partner who attempts to end their relationship.  
 
The next largest category illustrating the prior perpetrator-victim relationship is 
acquaintances, with percentages ranging from 9% (Nicastro et al., 2000) to 37% (Sheridan, 
Davies & Boon, 2001a). Pathé (2002) explained that acquaintances involve perpetrators 
who have had social encounters with the victim prior to the onset of harassment. Whilst 
some authors separate work colleagues and those who had a professional relationship with 
the victim (e.g., Mullen et al., 1999; Pathé & Mullen, 1997), others include these 
individuals within the broader acquaintance category (e.g., Finney, 2006). Sheridan and 
Davies (2001a) reported that victims who were an acquaintance of the perpetrator are less 
likely to be attacked. However, perpetrators may physically attack third party victims (such 
as friends or relatives of the victim), and perpetrators are less likely to be prosecuted. The 
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decreased likelihood of perpetrators within this category attacking the victim may result 
lower rates of prosecution. 
 
There is a myth associated with harassment that perpetrators target victims with whom 
they have no prior relationship to (i.e., strangers) (deBecker, 2002; Pathé, 2002; Spitzberg 
& Cadaz, 2002). Contrary to this, evidence suggests strangers engaging in harassment 
represent the smallest prior relationship category, with rates ranging from 4% (Nicastro et 
al., 2000) to 14% (Mullen et al., 1999). Whilst some studies have reported gender 
differences in being harassed by a stranger, there are inconsistencies across studies. Budd 
and Mattinson (2000) reported that females (35%) were more likely to be harassed by a 
stranger than males (28%). Conversely, Tjaden and Thoennes (1998) reported that males 
(36%) were more likely to be harassed by strangers than females (23%). Unfortunately, 
both studies provided descriptive statistics, and it is unclear whether gender differences are 
statistically significant. However, much of the evidence of strangers engaging in 
harassment has derived from victims‟ accounts, and may not reliably reflect the incidents 
of stranger-harassment. For example, perpetrators may know the victim but have not yet 
revealed their identity to the victim. Consequently, victims may report the perpetrator is a 
stranger, rather than unknown.  
 
Table 5 provides describes further demographic information relating to perpetrators of 
harassment reported in various studies. The average age of perpetrators ranges from 35 
years (Purcell et al., 2001) to 41 years (Ashmore et al., 2006), suggesting that harassment 
is perpetrated by older individuals. This finding contradicts the maturation hypothesis, 
which stipulates that as people age they become more mature and less likely to engage in 
criminal behaviour (Morowitz, 2002). However, the youngest perpetrator (aged 11 years) 
was reported by Sheridan et al. (2001a) and the oldest perpetrator (aged 75 years) was 
reported by Mullen et al. (1999). The age range of perpetrators illustrates that harassment 
is not restricted to being perpetrated by individuals aged in their thirties or forties. 
 
Table 5: Demographics of Perpetrators of Harassment 
Author Gender (n) Age Employment Status 
Ashmore et 
al. (2006) 
Male (46) 
Female (10) 
17 – 60 years 
(M = 41) 
Not Reported 
Purcell et al. 
(2001) 
Female (40) 15 – 60 years 
(M = 35) 
35% unemployed 
Sheridan et al. 
(2001a) 
Male (82) 
Female (7) 
11 – 73 years 
(M = 36) 
51% Employed 
23% Unemployed 
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Multiple (5) 
Unknown (1) 
10% Unknown 
7% Students 
4% Various 
3% Retired 
2% Self-employed 
Nicastro et al. 
(2000) 
Male (51) 
Female (4) 
20 – 59 years 
(M = 36) 
Not Reported 
Mullen et al. 
(1999) 
Male (115) 
Female (30) 
15 – 75 years 
(Median = 38) 
56% Employed 
39% Unemployed 
5% Unknown 
Kienlen et al. 
(1997) 
Male (21) 
Female (4) 
24 – 69 years 
(M = 38) 
60% unemployed 
 
Speculative accounts of harassment suggest that perpetrators are often unemployed (e.g., 
Meloy, 1998), providing perpetrators with more free time to engage in harassing 
behaviours. There is some evidence to support this speculation as Kienlen et al. (1997) 
reported 60% of perpetrators were unemployed. However, the majority of perpetrators in 
the study had a prior criminal record (63%), which may contribute to unemployment. 
Furthermore, the findings were based on a small forensic sample (n = 25). Thus, findings 
from the study must be treated with caution as they cannot be generalised to a wider 
population of perpetrators. Contrary to speculation, the majority of evidence suggests that 
harassing perpetrators are employed, self-employed, or students (Mullen et al., 1999; 
Purcell et al., 2001; Sheridan et al., 2001a). 
 
Table 6: Demographics of Victims of Harassment 
Author Gender (n) Age Employment Status 
Blaauw et al. 
(2002) 
Female (214) 
Male (27) 
19 – 82 years 
(M = 43) 
59% Employed 
Sheridan et al. 
(2001a) 
Female (88) 
Male (8) 
2 – 70 years 
(M = 34) 
47% Employed 
18% Unemployed 
10% Students 
8% Pre-school 
4% Self-employed 
2% Retired 
1% Unknown 
Nicastro et al. 
(2000) 
Female (51) 
Male (4) 
14 – 52 years 
(M 33) 
60% Unemployed 
 
Table 6 provides further demographic information relating to harassed victims reported in 
research. The average age of harassed victims range from 33 years (Nicastro et al., 2000) 
to 43 years (Blaauw et al., 2002). However, there are inconsistencies across studies, with 
some suggesting that victims are likely to be unemployed (e.g., Blaauw et al., 2002; 
Nicastro et al., 2000), whilst other suggest victims are more likely to be employed (e.g., 
Sheridan et al., 2001).  
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Despite the inconsistencies across studies, patterns of harassment have emerged. 
Reinforcing the myth that harassment is a gendered crime, females are more likely than 
males to become victims of harassment, and males are more likely than females to 
perpetrate harassment. However, males are harassed and females can perpetrate 
harassment. Furthermore, victims of harassment are likely to know their harassers prior to 
the onset of harassment, as instances of perpetrators harassing strangers are less common. 
 
2.3 Cyber-harassment and Cyberstalking: Legal and Definitional Issues 
 
Whilst cyber-harassment is a criminal act within the UK, there is no legislation dealing 
specifically with cyber-harassment. However, Basu and Jones (2007) and Ellison (1999) 
argue the Protection from Harassment Act (PfHA) (1997) is broad enough to allow for the 
prosecution of cyberstalkers. The Act does not describe what behaviours constitute 
harassment. Thus, whether the perpetrator‟s behaviour constitutes harassment is determined 
by a jury (Bocij, 2004). The Act has been criticised because of ambiguity concerning the 
term „harassment‟ (Bocij, Griffiths & McFarlane, 2002). This means that the ability of 
solicitors will play a major part in whether the cyberstalker will be successfully prosecuted 
as they will be responsible for proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the perpetrator‟s 
behaviour constitutes harassment (Bocij, 2004). Bocij, Griffiths and McFarlane (2002) 
further criticise the PfHA because it does not allow for cyberstalkers to include groups of 
people or organisations and it assumes that all victims are individuals. However, this is no 
longer the case, as Basu and Jones (2007) highlight that the Criminal Justice and Police Act 
(2001) extends the scope of the PfHA by acknowledging that cyberstalking perpetrators and 
victims can include groups of people or organisations. 
 
Drawing from anti-harassment legislation, definitions of cyberstalking have been 
proposed. For example, D‟Ovidio and Doyle (2003) define cyberstalking as “the repeated 
use of the Internet, e-mail, or related digital electronic communication devices to annoy, 
alarm, or threaten a specific individual or group of individuals” (p. 10). Similarly, Bocij 
(2002) defines cyberstalking as: 
 
 A group of behaviours in which an individual, group of individuals or 
organisations, uses information and communications technology to harass 
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one or more individuals.  Such behaviours may include, but are not limited 
to, the transmissions of threats and false accusations, identity theft, data 
theft, damage to data or equipment, computer monitoring, the solicitation 
of minors for sexual purposes and confrontation. (p. 4). 
 
Both of these definitions recognise that cyberstalkers can stalk „one or more‟ victims.  
Whitty and Carr (2006) regard Bocij‟s definition as inclusive and highlight four reasons 
why Bocij‟s definition is important. First, Bocij notes that a group of people and/or 
organisations can be the perpetrators of cyberstalking. The notion that organisations engage 
in cyberstalking is known as „corporate stalking‟ (Bocij, 2004). A clear example of this is 
the case Hitchcock vs. Woodside Literary Agency.  Resulting from a disagreement, the 
agency engaged in cyberstalking behaviours against Hitchcock. Such behaviours included 
spamming and impersonating Hitchcock online (Whitty & Carr, 2004). Second, in a 
deviation from the PfHA, Bocij provides a list of behaviours he considers to constitute 
cyberstalking, emphasising that the list is not exhaustive. This allows for the rapid pace at 
which technology evolves. Third, Bocij allows for cyberstalking to be carried out using text 
and multi-media messaging services on mobile telephones. Cyberstalking via mobile phone 
technology is rarely included in empirical research but case studies have shown that it does 
exist. For example, David Cruz sent up to thirty sexually explicit text messages per day to 
Chloe Easton when she rejected his romantic advances (Whitty & Carr, 2006). Finally, 
Bocij‟s definition includes a provision that acknowledges the use of the Internet by 
paedophiles to locate, „groom‟ and abuse children. This latter point is a major difference 
between stalking and cyberstalking (Bocij, 2004). However, the motivations of paedophiles 
and the notion of grooming their victims may render them sufficiently distinct from the 
more typical cyberstalker, setting them in a category of their own. In addition, paedophiles 
using the Internet to groom children are not prosecuted under the PfHA, but under the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003. This suggests that at least legally, grooming is not regarded as an 
act of harassment.  
 
A key issue regarding cyber-harassment is whether the threats made by perpetrators are 
credible, as perpetrators do not have to be geographically close to their victims (Burgess & 
Baker, 2002). However, Bocij and McFarlane (2003) argue the threats made are as 
legitimate as those made by offline stalkers. Sheridan and Grant (2007) found that 
cyberstalked victims received a similar amount of threats of physical and sexual harm 
compared to victims stalked offline. Other studies suggest that cyberstalkers are more likely 
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to threaten victims than those who engage in offline stalking (Alexy, Burgess, Baker & 
Smoyak, 2005). Whether these threats can be taken seriously has been questioned. 
However, cyberstalkers can travel to their victim‟s home and/or may enlist the help of other 
individuals who may be geographically closer to the victim. For example, Gary Dellapenta 
impersonated a woman whom he had become fixated on, and posted messages on the 
Internet claiming the woman had fantasies of being raped. The messages included the 
woman‟s contact information, address, and alarm code for her home (Ellison, 1999). Whilst 
these are direct threats to the victim, there are other forms of threatening behaviour that a 
cyberstalker can engage in. For example, Alexy et al. (2005) found that cyberstalkers are 
more likely to threaten suicide than offline stalkers. This type of threat may cause the 
victim distress. Additionally, sending computer viruses threatens the victim‟s hardware and 
software.  
 
As the PfHA is a victim-defined crime, the impact of cyber-harassment on the victim is a 
crucial determinant of whether a crime has taken place. Bocij (2003) found that 23% of 
cyberstalking victims were highly distressed by their experiences. Distress was measured 
by rating the level of distress on a key from 0 (indicating no distress) to 10 (indicating 
highly distressed). This measurement is subjective and vague, and the study fails to fully 
address the impact of cyber-harassment on victims. However, an interesting finding 
suggested that Internet self-efficacy was implicated in reducing or increasing distress: 
individuals who had a greater knowledge and experience of communications technology 
were less distressed than new users of technology. Sheridan and Grant (2007) found no 
difference in the medical and psychological impact of cyberstalking on victims compared to 
stalked victims. McKenna (2007) highlights the case of Ryan Halligan, who was harassed 
by his peers via Instant Messenger. Halligan was teased by his peers when a girl he had 
been chatting to online distributed transcripts of their „chats‟ to friends. Gati, Tenyi, Tury, 
and Wildmann (2002) present a case study of a 16 year old girl whose onset of anorexia 
nervosa correlated with online sexual harassment. These results suggest that the impact of 
cyber-harassment on victims can be severe, and their experiences and trauma should not be 
trivialised. 
 
Whilst there is a need to protect victims from cyber-harassment, Basu and Jones (2007) 
suggest that regulating people‟s behaviour on the Internet may not be appropriate. They 
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argue that regulating people‟s online behaviour is virtually impossible, and attempts to do 
so will detrimentally change the online environment. However, Wall (1998) argues that 
online behaviour is already being regulated in four main ways. First, Internet users can 
report negative experiences to online help groups. For example, Working to Halt Online 
Abuse (WHOA) is an organisation aimed at helping individuals who have been harassed 
online. Second, the Internet is regulated by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who are 
responsible for providing a safe service to their clients. According to Wall, ISPs are fearful 
of negative publicity and are wary of their legal liabilities to clients. Third, governments 
have controlled the access to information that their citizens have. In the US, there is now 
legislation requiring ISPs to provide „backdoor‟ access to user‟s email addresses. Finally, 
state-funded public police organisations also help to regulate the Internet. Local police 
authorities would fall under this category. 
 
The success of anti-harassment legislation depends on cyber-harassing crimes being 
reported to the authorities. However, Alexy, Burgess, Baker and Smoyak (2005) found 32% 
of cyberstalked victims reported their experiences. However, it is unclear who (the police or 
Internet service providers) participants reported it to. Bocij (2003) reported that 14% of 
victims reported their experiences to the police and a further 33% reported it to Internet 
service providers or Internet safety organisations. Finn (2004) reported that the most 
common reason for not reporting cyberstalking and/or cyber-harassment was because 
victims did not consider the problem to be serious enough to warrant police involvement 
(38%). Other reasons for not reporting it included participants ignoring the harassment 
(20%), dealing with it themselves (20%), and they did not know who to report it to (13%). 
Self-esteem issues and fear of secondary victimisation may be particularly relevant in cases 
of cyberstalking. Friends and family members of the victim may blame the victim‟s use of 
the Internet and online behaviour as the reason for their misfortune. Bocij (2004) and 
D‟Ovidio and Doyle (2003) note that police authorities told victims to turn off their 
computer. This suggestion blames victims for using the Internet and may deter low self-
esteem victims from seeking help and reporting the crime. If people fail to report their 
experiences to the authorities the extent of the problem will not be acknowledged, and 
adequate help and support for victims will not be provided. 
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2.3.1 The Nature and Extent of Cyberstalking 
 
Several studies have aimed provide prevalence rates and describe the nature of cyber-
harassment. However, at present there are no reliable prevalence rates for cyberstalking 
(Bocij, 2004; Sheridan & Grant, 2007) and this may be due, in part, to a lack of research 
investigating the issue (Bocij & McFarlane, 2002; Ogilvie, 2000a; Ogilvie, 2001b; Sheridan 
& Grant, 2007). Table 7 below shows the prevalence rates of various forms of cyber-
harassment (including cyberstalking) found in a number of studies. 
 
Table 7: The Prevalence of Cyber-Harassment 
Author Sample Population Prevalence Rates 
Sheridan & Grant (2007) Self-defined (stalked) 
victims  (n = 1051) 
47.5% cyberstalked 
4% stalked solely online 
4.9% stalked online for min 4 weeks then 
stalked offline 
38.6% stalked offline but included online 
methods 
Williams & Guerra (2007) Youths in Grades 5, 8 and 
11  (n = 5632) 
9.4% Total sample cyber-bullied 
Alexy, Burgess, Baker & Smoyak 
(2005) 
Students  (n = 756) 3.7% Cyberstalked 
Finn (2004) Students  (n = 339) 10 – 15% Cyber-harassed 
Ybarra (2004) Youths aged 10 – 17 years 
(n = 1489) 
6.5% harassed online 
3% cyberstalked 
Spitzberg & Hoobler (2002) Students  (n = 235) 59% cyber-ORI 
19.6% fearful 
 
The prevalence rates range from 3% (Williams & Guerra, 2007) to 59% (Spitzberg & 
Hoobler, 2002) and appear to be due to differing definitions of cyberstalking and 
methodologies employed. For example, the 59% prevalence rate found by Spitzberg and 
Hoobler (2002) included instances of cyber-obsessive relational intrusion (cyber-ORI) 
which the authors defined as “the unwanted pursuit of intimacy through the repeated 
invasion of a person‟s sense of physical or symbolic privacy” (p. 73). This is important 
because Cupach and Spitzberg (2004) note that whilst cyber-ORI and cyberstalking are 
related, not all cases of cyber-ORI are cases of cyberstalking. However, Spitzberg and 
Hoobler (2002) note that 19.6% of participants were fearful of their pursuer and they 
conclude this may be a more valid prevalence rate for cyberstalking. In another example, 
Finn (2004) reported cyber-harassment rates of 10–15% but did not measure the prevalence 
of cyberstalking per se. Rather, participants were asked to report on online harassment, 
defined as “repeated messages that threatened, insulted, or harassed” (p. 474). In Finn‟s 
study, the method of harassment was confined to email and Instant Messages, and 
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harassment could occur from one incident. It is clear that research reporting instances of 
cyberstalking include broader cyber-harassment rates. This is important to note as not all 
cases of cyber-harassment are cyberstalking. 
 
The methodology employed also influences the prevalence rates found. For example, 
Alexy, Burgess, Baker, and Smoyak (2005) reported that cyberstalking occurred among 4% 
of a student sample. They asked participants to read a vignette depicting a case of 
cyberstalking and to report whether they would label it as such. The authors did not 
describe the layout of the survey. If the vignette was given to participants at the same time 
as they were asked about their own cyberstalking experiences, the results may have been 
influenced by priming effects. Notably, the vignette described a severe case of 
cyberstalking and participants who had been cyberstalked may have marginalised their own 
experiences because they did not match the scenario. In another example, the recruitment 
method used by Sheridan and Grant (2007) would have lead to the over-inflated prevalence 
rate of 48% as participants were recruited from an organisation aimed to help victims of 
stalking and were likely to have experienced severe stalking. It is interesting to note that 
only 4% of victims were stalked solely online and a further 5% were cyberstalked for at 
least four weeks before the stalker engaged in offline stalking. These results suggest that 
whilst forms of pure cyberstalking (i.e., those who are stalked solely online) are rare, the 
majority of cyberstalking cases arise from offline stalkers who use the internet to further 
their pursuit of a victim. However, as the sample consisted of self-defined victims of 
stalking, the researchers may not have accessed cyberstalked victims who do not know 
what cyberstalking is or are embarrassed to seek help. In addition to the problems in 
recruitment strategy, Sheridan and Grant argue the similarities between offline stalking and 
cyberstalking may mean that it is “unnecessary to rigidly define cyberstalking” (p. 636). 
These studies highlight that how researchers obtain their sample, design a study and 
operationally define cyberstalking has lead to inconsistent prevalence rates.  
 
Whilst the prevalence of cyber-harassment is unclear, there is consensus that cyberstalking 
will increase as people incorporate technology into their lives (Alexy, Burgess, Baker & 
Smoyak, 2005; Bocij, 2004; Finn, 2004; Spitzberg & Hoobler, 2002; Wood & Wood, 2002) 
and Whitty and Carr (2006) propose that instances of cyberstalking will surpass incidences 
of offline stalking. As is noted by Spitzberg and Hoobler (2002), this may be because 
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increased contact (via the Internet) with others provides more opportunities for intrusion in 
one‟s life. However, research by Sheridan and Grant (2007) and Williams and Guerra 
(2007) indicate that instances of cyberstalking and cyber-bullying (48% and 9%, 
respectively) occur at a less frequent rate than their offline counterparts. This suggests that 
cyber-harassment is not more prevalent than offline forms of harassment, and adds to the 
confusion about the extent to which cyber-harassment is occurring.  
 
Although the prevalence of cyber-harassment is unclear, it is clear that cyber-harassment 
occurs. This provides some justification for the need to investigate aspects of cyber-
harassment and cyberstalking. Whilst it is beyond the remit of this thesis, research 
investigating cyber-harassment would benefit from establishing prevalence rates of cyber-
harassment among the general population of Internet users. Additionally, issues of false 
reporting found in research investigating offline stalking (see Section 2.2.3 in this chapter 
for discussion) have yet to be studied in relation to cyberstalking.  
 
To describe the nature of cyberstalking, there have been some descriptions of the 
behaviours perpetrators engage in. Ogilvie (2000a, 2000b) suggests there are three primary 
ways in which perpetrators can cyberstalk. These are by using email, using public spaces on 
the Internet (such as newsboards and chatrooms), and computer stalking (the manipulation 
of Windows to gain access and control over the victim‟s desktop). However, this view is 
speculative and it is important to gain a better understanding of the methods employed by 
perpetrators through empirical investigation. 
 
In an attempt to empirically investigate types of cyberstalking behaviours experienced by 
individuals, Bocij (2003) provided 169 participants (recruited via email using snowball 
sampling) with a checklist of behaviours and asked them to select the ones they had 
experienced. The most commonly experienced behaviours included receiving 
threatening/abusive comments in chatrooms (48%), receiving malicious computer programs 
(40%), and receiving threatening/abusive emails (40%) and via Instant Messaging services 
(39%), attempted computer monitoring (27%) and cyber-harassment by proxy (24%). 
Harassment by proxy occurs when the perpetrator of cyberstalking/harassment recruits third 
parties to contact the victim (Bocij & McFarlane, 2003). A large percentage of the sample 
(28%) stated that they had experienced some other form of online harassment that they 
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found to be distressing. However, considering this is a large percentage of the sample, the 
researcher does not elaborate on what other behaviours were encountered.  
 
Whilst these rates appear to be high, they must be treated with caution. Sheridan and Grant 
(2007) noted that the researchers only asked participants if they had experienced the 
behaviours. As this is the case, there is no way to tell if participants experienced more than 
one of the behaviours, and if they did experience more than one of the behaviours, there is 
no way to tell if the behaviours were perpetrated by the same individual. Therefore, it is 
impossible to know if the participants experienced cyber-harassment as defined by the 
PfHA. As noted by Bocij, the snowball sampling technique may have biased the results as 
those who were asked to take part may have recruited other people they knew to have 
experienced some of the behaviours. However, Bocij suggests that cyberstalkers engage in 
four main activities: issuing threats; harming the victim‟s reputation; causing damage to the 
victim‟s data/equipment; and computer monitoring.  
 
Using a similar checklist method to Bocij, Jerin and Dolinsky (2001) asked females who 
used online dating websites to identify any harassing behaviours they experienced. The 
most commonly reported behaviours were receiving threatening and/or obscene email, and 
receiving spam (i.e., multitudes of junk email). D‟Ovidio and Doyle (2003) also found that 
email methods were most common with 79% of cyberstalkers using email methods to 
harass their victims. Interestingly, 90% cyberstalkers in D‟Ovidio and Doyle‟s study used 
only one method whilst targeting the victim. Minimal effort is required to threaten or harass 
someone via email messages and may make it an attractive method to harass another 
person. Emails can be used to send videos, pictures and text and the content of such can be 
interpreted as obscene and threatening. Cynthia Armistead‟s cyberstalker used emails 
initially to harass her before his campaign escalated (Griffiths, Rogers & Sparrow, 1998). 
Armistead received numerous obscene and threatening emails from Hillyard (Deirmenjian, 
1999). Armistead began to receive thousands of messages from men who had seen a 
posting on the Internet that solicited sex and provided Armistead‟s contact details. 
Armistead relocated three times within a year, changed her mobile phone number and 
carried a concealed weapon. This case demonstrates the relative ease with which 
cyberstalkers can utilise online methods to harass. 
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Case studies may serve to better describe the way in which various behaviours are used by 
the perpetrators in their campaign to harass his/her victim. Bocij, Bocij, and McFarlane 
(2003) provide a case study illustrating a cyberstalking incident that began online and then 
moved offline. The perpetrator, described as Mr X, created a number of online identities 
and contacted women whom he could cyberstalk. He selected his victims on the basis of 
their gender, age, marital status, and geographical location, and had never met them. When 
the victims ignored one of his identities, he would contact them using another identity. 
Upon initial contact with his victims, he would send an email to them containing a Trojan 
virus that he would use to gain access to information about them held on their computers. 
As his behaviour escalated, he followed them, later describing what they were wearing, 
where they had been and boasted that they could not find him.  
 
Bocij and McFarlane (2002) describe a case of cyberstalking affecting the Boehle family, 
and illustrates that victims do not need to use the Internet to be subjected to cyberstalking. 
A neighbour of the family placed the details of the family‟s nine year old daughter on a 
website, suggesting she was soliciting sex because he was irritated with the child drawing 
on the pavement outside his house. The family were subjected to numerous men contacting 
them in response to the bogus ad. This caused the family extreme distress. This example 
highlights that stalking-by-proxy can occur in cyberstalking cases. The ease with which 
cyberstalkers can recruit third parties to help them in their campaigns is one of the most 
apparent differences between cyberstalking and offline stalking. One cause of 
cyberstalking-by-proxy may be deindividuation, which Lea, Spears and deGroot (2001) 
define as “a state of reduced self-awareness, or even loss of self, often associated with 
immersion in the group or crowd” (p. 526). According to Festinger, Pepitone and 
Newcomb, (1952) “individuals are not seen or paid attention to as individuals” (p. 382). 
Group membership reduces the saliency of the self, producing feelings of anonymity. 
Perceived anonymity, in turn, leads to a reduction in concern of evaluation from others, and 
self-stereotyping occurs in accordance with group norms. In the case of cyberstalking-by-
proxy, willing accomplices may perceive cyber-harassment as an acceptable form of group 
behaviour. However, individuals may unknowingly help perpetrators with their campaign 
of harassment, and deindividuation would not account for such cases. 
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2.3.2 Perpetrator and Victim Characteristics 
 
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of cyber-harassment, it is necessary to 
develop an understanding of who engages in cyberstalking, who the victims are, and how 
this impacts on victims. The following section will review research describing what is 
known about perpetrator and victim characteristics. Despite the suggestion that 
cyberstalkers cannot directly physically attack or harm their victims, there is some evidence 
to suggest that cyberstalking has detrimental effects on victims (Bocij, 2003; Sheridan & 
Grant, 2007). This section will demonstrate that the impact of cyberstalking on victims 
highlights the necessity to determine whether people perceive cyber-harassing behaviours 
as illegal. 
 
In an early attempt to describe the cyberstalker, Deirmenjian (1999) stated “the 
psychological profile of the cyberstalker reveals a sophisticated perpetrator. The typical 
cyberstalker is the emotionally disturbed loner who seeks attention and companionship in 
cyberspace and often becomes obsessed with someone he met in a chat room” (p. 410). 
However, Deirmenjian did not assess any cyberstalking perpetrator directly, nor did he 
have any direct contact with cyberstalked victims. Deirmenjian appears to assume that 
perpetrators of cyberstalking are seeking friendship. This contradicts the case of the Boehle 
family where the perpetrator engaged in cyberstalking as an act of revenge. The perpetrator 
described by Bocij, Bocij and McFarlane (2003) approached stalking methodically and had 
no history of mental illness.  Deirmenjian‟s description of the “typical cyberstalker” would 
not include Mr X and is unlikely to be relevant today. 
 
The lack of empirical research available on cyberstalking perpetrators has rendered 
devising typologies virtually impossible. However, drawing from cyberstalked victim 
accounts, McFarlane and Bocij (2003) have suggested a perpetrator typology. Twenty-four 
participants were recruited via victim support groups and agreed to take part in a semi-
structured interview. The data were coded by the researchers and an independent assessor. 
Findings pointed to four distinct cyberstalking subtypes; the vindictive, composed, intimate 
and collective. The „vindictive‟ cyberstalker was likely to have a previous criminal record 
and/or mental illness. Cyberstalkers who fell into this category typically made strange 
and/or unrelated comments to the victims, sent intimidating messages and were likely to 
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cross over into offline stalking. The researchers suggest these cyberstalkers had a medium 
to high degree of computer literacy. Yet, the most extravagant technological behaviour was 
to send Trojans to the victims. The „composed‟ cyberstalkers are less likely than the 
vindictive cyberstalker to threaten the victim but threats were also evident among this 
subgroup. The composed cyberstalker was also likely to engage in offline stalking 
behaviours, to have a possible criminal record, and a history of victimisation. The 
„intimate‟ category was divided into three groups (consisting of ex-intimates and 
infatuates). Ex-intimates were likely to impersonate the victim in chatrooms or buy goods 
using the victim‟s credit card. Infatuates were likely to send intimidating communications 
and were likely to engage in offline stalking behaviours. Both subtypes were likely to 
threaten the victim if they were rejected by the victim. Finally, „collective‟ cyberstalkers 
are suggested to have a high degree of computer literacy, allowing them to engage in 
spamming, mail-bombing, identity theft and information gathering behaviours. Threatening 
the victim and sending the victim intimidating messages were common among this group.  
 
As McFarlane and Bocij note, the data were gathered using a small sample. Additionally, 
the sample was recruited from victim support groups and may represent victims who 
experienced severe cyberstalking. The authors highlight that the ex-intimate and infatuate 
subtypes resemble the offline stalking subtypes of ex-intimates and intimacy seekers as 
described by Mullen, Pathé, Purcell, et al. (1999). However, the composed and collective 
cyberstalker subtypes do not compare to any offline stalking typologies.  
 
This typology must be treated with caution as the researchers did not assess any 
cyberstalkers directly. The data were gathered by interviewing victims and the researchers 
coded the data themselves. This may have led to interviewer bias which would reduce the 
reliability and validity of the research. The typology also appears to be incomplete and 
vague. It is not clear whether it was the researchers or the victims who assessed the 
perpetrator‟s degree of computer literacy. Perpetrators who were able to send their victims 
a virus were judged to have a medium to high level of computer literacy. This may not be 
as difficult as the researchers imply. Finally, the behaviours engaged in by some subtypes 
do not seem to be a comprehensive list of behaviours and the behaviours engaged in by 
composed subtypes are missing. This would suggest that there was not enough information 
collected in the study to devise a typology. 
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Table 8: Characteristics of Perpetrators and Victims of Cyberstalking 
Author Sample Perpetrators Victims 
D‟Ovidio & Doyle 
(2003) 
201 cases  
(reported to NYPD 
1996 – 2000) 
80% Males 
10 – 53 years old 
52% Female 
35% Male 
8% Educational 
Inst. 
5% Corporations 
Finkelhor, Mitchell & 
Wolak (2000) 
1501 youths  
(10 – 17 years) 
54% Males 
20% Female 
26% Unknown 
51% Male 
48% Female 
 
Table 8 above shows the breakdown of cyberstalking perpetrators and victims and their 
relationship prior to onset of harassment. D‟Ovidio and Doyle (2003) reviewed 201 cases 
of cyberstalking that were reported to the New York Police Department between 1996 and 
2000. Of those cases where a perpetrator had been apprehended, 80% were males aged 
between 10 and 53 years. This figure is similar to the male perpetration rates found in 
offline stalking. Finkelhor, Mitchell, and Wolak (2000) recruited 1,501 youths (aged 10 – 
17 years) to participate in a telephone interview about their experiences of online 
victimisation. They found 54% of perpetrators of online harassment were male. This figure 
is considerably lower than the figure reported by D‟Ovidio and Doyle. Notably, 26% of 
perpetrators were unknown. Although this study was conducted ten years ago, the figure 
illustrates that cyber-harassment can be perpetrated anonymously. However, if this group of 
perpetrators were male, the percentage of male perpetrators would resemble the figures 
found in offline stalking research. 
 
Whilst some studies suggest that victims of cyberstalking tend to be younger (e.g., Alexy, 
Burgess, Baker & Smoyak, 2005; Finkelhor, Mitchell & Wolak, 2000), other studies have 
found that older individuals are more likely to be cyberstalked (e.g., Bocij, 2003). The 
inconsistency in these findings may be due to sampling techniques. The study by Alexy et 
al. (2005) recruited students and the study by Finkelhor, Mitchell and Wolak (2000) 
targeted youths aged between 10 and 17 years. Bocij (2003) employed snowball sampling, 
which may have resulted in the sample characteristics being skewed. Bocij concluded that 
individuals aged thirty years and above are more likely to be cyberstalked because they use 
the Internet more than younger individuals. However, Dutton and Helsper (2007) surveyed 
2,350 British Internet users, judged to be representative of British population. They found 
that 69% of 25 to 44 year olds use the Internet in comparison to 78% of 18 to 24 year olds 
and 94% of those under 18 years. These findings contradict Bocij‟s assumption and suggest 
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that younger individuals are victims because they are more likely to use the Internet than 
older individuals. 
 
The percentage of male victims of cyberstalking ranges from 35% to 51% (D‟Ovidio & 
Doyle, 2003; Finkelhor, Mitchell & Wolak, 2000, respectively). These figures are higher 
than those reported for offline stalking. Whilst Alexy, Burgess, Baker and Smoyak (2005) 
did not report descriptive statistics, they reported that males were significantly more likely 
than females to have been cyberstalked than stalked (although this was a moderate effect). 
Finn (2004) also noted that males were more likely to be victims but did not provide the 
relevant descriptive statistics. Cues (such as gender, age, physical attractiveness) are 
indicative of one‟s social status. A reduction in these cues leads to perceived equalisation of 
social status among low and high status individuals or groups. This is known as the 
equalisation hypothesis (Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & Sethna, 1991). According to this 
hypothesis, males are targeted by cyberstalkers more on the Internet than offline because 
their social status is diminished. Whilst the evidence suggests that males and females are 
almost equally targeted by cyberstalkers, it is unclear whether males (or females) are 
targeted by male/female perpetrators, and research is needed to investigate this issue. 
 
Individuals who are socially isolated offline may be vulnerable to being cyberstalked. For 
example, Finn (2004) found that gay, lesbian, bisexual and transsexual individuals were 
twice as likely to experience online harassment compared to heterosexual participants. 
Bocij, Bocij and McFarlane (2003) provided the case study of Mr X who specifically 
targeted socially isolated individuals. Sheridan and Grant (2007) found that 11% of 
cyberstalked victims were disabled but did not find any disabled victims of offline stalking 
in their sample. McKenna and Bargh (2000) note that individuals who are stigmatised 
offline may be more likely to use the Internet to communicated with others to feel less 
socially isolated. Indeed, Bocij et al. suggest that socially excluded individuals are more 
likely to engage in online conversations, and more reluctant to terminate online 
relationships. More research is needed to gain an understanding of why such groups would 
become the target of the cyberstalker. 
 
Descriptions of the prior relationship between the victim and perpetrator of cyberstalking 
are similar to the perpetrator-victim relationship for offline stalking. However, Bocij (2003) 
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found that 42% of cyberstalked victims were stalked by a stranger. Bocij concluded that 
stranger-cyberstalking was frequent. However, Finn (2004) found that participants who 
reported receiving five or more unsolicited, harassing emails or instant messages were 
likely to be contacted by a stranger (7% and 2%, respectively) compared to acquaintances 
(2% and 2%, respectively) and “significant others” (7% and 1%, respectively). Whilst 
stranger-stalking was the largest single category, the majority of perpetrators were known 
to the victims. Similarly, Sheridan and Grant (2007) reported the prior victim-perpetrator 
relationship mirrored the prior perpetrator-victim relationship reported in offline stalking 
research. These findings highlight the need for future research to clarify the prior 
perpetrator-victim relationship for cyber-harassment in comparison to offline stalking. 
 
2.3.3 Anonymity as an Incentive to Engage in Cyber-Harassment 
 
The anonymous nature of cyberspace may encourage individuals to engage in cyber-
harassing behaviours. The anonymity of online communications has lead to individuals 
becoming less inhibited, resulting in greater disclosures of personal information (i.e., the 
stranger-on-the-train phenomenon), and higher instances of aggression. This section 
explains how the anonymous nature of cyberspace produces uninhibited behaviour. 
Specifically, social context cues theory, social identification mode of deindividuation 
effects (SIDE) and the „online disinhibition effect‟ will be described. 
 
According to social context cues theory, the lack of social context cues available in online 
communications produces feelings of anonymity. In turn, feelings of anonymity lead to 
uninhibited behaviour. Sproull and Kiesler (1986) argue that “social context influences 
information exchange through perception, cognitive interpretation, and communication 
behaviour” (p. 1495). According to this theory, cues can be either static (i.e., people‟s 
gender, age, or appearance), or dynamic (i.e., non-verbal cues). When individuals perceive 
social cues, they interpret the cues in order with cognitive schemas, and this produces 
emotional states. The cognitive interpretation of cues and the resulting emotional state are 
used to regulate one‟s own behaviour. According to Sproull and Kiesler, strong social cues 
encourage individuals to focus on another individual. A reduction in the social context cues 
available produces feelings of anonymity. These feelings of anonymity lead to self-centred 
and unregulated behaviour, and extreme forms of behaviour result. Sproull and Kiesler 
66 
 
tested their theory in a workplace context. Five hundred and thirteen participants were 
recruited from two divisions of a business. Participants were interviewed, completed an 80-
item questionnaire and a content analysis was performed on emails they received in the 
three days prior to the interviews. The researchers found evidence of uninhibited behaviour 
which supported their theory, and noted emails were self-absorbed and less personal. The 
theory received further support by Kiesler, Siegel and McGuire (1984), who asked 
participants to solve a choice-dilemma in three different conditions; face-to-face (FtF), via 
computer (anonymously), and via computer (non-anonymously). They found that 
computer-mediated groups took longer to reach a decision about the dilemma, participated 
more equally, and demonstrated higher levels of uninhibited behaviour than FtF groups. 
 
Whilst social context cues theory suggests that anonymity leads to impersonal online 
behaviours, SIDE theory argues that interpersonal communication does not become more 
impersonal. Rather, self-stereotyping occurs. This occurs when one‟s individualism is 
reduced and one is perceived in accordance to stereotypical group characteristics, resulting 
in greater adherence to group norms (Rogers & Lea, 2005). This means that individuals 
justify their behaviour in accordance to their perceptions of real or imagined group 
behaviour. Lea, Spears, and deGroot (2001) explain that this occurs due to visual 
anonymity, which leads to a reduction in self-awareness. This reduction in self-awareness 
increases uninhibited behaviour and hostile behaviour can result.  
 
Suler (2004) uses the „online disinhibition effect‟ to describe the way in which online 
anonymity has led to more uninhibited behaviour. According to Suler, people 
compartmentalise different aspects of themselves. This means their online identity can be 
separated from their offline identity, allowing individuals to relinquish responsibility for 
their behaviour in cyberspace. Suler suggests that „online disinhibition‟ can be either benign 
(indicative of people disclosing more personal information about themselves in online 
communications) or toxic (indicative of people engaging in criminal behaviour, flaming or 
accessing pornography). Cyberstalking is an example of toxic disinhibition (Bocij, 2004). 
According to Suler, five factors contribute to the „online disinhibition effect‟ – anonymity, 
invisibility, solipsistic introjections, dissociative imagination and minimisation of status 
and authority. Suler argues that anonymity is one of the most influential factors leading to 
uninhibited behaviour and that invisibility serves to amplify this effect. Solipsistic 
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introjections refers to the way that individuals feel that they connect deeply with another 
individual online, and this perceived connection becomes entangled in fantasy role playing. 
Dissociative imagination refers to individuals perceive their online selves as engaging in a 
type of game that is not bound by the same rules and norms that apply in the offline world. 
By splitting their online selves from their offline self, individuals reduce feelings of 
responsibility for any behaviour they engage in online. Finally, Suler suggests that the 
absence of social cues available online leads to reduced perceptions of other people‟s 
authority. These principles when combined contribute to uninhibited online behaviour and 
may explain why some individuals engage in cyberstalking but would not engage in offline 
stalking. 
 
Social context cues, SIDE theory, and the „online disinhibition effect‟ all argue that 
anonymity on the Internet can lead to positive or negative uninhibited behaviour. Bocij 
(2004) suggests that feelings of anonymity may contribute to feelings of invulnerability. 
However, Lea, Spears and deGroot (2001) investigated the role of visual anonymity in 
attractiveness to groups. They randomly assigned 56 female students to anonymous or non-
anonymous conditions to engage in a group discussion about nationality. Following the 
discussions, participants were asked to complete four questionnaires measuring group 
perceptions, group relations, individual perceptions of group prototypicality and British 
perceptions. Visual anonymity was found to increase evaluative concern amongst 
participants. This means that participants were more aware of their individual behaviour. 
Contrary to Bocij‟s assumption, the findings suggest that visual anonymity may increase 
feelings of vulnerability. However, Lea et al. acknowledge that other forms of anonymity 
(such as nominal, biographical and domiciliary) may contribute to a reduction in feelings of 
accountability for online behaviours. This is highlighted by research by Coffey and 
Woolworth (2004). Following a content analysis of web forum postings aimed at helping a 
community to cope with a series of robberies and assaults, the researchers found that 80% 
of all postings contained messages of anger and outrage. Of those who expressed negative 
racial views, only 25% included their email addresses. It was concluded that the majority of 
individuals expressed antagonistic views because they could remain completely 
anonymous. On the other hand, individuals may be aware of their behaviour but do not 
expect to be held accountable for it. In relation to cyber-harassment, Bocij argues 
perpetrators may feel they are above the law and can do what they want. Technological 
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advances allow individuals to remain anonymous online. For example, remailers allow 
individuals to send and receive emails with no real trace of who they are. Email addresses 
can be changed with ease, allowing people to change their identity. The accessibility of 
encryption software and software designed to delete files held on a computer beyond 
recovery has increased. Future research would benefit from investigating the specific forms 
of anonymity that make the Internet an attractive space to engage in criminal activity. 
 
2.3.4 Perceptions of Cyberstalking 
 
People‟s perceptions of cyber-harassment and cyberstalking are crucial in helping victims 
to cope with their experiences. One key feature of the judicial system is that perpetrators 
will be judged by their peers. In other words, a jury decides whether the perpetrator should 
have known that his/her behaviour constitutes harassment. This is known as the test of 
reasonableness. This test is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, Cupach and Spitzberg 
(2004) note that females are more aware of privacy intrusions than males. For example, 
Agatston, Kowalski, and Limber (2007) recruited 150 middle and high school students to 
take part in focus groups to investigate their perceptions of cyber-bullying. Whilst the 
students‟ perceptions were not a reliable indication of the prevalence of cyber-bullying, 
female students were more likely than male students to perceive cyber-bullying as a 
problem. Secondly, Whitty (2007) suggests that people split online interactions from the 
offline world and thus, individuals may not apply legislation to online behaviours. Research 
conducted by Alexy, Burgess, Baker and Smoyak (2005) lends some support to Whitty‟s 
theory. The researchers investigated students‟ perceptions of cyberstalking. Four hundred 
and fourteen male and 342 female undergraduate participants were asked to read a vignette 
depicting a genuine case of cyberstalking and answer questions relating to the vignette. The 
vignette described the cyberstalking of Cynthia Armistead (see section 2:2 for a description 
of this case). Despite the severity of the case, only 30% of participants in the study by 
Alexy et al. (2005) labelled the case as cyberstalking and 7% of participants did not label it 
harassment. Participants were asked to report their experiences of cyberstalking. 
Interestingly, those who had not been cyberstalked were more likely than victims to report 
that they would not report the incident to the police if they were the victim depicted in the 
vignette. Those who had been cyberstalked were less likely than non-victims to label the 
vignette as stalking. However, it should be noted that 45% of the participants had attended a 
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course concerning interpersonal violence and attendance at this course may have influenced 
the findings. The authors did not report differences in labelling the vignette as cyberstalking 
between those who had attended the course and those who had not. This would have been 
an interesting variable to consider as the findings may have been influenced by priming. 
 
These results have potentially major implications: if these crimes are not reported, there 
will be a failure to identify and implement adequate intervention strategies to help victims 
to cope with their experiences. Perpetrators will not be prosecuted for their behaviour and 
this will perpetuate the prevalence of cyberstalking. Second, for those perpetrators who are 
apprehended, the jury may find the perpetrator not guilty because they do not perceive the 
legislation as applying to online behaviours. Research is needed to further explore whether 
cyber-harassing behaviours are perceived as illegal, and assess why this may or may not be 
the case. The current research attempted to explore these issues. 
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Chapter 3: Methodological Issues and Considerations 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter has three sections which consider the methodological issues pertaining to the 
research reported in this thesis. The chapter begins with a discussion of the methodological 
and philosophical issues pertaining to mixed methods research. This section includes a 
discussion of the methodological debates and paradigm wars relating to quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to conducting research, and introduces the philosophy of conducting 
mixed methods research. The section finishes with a rationale for the mixed methods 
approach of this thesis. 
 
As the majority of research in this thesis used online research methods, the second section 
of this chapter focuses on internet-mediated research methods (IMR). The advantages and 
disadvantages of IMR are considered in terms of cost, offering incentives, sampling, data 
quality, attrition and missing data, the equivalence to offline methods, and self-disclosure. 
Consideration is given to methods of online interviewing, with specific focus on Instant 
Messenger as a research tool. 
 
Finally, the chapter explores the ethical considerations of this research. Ethical 
considerations were determined by the BPS Code of Conduct and include informed 
consent, risk of harm, anonymity and confidentiality, debriefing, and right to withdraw. 
Ethical decisions made during this project were further complicated by the choice to use 
online methods of data collection, and particular focus is given to this. 
 
3.2 Mixed Methods Research 
 
3.2.1 Methodological Debates and Paradigm Wars 
 
The methodologies and methods used by researchers are dictated by their paradigmatic 
orientation (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). A paradigm is a worldview encompassing beliefs 
and practices that guide the research process (Morgan, 2007). The two dominant paradigms 
within social science research are positivism and constructivism. Positivism is associated 
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with quantitative methodologies, whilst constructivism is associated with qualitative 
methods. However, the two paradigms differ on a range of philosophical and 
methodological issues, which has resulted in a paradigm war (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). 
Despite philosophical and methodological differences, the paradigms share agreement that 
research should be conducted rigorously, minimising potential sources of invalidity, and 
the need to embed theory with empirical investigation (Johnson & Onweugbuzie, 2004; 
Yardley & Bishop, 2008). Despite this superficial agreement, purists from the paradigms 
contend that it is inappropriate to mix qualitative and quantitative methodologies because 
of philosophical differences between the paradigms (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009).  
 
However, recently there has been a rise in a third paradigm – mixed methods. Researchers 
who utilise mixed methods counter the incompatibility thesis by contending it is possible 
to mix qualitative and quantitative methodologies. One school of thought associated with 
mixed methods is pragmatism. Pragmatism postulates that research methodologies should 
be determined by the research questions, and not the belief systems of the researcher 
(Bryman, 1984). This means pragmatists do not adopt the either/or approach in 
determining whether qualitative or quantitative methods are used to address research 
questions. Rather, pragmatists adopt the „what works‟ approach to answering research 
questions and argue for a more holistic study of phenomenon (Teddie & Tashakkori, 
2009). 
 
3.2.2 Quantitative Approaches 
 
Quantitative approaches to conducting research are associated with the positivist paradigm 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). Philosophically, positivism 
postulates that there is a single reality that can be objectively observed, also known as 
naive realism (Henwood, 2000; Michell, 2003). Positivism is concerned with empirical 
investigations that are value-free, as value-laden research is considered to confound 
empirical investigation which reduces objectivity. The possibility of causal linkages is an 
important tenet of positivism, as the identification of causes of phenomenon allow for 
prediction and control of the phenomenon under investigation (Teddie & Tashakkori, 
2009). 
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The philosophy of positivism is purposefully aligned with the physical sciences in order to 
gain scientific recognition for the study of social and psychological phenomena. Like the 
physical sciences, problems to be investigated are considered to comprise of discrete parts 
or units that are quantitatively measurable (Michell, 1997). For example, as length can be 
quantitatively measured (e.g., using inches, feet, etc.), attitudes consist of discrete parts 
that can be investigated using quantitative measurements. Furthermore, as phenomena 
consist of discrete parts that are measured quantitatively, the data gathered are analysed 
using statistical analysis (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). 
 
The quantitative research process is distinctive, and is based on the hypothetico-deductive 
model (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). Historically, the roots of positivism can be seen in the 
Socratic Method, which postulated that truth could be accessed through questioning after 
careful a priori reasoning. Thus, the hypothetico-deductive model involves the derivation 
of hypotheses from theory, which are empirically and rigorously tested to either support or 
refute the theoretical assumptions (Bryman, 1984; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Johnson & 
Onweugbuzie, 2004). Using the model, quantitative research aims to establish cause and 
effect among the phenomenon under investigation. Cause and effect are established by 
manipulating independent variables and examining the effect on the dependent variable. 
By conducting research in a similar fashion to research approaches of the natural sciences, 
quantitative research in the social sciences ensures research is highly replicable with high 
internal validity.  Based on measurement theory, Michell (1997) argued the primary aim of 
quantitative research is to develop reliable measurement tools. This is achieved by 
standardising measurements that have high internal validity. By achieving reliability and 
internal validity, empirical studies can be replicated, allowing theory to be further refuted 
or substantiated. Should the null hypothesis be accepted, researchers refine the theory and 
devise new hypotheses that are then tested to explain the phenomenon. The knowledge 
accumulating from the quantitative approach is accepted as factual (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994).  
 
Quantitative methodologies aim to gather numerical data which can be statistically 
analysed. Thus, research designs include correlational studies, surveys, experiments and 
quasi experiments (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). By aiming to gather numerical data, 
quantitative studies can recruit large numbers of participants either using probability or 
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purposive sampling, which can then be generalised to the wider target population. It is a 
nomothetic method which aims to identify laws that can predict at a general or macro level. 
 
Teddie and Tashakkori (2009) noted several widely recognised criticisms of quantitative 
research. By establishing cause and effect, quantitative research postulates that the effect 
will occur if certain pre-determined circumstances exist. However, the effect cannot be 
guaranteed in all cases. In this respect, quantitative research is concerned with macro 
predictions and cannot be specified to micro cases. Furthermore, the problem of 
verification exists, meaning that more than one theory can be supported through empirical 
investigation. Thus, multiple explanations of the existence of phenomena exist, and one 
theoretical position cannot be upheld as the truth. Finally, quantitative research relies on 
operationally defining the problem under investigation. By operationally defining the 
problem, researchers restrict the applicability and comparability of findings of research to 
other circumstances involving the problem under investigation which have differing 
operational definitions. Furthermore, whilst quantitative research can provide numerical 
valuations on attitudes and beliefs, it cannot explain individuals‟ meanings behind their 
attitudes and/or beliefs (Yardley & Bishop, 2008). These issues are apparent in quantitative 
research investigating offline and online harassment. For example, differing operational 
definitions of harassment and differing measurements have produced varied estimates of 
prevalence for both online and offline harassment (Sheridan & Grant, 2007). In studies 
measuring prevalence, quantitative measures can provide prevalence rates on behaviours 
operationally defined by the researchers but cannot explain what these behaviours mean to 
participants. 
 
3.2.3 Qualitative Approaches 
 
Some authors (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009) argue qualitative 
approaches to research are a product of positivism, borne from the criticisms of 
quantitative research. Qualitative research is associated with the interpretivist (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994) or constructivist (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009) philosophical orientation. 
Whilst the philosophical basis of qualitative research varies, the underlying philosophical 
arguments are essentially interpretivist.  
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There is a polarisation of the philosophies underlying positivism and interpretivism 
(Bryman, 1984), and as such, interpretivism rejects many of the philosophical tenets of 
positivism. Epistemologically, interpretivism rejects the positivist notion that the 
researcher can remain objectively distant from the research participant (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009; Yardley & Bishop, 2008), and emphasises 
sine qua non (i.e., obtaining a worldview from the participant‟s point of view) (Bryman, 
1984). Interpretivism considers all research inquiry to be value-laden, and researchers need 
to consider and reflect on their own values when investigating a phenomenon (King, 2000; 
Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). Ontologically, the interpretivist paradigm rejects the notion 
of a single reality in favour of the notion of multiple realities, that are constructed both at 
the societal and individual levels (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). 
The interpretivist paradigm postulates cause and effect relationships are impossible to 
verify, and as such should not be the focus of research in the social sciences. Finally, 
whilst positivism highlights the generalisability of findings, the interpretivist paradigm 
highlights that transferability is possible but the onus lies with the reader to decide whether 
transfer of the findings is relevant to their research (Kuper, Lingard & Levinson, 2008). 
Authors often assert that transferability is one of the greatest strengths of qualitative 
research, and one of the more important tenets of qualitative research (e.g. Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Yardley & Bishop, 2008). 
 
Whilst quantitative research is theory-led (i.e., deductive), qualitative research is concerned 
with generating theory (i.e., inductive) (Bryman, 1984; Johnson & Onweugbuzie, 2004; 
Yardley & Bishop, 2008). To attain greater insights to phenomena, qualitative methods 
include participant observation and semi- or unstructured interviews (Bryman, 1984). The 
data collected using qualitative methods is rich and in-depth, allowing the researcher to 
investigate a multitude of variables that are not restricted by the researcher‟s imagination 
(Yardley & Bishop, 2008).   
 
A further strength of qualitative research is gaining an understanding about the meanings 
individuals attach to social phenomena (Mason, 2006). Meaning relates to the intentions, 
cognitions, affect and evaluations of the participant (Maxwell, 2002). Qualitative research 
is committed to understanding how participants perceive or make sense of phenomena 
within a specific context (Yardley & Bishop, 2008). Whilst mean-making processes are 
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important within qualitative methodologies, Dilley (2008) notes the interview schedule 
may structure meaning during the interviews, and may be likely due to priming effects.  
 
Qualitative research is considered to counter the criticisms of quantitative research by 
focusing on phenomenon at the micro level, understanding the meaning individuals place 
on social phenomenon, and by allowing for the transfer of data. However, Teddie and 
Tashakkori (2009) note that qualitative research is criticised on the grounds that it is 
unscientific. As the research process is subjective and value-laden, there are concerns that 
credibility issues exist (Yardley & Bishop, 2008). However, researchers are increasingly 
being encouraged to increase the transparency of the data collection and analytical phases, 
which may serve to increase the credibility of qualitative research.  
 
3.2.4 Mixed Methods Approaches 
 
Mixed methods approaches to research are also known as multi-methods or multi-strategy 
approaches (Bryman, 2006). The basic premise of mixed methods (MM) research is the 
methods used to investigate a phenomenon should be dictated by the research questions 
(Bryman, 1984; Mason, 2006; Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009).  Johnson and Onweugbuzie 
(2004) define MM as „the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines 
quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or 
language into a single study‟ (p. 17). 
 
The philosophical underpinnings of pragmatism and the transformative perspective are 
associated with MM (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). As this thesis adopts a pragmatic 
approach to conducting research, this discussion will focus on the pragmatic approach as 
the transformative perspective has been discussed by other authors (e.g., Teddie & 
Tashakkori, 2009). 
 
Epistemologically, MM researchers postulate that quantitative and qualitative methods 
require imagination and interpretation (Yardley & Bishop, 2008). Whilst imagination and 
interpretation may be associated with qualitative methods, quantitative researchers require 
imagination to identify variables that may explain a phenomenon. Furthermore, the 
identification of appropriate statistical procedures that address the research question also 
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requires imagination. Multi-methods research rejects the incompatibility thesis, with a 
major tenet being that quantitative and qualitative methods can be combined and 
complement each other. This is evident as Teddie and Tashakkori (2009) define 
pragmatism as „a deconstructive paradigm that debunks concepts such as “truth” and 
“reality” and focuses instead on “what works” as the truth‟ (p. 7–8). The rejection of the 
incompatibility thesis, and the stance that quantitative and qualitative methods can be 
combined and complement each other is arguably one of the greatest strengths of MM 
research (Mason, 2006; Yardley & Bishop, 2008). 
 
Teddie and Tashakkori (2009) refer to the „inductive-deductive research cycle‟ and argue 
that MM research is essential to the holistic understanding of a phenomenon. Research 
designs can be either concurrent or sequential, with the data analysis being combined, 
equating to a single study. The reference to an inductive-deductive cycle suggests that 
qualitative research must precede quantitative research. Such a cycle appears logical with 
qualitative research exploring an unknown phenomenon, and quantitative research 
attempting to generalise the findings to a wider population. However, accepting qualitative 
research as preparation for, or informing quantitative research indicates the acceptance of 
positivism, and that qualitative research is inferior to quantitative research (Bryman, 1984).  
 
Some authors associate MM research with triangulation (e.g., Moran-Ellis, Alexander, 
Cronin, et al., 2006), which allows conclusions drawn from one research method to be 
evaluated against the conclusions from another method (Greene & McClintock, 1985). 
Blaikie (1991) argues that triangulation and the mixed methods approach to research is 
adopted so that issues of bias and validity of one method (e.g., quantitative) can be 
overcome by using the other method (e.g., qualitative). The divergence of results indicates 
the measurements used to investigate a phenomenon are flawed. However, if different 
methods produce similar conclusions, the validity of the research is increased and 
confidence is raised in relation to the conclusions (Blaikie, 1991; Bryman, 2006). 
However, following a systematic review of MM studies, Bryman concluded that 
triangulation is often a product of conducting MM research, rather than an aim of MM 
research. 
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However, MM approaches to research have not escaped criticism, indicating MM 
approaches are controversial (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). Hammersley (2000) warned 
that pragmatic mixed methods research may discourage consideration of methodological 
and theoretical issues relating to qualitative and quantitative research methods. Similarly, 
Mason (2006) notes the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of MM approaches 
are not as fully developed as quantitative and qualitative approaches. Furthermore, there 
are few guidelines referring to the appropriateness of different MM designs or how to 
combine quantitative and qualitative approaches. This latter point was highlighted by 
Bryman‟s (2006) systematic review, which revealed that 27% of MM studies reviewed did 
not use separate research instruments. Bryman queried whether such studies equate to a 
MM approach. However, until the MM guidelines are more developed, researchers are free 
to subjective interpretation of what they consider MM approaches. 
 
3.2.5 Rationale for Mixed Methods Approach 
 
The studies in this thesis formed a sequential mixed-method design as described by Teddie 
and Tashakkori (2009). The studies can be described as: 
 
QUAN QUAL QUAL QUAL 
 
Whilst Teddie and Tashakkori (2009) advocate the inductive-deductive research cycle, this 
thesis contradicts this suggestion. However, the position taken throughout this thesis is that 
it may not be appropriate to begin MM research with qualitative methods and progress to 
quantitative methods, and it is more appropriate to return to the MM philosophical position 
that research questions should dictate the methods. The reasons for beginning the research 
process with a quantitative study are two-fold. First, the methods used in this thesis were 
informed by the research questions. Second, cyber-harassed victims were the target 
population for Study 2. However, victims are not easily located as there is no central 
location to recruit cyber-harassed victims from. Thus, the first study facilitated sampling 
for the second study. Furthermore, the findings from one study provided some indication 
of the types of questions to be posed to participants in subsequent studies, lending to the 
sequential nature of the research.  
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Three of the four studies in this thesis were qualitatively driven, indicating a preference for 
qualitative methods. However, quantitative methods have dominated inquiry into cyber-
harassment. Quantitative methods have sought to demonstrate the prevalence, nature and 
extent of cyber-harassment. Whilst such methods have been useful in quantifying cyber-
harassment, a broader understanding of cyber-harassment is required. Thus, the qualitative 
focus of the studies in this thesis aimed to identify this gap in knowledge by expanding 
knowledge in the field. This will be achieved by exploring victims‟ and non-victims‟ 
understandings and mean-making processes relating to the issue of cyber-harassment. 
 
3.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Internet-Mediated Research 
 
The discussion of this chapter will now focus on issues relating to internet-mediated 
research (IMR) for quantitative and qualitative research. IMR presents novel benefits and 
challenges for research, and as the first three studies in this thesis use this approach, 
discussion of such methods is warranted. Following a discussion on the advantages and 
disadvantages of IMR, the section will evaluate the online interview, with particular focus 
on using Instant Messenger as a research tool. The aim of this section is provide a clear 
rationale for using IMR following careful consideration of the problems associated with 
conducting research via the Internet. 
 
3.3.1 Costs 
 
It is generally accepted that the financial costs associated with IMR are less than offline 
research. IMR eliminates the need for costs associated with stationary, printing, 
distribution of a survey, and transcribing interview data (Granello & Wheaton, 2004). 
However, Fricker and Schonlau (2002) warn that researcher labour costs are the greatest 
expenditure in IMR, and are often overlooked in costing estimates. They argue if over 
1,000 participants are required for a study, there will be minimal savings of IMR compared 
to postal surveys. Upon conducting a cost analysis of a web-survey compared to a postal 
survey, Raziano, Jayadevappa, Valenzula, Weiner, and Lavizzo-Mourey (2001) found the 
web-survey cost 27% less to conduct. However, Schleyer and Forrest (2000) argue for a 
sample of less than 189, a postal survey is cost-effective, and if over 348 a web-survey is 
cost-effective. This suggests that for quantitative IMR there is an optimal number of 
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participants that make IMR cost-effective. 
 
However, the cost-effectiveness of conducting qualitative research is also notable within 
IMR traditions. Chen and Hinton (1999) regard the interview method as the most 
expensive form of offline research. As with conducting quantitative IMR, the financial and 
time costs associated with recruiting participants and setting up the interviews are minimal. 
Arguably, one of the major advantages of conducting qualitative methods online is that 
data gathered is automatically saved; eliminating costs associated with transcription and 
associated errors (Chen & Hinton, 1999; Davis, Bolding, Hart, Sherr & Elford, 2004; 
Selwyn & Robson, 1998; Seymour, 2001). 
 
Along with reduced financial costs, the research process for IMR is, in most instances, 
more efficient than offline methods. Granello and Wheaton (2004) note the average data 
collection period for offline surveys is four to six weeks, compared to two to three days for 
IMR. This is because sending and receiving surveys is shorter than, for example, a postal 
survey (Fricker & Schonlau, 2002). In addition, qualitative data is automatically 
transcribed, and quantitative data can be automatically transferred to statistical packages 
(e.g., SPSS), eliminating the need for data entry and reducing data entry errors (Kraut, 
Olson, Banaji, et al., 2004). However, Fricker and Schonlau (2002) argue claims about the 
efficiency of IMR ignore the preparation time of research materials, which is often longer 
than offline methods. 
 
3.3.2 Incentives 
 
Whilst there is consensus that incentives increase response rates in offline surveys 
(Church, 1993), thereby reducing non-response bias (O‟Neil & Penrod, 2001), it is unclear 
whether incentives are beneficial or required in IMR. Incentives can alter participants‟ 
motivation, thus endangering validity (Göritz, 2006). Whilst Baron and Siepman (2000) 
argue the Internet encourages altruistic behaviour, reducing the need for incentives, this 
view is not shared by all. Bekkers (2007), on the premise that altruistic behaviour is a 
socially desirable behaviour and online anonymity reduces socially desirable behaviour, 
hypothesised that altruistic behaviour should be decreased in IMR. To test this, she 
recruited 1,964 volunteers to participate in a web-based dictator study after which 
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participants could choose to keep a monetary incentive or give it to charity. Findings 
supported the hypothesis, as only 6% participants chose to give their incentive to charity. 
However, the study indicates a desire to retain incentives and did not investigate the 
relationship between incentives and response rate and retention. In a meta-analysis of web-
based experiments, Göritz (2006) evaluated the impact of incentives and response rates of 
32 studies, and monetary incentives on retention of 26 studies. She found that incentives 
increased response rates by 3% and retention by 4%. In another study, O‟Neil and Penrod 
(2001) investigated the impact of incentives on completing a web-survey measuring 
attitudes towards the death penalty. They recruited 180 participants from a non-student 
sample and 51 students to complete the survey. The findings indicated that whilst 
incentives encourage response rates from non-students, no such relationship was found for 
the student sample.  
 
Overall, research suggests that incentives encourage response rates and retention of 
participants in web-based surveys and/or experiments to a small degree. However, this 
trend may not apply to undergraduate student samples. Considering the research described, 
the decision was made not to offer incentives to the undergraduate students participating in 
the first three studies of this thesis. 
 
3.3.3 Sampling 
 
The accessibility of large samples recruited via the Internet is a major advantage of IMR 
(Birnbaum, 2004; Hewson, Yule, Laurent & Vogel, 2003). For example, Gosling, Vazire, 
Srivastava and John (2004) reported a sample of 361,703 participants who completed an 
online personality survey. Whilst, the timeframe for collecting the sample is unclear, the 
costs involved in collecting an offline sample of this size would render it unlikely. 
 
A major concern is that online samples are not representative of the target population, 
meaning that findings cannot be generalised and lack validity (Hewson, Yule, Laurent & 
Vogel, 2003; Mathy, Kerr & Haydin, 2003). One contributory factor is the digital divide. 
This refers to “a difference in the take-up, or effective use of, ICTs between social groups 
or nations” (Liff & Shepherd, 2004: p. 1). The digital divide has been associated with 
gender, age, education, ethnicity, and geographical regions. For example, Granello and 
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Wheaton (2004) reported that Internet users are likely to consist of highly educated white 
males, aged 35 years or younger. More recently, Dutton and Helsper (2007) reported that 
Internet users consist of males, students, the highly educated, and those on a high income. 
Whilst they report the gender divide is narrowing, males and females use the Internet in 
different ways, with females less confident about their abilities in using the Internet. 
Additionally, Kaye and Johnson (1999) warns that the inclusivity of the Internet means that 
once a study is placed on the Internet, anyone who finds the study can complete it which 
may threaten generalisability to the target population. These studies highlight critical 
concerns in the representativeness of IMR. 
 
Concerns over the representativeness of research and generalisability of findings are not 
restricted to IMR. In particular, psychological research has heavily relied on recruiting 
undergraduate students in convenience sampling (Reips, 2000). For example, Gosling, 
Vazire, Srivastava and John (2004) reviewed 510 studies published in the Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology in 2002. Of the samples recruited, 85% were 
undergraduate students, of which 71–77% were females (experimental and correlational 
studies, respectively). In contrast, IMR samples have had more even ratios of male and 
female participants (see Buchanan, Johnson & Goldberg, 2005; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava 
& John, 2004; Schwarzer, Mueller & Greenglass, 1999). Age and ethnicity have also been 
found to be more diverse in Internet samples than samples recruited offline (see Gosling et 
al., 2004; Smith & Leigh, 1997). These studies indicate that online samples can be more 
heterogeneous and diverse than samples traditionally used in psychological research, and 
may help to increase the validity of psychological research (Baron & Siepman, 2000; 
Krantz & Dalal, 2000; Kraut, Olsen, Banaji, et al., 2004). 
 
The voluntary status of participants recruited in IMR is more likely to meet ethical 
demands than offline methods as participants are not coerced into participation. However, 
this increases the danger of volunteer biases being introduced into IMR, endangering 
validity (Kaye & Johnson, 1999; Reips, 2000; Strickland, Moloney, Dietrich, Myerburg, 
Cotsonis & Johnson, 2003). Smith and Leigh (1997) warn that volunteer biases introduce 
systematic error, as extraneous variables (such as the participants‟ motivation, personality, 
attitudes, and situational conditions) are not known to the researcher. Whilst there is a 
potential source of systematic error introduced in IMR due to the voluntary status of 
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participants, participants do not feel coerced into participating in research as is the trend in 
psychological research when undergraduate students take part for course credit. In 
addition, participants are freer to exercise their right to withdraw. This trade-off between 
systematic error and ethical considerations makes the Internet an attractive medium to 
conduct research. 
 
Low response rates have been associated with IMR, indicating sampling bias and 
threatening the validity of research (Mathy, Kerr & Haydin, 2003; Schmidt, 1997). In a 
meta-analysis of 49 studies reporting the use of 68 surveys, Cook, Heath and Thompson 
(2000) found the average response rate for postal surveys was 56% compared to 40% for 
web-surveys. In another study, Fricker and Schonlau (2002) noted important differences in 
responding in a review of studies using email and postal surveys. They found that, if given 
a choice, participants preferred to return postal surveys than via email with a few 
exceptions. In studies whereby participants preferred to respond via email, the samples 
were homogeneous, indicating sampling bias. It is noteworthy that the studies reviewed 
were in 1990s, during which time the Internet was not as accessible as it is now. 
Importantly, Krosnick (1999) argues that telephone surveys generally have difficulty in 
reaching recommended response rates of 60%, and face-to-face surveys fail to reach a 70% 
response rate and there is a trend of falling response rates. Kaye and Johnson (1999) 
suggest it is difficult to calculate response rates for IMR because there is no way to know 
who has seen an online survey as they are accessible to whoever finds them. Despite 
concerns relating to sampling bias, the accessibility of samples (discussed above) indicates 
that large samples can be obtained in IMR, which increases the power of studies and 
minimises sampling bias (Birnbaum, 2004; Hewson, Yule, Laurent & Voegl, 2003; Reips, 
2000). 
 
3.3.4 Data Quality 
 
The quality of data gathered via IMR can be affected by various problems that do not 
present in offline research methods. Problems that threaten data quality need to be 
carefully considered and strategies put in place to cope with anticipated and unanticipated 
problems. Researchers face practical issues which relate to ensuring measurement tools are 
presented in the same format to all participants (see Kaye & Johnson, 1999), and this may 
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be more of a cause of concern depending on the methods employed. Data quality may also 
be affected by multiple submissions, attrition and missing data (Reips, 2000). Finally, 
consideration needs to be given to the equivalence of online to offline surveys, and the role 
of anonymity and self-disclosure in influencing participants‟ responses (Davies, 1999; 
Joinson, 2001b). 
 
3.3.4.1 Practical Issues 
 
There is general consensus that the researcher has little control over the environmental 
condition under which participants take part in the research (Smith & Leigh, 1997). 
Consequently, IMR is associated with greater variance in participants‟ network and 
computer speeds (Reips, 2000), how visual information is presented to participants (Kaye 
& Johnson, 1999), and participants‟ ability in using the Internet (Strickland, Moloney, 
Dietrich, et al., 2003). Such issues pose greater problems for particular methods (such as 
experimental, survey or interview methods). For example, Plant, Hammond and 
Whitehouse (2003) compared the response time of eight different mice by measuring the 
time between pressing a button on the mouse and the computer receiving the signal. They 
found large degrees of variance between each of the mice. However, such findings would 
have greater implications for experimental research whereby the dependent variable is 
response time compared to the completion of a survey that does not measure response 
time.  
 
Research has also illustrated that visual information presented to participants can be 
affected by the quality of their computer screen in terms of pixels, luminance and flicker 
(Krantz, 2000). Whilst the hardware participants use is beyond the researcher‟s control, 
such a practical issue may be important if graphics are included in, or an essential element 
of the research. For example, researchers using an online survey may wish to include 
pictures or videos to motivate and encourage participation. However, the inclusion of 
pictures or videos may be problematic depending on the hardware participants are using 
and software, for example, their Internet browsers. 
 
The presentation of online surveys to participants is an important aspect of methods used in 
IMR. It is important to ensure that participants see the survey in the same format as is 
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intended by the research, as variations in presentation may confound the research. 
However, researchers cannot guarantee the survey is perceived by participants as the 
researcher intended (Reips, 2000). One potential reason for difference to occur is that 
different Internet browsers may load web pages including the survey differently. Another 
possibility is that the browser the survey is designed on may have different capabilities that 
cannot be loaded by different browsers that participants may use.  
 
One element beyond the researchers control is the environmental setting under which the 
participant engages in the research. For example, participants can use multiple applications 
on their computer (Reips, 2000). So, participants have the technological ability to complete 
a survey or take part in an interview whilst simultaneously browsing Internet pages, using 
Microsoft Office applications, listening to music, etc. The ability to use multiple 
applications introduces „noise‟ into the research process that would not exist if participants 
completed offline surveys in conditions imposed by the researcher. Online surveys have 
been criticised because of the introduction of extraneous variables that the researcher has 
no control over. However, such „noise‟ is also a factor in, for example, postal surveys. In 
postal surveys, participants receive the survey and are free to complete the survey at their 
desire. Therefore, participants may complete the survey whilst completing other tasks. For 
example, whilst watching television, listening to music, helping children with homework 
etc. In this respect, the online survey is not different from other survey methods. However, 
researchers engaging in IMR need to carefully consider and engage with the challenges 
posed by IMR when deciding whether to conduct research online or offline. 
 
3.3.4.2 Multiple Submissions 
 
IMR can be affected by multiple submissions (i.e. the same participant taking part on 
multiple occasions) which can threaten reliability (Reips, 2000). Schmidt (1997) suggests 
multiple submissions can be due to error, curiosity, or participants maliciously attempting 
to damage the study. Birnbaum (2004) argues that multiple submissions are rare, and are 
easily detected through data screening procedures. When screening data, Buchanan, Ali, 
Heffernan, et al. (2005) recorded participants‟ Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and deleted 
all data sets, except the first, to eliminate multiple submissions. They deleted a sizeable 
number (435 out of 1199) of submissions using this method. In another study, O‟Neil and 
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Penrod (2001) found evidence of four multiple submissions from 180 submissions. 
However, Hewson and Charlton (2005) propose that deleting all submissions, except the 
first, from the same IP address may be overcautious, and recommend checking all 
submissions for similarities between items before deletion of the data sets. Reips (2000) 
warns that deletion of all submissions from the same IP address may result in the deletion 
of genuine data but maximises validity. Whilst the studies reported here show variation in 
the degree of multiple submissions, they show that multiple submissions occur in IMR, and 
this needs to be considered by researchers when conducting online research. 
 
3.3.4.3 Attrition and Missing Data 
 
Another reported threat to the validity of IMR is attrition and missing data which may be 
caused by the decrease in social pressure to participate fully in the study (Birnbaum, 2004). 
Reips (2000) argues that IMR will be more affected by attrition than research conducted 
face-to-face unless responses to the items are forced (i.e. participants cannot move on in a 
survey unless they answer all questions). In contrast, Hewson, Yule, Laurent and Vogel 
(1996) argue the voluntary nature of participation often found in IMR provides greater 
assurances that the research will not be affected by attrition and missing data. 
 
To test the rate of attrition and missing data, Stanton (1998) compared the data collected 
from an online survey (N = 50) to a database of offline survey data (N = 181). Findings 
indicated the online data (M = 0.86, SD = 1.88) yielded significantly less missing data than 
the offline data (M = 1.64, SD = 3.08). In another study, Kiesler and Sproull (1986) 
reported fewer missing data in an online sample compared to an offline sample. However, 
the amounts of missing data were only marginally less in the online sample. These results 
indicate that IMR may not be affected by attrition and missing values as has been 
cautioned against, and make the internet an attractive medium for conducting research. 
 
3.3.4.4 The Equivalence of Online to Offline Measures 
 
As the first study contributing to this thesis used an online five-factor personality 
questionnaire, the equivalence of online compared to offline measures is now considered. 
Assessing the equivalence of online compared to offline measures is necessary to ensure 
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the scales are valid and reliable. There are a growing number of studies comparing the 
psychometric properties of measurements that have been adapted from paper-and-pencil 
formats.  
 
In an early study, Davis (1999) compared the Ruminative Responses Scale from the 
Response Styles Questionnaire between introductory psychology students (N = 1012), 
upper-level psychology students (N = 118), non-psychology students (N = 113), and web-
based students (N = 128). Cronbach‟s alpha for the web-based sample (.82) was marginally 
lower for the upper-level psychology students (.88) and the non-psychology students (.88), 
but comparable with the introductory psychology students (.83). However, the web-based 
sample yielded significantly higher rumination scores than other samples, except the 
upper-level psychology students. This study suggest the psychometric properties of online 
measures are comparable to offline measures, but the study highlights differences in 
responding which may be a consequence of the online medium. One explanation is that 
participants give more candid responses and in a less socially desirable manner which will 
be discussed later.  
 
The Davis‟ (1999) study assessed the equivalence of unidimensional scales, whilst 
assessments of the equivalence of multidimensional scales have yielded mixed results 
(Hewson & Charlton, 2005). Buchanan, Ali, Heffernan, et al. (2005) found differences in 
the subscales of the Prospective Memory Questionnaire, with the psychometric properties 
of the long term and techniques to remember subscales being comparable with the offline 
measure, but the short term and internally cued subscales were not. The researchers 
concluded that their research highlighted the need to check the psychometric properties of 
online measures, as they cannot be assumed to be equivalent to offline versions of the 
scales. In contrast, Hewson and Charlton (2005) found equivalence between the 
psychometric properties of online and offline versions of the Health Locus of Control 
Scale, but found differences in the way participants responded. 
 
The mixed findings of equivalence for multidimensional are of concern, as the first study 
contributing to this thesis utilises the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) which is 
designed to measure the „Big Five‟ personality traits. From the 2000 IPIP items, Buchanan, 
Johnson and Goldberg (2005) constructed and validated a 50-item scale based on Costa 
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and McCrae‟s NEO-PI-R over two studies. In the first study, 2,448 participants recruited 
via search engines completed the 50-item IPIP scale and a checklist of the behaviours they 
reported engaging in was correlated with the relevant dimensions of the IPIP scale. Factor 
analysis revealed the majority of items loaded on the relevant factors, but seven items 
cross-loaded onto other factors. However, the reliability scores for the five subscales were 
comparable with offline measures. In a second study aimed at reducing volunteer bias that 
may have affected the findings from the first study, 249 participants were recruited using 
an active advertisement campaign and completed a revised version of the scale used in the 
first study. As with the first study, the scale was found to be highly reliable. Whilst both 
the original and revised scales were considered to be reliable measures of the five 
dimensions of personality, Buchanan et al. recommend using the revised version as the 
scales are closer to orthogonality than the original scales. 
 
3.3.4.5Self-disclosure and Reduced Socially Desirable Responding 
 
There is consensus that web-based participants respond with increased self-disclosure and 
less socially desirable responding compared to offline research (Buchanan, 2002; Joinson, 
1999; Kiesler & Sproull, 1986; Reips, 2002; Strickland, Moloney, Dietrich, Myerberg, 
Cotsonis & Johnson, 2003; Wood & Griffiths, 2007). This is a major advantage of IMR 
which is of particular import and relevance to the research conducted as part of this thesis. 
In comparison to paper-and-pencil surveys, online surveys have consistently demonstrated 
that participants respond with greater self-disclosure and decreased socially desirability 
(see Davis, 1999; Buchanan & Smith, 1999; Hewson & Charlton, 2005; Kiesler & Sproull, 
1986). This effect is purported as a consequence of the increase in anonymity, or perceived 
anonymity, afforded to participants. To test the effect of anonymity on socially desirable 
responding, Joinson (1999) recruited 82 participants and randomly assigned the 
participants to an anonymous or non-anonymous condition. Within both conditions, 
participants completed either an online or paper-and-pencil version of measures assessing 
self-consciousness, self-esteem and social desirability. Joinson reported that participants 
who completed the measures online scored lower in social desirability, social anxiety and 
higher on self-esteem compared to those who completed the paper-and-pencil survey, and 
this effect was greater if participants were anonymous.  
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In another study, Joinson (2001b) conducted three experiments to examine the causes of 
increased disclosure in IMR. In the first study, Joinson reported increased self-disclosure 
among participants who took part in a dilemma task via computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) compared to face-to-face (FtF). To test whether this was due to 
participants‟ anonymity, he recruited 42 students to participate in a dilemma task. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a visually anonymous or non-anonymous 
condition. He reported significantly higher levels of disclosure in the visually anonymous 
condition which suggested anonymity plays a key role in self-disclosure via CMC. In the 
third study, Joinson recruited 84 students to participate in the same dilemma task but 
manipulated participants‟ public and private self-awareness. Participants were randomly 
assigned to private or public (high and low) self-awareness conditions. He found that 
disclosure was greatest when participants had high private and low public self-awareness. 
Joinson argued that disclosure could not occur because of deindividuation, as 
deindividuation requires low private and public self-awareness, but was caused by the 
interaction between anonymity and heightened private self-awareness.  
 
3.4 Online Interviewing 
 
The internet is increasingly being used by social scientists wishing to engage in qualitative 
methods. Arguably, the email method is the most popular tool used to conduct online 
interviews. Online interviews can be can be conducted asynchronously (e.g., using email or 
discussion boards) or synchronously (e.g., using Instant Messaging software), with 
challenges and benefits associated with each method. Many of the advantages and 
disadvantages of conducting online interviews have been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
However, online interviews present further challenges and benefits to conducting 
interviews via the Internet in comparison to offline. Thus, this section will consider further 
benefits and challenges that are specific to online interviewing to develop the rationales 
used in this thesis. The section will finish with a focus on conducting online interviews 
using Instant Messaging software, as this tool was used for research in this thesis. 
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3.4.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Conducting Online Interviews 
 
Online interviewing presents researchers with novel challenges in developing their social 
and technical skills (Davis, Bolding, Hart, Sherr & Elford, 2004). Different tools that may 
be used to conduct online interviews have different features that pose a technological 
challenge to researchers. For example, Selwyn and Robson (1998) note the capability of 
email to notify the researcher when the recipient has received and/or read recruitment 
emails may be beneficial. This feature may be beneficial as it contributes to determining 
the response rates of a study. However, this feature may also contribute to a breach of 
participants‟ privacy, representing a violation of ethics. 
 
Furthermore, researchers need to familiarise themselves with the social aspects of the 
Internet which can be different from how people behave offline. „Netiquette‟ is a term used 
to describe online etiquette and provides guidelines on how individuals should behave in 
various online spaces. However, researchers need to be aware that behaviour deemed 
acceptable in one online space may not be acceptable in another online space. For example, 
Scheuermann and Taylor (1997) propose the use of abbreviations and emoticons should be 
avoided. Whilst they propose adherence to such a guideline, the use of abbreviations and 
emoticons are more acceptable when using Instant Messenger (IM). However, other 
guidelines exist that researchers need to be familiar with which are applicable to all online 
spaces. These include not using upper casing as this denotes SHOUTING, being concise, 
remembering there is another person at the end of your communications, being careful 
about using humour and sarcasm as they can be picked up incorrectly, and summarising 
points that you make. 
 
Establishing rapport may be more difficult in online interviews compared to offline 
interviews due to the lack of face-to-face (FtF) communication. Developing rapport is an 
essential part of the interview process as it can encourage disclosure (Seymour, 2001), and 
make participants feel comfortable and safe (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006).  In the 
offline interview, non-verbal cues help to provide participants with re-assurance that the 
researcher is genuine. However, non-verbal cues (such as body language) are not as 
prevalent in the online communication compared to offline, and developing rapport may 
take longer via text-based communication. This is confounded by the lengthy process of 
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the online interview. As online interviews are text-based, the length of the interview partly 
depends on the reading and typing ability of both the researcher and participant. The 
questions the researcher wishes to pose to participants may leave little time to sufficiently 
develop rapport. To overcome this problem, Madge and O‟Connor (2002) developed 
rapport with participants prior to the online interview taking place. They conducted 
synchronous focus groups (n = 16) to develop understanding of how and why new parents 
use the internet for information and support. They allowed one hour for the interview 
which they felt left little time to build rapport with participants. To overcome this, they 
posted photographs and biographies and emailed all participants individually prior to the 
focus group taking place. Chen and Hilton (1999) also advocate building rapport by 
developing web pages that can be accessed by participants prior to an interview. However, 
they note that complex web pages may be difficult to be loaded by some internet browsers. 
The views of Madge and O‟Connor, and Chen and Hinton, relate to synchronous forms of 
interviewing. However, during asynchronous interviews, researchers may have more time 
for data collection, and may be able to devote more time to rapport building strategies. 
 
In this thesis, building rapport for the purposes of online interviewing was more important 
due to the topic under investigation. Chen and Hinton (1999) note participants who are 
suspicious of surveillance may be less likely to participate in online interviews compared 
to those who are not suspicious. As this research explored perceptions of cyber-harassed 
victims, individuals who were cyber-harassed may have been more suspicious about taking 
part in research via the Internet than non-victims. Therefore, time was devoted to building 
rapport with all participants prior to the online interviews taking place. Additionally, the 
researcher used the email address provided by Nottingham Trent University to contact all 
participants. All participants were contacted individually, which allowed participants‟ the 
opportunity to voice any concerns they had, and to ask questions about the research. 
 
The flow of online interviews depends on whether the interview is asynchronous or 
synchronous. Using email, researchers may choose to send all of the questions at the 
beginning of the interview and ask participants to answer them at the same time. This 
method resembles the open-ended survey. Alternatively, the researcher may send emails 
with one, or a couple, of questions at a time, and wait on the response before sending the 
next question. Using this method, the flow of the interview will be linear, with questions 
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following responses before another question is asked. However, a disadvantage of the 
asynchronous interview is that the researcher may be unsure about when (and if) a 
response will be received (Busher & James, 2007). 
 
During their online focus group research, Madge and O‟Connor (2002) noted the flow of 
the synchronous interview was not linear. They noted that interviewees and the interviewer 
interrupted each other when asking or answering questions. Davis, Bolding, Hart, Sherr 
and Elford (2004) note the time lag between questions and responses creates ambiguity 
with conversational turn-taking. The resulting ambiguity is an acceptable feature of 
synchronous CMC. However, due to the non-linear pattern of the synchronous interview, 
data may appear disjointed and possibly incoherent. The researcher needs to develop the 
skills necessary to analyse data in this format (Chen & Hinton, 1999). 
 
In comparison to FtF interviews, the online interview process can be lengthy as 
participants engage in reading questions, formulating responses, and typing the responses 
to send to the researcher. Davis, Bolding, Hart, Sherr and Elford (2004) recruited 128 gay 
men to investigate their use of the Internet to find sexual partners, and their attitudes to 
HIV risk. Thirty-five interviews were conducted online, with the remaining conducted FtF. 
The researchers noted that online interviews took, on average, twice the length of time as 
the FtF interviews. They attributed this to the process and time involved in reading, 
thinking, and typing during the interview. This illustrates the online interview can be 
physically demanding for participants, and requires participants‟ commitment to the study 
(Chen & Hinton, 1999). 
 
3.4.2 Instant Messenger as tool for online interviewing 
 
One popular version of IM software is MSN Instant Messenger which allows users to 
upload their picture, show their name, and choose to show or hide their online status. 
Below this is a list of the user‟s online contacts (friend list) which shows their friend‟s 
online status. When a friend is online, the user clicks on their friend‟s name and this opens 
a new window, which they can „chat‟ with each other. Users communicate with each other 
by opening a chat window. The chat window has a bar along the top that allows users to 
share pictures or files, engage in video or voice calls, play games or other activities online, 
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or invite other users to the conversation. Below this bar are pictures for each user along the 
left-hand side. There is a text box at the bottom, in which a user types the message they 
want to send to whoever they are communicating with. The text box allows for changes to 
the font and emoticons. When users send their message it appears above the text box with 
the user‟s name beside the message. If users are waiting on a reply to their message, they 
can see if the other user is typing a reply as this appears above the text box.  
 
In a nationally representative sample, Dutton and Helsper (2007) investigated how 2,350 
participants use the Internet in their daily lives. Instant Messenger (IM) was the third most 
common method (after sending emails and sending attachments) used for communication. 
Student participants reported IM as the second most popular method of communication, 
using it at least on a weekly basis. This illustrates the popularity of IM among British 
Internet users. Yet, despite this popularity, IM has rarely been used by social scientists as a 
method of online interviewing. 
 
Steiger and Goritz (2006) evaluated the usefulness of IM for conducting online interviews. 
Participants initially took part in an online survey enquiring about how they were likely to 
respond to a request via IM to participate in an interview. Sixteen percent of participants 
indicated they would delete the chat request, 1% said they had given false answers in an 
interview, and 29% admitted to pretending to be someone else in IM. Following the 
survey, invitations were sent to 72 IM accounts, inviting the respondents to participate in 
an IM interview. Thirty-two participants took part in the IM interviews and 9% terminated 
the interviews prematurely. During the interview process, participants were asked five 
demographic questions, four filler questions about their attitudes towards science, and a 
final question asking about their enjoyment of the interview. Steiger and Goritz 
recommended using IM for interviews for short studies if complex questions needed to be 
asked, and if a high response rate was required. Whilst Steiger and Goritz demonstrated 
that IM can be used for online interviews, the questions were not meaningful. Therefore, 
further research is needed to establish the usefulness of IM for interviewing with sensitive 
questions. 
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3.5 Ethical Considerations 
 
This research adhered to the ethical guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society 
(2009), and the guidelines for conducting online research (Bartrall, Hagger-Johnson, 
Hewson, Joinson, Mackintosh & O‟Dell, 2007). This section will outline the ethical 
considerations applicable to this thesis. 
 
3.5.1 Informed Consent 
 
Obtaining informed consent from participants is necessary before conducting research 
(Schmidt, 1997). Traditionally, informed consent has been sought by asking participants to 
sign a consent form but this cannot be sought from participants via the Internet. Written 
consent is often difficult to obtain from online participants, and researchers cannot 
guarantee that participants will read and understand the statements of informed consent 
(Kraut, Olsen, Banaji, et al., 2004). Furthermore, researchers cannot guarantee that 
participants are over 18 years of age, as participants may lie about their age (Hewson, 
Yule, Laurent & Vogel, 2003; Wood & Griffiths, 2007). However, Hewson et al. (2003) 
argue that participants lying about their age may be rare and easy to detect when it occurs. 
These issues have lead to a debate concerning whether a digital signature is legally 
acceptable and binding (Kraut et al., 2004). In this thesis, participants recruited via the 
Internet were provided with background to and information about the study, and the 
researcher‟s contact details. To encourage participants to read information provided to 
them about this study, participants were presented with radio buttons for each statement of 
informed consent. Participants‟ responses were forced, meaning they could not progress 
through the informed consent without responding to essential statements relating to 
informed consent. The radio button method described is widely recognised as an 
acceptable method of gaining consent in IMR (Birnbaum, 2004). 
 
3.5.2 Risk of Harm 
 
It was not anticipated that participants would experience significant physical, 
psychological or emotional distress as a result of completing the survey or participating in 
online interviews. However, there was a possibility that cyber-harassed victims may have 
94 
 
become psychologically or emotionally distressed due to recalling negative experiences 
whilst participating in this research (King, 2000). To minimise this effect, participants in 
the first three studies were provided with the contact details for the counselling service 
provided by Nottingham Trent University for students. This contact information was given 
to participants prior to and following their participation in this research. Furthermore, 
participants were advised and assured that they did not have to answer any questions they 
were uncomfortable with. 
 
3.5.3 Anonymity and Confidentiality 
 
There is a small risk with all IMR that hackers may try to gain access to the data gathered, 
thereby threatening the security of data, and this is beyond the researcher‟s control 
(Brownlow & O‟Dell, 2002; Hewson, Yule, Laurent & Vogel, 2003). To maximise 
confidentiality, participants should be advised that they should not provide any identifying 
information. If participants have to provide identifying information, this information 
should be kept separately from the research data (Hewson, et al., 2003; Kraut et al., 2004). 
All participants in this research were advised that they did not have to provide any 
information they felt uncomfortable providing. Participants in Study 1 were asked to 
provide their email address if they would like to participate in Study 2.  Any email 
addresses were held separately from the survey data and all data were held in password 
protected files. 
 
Online participants have greater visual anonymity than offline participants, as the 
researcher and participants never meet. However, checking for multiple submissions for 
the quantitative survey in Study 1 was necessary to ensure the validity of the research. To 
achieve this, participants‟ Internet Protocol (IP) addresses were recorded. However, 
Joinson (2006) argues that anonymity cannot be provided. If anonymity is guaranteed, the 
research would lose validity as data screening for multiple submissions would be 
impossible. However, once the data was screened for multiple submissions, the IP 
addresses were deleted, leaving the data complete anonymous. 
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3.5.4 Debriefing 
 
It is the researcher‟s responsibility to ascertain whether participants are distressed because 
they took part in research (Hewson et al., 2003; Kraut et al., 2004). In offline research, 
participants have the opportunity to approach the researcher. In IMR, the researcher and 
participants do not meet, making a personal debriefing session impossible. All participants 
were presented with a debriefing page following their participation in the research. The 
debriefing provided participants with the researcher‟s contact information and the contact 
information for the counselling service with Nottingham Trent University. 
 
3.5.5 Right to Withdraw 
 
Hewson et al. (2003) advise that participants in IMR must be provided with the right to 
withdraw from the research at any stage of the research. Participants were able to withdraw 
during the study simply by closing the browser. To ensure that participants‟ data could be 
identified should they wish to withdraw after submission of their data, and remain 
anonymous, participants were asked to provide a word at the beginning of the study. 
Should participants have wished to withdraw after submission of their data, they were 
asked to quote the word they chose prior to taking part in the survey or at the beginning of 
their interview. 
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Chapter 4: Perceptions and Experiences of Cyber-Harassing Behaviours 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Globally, there is no single piece of legislation to prosecute cyber-harassment. However, 
many countries have cyber-harassment legislation, or legislation relating to offline 
harassment that can be used to prosecute cyber-harassment. Perpetrators are prosecuted in 
the country they reside. However, countries differ in how they define harassment, and 
intent and threat requirements. This research will focus on the UK anti-harassment 
legislation: the Protection from Harassment Act (PfHA) (1997).  
 
According to the PfHA, „a person must not pursue a course of conduct – a) which amounts 
to harassment of another, and b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment 
of another‟(s.1). Section 4 allows for the prosecution of more serious offences (i.e. 
stalking), and stipulates that „a person whose conduct causes another to fear, on at least 
two occasions, that violence will be used against him is guilty of an offence‟ (s.4). The Act 
acknowledges that conduct „includes causing the person alarm or distress‟. As the Act does 
not define harassment, it is broad enough to include cyber-harassment. Considering the 
focus of this research on the perceived criminality of cyber-harassment, the operational 
definition of cyber-harassment is in accordance with the Act. 
 
Research investigating offline harassment suggests that individuals identify harassment in 
line with anti-harassment legislation. For example, Sheridan and Davies (2001c) assigned 
88 undergraduate students to one of four groups. Each group was asked to read 20 
vignettes depicting intrusive behaviour. Three groups were asked to rate the extent to 
which the vignettes depicted stalking in accordance with the PfHA, the USA Model 
Stalking Code, or the South Austrailian Criminal Law Consolidation Act. The final group 
was asked to rate the extent to which the vignettes met their opinions of stalking. The 
findings indicated that individuals were able to interpret anti-harassment legislation when 
making judgements of criminality for the transcripts. This was particularly evident among 
the group who interpreted the PfHA. Furthermore, when participants were not provided 
with anti-harassment legislation, their perceptions of stalking were closely aligned with the 
PfHA. This study suggests that jurors will be able to apply anti-harassment legislation to 
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harassment cases. However, Sheridan and Davies‟ study reflects a comprehension task that 
may not apply in cases whereby the perpetrators behaviour is ambiguous. Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that the findings from this study will translate to perceptions of cyber-harassment.  
 
Evidence suggests that people may not perceive online behaviours as having offline 
consequences. According to Suler (2004), online visual anonymity reduces feelings of 
responsibility for behaviours people engage in online. If this is the case, people may not 
perceive online behaviours as facing offline consequences. Whitty (2007) agrees that 
people split their online behaviour from offline consequences. As such, people may not 
apply anti-harassment legislation to cyber-harassment. Research conducted by Alexy, 
Burgess, Baker and Smoyak (2005) lends support to this theory. Three hundred and forty-
two participants read a vignette depicting a genuine case of cyberstalking. Despite the 
seriousness of the case, only 30% labelled the case as cyberstalking, and 7% did not view it 
as harassment. For this study, the null hypothesis is expected: individuals will not perceive 
cyber-harassing behaviours as criminal. 
 
Gender may also play a role in whether people perceive cyber-harassment as criminal. 
Cupach and Spitzberg (2004) suggest that females are more aware of privacy intrusions 
than males. Agatston, Kowalski, and Limber (2007) recruited 150 students to take part in 
focus groups that investigated their perceptions of cyber-bullying. They found that females 
were more likely than males to perceive cyber-bullying as problematic. In addition, Alexy, 
Burgess, Baker and Smoyak (2005) reported that females were more likely than males to 
report stronger feelings and reactions after reading a vignette depicting a genuine, severe 
case of cyberstalking. Using an Australian sample, Whitty and Carr (2003) found that 
women were more likely than men to think that offensive material should be banned in the 
workplace, and disagreed more strongly than men that employees should be allowed to 
access sexual material on the Internet. The research noted here indicates women show 
more sensitivity to harassment than males. Thus, it is expected that females will be more 
likely than males to perceive cyber-harassing behaviours as criminal. Also, females who 
report experiencing cyber-harassment are predicted to report being more upset than males. 
 
The prevalence of cyber-harassment is unclear, with rates ranging from 3% (Williams & 
Guerra, 2007) to 59% (Spitzberg & Hoobler, 2002) from samples from the UK and USA. 
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The range in prevalence rates is due to differing operational differences used by 
researchers, differing sampling techniques and methodologies used. Despite the unreliable 
prevalence rates, there is consensus that cyber-harassment will increase as people 
incorporate technology in their everyday lives, and may surpass instances of offline 
harassment (Alexy, Burgess, Baker & Smoyak, 2005; Bocij, 2004; Finn, 2004; Spitzberg 
& Hoobler, 2002; Whitty & Carr, 2006; Wood & Wood, 2002). This is important when 
considering that offline stalking affects 12% of the adult population within UK (Budd & 
Mattinson, 2000), and provides justification for research in this field. 
 
Research has indicated that students represent a group vulnerable to offline harassment 
(e.g., Budd & Mattinson, 2000; Fremouw, Westrup and Pennypacker, 1997), and cyber-
harassment (e.g., Finkelhor, Mitchell & Wolak, 2000; Finn, 2004; Spitzberg & Hoobler, 
2002). Morewitz (2000) suggests that students represent a group who may have more free 
time to engage in harassment than those employed in full-time jobs, and perpetrators of 
harassment may be more likely to target individuals who are of similar age. Whilst the 
trend in psychological research to recruit student samples may have biased these findings, 
the current study will recruit undergraduate students. 
 
In parallel with offline harassment, females are more likely than males to experience 
cyber-harassment. In a representative sample in USA, Tjaden and Thoennes (1998) found 
8% of women and 2% of men had experienced offline harassment. Budd and Mattinson 
(2000) found similar results in the UK, with 16% of females and 7% experiencing offline 
harassment. Whilst it is recognised that males are more likely to report experiencing cyber-
harassment than offline harassment, females are more likely to experience cyber-
harassment than males (e.g., Alexy, Burgess, Baker & Smoyak, 2005; Bocij, 2003; 
D‟Ovidio & Doyle, 2003; Finkelhor, Mitchell & Wolak, 2000; Sheridan & Grant, 2007). 
Thus, it is expected that females will be more likely to experience cyber-harassing 
behaviours than males in this study. 
 
Despite cyber-harassment occurring in a virtual world, it can impact victims 
psychologically to the same extent as offline harassment. In a sample of 1,051 self-defined 
stalking victims, Sheridan and Grant (2007) found that 48% had been cyberstalked. 
Logistics regression revealed no significant differences in the psychological impact of 
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cyberstalking compared to offline stalking. The psychological variables considered 
included fear, anxiety, irritation, anger, suicidal ideation, distrust, confusion, self harm, 
suicide attempts, depression, sleep disturbances, loss of or increased appetite, weight 
changes, headaches, aggression, and paranoia. In addition, Bocij (2003) found that 23% of 
victims in his sample reported being highly distressed by cyber-harassment. Such findings 
are particularly relevant to the PfHA as it is a victim-defined crime: it is the impact on the 
victim that determines whether a crime has taken place.  
 
Considering the PfHA allows for the prosecution of cyber-harassment, research suggests 
that few victims report their experiences to the police (Alexy, Burgess, Baker & Smoyak, 
2005; Bocij, 2003). Failure to report such instances will lead to a failure in recognising the 
extent of cyber-harassment, and may help to perpetuate instances of cyber-harassment. 
Finn (2004) noted that cyber-harassed victims thought their experience was not serious 
enough to warrant police intervention. Whilst there is evidence to suggest victims do not 
report their experiences to the police, there is a dearth of research investigating perceived 
social support in victims of cyber-harassment. According to Yap and Devilly (2004), social 
support has a buffering effect from stressful situations, and has a positive effect on well 
being. However, Kenney (2002) suggests that victims of crime fear stigmatisation by 
others, which is a form of secondary victimisation. He explains that victims of crime suffer 
reduced self-esteem as a consequence of being a crime victim. Stigmatisation and others‟ 
negative evaluations of their lifestyle further threatens victims‟ self-esteem. This may be 
particularly relevant to cyber-harassed victims as their experiences occur in cyberspace. 
Victims may fear that others will negatively judge them for their choices in using the 
Internet and for the impact „virtual behaviours‟ have on them. Consequently, they may not 
feel able to talk about their experiences. This study will examine perceived social support 
by asking participants to imagine who they would tell if they experienced cyber-harassing 
behaviours. It is predicted that males will be less likely than females to talk to others about 
their experiences of cyber-harassment. 
 
4.1.1 The Role of Personality 
 
It is widely accepted that personality influences a wide range of behaviour (Swickert, 
Hittner, Harris & Herring, 2002).  Whilst associations between personality and behaviour 
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are not limited to negative experiences, research suggests personality influences 
perceptions of, and reactions to interpersonal conflict (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995), how 
individuals use the Internet (Amichai-Hamburger, Wainapel & Fox, 2002), and 
perpetration and victimisation of intimate partner aggression (Hines & Saudino, 2008). 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that personality traits are stable over the lifespan (Conley, 
1985), suggesting that the influence of personality on behaviour is consistent. Personality 
may account for individual differences in the perceptions and experiences of cyber-
harassment. This study will investigate the relationship between the „Big Five‟ personality 
characteristics, Internet self-efficacy and individuals‟ perceptions and experiences of 
cyber-harassment.  
 
4.1.1.1 The ‘Big Five’ 
 
There is little research investigating the relationship between the „Big Five‟ and sensitivity 
to harassment. Therefore, to inform this research, consideration will be given to research 
investigating interpersonal conflict. Research investigating the relationship between 
personality and interpersonal conflict may provide some insight into how people react to 
threatening behaviour. Evidence suggests that introverts are more likely to over-react to 
perceived threat than extraverts (Crow, Hartman, Hammond & Fok, 1995), experience 
conflict (Bono, Boles, Judge & Lauver, 2002; Dijkstra, van Dierendonck, Evers & DeDreu, 
2005) and to be victims of workplace bullying (Coyne, Seigne & Randall, 2000; Glaso, L, 
Matthiesen, Nielsen & Einarsen, 2007). Of particular relevance to this study, Clark, 
Boccaccini, Caillouet and Chaplin (2007) investigated the relationship between jury 
members‟ personality characteristics and the outcomes of criminal and civil cases. They 
recruited 764 jurors who completed a measure of personality, and gathered data on case 
outcomes. They found that extraverts were more likely to render „not guilty‟ verdicts in 
criminal cases than introverts. Whilst the effect size was large (.63), the findings related 
specifically to criminal cases and not civil cases. Theoretically, introverted individuals are 
shy, withdrawn, submissive, and feel inferior to others (McCrae & Costa, 1985, 1987). 
Feelings of inferiority may produce hyper-sensitivity to conflict in introverted individuals, 
and they may not be confident in their judgements about criminal crimes.  
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According to Graziano, Jensen-Campbell and Hair (1996), agreeable individuals have 
learned to control negative affect and anger better than low-agreeable individuals. Highly 
agreeable individuals are motivated to maintain positive interpersonal relationships, and 
their ability to control negative affect means they are unlikely to perceive others‟ 
behaviour as threatening. In contrast, low-agreeable individuals are antagonistic, 
mistrustful, sceptical and unco-operative (McCrae & Costa, 1985; 1987). Considering the 
motivations of highly agreeable individuals, it is not surprising that negative associations 
have been found between agreeableness and experiencing interpersonal conflict. For 
example, Dijkstra, van Dierendonck, Evers and DeDreu (2005) found agreeableness was 
negatively associated with experiencing conflict at work among nurses. Similarly, Bono, 
Boles, Judge and Lauver (2002) reported that highly agreeable undergraduates were less 
likely to experience conflict than their low-agreeable counterparts. Whilst the effect sizes 
for both studies were low (r = -.27, r = -.22, respectively), the trend supports the theory that 
agreeableness is negatively associated with experiencing interpersonal conflict. Highly 
agreeable individuals may not perceive a perpetrator‟s behaviour as harassing because they 
are motivated to maintain positive interpersonal relations.  
 
According to McCrae and Costa (1985, 1987), neurotic individuals worry, are insecure, 
self-conscious, anxious, angry, mistrustful and likely to suffer from depression. In a dyadic 
study, Bono, Boles, Judge and Lauver (2005) reported that neurotic roommates were more 
likely to report experiencing conflict with their roommates. Interestingly, the roommates of 
neurotic individuals did not perceive the conflict reported by their neurotic roommates. 
These results suggest that neurotic individuals perceive conflict even when conflict may 
not have arisen. These results must be treated with caution as the researchers did not report 
the personality characteristics of the roommates of neurotic participants. In another study, 
Gunthert, Cohen and Armeli (1999) asked 197 students to complete personality measures 
and to keep a diary detailing stressful encounters for a two-week period. Neurotic 
individuals experienced more interpersonal conflict and reported increased levels of 
negative affect compared to non-neurotic individuals. They explained that neurotic 
individuals may misinterpret encounters as negative or may have negative recall bias. 
However, taken together, these findings indicate that neurotic individuals are more likely 
to experience conflict. 
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There is less theoretical and empirical work associated with interpersonal conflict and 
conscientiousness and openness to experience. Theoretically, these personality 
characteristics may be applicable to this research, despite there being less empirical work 
to substantiate this decision. According to McCrae and Costa (1985, 1987), conscientious 
individuals are dutiful and have high moral codes. This high sense of morality may dispose 
the conscientious individual to perceive cyber-harassing behaviours as criminal. In 
addition, Bono, Boles, Judge and Lauver (2002) argue that individuals who score high on 
openness to experience tend to be argumentative, and this may provoke conflict with 
others. 
 
4.1.1.2 Internet self-efficacy 
 
According to Bandura (1997), self-efficacy influences individuals‟ perceptions of 
threatening situations. Individuals may not perceive a situation as threatening if they 
believe that they have control over the situation (Ozer & Bandura, 1990). In contrast, if 
individuals believe that they have little or no control over a situation, they will be more 
distressed by threatening situations. Internet self-efficacy refers to the belief individuals 
have in their ability to use and navigate the Internet, and is strongly associated with prior 
Internet experience (Easton & LaRose, 2000). According to self-efficacy theory, 
individuals high in Internet self-efficacy will feel more in control over online interactions, 
and will be more confident in their ability to cope with experiences of cyber-harassment. 
Whilst Bocij (2003) did not measure Internet self-efficacy, he found that novice Internet 
users were more likely to be distressed by cyber-harassment than veterans. This might 
implicate Internet self-efficacy as Internet experience is associated with prior Internet 
experience (Easton & LaRose, 2000).  
 
In summary, this study will determine the types of cyber-harassing behaviours that 
students perceive as criminal, and to assess whether the „Big Five‟ personality 
characteristics, and Internet self-efficacy influence their perceptions. The study also aims 
to identify the types of cyber-harassing behaviours undergraduate students‟ experience, 
and to assess whether the „Big Five‟ personality characteristics, and Internet self-efficacy 
predict the behaviours they report experiencing. Finally, the study aims to identify the 
support networks students think they would avail of, if they experienced cyber-harassment. 
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Given previous empirical and theoretical work, it is expected that perceiving cyber-
harassment as criminal, and experiencing cyber-harassment will be negatively associated 
with agreeableness, and positively associated with neuroticism, conscientiousness, and 
openness to experience. It is expected that extraverts will be more likely than introverts to 
experience cyber-harassment but less likely to perceive it as criminal. Finally, it is 
predicted that Internet self-efficacy will be negatively associated with experiences and 
perceived criminality of cyber-harassment.  
 
4.2 Method 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
 
Undergraduate students were recruited from Nottingham Trent University between 
December 2008 and February 2009. Four hundred and forty-three students responded to an 
email inviting their participation in an online survey. The survey was designed to measure 
their perceptions and experiences of cyber-harassing behaviours. Following data screening 
(see section 4.2.4), 320 responses were retained for data analysis. Of these responses, 114 
(35.7%) were male, and 205 (64.3%) were female. Participants‟ ages ranged from 18 to 51 
years, with a mean of 21.02 (SD = 4.58). Two-hundred and seventy-seven (86.6%) were 
heterosexual, 9 (2.8%) were homosexual, 23 (7.2%) were bisexual, and 11 (3.4%) 
preferred not to provide their sexual orientation. When asked about their relationship 
status, 173 (54.2%) said they were single, 113 (35.4%) had a boyfriend or girlfriend, 21 
(6.6%) were cohabiting, and 12 (3.8%) were married. 
 
4.2.2 Measures 
 
An online survey was designed using an online survey designer (www.surveymonkey.com) 
as there were no existing measures available to assess individuals‟ perceptions and 
experiences of cyber-harassment. The survey items drew from pre-existing research which 
employed quantitative surveys to measure the types of behaviours cyberstalkers engage in 
(see Alexy, Burgess, Baker & Smoyak, 2005; Bocij, 2003; D‟Ovidio & Doyle, 2003; Jerin 
& Dolinsky, 2001; Sheridan & Grant, 2007) and case studies (see Bocij, 2003; Bocij & 
McFarlane, 2002; Ellison, 1999; Griffiths, Rogers & Sparrow, 1998). Ten final year 
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psychology undergraduate students and 22 postgraduate students took part in a pilot of the 
survey and were asked to give feedback.  
 
Major issues arising from the pilot included the length of the survey, the structure and 
wording of some items. To reduce the length of the survey, the following changes were 
made: 
 
 Two demographic questions (asking participants to state their highest level of 
academic achievement and whether they owned a mobile phone) were deleted as 
they were considered redundant as undergraduate students would be recruited to 
complete the survey, and all pilot participants owned a mobile phone.  
 The Internet personality scale used in the pilot was modified by using the revised 
version, rather than the full version.  
 
To improve readability and clarity of the survey, some of the items relating to the 
perceived criminality and experiences of 18 online behaviours were re-structured and re-
worded. The changes made include the following: 
 
 Initially, participants were asked whether they had experienced each of the 18 
behaviours and to report the degree to which they were upset for each of the 
behaviours. This led to a lot of missing data and was thought to be too demanding 
on participants. This was changed to two separate items: one item asked if they had 
experienced each of the behaviours and one item asking to rate how upset they 
were by their experience(s) with a „not applicable‟ option. 
 When asked who participants imagined they would report the behaviours to if they 
experienced them, pilot participants were only provided with one response. 
Feedback from the pilot highlighted that people may choose to tell more than one 
person. Consequently, participants were given the option to „tick all that apply‟, 
allowing them to choose as many responses as they saw fit. 
 Two of the pilot participants volunteered to participate in an online interview but 
failed to give their contact details. This item was re-phrased to improve the clarity 
of what was expected from participants if they wished to volunteer for a further 
study.  
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Following the pilot, the measures used in the study included the following: 
 
Demographics: Participants were asked to confirm they lived in England or Wales, to 
provide their age, gender, sexual orientation, and relationship status. 
 
International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) Five Factor Personality Inventory: Buchanan, 
Johnson, and Goldberg‟s (2005) revised version of the IPIP was used in this study. The 41-
item scale is designed to measure five personality dimensions: extraversion (9-item), 
neuroticism (8-item), agreeableness (7-item), openness to experience (7-item), and 
conscientiousness (10-item). Participants were required to read statements relating to 
personality, and rate on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from „Very Inaccurate‟ to „Very 
Accurate‟) the extent to which the statements matched how the participants perceived 
themselves. Reliability analyses indicated Cronbach‟s α for this study closely resemble the 
α values reported by Buchanan et al. (2005), indicating the subscales are internally 
consistent: extraversion (.86 and .85, respectively), neuroticism (.83 and .86, respectively), 
conscientiousness (.85 and .84, respectively), agreeableness (.77 and .77, respectively), and 
openness (.71 and .76, respectively). 
 
Internet Self-Efficacy Scale: Eastin and LaRose‟s (2000) Internet self-efficacy scale was 
used in this study. Participants were required to read eight statements and indicate on a 7-
point Likert scale (ranging from „Strongly Disagree‟ to „Strongly Agree‟) the extent to 
which they agreed with the statements. Cronbach‟s α (.92) demonstrated high internal 
consistency. 
 
Cyber-harassment Items: Participants were asked to read 18 online behaviours and answer 
four questions.  Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they thought each of the 
behaviours were criminal on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from „not at all criminal‟ to 
„definitely criminal‟), and to indicate whether they had experienced the behaviours on a 
dichotomous scale. All points on the Likert scale were labelled to increase validity and 
reliability (Krosnick, 1999). Participants were asked to indicate how upset they were if 
they experienced any of the behaviours (using a scale ranging from „0 – not at all upset‟ to 
‟10 – extremely upset‟), and whether they thought the same person carried out the 
behaviours. Finally, participants were asked who they imagined they would report their 
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experience to (family, friends, Internet service provider/mobile phone company, Internet 
moderator, police, doctor, university, no-one, don‟t know, and other) if they experienced 
each of the behaviours. Participants were asked to suggest who they would report the 
experience to if they selected the „other‟ response. For all items in this section, participants 
were provided with the option „prefer not to say‟ (Please see Appendix 2 for a copy of the 
survey). 
 
4.2.3 Procedure 
 
Undergraduate students attending Nottingham Trent University responded to an email 
inviting their participation in an online survey. The invitation email explained the survey 
was designed to measure their perceptions and experiences of online behaviours (please 
see Appendix 1 for a copy of the recruitment email). The invitation email included a URL 
link to the survey. Upon clicking the link, participants were presented with the background 
information to the study, and the researcher‟s contact details. To encourage participants to 
read the background information and the consent declaration, radio buttons were used for 
each consent statement. The radio button method is recognised as an acceptable method of 
gaining consent in Internet-mediated research (Birnbaum, 2004). Surveymonkey provides 
the option to „force‟ respondents to answer questions. This means they cannot move on to 
the next part of the survey until they have answered items that the researcher requires. This 
„forced-response‟ was used to ensure participants provided informed consent before 
participating in the study. When participants responded to the consent, they were asked to 
provide a code word that they could use if they wished to withdraw from the study; they 
then complete the survey (as described above). Apart from the consent items, no other 
items forced participants to respond before continuing with the survey to ensure 
participants‟ voluntary status (for a full discussion of ethical considerations, please see 
chapter 3, „ethical considerations‟). When the data collection period ended, the responses 
were downloaded, fully anonymised, and transferred to SPSS for data analysis. 
 
4.2.4 Data Screening 
 
Although data screening is a laborious process, it is necessary to ensure the final data set is 
not influenced by multiple responses. According to Reips (2000), one accepted method of 
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data screening is to check the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of the submissions to check 
if more than one response has been sent by the same IP address. Reips suggests that if the 
same IP address appears more than once, all data sets should be deleted apart from the first 
submission. However, the current study recruited participants from Nottingham Trent 
University. More than one student may have used the same university computer to 
complete the survey. Thus, it would not be surprising to find the same IP address for more 
than one data set.  
 
Following Reips (2000) recommendations, the first step of data screening was to check for 
duplicate IP addresses. The date and time of all responses originating from the same IP 
address were then checked. Responses that were submitted in quick succession were 
deleted, with the first response being retained. This procedure did not account for all 
submissions originating from the same IP address. Thus, the next step of data screening 
involved checking submissions from the same IP address for similarities in the responses 
to items within the survey. Any data deemed similar (with the exception of a few items) 
were deleted, with the first response being retained. Following this, the data was screened 
using the code words participants provided at the beginning of the survey. Data sets that 
used the same code word(s) were checked for similarities within the data. Again, the later 
submissions were deleted with the first submission being retained. Finally, the data sets 
were checked to see what participants answered. If participants did not complete the 
majority of items relating to their perceptions and experiences of the described online 
behaviours, their responses were deleted. This method of data screening may have been 
overly cautious, and may have resulted in genuine data sets being deleted. However, it was 
necessary to ensure the validity of the research. 
 
Table 9: Justification for deleting data sets 
Reasons for deletion Number of cases deleted 
Multiple submissions of identical data sets 9 
Participant declined ethics 9 
Participant complete informed consent only 17 
Participant completed informed consent and demographics only 45 
Participant completed informed consent, demographics, personality, and 
Internet self-efficacy items only 
43 
 
Initially, 443 participants responded to the invitation to take part in the survey. The table 
above shows that a total of 123 data sets were deleted following the screening process. The 
majority of cases were deleted due to participants dropping out from the study, and not 
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from multiple submissions or mischievous responding. This supports Birnbaum‟s (2004) 
claim that multiple submissions are rare. Following data screening procedures, a total of 
320 responses were retained for data analysis. 
 
4.3 Results 
 
4.3.1 Perceived Criminality of Cyber-Harassing Behaviours 
 
4.3.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Participants were asked to rate on a 5-point Likert scale, the extent to which they thought 
18 online behaviours were criminal. Table 10 shows descriptive statistics for each item on 
the survey. Sending malicious software to access another person‟s information was 
considered to be the most criminal behaviour, followed by sending malicious software to 
damage another person‟s software or hardware. The associated standard deviations indicate 
high agreement among participants in these judgements. Posting someone‟s contact 
information in a way that solicited sex, sending abusive/threatening messages via mobile 
phone, and sending abusive/threatening messages via the Internet were also rated as 
criminal. Telling someone information about their offline life that he/she did not disclose, 
and changing online identities/screen names to contact someone who had blocked their 
previous contact attempts were rated least criminal. 
 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Criminality of Cyber-harassing Behaviours 
Item: N M SD 
14) Sending another person malicious software that can be 
used to access information on their computer 
 
319 
 
4.73 
 
0.66 
13) Sending another person malicious software that can 
damage their software and hardware 
 
317 
 
4.58 
 
0.87 
4) Sending numerous unsolicited text and multimedia 
messages to someone‟s mobile phone that are abusive and 
threatening 
 
319 
 
4.46 
 
.86 
8) Posting another person‟s contact information on the 
Internet in a way that is soliciting sex 
 
319 
 
4.36 
 
1.07 
2) Sending numerous unsolicited messages over a period of 
time via email, instant messenger, chat rooms, or Internet 
discussion boards that are abusive and threatening 
 
320 
 
4.32 
 
.95 
9) Posting sexually explicit pictures on the Internet that have 
been changed to resemble another person 
 
319 
 
3.9 
 
1.29 
3) Sending numerous unsolicited text and multimedia 
messages to someone‟s mobile phone that are sexually 
explicit 
 
320 
 
3.77 
 
1.22 
1) Sending numerous unsolicited messages over a period of    
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time via email, instant messenger, chat rooms, or Internet 
discussion boards that are sexually explicit or obscene 
319 3.66 1.22 
18) Spamming another person‟s email in an attempt to disrupt 
or disable their email 
 
319 
 
3.61 
 
1.32 
12) Encouraging other Internet users to be abusive or 
threatening to another person 
 
319 
 
3.61 
 
1.32 
7) Posting false information on the Internet about another 
person  
 
319 
 
3.59 
 
1.41 
6) Sending another person‟s friends, family, or work 
colleagues improper messages to their mobile phone to 
embarrass that person or damage their reputation 
 
320 
 
 
3.43 
 
1.33 
15) Telling someone in an online „chat‟ they followed them 319 3.39 1.33 
17) Subscribing another person to online services that they did 
not want 
 
319 
3.35  
1.43 
16) Using an identity/screen name similar to another person 
and contacting their friends to destroy their reputation 
 
318 
 
3.35 
 
1.36 
5) Sending another person‟s friends, family or work 
colleagues messages via email to embarrass that person or 
damage their reputation 
 
318 
 
3.34 
 
1.38 
10) Changing online identities/screen names to contact another 
person who has blocked their online contacts 
 
319 
 
2.74 
 
1.42 
11) Telling someone information about the other person‟s 
offline life that he/she did not disclose 
319  
2.71 
 
1.32 
 
4.3.1.2 Dimensions of perceived criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours 
 
Principal axis factoring was used to identify the key dimensions underlying the perceived 
criminality of 18 online behaviours. The total sample consisted of 320 participants 
(missing values, excluded pairwise from the analysis = 10), giving a sample of 310. 
Eighteen items were subjected to factor analysis, with direct oblimin rotation. Direct 
oblimin was used because it was hypothesised that the underlying dimensions would be 
inter-related. 
 
Prior to performing factor analysis, the suitability of the data was assessed. Table 12 shows 
the correlation coefficients between each of variables included in the factor analysis. The 
correlations revealed a high correlation between Items 5 and 6, suggesting a potential 
problem of multicollinearity in the data. The determinant (.0000684) was above the 
threshold of .00001 (Field, 2005), indicating singularity was not a problem. Including both 
Items 5 and 6 in the factor analysis resulted in a fourth factor which included only these 
items. In conjunction with this, the determinant was very close to the cut-off threshold. The 
inclusion of both items is noted in the correlation coefficients (Table 12). Tabachnick and 
Fidell (1996) recommend that when two items show a correlation coefficient greater than 
.9, the analysis should be repeated deleting one of the two items. When repeated with the 
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exclusion of either Items 5 or 6, the determinant reduced below the threshold. However, 
the fourth factor remained but comprised of the one item left in the analysis. Consequently, 
both items were deleted from further analyses. When Items 5 and 6 were excluded, the 
determinant increased to .001, indiciating singularity was not a problem in the data. Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (.86) demonstrated the adequacy of the sample size, and Bartlett‟s test of 
sphericity reached significance 
2
 = 2172.5; df = 120; p < .001, demonstrating the 
factorability of the correlation matrix. 
 
Inspection of the Scree plot (Figure 1) and Eigenvalues indicated three factors underlying 
perceived criminality of 16 behaviours. Accumulatively, the factors explained 49.2% of the 
variance, with Factor 1 explaining 34.8%, Factor 2 explaining 8.4%, and Factor 3 
explaining 6%. 
 
Figure 1: Scree Plot indicating the number of factors found for the behaviours perceived as criminal 
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Table 11 shows the items that loaded onto each of the three factors, which emerged in 
seven iterations. Item 18 cross-loaded on factors 1 and 3, with higher loadings on Factor 1. 
Items 8 and 12 cross-loaded on factors 1 and 2, with Item 8 having a higher loading on 
Factor 2 and Item 12 loading higher on Factor 1. 
 
Cronbach‟s α was checked for the reliability of all factors, with cross-loading factors 
initially retained on all the factors they loaded on. Cronbach‟s α for Factor 1 was reduced if 
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Item 18 was deleted but increased if it was deleted from Factor 3. Cronbach‟s α reduced 
for Factor 1 and remained the same for Factor 2 if Item 12 was deleted from the scale. 
Consequently, Items 18 and 12 were retained on Factor 1 and deleted from Factors 3 and 2, 
respectively. Cronbach‟s α reduced if Item 8 was removed from factors 1 and 2. However, 
as Item 8 loaded higher on Factor 2, it was retained on this factor and deleted from Factor 
1. Following these changes, all three factors were internally consistent, with Cronbach‟s α 
values of .85 for Factor 1, .83 for Factor 2, and .76 for Factor 3. 
 
Table 11: Pattern Matrix showing the Loadings of Items on each of the Factors 
Item: Factor 
 Deception/
Disclosure 
M = 3.36 
(SD = .9) 
Harassing 
Messages 
M = 4.11 
(SD = .8) 
Malicious 
Software 
M = 4.65  
(SD = .7) 
10. Changing online identities/screen names to contact another 
person who has blocked their online contacts 
 
.75 
 
-.01 
 
-.14 
11. Telling someone information about the other person‟s life that 
he/she did not disclose 
 
.75 
 
-.01 
 
-.16 
16. Using an identity/screen name similar to another person and 
contacting their friends to destroy their reputation 
 
.66 
 
-.01 
 
.18 
17. Subscribing another person to online services that they did not 
want 
 
.57 
 
.12 
 
.17 
9. Posting sexually explicit pictures on the Internet that have been 
changed to resemble another person 
 
.54 
 
-.17 
 
.03 
18. Spamming another person‟s email in an attempt to disrupt or 
disable their email 
 
.45 
 
.09 
 
.38 
7. Posting false information on the Internet about another person  
.42 
 
-.23 
 
.16 
15. Telling someone in an online „chat‟ that they had followed them 
offline 
 
.38 
 
-.17 
 
.02 
12. Encouraging other Internet users to be abusive or threatening to 
another person 
 
.36 
 
-.32 
 
.12 
2. Sending numerous unsolicited messages via email, instant 
messenger, chat rooms or Internet discussion boards that are 
abusive or threatening 
 
-.09 
 
-.84 
 
.05 
4. Sending numerous unsolicited text and multi-media messages to 
someone‟s mobile phone that are abusive and threatening 
 
-.07 
 
-.76 
 
.18 
1. Sending numerous unsolicited messages via email, instant 
messenger, chat rooms or Internet discussion boards that are 
sexually explicit or obscene 
 
.09 
 
-.72 
 
-.12 
3. Sending numerous unsolicited text and multi-media messages to 
someone‟s mobile phone that are sexually explicit or obscene 
 
.11 
 
-.64 
 
-.01 
8. Posting another person‟s contact information on the Internet in a 
way that is soliciting sex 
 
.32 
 
-.36 
 
.18 
13. Sending another person malicious software that can damage 
their software and hardware 
 
.05 
 
-.03 
 
.78 
14. Sending another person malicious software that can be used to 
access information on their computer 
 
-.05 
 
-.12 
 
.78 
Note: The higher factor loading for each item appears in boldface type. 
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Table 12: Correlation coeffiecents between variables included in the factor analysis 
Items: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 1.00 .58 .68 .44 .38 .37 .33 .38 .28 .24 .25 .34 .19 .19 .28 .28 .19 .15 
2  1.00 .44 .75 .32 .34 .36 .43 .31 .19 .17 .44 .24 .27 .25 .27 .14 .19 
3   1.00 .52 .47 .45 .31 .41 .29 .27 .3 .34 .29 .27 .32 .31 .17 .21 
4    1.00 .39 .41 .41 .47 .32 .23 .18 .5 .32 .35 .22 .29 .16 .29 
5     1.00 .92 .47 .37 .37 .33 .37 .4 .32 .25 .26 .56 .26 .39 
6      1.00 .48 .4 .39 .35 .36 .44 .36 .28 .25 .56 .25 .4 
7       1.00 .52 .51 .38 .33 .39 .36 .29 .27 .49 .35 .34 
8        1.00 .53 .33 .34 .37 .36 .37 .32 .39 .31 .33 
9         1.00 .44 .39 .37 .24 .23 .33 .43 .34 .34 
10          1.00 .58 .42 .21 .11 .27 .5 .33 .33 
11           1.00 .4 .17 .13 .31 .46 .36 .32 
12            1.00 .36 .28 .29 .44 .26 .35 
13             1.00 .64 .15 .4 .27 .45 
14              1.00 .25 .31 .22 .34 
15               1.00 .41 .31 .22 
16                1.00 .47 .47 
17                 1.00 .52 
18                  1.00 
Note: The item numbers refer to 1 = Sending numerous, unsolicited messages via the Internet that are sexually explicit or obscene 
    2 =   Sending numerous, unsolicited messages via the Internet that are abusive or threatening 
    3 =   Sending numerous, unsolicited messages via mobile phone that are sexually explicit or obscene 
    4 =   Sending numerous, unsolicited messages via mobile phone that are abusive or threatening 
    5 =   Sending emails to a person‟s friends, family or work colleagues in an attempt to destroy their reputation 
    6 =   Sending improper messages to a person‟s friends family or work colleagues in an attempt to destroy their reputation 
    7 =   Posting false information on the internet about a person 
    8 =   Posting someone‟s contact information online in a way that solicits sex 
    9 =   Posting sexually explicit pictures on the internet that have been changed to resemble another person 
    10 =  Changing online identity to contact someone who has blocked previous contact attempts 
    11 =  Telling someone in an online „chat‟ information about their offline life that they did not disclose 
    12 =  Encouraging other internet users to be abusive towards someone 
    13 =  Sending malicious software that can damage their hardware or software 
    14 =  Sending malicious software that can be used to access information stored on their computer 
    15 =  Telling someone in an online „chat‟ that you have followed them offline 
    16 = Using an identity/screen name similar to another person and contacting their friends to destroy their reputation 
    17 =  Subscribing another person to online services that they did not want 
    18 =  Spamming another person‟s email in an attempt to disrupt or disable their email 
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Factor 1 was labelled as ‘Deception/Disclosure’. This factor included items that involved 
the perpetrator deceiving a person or other Internet users in relation to that person. Such 
items included changing one‟s online identity in an attempt to contact someone who had 
previously blocked their online contact attempts, posting sexually explicit pictures on the 
Internet that had been changed to resemble a particular person, and posting false 
information on the Internet about a particular person. The disclosure element of the factor 
included items that involved the perpetrator disclosing information to a person. Such items 
included telling someone in an online chat that they had followed them offline, or telling 
them information about his/her offline life that he/she did not disclose. What the items had 
in common was that the deception and disclosure involved malicious intentions. Factor 2 
was labelled as ‘Harassing Messages’. This factor included items whereby a perpetrator 
was sending someone abusive/threatening messages via the Internet or mobile phone, 
sending sexually explicit messages via the Internet or mobile phone, and encouraging other 
internet users to be abusive to someone. Factor 3 was labelled as ‘Malicious software’. 
This factor included two items that involved sending someone malicious software that 
could be used to damage that person‟s software/hardware or to access information held on 
someone‟s computer.  
 
Table 13: Matrix Showing the Correlations between Each of the Factors 
Factor: Deception/Disclosure Harassing 
Messages 
Malicious 
Software 
Deception/Disclosure 1.00 -.45 .39 
Harassing Messages -.45 1.00 -.33 
Malicious Software .39 -.33 1.00 
 
Finally, the correlation matrix (Table 13) shows each of the factors correlated with each of 
the other factors with all coefficients greater than .3. This indicates the factors were inter-
related, confirming that direct oblimin rotation was the correct method in these analyses. 
 
Although normality violations were observed for the factors Harassing Messages and 
Malicious Software, the ANOVA statistic is considered to be robust to assumption 
violations (Field, 2005). One-way repeated measures ANOVA was used to see if there 
were any significant main effects on perceived criminality of online behaviours. Mauchly‟s 
test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been violated (
2
 (2) = 1.28, p = 
.53). Results indicated a significant difference between the ratings of criminality on the 
three factors F (2, 636) = 376.82, p < .001, partial 
2
 = .54. Using the Bonferroni post-hoc 
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test, significant differences were found between the factors. Malicious Software was 
perceived the most criminal act, followed by Harassing Messages. Deception/Disclosure 
was not perceived as criminal.  
 
Between groups ANOVA revealed significant gender differences in perceived criminality 
of harassing messages F(1, 317) = 5.64, p = .02, partial 
2
 = .02: females (M = 4.2, SD = .73) 
rated harassing messages as more criminal than males (M = 3.97, SD = .98). Females (M = 
3.4, SD = .87) rated deception/disclosure as more criminal than males (M = 3.27, SD = 
.98) and males (M = 4.75, SD = .64) rated malicious software as more criminal than 
females (M = 4.6, SD = .72). However, these differences were not significant. 
 
4.3.1.3 The role of personality in the perceived criminality of cyber-harassing 
behaviours 
 
A series of regression analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between Internet 
self-efficacy, the „Big Five‟ personality characteristics, and each of the three factors. The 
data was checked to confirm suitability for regression analyses, and none of the 
assumptions were violated. 
 
Table 14: Multiple Regressions using Internet self-efficacy and the ‘Big Five’ personality dimensions as predictors 
for Deception/Disclosure, Malicious Software, and Harassing Messages. 
      Confidence 
Intervals 
  
 B SE B  t p Lower Upper Tolerance VIF 
Harassing Messages          
      Constant 5.21 .69        
      Agreeableness -.33 .15 -.2 -2.3 .02* -.62 -.05 .41 2.41 
Malicious Software          
      Constant 4.96 .57        
      Internet Self-Efficacy .08 .03 .16 2.93 .004** .03 .14 .98 1.03 
Note: *   = p < .05. 
 ** = p < .01. 
 
The enter method was used to identify significant variables that predicted individuals‟ 
perceptions of criminality on the three factors. Results indicated that Agreeableness β = - 
.2, t = - 2.3, p = .02 was a significant predictor of harassing messages F (6,313) = 2.34, p = 
.03, explaining 4.3% of the variance (Table 14). Those who scored high in Agreeableness 
were less likely to perceive harassing messages as criminal. The results also indicated that 
Internet self-efficacy β = .16, t = 2.93, p < .01 was a significant predictor for malicious 
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software F (6, 312) = 2.25, p = .04, explaining 4.1% of the variance. Those who scored high 
in Internet self-efficacy were more likely to perceive malicious software as criminal. 
 
4.3.2 Experiencing cyber-harassing behaviours 
 
4.3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 15 shows the percentages of participants who reported experiencing cyber-harassing 
behaviours. Nearly half the sample reported receiving malicious software that could 
damage their hardware or software. The next frequently reported behaviours included 
receiving numerous, unsolicited sexually explicit or obscene messages via the Internet, 
someone changing their online identity to contact an individual because previous contacts 
had been blocked, being sent malicious software that could be used to access information 
held on one‟s computer, being subscribed by someone to unwanted online services, having 
one‟s email spammed in an attempt to disrupt service, receiving numerous unsolicited 
sexually explicit or obscene messages to one‟s mobile phone, and being told information 
about one‟s offline life that one did not disclose. The least frequently occurring behaviours 
included having one‟s contact information posted on the Internet in a way that solicits sex, 
having sexually explicit pictures posted on the Internet that have been changed to resemble 
oneself, and being told in an online „chat‟ that the person you are chatting to has followed 
you offline. 
 
Table 15: Descriptive statistics showing the percentages of those who reported experiencing cyber-harassing 
behaviours  
 Responses % 
 
Item: 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Not Sure 
Prefer 
Not to 
Say 
13. Being sent malicious software that could damage 
your hardware or software 
41.7 48.3 10 0 
1. Receiving numerous, unsolicited sexually explicit 
or obscene messages via the Internet 
29.5 66.5 3.4 .6 
10. Changing online identities in an attempt to 
contact one because previous contacts were 
blocked 
26.6 67.4 6 0 
14. Being sent malicious software that could be used 
to access information held on your computer 
25.5 58.5 16 0 
17. Being subscribed to unwanted online services by 
someone else 
25.5 65.1 9.4 0 
18. Having your email spammed in an attempt to 
disrupt/disable your email 
22.6 64.8 12.6 0 
3. Receiving numerous, unsolicited sexually explicit 
or obscene messages via mobile phone 
21.6 77.2 .6 .6 
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11. Someone telling you information about your 
offline life that you did not disclose 
20.1 72.4 7.5 0 
7. Someone posting false information on the Internet 
about you 
19.7 66.2 14.1 0 
2. Receiving numerous, unsolicited abusive and/or 
threatening messages via the Internet 
19.4 78.4 1.9 .3 
4. Receiving numerous, unsolicited abusive and/or 
threatening messages via mobile phone 
15.7 83.4 .9 0 
12. Someone encouraging other Internet users to be 
abusive or threatening to you 
13.5 78.3 8.2 0 
5. Friends, family, or work colleagues being sent 
email messages in an attempt to embarrass or 
damage one‟s reputation 
11.6 79.3 9.1 0 
6. Friends, family, or work colleagues being sent 
messages to their mobile phone in an attempt to 
embarrass or damage one‟s reputation 
9.1 83.1 7.8 0 
16. Having someone use a similar identity or screen 
name to yours and contacting your friends to 
damage your reputation 
8.5 87.5 4 0 
15. Someone telling you in an online „chat‟ that they 
had followed you offline 
4.7 91.9 3.4 0 
9. Having sexually explicit pictures posted on the 
Internet that have been changed to resemble one 
4.1 92.4 3.5 0 
8. Having your contact information posted on the 
Internet in a way that solicits sex 
2.2 93.7 4.1 0 
Note: N = 320 
 
4.3.2.2 Gender differences in experiencing cyber-harassing behaviours 
 
Table 16 shows gender differences in experiencing cyber-harassing behaviours. Chi Square 
was used to identify significant gender differences in experiencing cyber-harassing 
behaviours. As a lot of chi square analyses were run, the cut-off was reduced from .05 to 
.01 to ensure the findings are significant. Males were more likely than females to receive 
numerous unsolicited abusive and/or threatening messages via the Internet, and to be 
subscribed to unwanted online services. No other significant gender differences were 
found.  
 
Table 16: Gender breakdown relating to experiencing online behaviours 
Item: Gender %   
Males Females 2 p 
13. Being sent malicious software that could damage your hardware 
or software 
48.6 45.1 .33 .57 
1. Receiving numerous, unsolicited sexually explicit or obscene 
messages via the Internet 
31.5 30.5 .03 .85 
14. Being sent malicious software that could be used to access 
information held on your computer 
39 25.1 5.68 .02 
10. Changing online identities in an attempt to contact one because 
previous contacts were blocked 
27.5 28.4 .03 .87 
17. Being subscribed to unwanted online services by someone else 42.6 20.4 15.85 .000** 
18. Having your email spammed in an attempt to disrupt/disable your 29.1 24.1 .84 .36 
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email 
7. Having false information posted on the Internet 25.5 21.7 .51 .48 
3. Receiving numerous, unsolicited sexually explicit or obscene 
messages via mobile phone 
20.9 22.5 .11 .74 
11. Being told information about one‟s offline life that one did not 
disclose 
23.6 20.7 .32 .57 
2. Receiving numerous, unsolicited abusive and/or threatening 
messages via the Internet 
29 15.2 8.35 .004* 
4. Receiving numerous, unsolicited abusive and/or threatening 
messages via mobile phone 
13.5 17.2 .75 .39 
12. Encouraging other Internet users to be abusive or threatening to 
one 
17.5 13.2 .96 .33 
5. Friends, family, or work colleagues being sent email messages in 
an attempt to embarrass or damage one‟s reputation 
18.4 9.5 4.68 .03 
6. Friends, family, or work colleagues being sent messages to their 
mobile phone in an attempt to embarrass or damage one‟s 
reputation 
12.7 8.4 1.42 .23 
16. Having someone use a similar identity or screen name to yours 
and contacting your friends to damage your reputation 
9.6 8.5 .11 .74 
15. Being told in an online „chat‟ that the person you are chatting to 
has followed you offline 
4.7 5 .01 .92 
9. Having sexually explicit pictures posted on the Internet that have 
been changed to resemble one 
4.7 4 .09 .77 
8. Having your contact information posted on the Internet in a way 
that solicits sex 
1.9 2.5 .12 .73 
NOTE: *   = p < .01 
 ** = p < .001 
 
4.3.2.3 The role of personality predicting the experience cyber-harassing behaviours 
 
A series of logistic regression analyses (using the entry method) were used see if the „Big 
Five‟ personality characteristics and Internet self-efficacy predicted whether participants 
experienced each of the cyber-harassing behaviours. Table 17 illustrates the associated 
statistics relating to significant models. 
 
For receiving abusive messages via the Internet, a total of 312 cases were analysed and a 
significant model emerged (
2
 (6) = 15.6, p = .02). The model accounted for 4.9% to 7.7% 
of the variance (Cox and Snell R
2
 = .05, Nagelkerke R
2
 = .08). The Hosmer and Lemeshow 
test (
2
 (8) = 9.88, p = .27) indicated the model was a good fit. Overall, the model was 
80.1% accurate, with 100% of cases correctly identified for not receiving abusive messages 
via the Internet but 0% of cases correctly identified for receiving abusive messages via the 
Internet. It should be noted that the explanatory power did not increase from blindly 
estimating the outcome. Thus, minority status (i.e., receiving abusive messages via the 
Internet) cannot be differentiated on the basis of personality and Internet self-efficacy. 
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Internet self-efficacy was the only predictor variable that reliably predicted not receiving 
abusive messages via the Internet.  
 
Table 17: Logistic Regression Analyses  
    95% CI for exp b 
Included B (SE) Wald p Lower exp b Upper 
Receiving abusive messages via the 
Internet 
      
      Constant -4.96 (2.26) 4.81 .03  .01  
      Internet self-efficacy .37 (.12) 9.93 .002 1.15 1.44 1.82 
Receiving abusive messages via 
mobile phone 
      
      Constant -7.82 (2.44) 10.28 .001  .000  
      Agreeableness 1.14 (.52) 4.86 .03 1.13 3.11 8.54 
Being subscribed to unwanted online 
services 
      
      Constant -2.56 (2.04) 1.58 .21  .08  
      Neuroticism .86 (.32) 7.49 .006 1.28 2.37 4.40 
      Internet self-efficacy .26 (.10) -6.58 .01 1.06 1.30 1.59 
 
For receiving abusive messages via mobile phone, a total of 315 cases were analysed and a 
significant model emerged (
2
 (6) = 20.33, p = .002). The model accounted for 6.2% to 
10.7% of the variance (Cox and Snell R
2
 = .062, Nagelkerke R
2
 = .11). The Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test (
2
 (8) = 6.01, p = .65) indicated the model was a good fit. Overall, the 
model was 84.1% accurate, with all but one case correctly identified for not receiving 
abusive messages via mobile phone but only predicts one case receiving abusive messages 
via mobile phone. It should be noted that the explanatory power did not increase from 
blindly estimating the outcome. Agreeableness was a significant predictor variable that 
reliably predicted not receiving abusive messages via mobile phone.  
 
For being subscribed to unwanted online services, a total of 288 cases were analysed and a 
significant model emerged (
2
 (6) = 13.92, p = .03). The model accounted for 4.7% to 
6.8% of the variance (Cox and Snell R
2
 =.05, Nagelkerke R
2
 = .07). The Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test (
2
 (8) = 6.89, p = .55) indicated the model was a good fit. Overall, the 
model was 71.9% accurate, with all but 3 cases correctly identified for not being 
subscribed to unwanted services, but only predicts three cases of being subscribed to 
unwanted services. It should be noted that the explanatory power did not increase from 
blindly estimating the outcome. Neuroticism and Internet self-efficacy were significant 
predictor variables that reliably predicted not being subscribed to unwanted online 
services.  
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4.3.2.4 The relationship between personality, Internet self-efficacy, experiencing 
cyber-harassing behaviours and upset 
 
The total number of experienced behaviours was calculated for each participant. Pearson‟s 
correlation was used to see if there was a relationship between the number of behaviours 
individuals experienced and how upset they were by their experiences. A positive 
correlation was found (r = .17, p = .01), indicating that how upset individuals were by their 
experiences was positively associated with the number of behaviours they experienced, 
although this effect was weak. 
 
Regression analyses were used to see if personality, Internet self-efficacy, or the 
behaviours experienced predicted participants‟ ratings of upset. The data were checked to 
confirm suitability for analyses, and all assumptions were met. A significant model 
emerged F (18, 92) = 2.47; p = .003, explaining 32.6% of the variance in ratings of upset. 
Receiving abusive and/or threatening messages to their mobile phone (β = .47, t = 4.41, p < 
.001), someone changing their online identity in an attempt to contact participants when 
previous contact attempts had been blocked (β = .25, t = 2.45, p = .02), being told 
information about one‟s offline life that one did not disclose (β = .25, t = 2.35, p .02), and 
receiving malicious software that could be used to damage one‟s hardware and/or software 
(β = .26, t = 2.3, p = .02) significantly predicted participants‟ ratings of upset. No other 
variables significantly contributed to the model. 
 
4.3.2.4.1 Gender differences in ratings of upset 
 
An independent samples t-test indicated that there were significant gender differences in 
participants‟ ratings of upset following their experiences of cyber-harassing behaviours (t = 
-3.54; df = 230, p < .001). Females (M = 4.88; SD = 2.9) rated their experiences as more 
upsetting than males (M = 3.52; SD = 2.8). 
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4.3.3 Perceived peer support in the experience of cyber-harassing behaviours 
 
4.3.3.1 Multiple Response Analyses 
 
Participants were asked to report who they would tell if they experienced each of the 18 
cyber-harassing behaviours. As participants could select more than one response for the 
behaviours, the data were subjected to multiple response analysis. This is a more useful 
way to describe the behaviours as the percentages are of the total responses selected. 
 
As can be seen from Table 18, for each of the cyber-harassing behaviours, the friend 
category yielded the highest percentage for who participants would tell. The only 
exception was if participants received malicious software that could be used to access 
information held on their computer; 20.1% of responses indicated participants would tell 
their friend and 20.8% of responses indicated participants would tell their ISP. Participants 
were most likely to tell their family if the perpetrator contacted their friends, family or 
work colleagues via email and via mobile phone to damage their reputation (27% and 
27.9%, respectively).  
 
Participants were most likely to tell the police if a perpetrator sent them abusive or 
threatening messages to their mobile phone, or if an online chat partner told them they had 
followed them offline (25% and 23.3%, respectively). Participants would be least likely to 
contact the police if their email was spammed in an attempt to disrupt their email service, 
if someone changed their online identities to contact the participants after previous contacts 
were blocked, and if they were subscribed to unwanted online services (4.2%, 5%, and 
5.7%, respectively).  
 
Participants reported being most likely to tell no-one if a perpetrator changed his/her online 
identity to contact them after previous contacts were blocked, and if a perpetrator told them 
information about their offline life during an online chat (14.5% and 11.3%, respectively). 
Participants were least likely to tell no-one if they received abusive and/or threatening 
messages to their mobile phone (2.5%). 
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4.3.3.2 Gender differences in perceived social support for the experience of cyber-
harassing behaviours 
 
Significant gender differences arose in who participants imagined they would tell if they 
experienced the 18 behaviours. Table 19 shows the percentages of males and females who 
reported they would tell, and the relevant chi square statistics. Females were more likely 
than males to tell a friend if they experienced all of the behaviours, with the exception of 
someone sending their friends, family or work colleagues improper messages to their 
mobile phone to embarrass them or damage their reputation, someone telling them in an 
online „chat‟ that they had followed them offline, someone using a similar online identity 
to them to contact their friends to damage their reputation, being subscribed to unwanted 
online services, or if someone spammed their email in an attempt to disable or disrupt their 
email service. 
 
 Females were more likely than males to tell their family if they 1) received numerous, 
unsolicited messages via the Internet that were abusive and/or threatening; 2) if someone 
encouraged other Internet users to be abusive and/or threatening towards them; 3) if they 
received malicious software that could be used to damage their hardware or software; 4) if 
they received malicious software that could be used to access information held on their 
computer;  and 5) if they were sent spam in an attempt to disrupt or disable their email. 
 
Males were more likely than females to tell no-one if 1) they received abusive or 
threatening messages to their mobile phone, 2) false information was posted on the Internet 
about them, 3) their contact information was posted on the Internet in a way that solicited 
sex, 4) sexually explicit pictures were changed to resemble them and posted on the 
Internet, 5) someone told them in an online „chat‟ information about their offline life they 
did not disclose, 6) someone encouraged other Internet users to be abusive and/or 
threatening to them, 7) they received malicious software that could damage their hardware 
and/or software or 8) access information held on their computer, and 9) someone told them 
in an online „chat‟ they followed them offline. Finally, males were more likely than 
females to tell the police if someone sent them malicious software that could be used to 
damage their hardware or software. 
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Table 18: Percentages of who participants would tell if they experienced cyber-harassing behaviours 
 
 
Behaviour 
Friend Family ISP / 
Mobile 
Phone 
Operator 
IM Police Doctor University No-
one 
Don’t 
know 
Other 
1. Sexually explicit messages via Internet 29.7 13.6 15 16.3 10.6 .2 3 7.3 3.2 1.1 
2. Abusive/threatening messages via Internet 24.2 18.2 14.2 13.9 19.7 0 3.9 3.6 1.5 .7 
3. Sexually explicit messages via mobile phone 32.3 14.5 24.2 - 15.7 .2 1.8 6 3.8 1.4 
4. Abusive/threatening messages via mobile 
phone 
26.5 19.6 19.9 - 25 .2 2.8 2.6 2.5 1 
5. Contacting friends, family or work colleagues 
via email to damage reputation 
33.6 27 8.9 7.1 8 .2 2.6 4.2 5.1 3.3 
6. Contacting friends, family or work colleagues 
via mobile phone to damage reputation 
35.2 27.9 9.6 4.5 7.3 .5 2.1 4.3 5.5 3 
7. Posting false information online 27.9 18 11.8 19.6 9.1 .2 2 5.1 5.1 1.3 
8. Posting contact information in a way that 
solicits sex 
23.2 13 12.8 17.9 22 .5 2.2 3.4 3.9 1 
9. Posting sexually explicit pictures that have 
been changed to resemble you 
24.9 13.1 13.2 19 17.8 .3 1.9 4.7 3.5 1.6 
10. Changing online identity to contact you after 
blocking previous contacts 
30.7 13.6 12.7 15.1 5 .4 2 14.5 4.4 1.5 
11. Being told in online chat information about 
offline life  
31.5 18.8 8.4 10.5 9.6 .4 1.3 11.3 6.6 1.5 
12. Encouraging other Internet users to be abusive 25.6 17.1 12.1 17.8 14.1 .4 1.5 6.3 3.7 1.5 
13. Receiving malicious software that could 
damage hardware or software 
21.2 17.1 20.6 19.6 9.7 .2 1.8 4.8 3.6 1.4 
14. Receiving malicious software that can be used 
to access information held on computer 
20.1 16.3 20.8 18.7 13.7 0 1.7 4.3 3.1 1.4 
15. Being told in online chat that chat partner has 
followed you offline 
29.3 20.5 7.2 7.4 23.3 .4 2.1 4.7 4.0 1.1 
16. Using a similar ID to you to contact online 
friends and damage reputation 
25.6 20.9 11 13.2 6.5 .4 1.7 4.8 4.3 1.7 
17. Being subscribed to unwanted online services 22.8 12.4 21.1 20.3 5.7 0 1.1 9.9 4.6 2.1 
18. Receiving spam to disrupt email service 23.8 13.1 24.1 19.8 4.2 .2 1.3 9.1 4.4 0 
 
Table 19: Gender differences in who participants thought they would tell if they experienced cyber-harassing behaviours 
 
 
Item 
 Within gender breakdown of responses % 
 Friend Family Internet 
Service 
Provider 
Internet 
Moderator 
Police University No-one Mobile 
phone 
company 
1. Receiving numerous unsolicited 
sexually explicit or obscene 
messages via the Internet  
Males 41.6 19.8 30.7 32.7 22.8 6.9 19.8  
N/A Females 67 30.3 28.7 31.4 19.1 5.3 11.2 
2 
(p) 17.5 (.000)** 3.7 (.05) .1 (.7) .1 (.8) .5 (.5) .3 (.6) 4 (.05) 
2. Receiving numerous unsolicited 
abusive and/or threatening messages 
via the Internet 
Males 40.2 29.4 33.3 37.3 42.2 9.8 12.7  
N/A Females 65.6 50 33.3 30.1 47.8 8.6 5.9 
2 
(p) 17.3 (.000)** 11.4 (.001)* .0 (1.0) 1.5 (.2) .9 (.4) .1 (.7) 4 (.05) 
3. Receiving numerous, unsolicited 
sexually explicit and/or obscene 
messages via mobile phone 
Males 40.6 21.8  
N/A 
 
N/A 
23.8 4 16.8 46.5 
Females 64.7 27.2 28.8 2.7 7.1 39.7 
2 
(p) 15.4 (.000)** 1 (.3) .8 (.4) .3 (.6) 6.6 (.01)* 1.3 (.3) 
4. Receiving numerous, unsolicited 
abusive and/or threatening messages 
via mobile phone 
Males 45 35  
N/A 
 
N/A 
52 7 10 44 
Females 62.9 45.7 53.8 5.4 3.2 41.9 
2 
(p) 8.5 (.004)* 3.1 (.08) .1 (.8) .3 (.6) 5.7 (.02) .1 (.7) 
5. Sending your friends, family or work 
colleagues email messages in an 
attempt to embarrass you or damage 
your reputation 
Males 57.4 47.5 19.8 17.8 20.8 5 9.9  
N/A Females 71.7 56.7 16.6 12.3 13.4 5.3 7.5 
2 
(p) 6 (.01)* 2.2 (.1) .5 (.5) 1.6 (.2) 2.7 (.1) .0 (.9) .5 (.5) 
6. Sending your friends, family or work 
colleagues improper messages to 
their mobile phone to embarrass you 
or damage your reputation 
Males 61.8 49 21.6 12.7 16.7 4.9 9.8  
N/A Females 71.1 56.1 17.1 6.4 12.8 3.7 7.5 
2 
(p) 2.7 (.1) 1.4 (.3) .9 (.4) 3.3 (.1) .8 (.4) .2 (.6) .5 (.5) 
7. Having false information posted on 
the Internet about you 
Males 38.6 27.7 18.8 42.6 18.8 3 16.8  
N/A Females 61.5 38 24.6 34.2 16.6 4.3 5.9 
2 
(p) 13.8 (.000)** 3.1 (.1) 1.3 (.3) 2 (.2) .2 (.6) .3 (.6) 9 (.003)* 
8. Having your contact information 
posted online in a way that solicits 
sex 
Males 31 18 23 43 43 4 13  
N/A Females 56.8 31.4 28.1 33 46.5 4.9 3.8 
2 
(p) 17.3 (.000)** 5.9 (.02) .9 (.4) 2.8 (.1) .3 (.6) .1 (.7) 8.6 (.004)* 
9. Having sexually explicit pictures 
posted on the Internet that have been 
changed to resemble you 
Males 32.3 18.2 21.2 43.4 29.3 5.1 20.2  
N/A Females 59.1 30.6 29.6 34.9 39.2 3.2 3.8 
2 
(p) 18.6 (.000)** 5.2 (.02) 2.3 (.1) 2 (.2) 2.8 (.1) .6 (.5) 22.5 
(.000)** 
10. Having someone change their online 
identity to contact you when you 
Males 39 21 22 29 10 4 29  
N/A Females 54.3 22 19.4 21.5 7 2.7 19.4 
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have blocked their previous contacts 2 (p) 6.1 (.01)* .0 (.8) .3 (.6) 2 (.2) .8 (.4) .4 (.5) 3.5 (.06) 
11. Being told information about your 
offline life that you did not disclose 
Males 35.6 21.8 12.9 17.8 14.9 3 27.7  
N/A Females 59.5 35.7 14.1 16.8 16.2 1.6 13 
2 
(p) 14.8 (.000)** 5.9 (.02) .1 (.8) .1 (.8) .1 (.8) .6 (.5) 9.6 (.002)* 
12. Having someone encourage other 
Internet users to be abusive and/or 
threatening towards you 
Males 31.6 21.4 22.4 38.8 24.5 3.1 19.4  
N/A Females 57.5 38.2 23.1 30.6 28 2.7 7.5 
2 
(p) 17.2 (.000)** 8.2 (.004)* .0 (.9) 1.9 (.2) .4 (.5) .0 (.9) 8.8 (.003)* 
13. Being sent malicious software that 
could be used to damage your 
software and/or hardware 
Males 27.3 23.2 38.4 43.4 27.3 4 18.2  
N/A Females 48.9 38.7 41.4 35.5 14.5 3.2 4.3 
2 
(p) 12.5 (.000)** 6.9 (.01)* .2 (.6) 1.7 (.2) 6.9 (.01)* .1 (.7) 15 
(.000)** 
14. Being sent malicious software that 
could be used to access information 
held on your computer 
Males 26 21 41 41 34 4 17  
N/A Females 47.9 38.8 42 35.6 23.9 3.2 3.7 
2 
(p) 13 (.000)** 9.4 (.002)* .0 (.9) .8 (.4) 3.3 (.07) .1 (.7) 15.1 
(.000)** 
15. Someone telling you in an online 
chat that they followed you offline 
Males 50.5 32.3 15.2 17.2 44.4 3 17.2  
N/A Females 62.9 45.7 14 13.4 47.8 4.8 4.8 
2 
(p) 4.1 (.05) 4.8 (.03) .07 (.8) .7 (.4) .3 (.6) .5 (.5) 11.9 
(.001)* 
16. Someone using a similar online 
identity to yours to contact your 
friends in an attempt to destroy your 
reputation 
Males 58.6 38.4 22.2 32.3 16.2 4 15.2  
N/A Females 71 39.2 19.9 21 10.2 2.7 5.9 
2 
(p) 4.5 (.04) .0 (.9) .2 (.6) 4.5 (.04) 2.1 (.2) .4 (.5) 6.7 (.01)* 
17. Being subscribed to online services 
you did not want 
Males 28.6 14.3 37.8 39.8 8.2 2 23.5  
N/A Females 43.2 24.3 34.1 30.8 10.3 1.6 12.4 
2 
(p) 5.8 (.02) 3.9 (.05) .4 (.5) 2.3 (.1) .3 (.8) .1 (.8) 5.7 (.02) 
18. Someone spamming your email in an 
attempt to disable or disrupt your 
email 
Males 30.3 11.1 45.5 36.4 8.1 3 21.2  
N/A Females 44.9 27.6 37.3 31.4 6.5 1.6 11.4 
2 
(p) 5.7 (.02) 10.2 (.001)* 1.8 (.2) .7 (.4) .3 (.6) .6 (.4) 5 (.03) 
Note: *   p < .01 
 ** p < .001 
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4.4 Discussion 
 
This study aimed to determine the types of cyber-harassing behaviours that undergraduate 
students experience and perceive as criminal. Furthermore, the study assessed whether the 
„Big Five‟ personality characteristics and Internet self-efficacy predicted the likelihood of 
experiencing, or the perceived criminality, of cyber-harassing behaviours. Finally, the 
study assessed perceived peer support that participants would avail of, should they 
experience cyber-harassment. Discussion of the findings is divided into three sections: 1) 
perceived criminality of cyber-harassment; 2) experiences of cyber-harassment; and 3) 
perceived peer support in dealing with cyber-harassment. 
 
4.4.1 Perceived criminality of cyber-harassment 
 
Following factor analysis of the data, three factors emerged that were underlying 
participants‟ perceptions of criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours. Participants 
perceived Malicious Software and Harassing Messages as criminal but did not perceive 
Deception/Disclosure as criminal. Whilst the null hypothesis was expected, the findings 
partially support the hypothesis that participants would perceive cyber-harassing 
behaviours as criminal. This finding contradicts the findings of previous research (e.g., 
Alexy, Burgess, Baker & Smoyak, 2005), and theoretical assumptions that individuals do 
not perceive online behaviours as having offline consequences (see Suler, 2004; Whitty, 
2007). However, perceiving online behaviour as not having offline consequences may 
relate specifically to one‟s own behaviour and not to others‟ behaviour.  
 
The items that loaded on the Malicious Software and Harassing Messages factors indicated 
behaviours that could be prosecuted within the UK using the Computer Misuse Act (1990) 
and the Malicious Software Act (1998) as single offences. Consequently, participants may 
have clear ideas about legislation within the UK and may have known that these items 
could be prosecuted as single offences. As such, participants may have recognised that the 
items loading on the Deception/Disclosure factor were indicative of cyber-harassment. 
However, the PfHA stipulates that perpetrators must pursue a course of conduct that causes 
the victim alarm or distress. Participants may have been aware of these requirements but 
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needed further information before they could make judgements about whether the 
behaviours were criminal. 
 
Alternatively, participants may have judged the behaviours as criminal depending on 
whether they involved threat to the victim. For instance, the items that loaded on Malicious 
Software threatened the victim‟s computer hardware and/or software, or personal 
information stored on the computer. Similarly, the items that loaded on Harassing 
Messages involved sending the victim abusive and/or threatening messages via the Internet 
or to their mobile phone. In contrast, the items that loaded onto the Deception/Disclosure 
factor did not involve any explicitly threatening behaviour towards the victim.  
 
The „Big Five‟ personality characteristics and Internet self-efficacy did not consistently 
predict the perceived criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours. Therefore, the hypotheses 
making predictions between personality, Internet self-efficacy and the perceived 
criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours were rejected. However, there were two 
exceptions to this finding. First, individuals who scored high on agreeableness were less 
likely to perceive Harassing Messages as criminal, compared to low scorers. Agreeable 
individuals may have perceived the items that loaded on Harassing Messages as more 
personal than behaviours that loaded on other factors. Theoretically, high-agreeable 
individuals are better able to control negative affect (Bono, Boles, Judge & Lauver, 2002), 
and are highly motivated to maintain positive interpersonal relations. The desire to 
maintain positive relations with others may explain why highly agreeable individuals were 
less likely to perceive Harassing Messages as criminal. 
 
Second, individuals who scored high on Internet self-efficacy were more likely to perceive 
Malicious Software as criminal, compared to low scorers. According to Eastin and LaRose 
(2000), Internet self-efficacy is strongly associated with prior experience using the 
Internet. Experienced Internet users may be more aware of the damage that can be caused 
by malicious software in comparison to other cyber-harassing behaviours compared to 
novice users. They may realise that malicious software may cause instability in your 
computer and its components or software, or allow the owner access to your computer and 
any information stored on it. All of these behaviours may have significant financial costs to 
the victim. Therefore, low Internet self-efficacious individuals may not have enough 
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knowledge and/or Internet experience to recognise the threatening nature of such 
behaviours and may explain why they were less likely to perceive malicious software as 
criminal. 
 
Despite the two exceptions above, personality and Internet self-efficacy did not 
consistently predict participants‟ judgements of criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours.  
This indicates that other factors may yield greater explanatory power to the perceived 
criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours. Lerner and Miller‟s (1978) just world 
hypothesis may provide a better explanation to the findings than personality characteristics. 
According to their hypothesis, individuals need to believe that people get what they 
deserve, thus allowing them to perceive their world as stable and controllable. It may be 
that participants‟ perceived a greater lack of control on the victim‟s behalf if they were to 
experience behaviours associated with Malicious Software or Harassing Messages. The 
perceived lack of control the victim has may have shattered participants‟ beliefs in a just 
world. Consequently, participants may have been motivated to re-establish equilibrium in 
their perceptions of the world, and deemed behaviours associated with Malicious Software 
and Harassing Messages as criminal. 
 
4.4.2 Experiencing cyber-harassment 
 
This study revealed a wide range of cyber-harassing behaviours experienced by 
participants. Nearly half of the participants in this study reported receiving malicious 
software that could damage their hardware or software, and was the most frequently 
reported behaviour. Bocij (2003) also reported that participants frequently received 
malicious software. However, participants‟ in this study reported experiencing a greater 
range of behaviours in comparison to Bocij‟s study. This may reflect a change in the 
methods used by perpetrators as the Internet evolves and software becomes easier to use. 
 
Participants reported that the least frequently experienced included having their contact 
information posted on the Internet in a way that solicited sex, and having sexually explicit 
pictures posted on the Internet that had been changed to resemble them. There have been 
instances of cyberstalking whereby perpetrators have used these methods to harass their 
victim. For example, Cynthia Armistead‟s information had been posted online in a way 
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that solicited sex (Griffiths, Rogers, & Sparrow, 1998). However, the current findings 
suggest these tactics are atypical representations of cyber-harassment. 
 
Contrasting previous harassment research, the findings of this study suggest that males and 
females experience the majority of cyber-harassing behaviours to a similar degree. The 
trend found in research investigating offline harassment indicates that females are more 
likely to be victimised than males (Ashmore, Jones, Jackson, & Smoyak, 2006; Budd & 
Mattinson, 2000; Kienlen, Birmingham, Solberg, & O‟Regan, 1997; Spitzberg & Cupach, 
2003; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). The lack of empirical research investigating cyber-
harassment has resulted in inconsistent findings between the few studies that have been 
conducted. However, Bocij (2004) argues that a major deviation from offline harassment is 
that males are more likely to report being victimised than their offline counterparts and 
there is some research lending support to this argument, with 35% to 51% of cyber-
harassment victims being male (D‟Ovidio & Doyle, 2003; Finkelhor, Mitchell & Wolak, 
2000, respectively). Thus, the findings of this study provide further indication that males 
are more likely to experience (or at least report) cyber-harassment compared to offline 
harassment. 
 
The finding that there were few gender differences in experiences of cyber-harassing 
behaviours, and in some instances males were more likely to experience cyber-harassing 
behaviours lends some support to the equalisation hypothesis. Cues that are visible in face-
to-face communication (such as gender, age, and ethnicity) are not apparent in online 
communications. According to the equalisation hypothesis, the reduction in these cues 
leads to perceived equalisation of social status among low and high status individuals 
(Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & Sethna, 1991). Therefore, males may be more likely targeted in 
cyber-harassment than their offline counterparts. 
 
The survey was conducted anonymously by participants and the online disinhibition effect 
may account for the findings. Reips (2000) argues that participants are more open on the 
Internet than offline. Research has demonstrated that participants are likely to disclose 
more in IMR than offline methods and this may be due to the anonymity provided by the 
Internet (Buchanan, 2002; Buchanan & Smith, 1999; Joinson, 2001). Additionally, as 
participants perceive themselves as anonymous, they are less likely to respond in a socially 
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desirable manner (Joinson, 1999). This being the case, male participants may have felt less 
anxiety over admitting to experiencing these behaviours because they could not be 
identified. 
 
Similar to findings relating to the perceived criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours, 
personality did not consistently predict the likelihood of experiencing cyber-harassment. 
However, significant predictions were found in relation to specific cyber-harassing 
behaviours. First, individuals who scored high in Internet self-efficacy were less likely to 
receive abusive or threatening messages via the Internet. As Internet self-efficacy is related 
to prior internet experience (Eastin & LaRose, 2000), high scorers may be more aware of 
how to protect themselves from receiving abusive or threatening messages via the Internet. 
Second, individuals who scored high on agreeableness were less likely to receive abusive 
or threatening messages to their mobile phone. Mobile phone communication may be 
regarded as more personal than online communications. This supports previous research 
that suggests highly agreeable individuals are more adept at avoiding confrontation than 
individuals scoring low on agreeableness (Bono, Boles, Judge & Lauver, 2002; Dijkstra, 
van Dierendonck, Evers & De Dreu, 2005). Finally, individuals who scored high on 
neuroticism or Internet self-efficacy were less likely to be subscribed to unwanted services. 
According to McCrae and Costa (1985, 1987), individuals who score high on neuroticism 
are worriers, insecure, self-conscious, anxious, angry, and mistrustful. Whilst previous 
research suggests that highly neurotic individuals are more likely to experience 
interpersonal conflict (Bono, Boles, Judge & Lauver, 2002), being subscribed to unwanted 
services does not constitute interpersonal conflict. Subscribing someone to unwanted 
services may require a certain level of personal knowledge of the victim of this behaviour. 
For instance, the perpetrator would need to know the victim‟s full name, email address, 
and other personal information (such as their address or date of birth). Considering the 
untrusting nature of the neurotic individual, these individuals may be more careful about 
their online security, and may divulge less personal information to people on the Internet. 
In effect, this may protect them from experiencing this type of behaviour.  
 
Participants who experienced cyber-harassing behaviours were asked to indicate how upset 
they were by their experiences. Personality and Internet self-efficacy were not associated 
with the degree to which participants were upset by cyber-harassment. This contradicts 
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previous research implying associations between personality and reactions to conflict 
(Crow, Hartman, Hammond & Fok, 1995; Graziano, Jensen-Campbell & Hair, 1996; 
McCrae & Costa, 1985; 1987). Rather, this study found that participants were more upset 
by the types of cyber-harassing behaviours they experienced and the number of behaviours 
experienced. This suggests that the methods used by perpetrators have particular 
importance in relation to the impact of their behaviour on their victim. 
 
4.4.3 Perceived social support in dealing with cyber-harassment 
 
Overall, participants reported that they would tell their friends or family if they 
experienced all of the cyber-harassing behaviours included in the survey. Previous research 
has focused on whether victims of cyber-harassment report their experiences to the police, 
or Internet service providers (Alexy, Burgess, Baker & Smoyak, 2005; Bocij, 2003) and 
has failed to take into consideration the support that victims may receive from their family 
or friends. The current research addresses this issue by illustrating that participants regard 
their friends and family as an important support network, if they were to experience cyber-
harassment. 
 
Despite this overall finding, there were marked gender differences in perceived social 
support when dealing with cyber-harassment. For the majority of behaviours, females were 
more likely than males to say that they would tell their friends or family. In contrast, males 
were more likely than females to say they would tell no-one. However, there were some 
exceptions as males were more likely than females to tell the police if they received 
abusive or threatening messages via mobile phone, or if someone told them in an online 
„chat‟ that they had followed them offline.  
 
Finn (2004) found that the most common reason for not reporting cyber-harassment was 
because victims did not consider the problem to be serious enough. It may be that males, 
more so than females, regard cyber-harassment as less of a threat. This explanation is 
supported by the finding that females were significantly more upset by their experiences of 
cyber-harassment than males. The exception to this finding is that males were more likely 
than females to report that they would tell the police if they received abusive/threatening 
messages to their mobile phone, or if someone told them in an online „chat‟ that they had 
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followed them offline. This implies that males considered these behaviours to be more 
concerning, or more threatening than any other behaviour included in the survey. 
 
4.4.4 Implications 
 
In this study, the inclusion of threat included in cyber-harassing behaviours was used by 
participants when judging whether the behaviours were criminal. This may have serious 
implications on social policy. Perpetrators of harassment often engage in behaviours that 
are ambiguous (Draucker, 1999; Skoler, 1998) and vague, especially in regards to the 
perpetrator‟s intention. This ambiguity may be exaggerated in cases of cyber-harassment, 
as perpetrators may provide the defence that their behaviour was not intentionally 
threatening. Furthermore, perpetrators of cyber-harassment may not explicitly threaten 
their victims and if threat is involved, individuals may not perceive the threat as credible. 
Consequently, if perpetrators of cyber-harassment do not explicitly threaten their victims, 
the findings of this study suggest that individuals would not judge their behaviour as 
criminal. In court, this may result in perpetrators not being found guilty, and may 
perpetuate cyber-harassing instances. This study highlights a need to better educate 
individuals about cyber-harassment, the impact cyber-harassment can have on victims, and 
the legal consequences of engaging in cyber-harassing behaviours. 
 
This study indicates that males and females suffer from cyber-harassing experiences to a 
similar degree. In particular, in comparison to offline harassment, males are more likely to 
report experiencing cyber-harassing behaviours. Furthermore, personality did not 
consistently predict the likelihood of experiencing cyber-harassment. This suggests that 
cyber-harassment may affect more individuals compared to offline harassment, regardless 
of personality characteristics or Internet self-efficacy. Therefore, this study highlights the 
need to increase personal protection and security whilst online, in an attempt to avoid 
experiencing cyber-harassing behaviours. 
 
4.4.5 Limitations 
 
The effect sizes relating to all the results found in this study were small. For example, the 
variance explained by personality and internet self-efficacy in predicting perceptions of 
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criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours was small. Personality and Internet self-efficacy 
do not fully explain perceptions of criminality and experiences of cyber-harassing 
behaviours. This highlights the need to look at other variables that may be important in 
influencing perceptions and experiences of cyber-harassing behaviours. For instance, 
„belief in a just world‟ may be worthy of investigation. 
 
The PfHA requires that a „course of conduct‟ is required for harassment. When asked if 
behaviours were criminal, participants were given a list of single behaviours. Therefore, 
although some of the behaviours implied a course of conduct, the items may have been too 
ambiguous for participants to identify them as harassment. Providing participants with 
scenarios that depict cyber-harassment may be a more useful method for judging whether 
the perpetrator‟s behaviour is criminal. 
 
Linked to this, the checklist method was used to establish whether participants experienced 
cyber-harassing behaviours. Whilst some participants said they had experienced more than 
one of the behaviours, it is not known whether the behaviours were carried out by the same 
perpetrator.  Therefore, the survey measured whether participants experienced potentially 
cyber-harassing behaviours, rather than whether they were truly victims of cyber-
harassment. 
 
4.4.6 Future Research 
 
Although this study was useful in establishing the types of cyber-harassing behaviours 
experienced by undergraduate students, the behaviours provided to participants were vague 
and there is no information about how participants interpreted the items on the survey. For 
example, participants may report receiving malicious software but their experience may be 
due to downloading malicious software accidentally, rather than reporting a true cyber-
harassing experience. In other words, whilst the study provides descriptive information, it 
cannot inform us about the lived experience of cyber-harassment. Therefore, future 
research would benefit from conducting qualitative research with cyber-harassed victims to 
fully explore their experience, and how they cope with their experience.  
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Furthermore, the study does not explore the impact that cyber-harassment has on 
individuals, and further research is required to explore this issue. For instance, there is little 
empirical research comparing the effects of cyber-harassment compared to offline 
harassment on victims. This research is necessary to establish whether cyber-harassment is 
qualitatively different in comparison to offline harassment, and to identify ways to help 
victims to cope with their experiences. 
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Chapter 5: Victims’ Accounts of Their Experiences of Cyber-harassment 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Despite estimates suggesting the prevalence of cyber-harassment will increase, and surpass 
instances of offline harassment (Alexy, Burgess, Baker & Smoyak, 2005; Bocij, 2004; 
Finn, 2004; Spitzberg & Hoobler, 2002; Whitty & Carr, 2006; Wood & Wood, 2002), little 
is known about the phenomenon. This study set out to provide an understanding of how 
undergraduate students make sense of their experiences of cyber-harassment and aimed to 
explore the issues they identified as of importance when evaluating their experience.  
 
To date, empirical research has focused on identifying the behaviours used by those 
engaging in cyber-harassment (see chapter 2: „Nature and Extent of Cyberstalking‟). With 
the exception of a few case studies (see Bocij, Griffiths & McFarlane, 2002; Bocij, Bocij, 
& McFarlane, 2003; Griffiths, Rogers & Sparrow, 1998), research has relied on surveys to 
quantify the behaviours used by cyber-harassers. Common behaviours experienced by 
victims include receiving threatening/abusive messages via email (Bocij, 2003; Jerin & 
Dolinsky, 2001; D‟Ovidio & Doyle, 2003), and via chat rooms or instant messenger, and 
receiving malicious software or attempted computer monitoring (Bocij, 2003). Whilst 
quantifying the behaviours used by cyber-harassers is useful, it is limited to the methods 
used by cyber-harassers identified in previous research. Given that the Internet evolves at a 
rapid pace, it is essential that researchers allow for new cyber-harassing methods to be 
identified. Furthermore, the behaviours listed in surveys can be vague and ambiguous. For 
example, receiving malicious software may simply be due to participants downloading 
software from an online, unknown source which is unlikely to be considered as cyber-
harassment. 
 
Surveys have also been the preferred method to measure the impact of cyber-harassment 
on victims. Bocij (2003) used rating scales to determine how distressed participants were 
by their cyber-harassing experiences. Sheridan and Grant (2007) provided participants with 
a checklist of a range of the different types of physical, emotional, social and financial 
effects that cyberstalking can have on victims. They found little difference between the 
impact of cyberstalking, compared to stalking, on victims. These studies provide a good 
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way of quantifying the impact of cyber-harassment, and both highlighted that cyber-
harassment can impact on victims to the same extent as offline harassment on victims. 
However, they reduce the impact of cyber-harassment into a list of categories without 
providing rich accounts of victims‟ actual experiences that illustrate the complex and 
diverse nature of cyber-harassment. As quantitative methods have dominated research in 
this field, this study focuses on using qualitative methods to further understanding about 
the experiences of cyber-harassed victims and the impact of their experience on their 
online and offline lives. 
 
Although cyber-harassment is a crime within the UK, research suggests that few victims 
report their experiences to the authorities (see Alexy, Burgess, Baker & Smoyak, 2005; 
Bocij, 2003). Common reasons for not reporting cyber-harassment have included not 
knowing who to report it to, and not considering cyber-harassment as serious enough to 
warrant police intervention (Finn, 2004). However, if people fail to report their experiences 
to the authorities the extent of the problem cannot be identified or acknowledged, and 
adequate help and support for victims cannot be provided. Consequently, this research will 
explore participants‟ perceived criminality of the perpetrators‟ behaviour, and their 
perceptions on reporting cyber-harassment to the police. 
 
Despite some debate over the characteristics of cyber-harassed victims (see Chapter 2: 
„Perpetrator and Victim Characteristics‟), students have been identified as a vulnerable 
group who may be cyber-harassed or cyberstalked (Dutton & Helsper, 2007; Fremouw, 
Westrup & Pennypacker, 1997; Finn, 2004; Spitzberg & Hoobler, 2002).  Considering this, 
this study aimed to recruit undergraduate students who experienced behaviours associated 
with cyber-harassment. 
 
Considering the commitment of this research to participants‟ subjective experience of 
cyber-harassment, interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) will be used to analyse 
the data. Whilst IPA has roots in health psychology (e.g., Lavie & Willig, 2005; Mulveen 
& Hepworth, 2006; Seamark, Blake, Seamark & Haplin, 2004), it has also been used to 
investigate the emotional experience of anger (Eatough & Smith, 2006), aggressive 
behaviour among slot machine gamblers (Parke & Griffiths, 2005), addicts‟ experiences of 
treatment (Larkin & Griffiths, 2002), comparative experiences of ecstasy users and bungee 
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jumpers (Larkin & Griffiths, 2004), and the perpetrators‟ perspective of downloading and 
accessing child pornography (Winder & Gough, 2009). As Smith (1996) asserted, IPA is 
not restricted to health psychology. According to Smith (2004), IPA is useful for exploring 
issues that have previously been assessed using quantitative methods, and for the 
investigation of subjective experience (Lavie & Willig, 2005). Importantly, IPA is an 
idiographic method that Smith (2004) explains “explores in detail participants‟ personal 
lived experience and how participants make sense of that personal experience” (p. 40). 
Furthermore, IPA is flexible enough to keep the essence of individual experiences, whilst 
also highlighting similarities that victims may share in cases of cyber-harassment. 
 
There are some features of IPA that distinguish this analytic procedure from thematic 
analysis. Thematic analysis is not tied to a theoretical framework and is a foundational 
method which increases accessibility for novice qualitative researchers (Braun & Clarke, 
2006; Brocki & Wearden, 2006). In contrast, IPA originates from an epistemological 
position as it is rooted in phenomenology and symbolic interactionism (Braun & Clarke, 
2006; Smith, 1996).  IPA places emphasis on what the participant says and the language 
they use (Chapman & Smith, 2002). Indeed, Smith and Osborn (2008) stipulate that a basic 
tenant of IPA is that there is a connection between how people talk, think and feel. 
Phenomenology is concerned with individuals‟ experiences of a phenomenon, and searches 
for convergence and divergence in individuals‟ accounts (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2008; Willig, 
2001), whilst symbolic interactionism is concerned with the meanings individuals attach to 
a particular phenomenon (Smith, 1996). Thus, IPA focuses on the meanings individuals 
give to their lived experience of a phenomenon, rather than objectively focusing on the 
phenomenon itself. Hermeneutics is also an important focus of the analytical process, as 
the meaning of sentences can only be gained from close interpretation of individual words 
(Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009).  
 
In addition to the participants‟ experience, IPA takes into account the role of the researcher 
in the analytic process, making IPA a dual-natured approach. Smith (1996) notes that 
“research is a dynamic process...dependent on, and complicated by, the researcher‟s own 
conceptions” (p. 264). Whilst researchers are encouraged to be open and flexible during 
the research process, it is recognised that they cannot abandon their own assumptions and 
these need to be taken into consideration throughout the research process. In the analytic 
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phase of research, investigators check and re-check the data to ensure the findings are 
firmly in the data and not from the researchers‟ own assumptions. By doing so, researchers 
can attempt to limit their own interjection to the findings. 
 
When designing the interview schedule, consideration must be given to the analytical 
methods as IPA and thematic analysis require different methods of data collection. When 
researchers intend to use thematic analysis, the interview schedule may be prescriptive 
with the use of prompts to guide the interview. In contrast, when using IPA, researchers are 
encouraged to view the interview schedule as a guide, with minimal use of prompts (Smith 
& Osborn, 2008). This allows interviewees more freedom to discuss their experiences in 
ways that are important to them. 
 
When data collection is completed, the analytical process of IPA differs to the process used 
in thematic analysis. Thematic analysis does not require detailed transcription (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006), whereas IPA requires verbatim transcripts that include pauses, laughter, 
utterances, shouting, and non-verbal notes made by researcher (Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 
2009). The transcripts used in IPA are line-numbered in preparation for analysis.  
 
Thematic analysis involves reading entire datasets and the coding of generic themes, and 
the coded extracts are grouped together in single data files (Braun & Clarke; 2006; Miles 
& Huberman, 1994). Following this grouping of data, the themes are refined and named. 
IPA is conducted using individual cases rather than reading the entire data set (Smith, 
1999). Within each participant‟s transcript, the researcher gains familiarity with the 
transcript by reading and re-reading the transcript. The analyst engages in a line by line 
interpretation of the text which involves interpretation of the meaning of words used in the 
construction of sentences. The left-hand margin of the page is used to make initial notes. 
The right-hand margin is used to develop the initial notes into themes and psychological 
concepts may be used at this stage. The themes identified in this latter stage are listed on a 
separate sheet of paper and are clustered and refined until superordinate and subordinate 
themes are identified, resulting in a master table of themes. When all transcripts have been 
analysed, the researcher begins to refine the themes across the dataset until a single master 
table of themes is produced. Essentially, IPA can be likened to a detailed thematic analysis 
which is conducted in a different way (Braun & Clarke, 2006). However, Warwick, 
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Joseph, Cordle and Ashworth (2004) compared thematic analysis to IPA on their data of 
individuals suffering chronic pain. They concluded the detailed analysis of IPA resulted in 
a different list of themes compared to their thematic analysis which they deemed as more 
informative. 
 
This study utilises an online method of data collection that is appropriate given that the 
research focuses on an online phenomenon. IPA requires participants to articulate their 
thoughts and feelings about a phenomenon (Willig, 2001). Online research requires 
participants to verbalise their thoughts through written text and, therefore, places an 
additional demand on participants. Considering the demands placed on participants 
engaged in internet-mediated research (IMR), there may be concern that the data will not 
reach the depth required for IPA (Brocki & Wearden, 2006). However, Smith and Osborn 
(2008) note that written accounts (such as diaries) are suitable for IPA, and Mann and 
Stewart (2000) suggest that online communication is a hybrid between written and spoken 
language. In IMR, participants are allowed more time to reflect on questions, and their 
responses compared to face-to-face interviews. This makes the online interview a suitable 
method for IPA, given the assumed link between language and cognition. 
 
In summary, the aims of this study were fourfold: 
 
1. To provide rich, in-depth accounts of undergraduate students‟ experiences of 
behaviours associated with cyber-harassment, and the meanings they attached to 
their experiences. 
2. To explore the impact of cyber-harassment on students‟ online and offline lives. 
3. To further understanding how students coped with their cyber-harassing 
experience, and explore their evaluations of the help and support they received. 
4. To identify whether students‟ perceived the cyber-harassers‟ behaviour as criminal, 
and explore their reasons for reporting/failing to report their experience to the 
police. 
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5.2 Method 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
 
Twelve undergraduate students from Nottingham Trent University participated in this 
study. Table 20 provides information about the participants, including the cyber-harassing 
behaviours they experienced, and who the perpetrator was. The sample consisted of eight 
females and four males, all were aged between 18 to 35 years (M = 20.8, SD = 4.6). All 
participants were volunteers and were not intended to form a representative sample of 
undergraduate students. 
 
Table 20: Participants’ Demographic Information for Study 2 
Participants’ 
pseudonyms 
Age Behaviours experienced Prior relationship 
with instigator 
David 21 - Numerous, unsolicited sexually explicit/obscene messages 
via Internet discussion boards  
Stranger 
Hannah 18 - Numerous, unsolicited abusive/threatening text messages Ex-partner of 
participant‟s 
partner 
Julia 19 - Received malicious software (keylogger) Partner 
Karen 18 - Numerous, unsolicited abusive/threatening messages via 
text messages 
Online friend 
Lisa 19 - Created a website pretending to be participant and posted 
false information about participant 
- Other Internet users encouraged to be abusive towards 
participant 
- Information posted online that participant did not disclose 
University 
acquaintances 
Jill 20 - Social networking profile hacked into 
- Contacted participants‟ friends and family via the Internet 
in an attempt to damage her reputation 
- False information posted on the Internet 
- Other Internet users encouraged to be abusive towards 
participant 
- Participants‟ contact information posted on the Internet in a 
way that solicited sex 
- Information posted online that participant did not disclose 
Unknown 
Beth 19 - Contacted participants‟ friends via the Internet and text 
messages in an attempt to damage her reputation 
Ex-partner of 
participant‟s 
partner 
Brendan 20 - Subscribed to unwanted online services Friend/Company 
subscribed to 
Simon 19 - Changed online identity to contact participant after 
previous contact attempts were blocked 
Ex-partner 
Ian 21 - Received sexually explicit/obscene text messages Previously 
unknown company 
Andrea 20 - Numerous unsolicited sexually explicit/obscene messages 
via the Internet 
Strangers 
Mary 35 - Numerous, unsolicited emails that were 
abusive/threatening 
- Contacted her friends, family and work colleagues via the 
Internet in an attempt to damage her reputation 
Friend 
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- False information posted on the Internet 
- Instigator changed their online identity to contact 
participant after previous contact attempts were blocked 
- Other Internet users encouraged to be abusive/threatening 
towards participant 
- Told in via text messages that she had been followed 
offline 
- Numerous, unsolicited telephone calls 
- Followed to work  
 
5.2.2 Measures 
 
Online semi-structured interviews were used to explore participants‟ experiences and 
perceptions of behaviours associated with cyber-harassment. Smith and Osborn (2008) 
suggest the semi-structured interview is the best way to gather data for IPA studies, and the 
interview schedule was created in accordance with their guidelines. Initially, the interview 
schedule consisted of too many questions and prompts which may have directed 
participants‟ answers. However, Smith and Osborn (2008) suggest that if the interviewer 
has to provide too many prompts, the data may not be suitable for IPA. They also suggest 
that prompts should only be prepared for questions that are potentially difficult. Work on 
the interview schedule was an iterative process that aimed to ask broader questions with 
less prompts, and continued on to the final version. As the research investigated a sensitive 
topic, care was taken with the ordering of questions to ensure that participants felt 
comfortable with disclosing their thoughts and feelings about the topic. The interview 
schedule comprised of four main sections: 
 
1. Participants‟ thoughts and feelings about their cyber-harassing experiences. 
2. The impact of their cyber-harassing experiences. 
3. Coping with their experiences of cyber-harassment. 
4. Perceptions about the legality of the perpetrator‟s behaviour. 
 
5.2.3 Procedure 
 
Study 1 of this thesis recruited undergraduate students to complete an online survey. At the 
end of that survey, participants were asked to provide their email address if they wished to 
participate in an online interview for this study. Fifty-two participants provided their email 
addresses and were emailed (including information about the study) in June 2009, inviting 
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them to take part in the interview. The recruitment emails were personalised, as much as 
possible, to maximise recruitment. This was achieved by sending individual emails that 
included participants‟ names (where possible) and detailed the behaviours associated with 
cyber-harassment that they reported experiencing during the online survey. All of the 
recruitment emails requested delivery notifications that indicated seven email addresses 
were bogus. Of the 45 remaining invitations that were deliverable, 12 individuals agreed to 
take part. When participants expressed further interest in participating, they were sent 
another email that provided a link to Surveymonkey for them to provide informed consent. 
When participants provided their consent, they were contacted again to see whether they 
preferred to conduct the interviews via email or via Instant Messenger (IM), and their 
availability to take part in the interviews. Two participants chose to participate via email 
for convenience and because they had trouble with their Internet connections. The 
remaining ten participants participated via IM, which were arranged for a time to suit the 
participant. 
 
Developing rapport is an essential part of the interview process as it can encourage the 
interviewee to be more open in their responses (Seymour, 2001). Considering the 
experiences that participants had with cyber-harassment and the research medium, 
establishing rapport was a crucial part of the research process. Madge and O‟Connor 
(2002) recommend establishing rapport prior to online interviews as there is less time 
during the interview to do so. Therefore, care was taken to establish rapport with 
participants during the initial stages of contact. This was achieved by discussing upcoming 
exams, computer problems, interests and life events, shared experiences, and their 
university experiences. 
 
The email interviews commenced immediately after participants provided their consent, 
and lasted between two to four weeks. In an attempt to reduce the length of the interviews, 
only a few questions were sent at a time. The IM interviews were conducted over a two 
week period, and lasted between 1.5 to 4.5 hours. It was intended that all interviews would 
last no longer than 1.5 hours. However, some participants requested a longer period of time 
to allow them to tell their story. Prior to, and immediately after the interviews, participants 
were asked if they still wanted to participate in the study, and were reminded of their right 
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to withdraw. Finally, participants were asked if they had any questions about the research, 
which were answered and participants were debriefed. 
 
 5.2.4 Analysis 
 
Following data collection, the transcripts were prepared for analysis by transferring the 
data from IM chat logs to Microsoft Word. The font for all transcripts was changed to 
Times New Roman, size 12 with 1.5 line spacing, and the transcripts were fully 
anonymised. In this format, the transcripts ranged from 6-20 pages (M = 11.7; SD = 4.6).  
 
Smith and Osborn (2008) produced guidelines that can be used for IPA, and these 
guidelines were followed when analysing the data from this study. The analysis of each 
participant‟s data was conducted in full before beginning analysis on the next case. This 
method of focusing on one case before another has been used in other research to maintain 
the idiographic nature of the research (Smith & Osborn, 2008). Table 21 describes the 
analytical process used for this study. 
 
Table 21: Process used for analysis of data 
Stage Process 
1 The first transcript was read several times before making notes. This was 
necessary to familiarise with the transcripts as the data was collected online, 
eliminating the transcription process. 
 
2 Initial notes were made on the left-hand margin of the transcript. Notes included 
interesting descriptions of the participant‟s experience, how they described their 
experience, how they felt, and how they interpreted their experience. The 
participant‟s descriptions focused on the language used, sentence construction 
and the juxtaposition of concepts discussed. Time was spent interpreting 
ambiguous comments and meaning was ascribed to these comments after careful 
examination of contextual information. The notes also focused on the 
participant‟s questioning to determine whether the questions were rhetorical and 
who they were directed towards (the participant or the researcher). The 
participant‟s laughter, pauses and emoticons were considered in terms of when 
and why they occurred. Finally, prompts were examined to see why they were 
necessary, and the outcome of prompting.  
 
3 The transcript was left for 1 day before it was re-read and the note-making 
process was continued. This step led to a more enlightened reading of the text 
and meanings became clearer. Connections between extracts within the transcript 
were made during this stage. 
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4 Focus was given to the notes made on the left-hand margin to link the notes 
made with psychological concepts. This stage was data-driven and the data was 
checked to ensure concepts were rooted in the data. 
 
5 The list of themes identified in Stage 4 was transferred onto a single sheet and 
were clustered.  The clustered themes were given superordinate names, resulting 
in the creation of a master table of superordinate and subordinate themes. 
 
6 Stages 1 to 5 were repeated for the remaining 11 transcripts. This resulted in a 
master table of themes for each participant. 
 
7 The 12 master tables were read together and consolidated into a single master 
table of themes. 
 
To begin, transcripts were read several times in full before comments were made in the 
left-hand margin. Upon making comments, the transcripts were left for a short period, after 
which they were re-read and additional comments made. This process continued until all 
relevant and interesting issues were identified. At this stage, the right-hand margin was 
used to identify theme titles. On a separate page, all theme titles were listed and 
connections were made between the themes and a master table of themes was created. 
Using the master tables created for each participant, a single master table was created. At 
this stage some themes converged with other themes, and some were abandoned because 
they lacked richness in the data. Using the single master table, each transcript was checked 
to ensure the themes emerged from the data. Anonymised transcripts were also distributed 
among the supervisory team and an IPA expert within the university to gain their 
perspective on the themes identified during the analysis to increase the validity of findings. 
Furthermore, participants were contacted to ensure the interpretations made reflected their 
experiences (Smith, 2000).  
 
5.3 Results 
 
Throughout this section, the target refers to the participant who was the target of cyber-
harassing behaviours and the instigator refers to the person/group of people who carried 
out the cyber-harassing behaviours. When using IPA, excerpts of transcripts are verbatim 
and as such all spelling mistakes, abbreviations, and acronyms have been kept throughout 
this section. Table 21 shows the superordinate and subordinate themes that were identified 
during data analysis.  
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Table 22: Superordinate and subordinate themes of IPA analysis 
Superordinate Theme Subordinate Theme 
It’s all virtual, nothing is face to face 
confrontational 
The Fantasy Realm 
 The Mentally Ill Perpetrator: “Psychos and Nutjobs” 
 “It was something silly” 
 Embodiment of Threat 
 “I‟m not sure” 
PTSD-Like Symptoms Re-experiencing the event 
 Avoidance and emotional numbing 
 
5.3.1 Superordinate Theme 1: It’s all virtual, nothing is face to face confrontational 
 
„It‟s all virtual, nothing is face to face confrontational‟ was the first superordinate theme 
identified in this study. The subordinate themes that comprised this theme included „the 
fantasy realm‟, „the mentally ill perpetrator: “Psychos & Nutjobs”‟, „it was something 
silly‟, „embodiment of threat‟, and „I‟m not sure‟. The overarching nature of this theme 
highlighted participants‟ perceptions of the „real‟ and „not real‟ discrepancy between their 
offline and online worlds. 
 
5.3.1.2 The Fantasy Realm 
 
Three participants discussed the Internet as a place in which they could create different 
identities that could be used to explore their own identity. In this respect, the internet was 
perceived as a fantasy realm that emphasised that experiences whilst online are „not real‟. 
 
The internet does allow for it, I mean on the internet u can spend hours and 
hours on to a certain extent u can do whatever you want or say whatever 
you want on the internet perhaps sides of u [you] u [you] wouldn‟t want to 
display in the real world. Andrea 
 
According to Andrea, aspects of the Internet, in conjunction with temporal displacement 
whilst online, produce the optimal environmental conditions for the creation of different 
identities, and identity play that individuals would not „want to display in the real world‟. 
Andrea‟s emphasis on the „real world‟ emphasised the perceived difference of reality 
between the online and offline worlds. Karen also agreed with Andrea‟s perception as she 
said „you can easily reinvent yourself on the Internet‟. This illustrated one of the perceived 
positive aspects of the Internet that allows individuals the freedom to be creative and 
explore aspects of their identity. In this respect, participants‟ perceptions of the Internet 
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mirrored Turkle‟s (1995) utopian view of the Internet, as she argued the Internet provides 
users with the freedom to discover their true selves. However, participants explained how 
their online experiences could become negative. 
 
Guys always used to start conversations up with you...just really 
inappropriately...like the standard questions that you‟d get a/s/l? 
[age/sex/location] followed by what do you look like? What size are you? 
Etc. And then they‟d try starting up “cyber sex” I guess...I‟ve been sent 
dodgy pictures of naked guys too...I don‟t think it‟s necessarily because of 
anything I did I think they probably did it to everyone they thought was a 
girl. Andrea 
   
For instance, Andrea described situations that involved her „chatting‟ to males online, who 
began their chats with asking benign questions considered as „standard‟. However, the 
males she referred to soon attempted to engage her in cybersex, which she perceived as 
inappropriate. In conjunction with text-based attempts to engage her in cybersex, males 
also sent her naked images. Importantly, Andrea attributed their behaviour to their belief 
that they were communicating with a female. This attribution demonstrated Andrea‟s 
acknowledgement that other Internet users could engage in fantasy by imagining their 
communicative partner was of the desired gender, and they would use this fantasy for their 
own sexual gratification. The creation of fantasy of communicative partners cannot occur 
in offline environments. However, the lack of non-verbal cues available in online 
interactions allows individuals to engage in fantasies about their communicative partners.  
 
The internet for me has always been my safe place. It sounds really sad but 
I‟m more confident online, I feel like I can be myself and I felt they broke 
all that which is probably why I got so angry at first. Jill 
 
Whilst Andrea and Karen acknowledged the creation of different identities as a possibility 
in the fantasy realm, Jill perceived the Internet as a safe haven where she could explore and 
display aspects of her true self that she felt unable to display in the real world. However, 
she perceived her cyber-harassing experiences as the destruction of her „safe place‟, which 
manifested in anger. 
 
5.3.1.3 The Mentally Ill Perpetrator: “Psychos and Nutjobs” 
 
In contrast to the fantasy realm, participants described the instigators of cyber-harassment 
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as „psychos‟ and „nutjobs‟ in the „real world‟.  When recalling her cyber-harassing 
experience, Julia responded „Ohhh I remember now the psycho ex installed a keylogger!‟  
 
U hear about the psychos that are on the Internet and the desperate ones 
that just sit at their computers all day long and that u kind of know they are 
just using you to get themselves off...Like u hear stories of people that 
have “fallen in love” etc on the internet and they turn out to be a 
nutjob...Why are you online trying to have sex, is it cause u can‟t get any 
in the real world!?  Andrea 
 
As Andrea described, people who engage in sexual harassment whilst online are likely to 
be „psychos‟ or „desperate‟ in the „real world‟. Andrea‟s comments alluded to the 
idealisation of online partners, who individuals can fall in love with. When meeting a 
person offline, the illusion created of an online partner can be shattered, as perceptions 
about the person created offline can destroy any fantasy created whilst online about who 
the person is. This description further illustrated the dichotomy of the online, fantasy realm 
and the offline, „real‟ world. 
 
She was mad about me, and didn‟t want to let go...help should be provided 
for people like my ex, who don‟t want it to be over, but can‟t be with the 
person they broke up with. Simon 
 
Whilst Andrea described cyber-harassing experiences with strangers, eight participants 
knew the person who was harassing them. The creation of fantasy about an online partner 
may be more difficult as they are known in the „real world‟. However, four participants 
indicated they perceived the instigator as in need of help, suggesting they were also seen as 
„nutjobs‟ or „psychos‟. In describing an ex-partner who used the Internet to re-establish a 
relationship that Simon perceived as „dead‟, Simon stated that his ex-partner was „mad 
about‟ him. Whilst he later clarified that he meant that she was in love with him, the 
language he used portrayed the instigator as in need of professional help for psychological 
problems. Similarly, Beth stated „I think, without sounding harsh, I think she needs help‟, 
and more specifically, Karen thought the instigator was „slightly obsessed‟. Thus, 
participants‟ thought that cyber-harassing instigators had psychological problems and the 
Internet allowed them the freedom to act out and portray sides of their personality that they 
would not display in the „real world‟. 
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5.3.1.4 “It was something silly” 
 
As cyber-harassment occurs in a virtual reality, eight participants discussed their 
experiences in terms of the instigators‟ humour. Whilst participants considered that the 
instigator may have intended to play a joke on them, the instigator‟s intention did not 
determine how they felt about the experience. 
 
It was another practical joke but i thought it was quite disturbing and 
distressing...Although it was meant as a practical joke, I wasn‟t really 
happy about this incident. Brendan 
 
Brendan explained that the instigator‟s intention was not malicious and did not intend to 
cause him harm. Despite the intention, Brendan felt disturbed and distressed by his 
experience. The view that the instigator‟s behaviour may not be maliciously intended was 
shared by other participants. 
 
Y‟know silly things like one person will say something stupid, the next 
guy will say “fuck you” then someone else says “i fucked your 
mum”...people don‟t really care when there‟s anonymity and ultimately 
people find it funny? Well, that‟s what I think...I don‟t know the people 
anyway...it‟s just a form of humour like any other. David 
 
For instance, David perceived that abusive and threatening messages were common among 
online interactions in forums, and were not intended to be malicious. Unlike Brendan, 
David was not upset by his experiences, as he explained that anonymity was an important 
factor in accepting the humour intended in online communication. As David did not know 
the people who sent him harassing messages, he perceived their behaviour as „a form of 
entertainment‟. 
 
Whilst Brendan and David perceived the instigators‟ intention as being non-malicious, or 
joking with them, other participants believed the instigators had malicious intentions but 
they perceived the instigators‟ behaviour as stupid or silly. 
 
It was all a bit stupid but done to be insulting...They [parents] probably 
would have taken it seriously and wanted to have reported it and I just 
didn‟t see it in that way. It wasn‟t something I wanted them to worry 
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about...it was something silly and something i could sort out on my own. I 
didn‟t take it very seriously. Lisa 
 
The instigators of Lisa‟s cyber-harassing experience were perceived to have malicious 
intentions as their behaviour was intended „to be insulting‟. Despite their intention, Lisa 
perceived their behaviour as „silly‟. As she believed they were being silly, she did not want 
to tell her parents about her experiences as she thought they would perceive it as more 
serious and perhaps report it to the police. 
 
Because I was ignoring her she text me saying if you don‟t talk to me I‟ll 
find where you are and make you talk...I just laughed at it...I just thought it 
was a bit ridiculous...I was joking with a friend that I had a stalker. Karen 
 
Similarly, Karen perceived the instigator‟s behaviour as funny, despite the veiled threat 
behind the instigator saying she would „find where you are and make you talk‟. 
Interestingly, Karen joked that she had a stalker, indicating an awareness of the harassing 
nature of the instigator‟s behaviour. Karen‟s transcript also alluded to her perception that 
stalkers are humorous. Karen was not the only participant to perceive threatening 
behaviour as non-threatening, as Hannah shared Karen‟s outlook. 
 
I thought they were well funny, thought that the girls texting me were 
absolutely pathetic the fact that they had to text me but couldn‟t say it to 
my face...they‟d be more than welcome to say it to my face  It would‟ve 
shown more courage. Hannah 
 
Whilst Karen did not elaborate as to why she perceived the instigator‟s behaviour as non-
threatening and humorous, Hannah explained that the behaviour was not perceived as 
threatening because of the lack of social presence of the instigator reduced the credibility 
of threats made. According to Hannah, the instigators‟ behaviour was „pathetic‟ and lacked 
courage. Hannah elaborated further that „it‟s very easy to say stuff behind a mobile phone, 
you don‟t get to see/feel the brunt of anyone‟s retaliation‟. Hannah perceived the lack of 
social presence of the instigators as reducing the credibility of threats, emphasising the 
instigators were hiding behind a barrier of technology and did not intend to carry out their 
threats. Furthermore, instigators were perceived to choose cyberspace to threaten 
individuals because they were afraid of their victim retaliating against them. The 
perception that threats made via the Internet or mobile phones lack credibility further 
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demonstrated that participants did not perceive threatening behaviour as real because it 
occurred in cyberspace. 
 
The perception that online behaviours could be construed as a joke or something funny and 
not serious extended to their perceptions about the criminality of cyber-harassing 
behaviours. For instance, Brendan attributed his cyber-harassing experience to a practical 
joke played on him by a school friend. Despite Brendan feeling „disturbed‟ by his 
experience, he stated „it was a prank rather than a breach of the law...as a prank you don‟t 
see it as illegal‟. Furthermore, both Andrea and Hannah expressed concern that the 
instigator of cyber-harassment could defend their behaviour by saying it was intended to as 
a joke.  
 
If you‟re not with the person there‟s always the chance of them messing 
around or joking. Andrea 
 
It‟s so easy to misread a text...she could turn around and say it was a joke. 
Hannah 
 
The lack of social presence of the instigator was central to Hannah and Andrea‟s concerns 
regarding possible defences to the behaviour. As the instigator is not present, participants 
considered that the intention of the instigator‟s behaviour could be misconstrued because 
they are relying on their interpretation of text-based communication. Thus, the lack of non-
verbal communication increased concerns that participants‟ interpretation of cyber-
harassment may not reflect the real world intentions of the instigators. 
 
5.3.1.5 Embodiment of Threat 
 
Contrasting the perception that cyber-harassing experiences are not real, two participants 
feared that perceived threats would become embodied, and this caused them distress.  
 
Even though I‟d moved back home which was miles away from everyone 
I‟d be terrified they‟d find me...Knowing that they all had my number and 
email address and even knew roughly where I was made me think I wasn‟t 
safe...particularly because I knew one of them could be violent. Jill 
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Despite the real world geographical distance Jill perceived between herself and the 
instigators of cyber-harassment, she feared the instigators would find her. Whilst Jill knew 
the instigators offline, her language indicated that they did not know where she lived as she 
was „terrified they‟d find‟ her. However, knowledge about the violent capabilities of one of 
the instigators increased her belief that she was not safe.  
 
I‟d really panic. My heart beat would like speed up, and I‟d start 
shaking...I‟d heard that he‟d beaten up one of his ex‟s. Beth 
 
Similar to Jill, Beth explained that prior knowledge of the instigator‟s violent capabilities 
contributed to her fear of the embodiment of perceived threat. Interestingly, Beth and Jill 
were not explicitly threatened by their cyber-harassing instigators. This is interesting as it 
directly contrasts the perceptions of other participants who were threatened but did not 
interpret the instigators‟ behaviour in this manner.  
 
5.3.1.6 “I’m not sure” 
 
As cyber-harassment occurs in a virtual world, participants did not know how to deal with 
their experience but did consider offline methods of harassment as more serious and easier 
to define. Furthermore, participants did not perceive the instigators‟ behaviour as criminal. 
 
I don‟t see throwaway comments made anonymously via the Internet as 
harassment. It‟d be if I kept getting calls and what have you that‟d piss me 
off. David 
 
David was the only participant who held clear views that cyber-harassing behaviours were 
not truly harassing. He received sexually explicit messages via the Internet, which he 
described as „throwaway comments‟. For David, the communication method was important 
in determining whether communication could be considered as harassing, rather than the 
message content. Messages sent anonymously via the Internet did not constitute 
harassment. However, David considered that telephone calls were more serious as 
messages received via this method would have a greater impact on him. However, other 
participants struggled with their judgements about the criminality of cyber-harassing 
behaviours. 
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[I‟m] not sure if it was illegal so I didn‟t report it to the authorities...If I was 
to stumble across something definitely illegal I would most certainly report 
it to the police. Brendan 
 
For instance, Brendan‟s comments illustrated the confusion felt regarding the criminality 
of cyber-harassing behaviours.  Brendan explained that he was unsure whether his cyber-
harassing experiences were illegal and did not report it to the police because of his 
uncertainty. This uncertainty was shared by other participants. When considering the 
criminality of her cyber-harassing experience, Beth explained: 
 
Beth: Urm, yeah I think so. I‟m not really sure. 
Interviewer: Ok. Why would you say it was harassment? 
Beth: Because of the persistence. 
Interviewer: Ok, and why would you say it wasn‟t harassment? 
Beth: Urm, because it‟s all virtual, nothing‟s face to face confrontational. 
 
Beth‟s transcript encapsulated the essence of the confusion expressed by participants when 
they considered the criminality of their cyber-harassing experiences. Beth‟s comments 
illustrated that cyber-harassment is equated to the experience of offline harassment, and 
was essentially the same. However, the cyber-harassing experience is perceived as not 
being real because it happened in a virtual reality. In contrast, if the instigators used offline 
methods of harassment, it would be considered as more tangible and represented the true 
form of harassment. 
 
5.3.2 Superordinate Theme 2: PTSD-Like Symptoms 
 
Despite the dichotomy in participants‟ views of their offline and online worlds, the real and 
the not real, participants reported psychological symptoms that they directly attributed to 
their cyber-harassing experiences. Many of the symptoms that participants reported 
experiencing due to their experiences of cyber-harassment appeared to fall along the 
spectrum of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). According the Diagnostic and Statistics 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), there are two criteria for PTSD and both of 
the criteria must be met in order for a diagnosis of PTSD (APA, 2000). The first criterion 
involves exposure to a traumatic event that involves a serious injury or threat to one‟s 
physical integrity. The second criterion is that it caused the victim intense fear, 
helplessness, or horror. However, this study did not measure PTSD among participants but 
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the symptoms described fell along the PTSD spectrum. A further caveat is that not all 
participants reported that their experience negatively impacted on them, and this section 
focuses only on participants who felt their experience had a negative impact on them. 
 
5.3.2.1 Re-experiencing the event 
 
PTSD-like symptoms include re-experiencing the event, with nightmares, intrusive 
upsetting memories, and intense physical reactions to reminders of the event falling in this 
category.  
 
I started having nightmares that I wasn‟t good enough or that I was gonna 
see her in town and she was gonna hit me or something...I then started 
having dreams that his mates, and his family all kinda turned on me and 
said I was a compulsive liar, and that I‟d ruined his life and he‟d be better 
off without me, he‟s just too blind to see it...I also had a nightmare that she 
came to his house and started hitting me and beating me up and that, after 
taking me to a & e my partner turned and said „you cause too much trouble 
for me – its over‟. Beth  
 
I felt bad „cause we were having a really nice day out, with loads of photos 
and stuff, and I just couldn‟t forget it and have fun. Beth 
 
I‟d walk to school/college and every time I saw a blue Peugeot 106 (that‟s 
the car he had) I‟d really panic…my heart beat would like speed up, and 
[I‟d] start shaking. Beth 
 
For Beth, re-experiencing cyber-harassment invaded her when she was awake through 
rumination, and when she was asleep through her dreams. Importantly for Beth, the 
nightmares she described as having, were not a one-off occurrence. She clearly remembers 
at least three nightmares that all magnify her fears about the impact the harassment might 
have on her, and her relationship with others, in particular her boyfriend. Expressed in her 
nightmares is the fear of being confronted by the instigator, whom she assumed would 
harm her physically to the extent of hospitalisation. The instigator was the ex-girlfriend of 
Beth‟s boyfriend. The instigator targeted Beth to try and „break us up‟. Despite the 
instigator‟s connection with Beth‟s boyfriend, Beth‟s dreams implied she was worried that 
her partner would blame her for the harassment. 
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The thoughts described by Beth, clearly resemble rumination which has been associated 
with depression and anxiety (Mor & Winquist, 2002). According to Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Morrow and Fredrickson (1993), rumination involves self-focused thoughts on, and the 
causes of, one‟s negative mood. For Beth, ruminating has a debilitating effect on her social 
life as she could not „forget it and have fun‟, and based on Nolen-Hoeksema et al.‟s 
findings, may highlight underlying psychological issues. 
 
5.3.2.2 Avoidance and Emotional Numbing 
 
Feeling socially isolated, feeling detached from others, and the loss of interest in activities 
and life in general, are symptoms reported by participants that resemble PTSD symptoms. 
All participants who still felt affected by their experience of cyber-harassment reported 
they felt socially isolated. 
 
A few people phased me out blanking me and making it so I couldn‟t hang 
out with my friends if they were there…I was very withdrawn and always 
on my own. Jill 
 
For Jill, social isolation was a consequence of others‟ reactions to her following her 
experience. This resulted from the instigator contacting her friends and successfully 
damaging her reputation.  
 
Mary also reported that she felt socially isolated. Unlike Jill, Mary reported that social 
isolation was self-imposed as she reported „I changed the way that I socialised‟. Regardless 
of whether social isolation was self imposed or imposed by others, participants reported 
that social isolation impacted on their self-perceptions and was hard to adjust to: 
 
Like a puff of smoke everyone had vanished! The house was empty and it 
was very hard to adjust to that… There is a massive part of me that longs 
for the social network I used to have and yet now I struggle to think of 
people to ring for a pint on a Friday night. Mary 
 
For those who were severely impacted by their experience of cyber-harassment, feeling 
socially isolated was associated with reports of depression and loss of interest in activities 
and life in general.  
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I suffered with depression before i came to uni and I‟ve been in 
counselling all three years I‟ve been here so when it [cyber-harassment] all 
happened it just made me feel worse. Particularly because my boyfriend 
had finished his exams and had moved home I didn‟t have anyone else and 
it [cyber-harassment] made me turn to things I‟m not proud of...[Like] 
cutting myself. I struggled with it through college and really wanted to 
stop. I think at the time I‟d stopped for about 3 months but it just sent me 
straight back. Jill 
 
Jill‟s depression was exacerbated by cyber-harassment and was entangled with her feelings 
of social isolation. Although she reported self-harm behaviours prior to her experience, she 
had stopped self-harming for three months prior to being cyber-harassed. Jill was ashamed 
of her self-harming behaviour, and stopping for three months was an achievement. 
However, her experiencing of cyber-harassment was perceived to be a set-back to her 
progress.  
 
I did get depressed about it...I used to be very down and feel very sad that I 
didn‟t have [the perpetrator] in my life anymore...it used to make me cry 
when I thought about how much I liked her. When I was depressed I felt 
nearly fraudulent about attributing my lowness to that broken trust element 
of those relationships. Mary 
 
Whilst Jill reported that cyber-harassment exacerbated her depression, Mary reported 
cyber-harassment was the primary cause of the onset of depression. For Mary, depression 
was entangled with losing her friendship with the instigator, and resembled a form of grief. 
Mary also associated her feelings of depression with changes in her personality and 
behaviour: 
 
I can‟t be bothered with entertaining friends to the same extent that I used 
to cos I just think there‟s no point anymore...I can‟t really be bothered 
making deep dug friends...I haven‟t made much effort in friendships with 
people at uni either...I was always sparky before and so full of energy, and 
I just seemed to be very bored with it all suddenly...I was putting so much 
effort on the business and same effort in personal life and got shit on big 
time and couldn‟t see the point. Mary 
 
From the extract above, it is clear that Mary felt greatly impacted by her experience as it 
affected her social life. Throughout this extract, Mary‟s language emphasised the degree to 
which she perceived her life to change, and attributed this change to her experience of 
cyber-harassment. Mary reported that her dedication to her work life was reduced also as „I 
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was self-employed and that means going out to find clients, and I‟d keep putting it off 
because I was so worn out and felt low‟. Several studies have found that offline stalking 
victims have reduced social outings, lost days at work, changed work, or stopped work, 
and have avoided places and people (e.g., Budd & Mattinson, 2000; Pathé & Mullen, 1997; 
Purcell, Pathé & Mullen, 2004; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). The impact of cyber-
harassment was, for this participant, as severe as the impact reported by victims of offline 
harassment.  
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5.4 Discussion 
 
Whilst previous studies have typically focused on the types of behaviours experienced, and 
the impact of those experiences, on victims of cyber-harassment (e.g., Bocij, 2003; 
Sheridan & Grant, 2007), this study sought to explore how victims make sense of their 
experience. Following semi-structured, online interviews with 12 participants who 
experienced behaviours associated with cyber-harassment, two superordinate themes were 
identified. The superordinate themes were ‘It’s all virtual, nothing is face to face 
confrontational’ and ‘PTSD-Like Symptoms’. Although participants reported experiencing 
similar methods used in campaigns of cyber-harassment, participants‟ experiences were 
not identical and variations were found in the meanings participants attached to their 
experiences. 
 
Participants shared Turkle‟s (1995) view that cyberspace could be a place where 
individuals are free to explore their identity and aspects of their true selves. For instance, 
one participant perceived cyberspace as her safe haven, where she could be more 
confident. However, participants explained that other Internet users could also use the 
internet to play out fantasies, particularly in the case of online sexual harassment. In 
contrast to participants‟ perceptions of cyber-space, they described instigators of cyber-
harassment as „psychos and nutjobs‟ in the real, offline world. According to some 
participants, in reality, instigators of online sexual harassment were unlikely to be able to 
initiate relationships offline, which is why they try to engage Internet users in instances of 
cybersex. This perception of perpetrators of cyber-harassment mirrors Diermenjian‟s 
(1999) definition of a cyberstalker as a „disturbed loner who seeks attention and 
companionship in cyberspace‟ (p. 410). However, this perception may relate specifically to 
strangers who sexually harass other Internet users. The perception that instigators of cyber-
harassment are „psychos and nutjobs‟ in the „real world‟ highlighted the distinction 
participants perceived between the online (not real) and the offline (real) worlds. 
 
One of the most concerning findings of this study was the perception that cyber-harassing 
experiences were perceived as „something silly‟. Some participants believed the instigator 
of cyber-harassment to have intended for their behaviour to be humorous. One participant 
in particular commented that cyber-harassing behaviours were not harassing but were a 
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form of entertainment. In other cases, the instigator‟s intentions were perceived as 
malicious but the lack of social presence reduced the credibility of threats made. In these 
instances, participants perceived the instigator(s) as pathetic, lacking courage, and as a 
joke. Furthermore, the perception that cyber-harassment is „something silly‟ extended to 
participants‟ judgements about the criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours. Participants 
were not sure that online behaviours could be considered as harassment because they did 
not involve face-to-face confrontation. In this respect, the virtual nature of the behaviours 
rendered the behaviours as „not real‟. This lends further support to the findings of Alexy, 
Burgess, Baker and Smoyak (2005) who reported in an online survey that seven percent of 
participants did not label a vignette depicting a case of involving severe cyber-harassment, 
as harassment. Furthermore, Alexy et al. reported that cyber-harassed victims were less 
likely than non-victims to perceive the vignette as harassment. 
 
The perception that cyber-harassment is „not real‟ may be a consequence of 
disembodiment whilst in cyberspace. According to Kang (2007), disembodiment refers to 
the „transcendence of body constraints in cyberspace‟ (p. 475). Feelings of disembodiment 
are created by the lack of social presence and non-verbal cues available in online 
communication. Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber and Ric (2005) explain 
the presentation of environmental stimuli activates schemas that are used to cognitively 
process environmental information and relates to real-world experiences. The knowledge 
held within schemas help to form actions in relation to the environmental schema, which 
informs behaviour. Whilst online, cognitive processing of environmental stimuli becomes 
decoupled from offline experiences. Furthermore, whilst online, individuals are free from 
non-verbal cues and become immersed in the textual information available to them. The 
lack of non-verbal cues contributes to a disembodied state and contributes to feelings that 
online experiences are „not real‟. 
 
Disembodiment may also account for individual differences in the impact of cyber-
harassing experiences. In this current study, participants who were not specifically 
threatened feared the embodiment of physical threat posed by the instigators of cyber-
harassment. Hartmann and Vorderer (2010) suggest that individuals automatically perceive 
their experiences as „real‟. Although individuals are disembodied whilst online, they strive 
to imagine the real person behind computer-mediated communication (Niedenthal et al., 
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2005). Thus, thinking about the possibility of being physically attacked produces an 
embodied state. Hence, explaining those individuals who felt threatened by the instigator 
of cyber-harassment despite the lack of explicit threats.  
 
In contrast, participants who were explicitly threatened by the instigator of cyber-
harassment did not perceive the threats to be credible, aligning their experience with the 
„not real‟. Hartmann and Vorderer (2010) explain that motivational effort is required for 
individuals to remind themselves that online experiences are not real, and this can lead to 
detachment from the experience. In the current study, participants who were explicitly 
threatened had increased motivation to remind themselves that online experiences are not 
real because they occur in cyberspace. By doing so, participants who were explicitly 
threatened protected themselves from the fear that can be aroused by threats of physical 
harm. 
 
In some instances, participants reported that cyber-harassment had an adverse and 
pervasive impact on their online and offline lives, and reported symptoms appeared to fall 
along the post-traumatic stress spectrum. At present, there are no empirical studies that 
have investigated post-traumatic stress symptomology among victims of cyber-harassment. 
However, Milkkelsen and Einarsen (2002) investigated post-traumatic stress disorder 
among 118 victims of workplace bullying. Less than one third of participants fulfilled both 
of the DSM-IV-TR criteria for PTSD. However, 76% of participants reported PTSD 
symptoms that moderately to severely impaired their daily functioning. Similarly, 
participants in this study who reported that cyber-harassment produced PTSD-like 
symptoms failed to meet the first of the diagnostic criteria. However, their lifestyles and 
daily functioning had been detrimentally affected by cyber-harassment. If accepted that 
some of the participants may have had PTSD-like symptoms, this study lends some support 
to the empirical research conducted by Sheridan and Grant (2007). The researchers found 
no difference in the impact of cyberstalking on victims compared to offline stalking on 
victims. This highlights that whilst cyber-harassment occurs in a virtual world, the impact 
can have severe consequences on victims‟ online and offline lives. However, as PTSD was 
not assessed using a standardised test, further research would be beneficial to determine the 
extent of PTSD symptoms prevalent among victims of cyber-harassment. 
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Conducting IPA requires patience on the researcher‟s part to allow participants to tell their 
own story, without interjection. This is especially relevant when conducting online 
interviews as the lack of visual cues leave the researcher unable to ascertain whether the 
participant has finished answering questions during the interview process. Using Instant 
Messaging software was useful for this as the chat window allows the researcher to see 
when the participant has finished typing. When the chat window showed a participant had 
finished typing, the researcher continued to ask a question. On occasion, this appeared to 
interrupt the participant‟s thought processes and prematurely ended some participants‟ 
responses. To overcome this, researchers need to be more patient to ensure participants are 
finished their responses when conducting interviews online. As the researcher became 
more experienced with online interviewing, such instances occurred less frequently. 
 
In conjunction with allowing participants the time to tell their story, IPA requires rich, in-
depth data. To maximise participation, this study conducted interviews via email and 
instant messenger (IM). Madge and O‟Connor (2002) suggest that asynchronous 
interviewing allows participants time to reflect and formulate their responses to questions 
asked during online interviews. However, the two email interviews conducted in this study 
produced less rich data than the interviews conducting via IM, an observation reported in 
other studies (e.g., Hussain & Griffiths, 2009). The data gathered for IM interviews were 
more detailed, and the responses were more naturalistic and less formal than the data 
gathered from email interviews. 
 
IPA acknowledges that the researcher cannot be free from their own pre-conceptions and 
interpretations of the data (Smith, 1996). During the interviews, the researcher‟s 
conceptions and technological naivety may have influenced how participants‟ experiences 
were interpreted. For example, the researcher initially thought that creating a website 
involved technological skill. Whilst concerned with reducing the impact of the researcher‟s 
pre-conceptions, there was also concern that addressing issues would influence 
participants‟ responses during the interview. Consequently, such issues were addressed at 
the end of the interview. This was important as misinterpreting participants‟ experiences in 
fundamental ways may have changed the findings of the data. 
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Initially, the lack of visual cues caused concern about conducting online interviews with 
participants about a sensitive topic. Researchers are ethically bound to ensure participants 
are comfortable and are not distressed during the interview. This was achieved during the 
interview, and prior to the interview participants were asked how they felt about the 
interview. Several participants commented that the interview process was therapeutic and 
commented that having someone to listen to them was beneficial.  
 
Disengaging from some participants after they had taken part in the interviews proved 
difficult in some cases. This was particularly evident in cases whereby participants 
reported that their experiences of cyber-harassment had a detrimental affect on their social 
lives. The research medium made it easier for participants to contact the researcher after 
they had taken part in the study. When logged onto IM to conduct other interviews, 
participants who had taken part in interviews previously and who were logged into IM, 
took the opportunity to begin a conversation with the researcher, presenting the researcher 
with some difficulties. First, the researcher‟s attention was momentarily diverted from the 
current interview to read and respond to contact attempts. Second, considering the research 
topic and the therapeutic nature of the interviews as reported by participants, the researcher 
did not want participants to suffer further negative online experiences by ignoring their 
contact attempts. As a researcher, there was a need to maintain the professional 
relationship with the participants. However, knowledge of participants‟ feelings of 
mistrust, depression and social isolation following their cyber-harassing experiences meant 
that care had to be taken when ending the relationship.  
 
Disengagement from these participants was managed using several strategies, and in some 
cases was a lengthy process. In order to fully attend to the current interview, the researcher 
explained to previous participants that an interview was taking place and arranged to „chat‟ 
with the person after the interview. Following the interview, the researcher made time to 
„chat‟ with previous interviewees. In some instances, the researcher explained that she was 
not a counsellor and directed participants to the counselling services at Nottingham Trent 
University. In conjunction with directing participants to counselling services, the 
researcher kept an open policy with regards to contact from participants. This was deemed 
necessary to ensure participants did not resent participating in the study and it was hoped 
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that participants would not consider the online interview as a negative experience. All 
participants naturally disengaged from the researcher over a period of two months.  
 
5.4.1 Implications 
 
This study highlights a need to better educate people about cyber-harassment; what 
constitutes cyber-harassment, how to cope with cyber-harassment, and who to approach for 
help if faced with cyber-harassment. Providing people with different examples of cyber-
harassment and cyber-ORI, and illustrating how the instigator‟s behaviour may escalate, 
may help individuals identify and prevent circumstances in their online interactions that 
may potentially lead to cyber-harassment. By raising awareness and educating people 
about issues surrounding cyber-harassment, individuals can better protect themselves 
against vulnerability to experiencing cyber-harassment. If faced with cyber-harassment, 
victims will be better able to cope with their experiences, know who to report it to, and 
receive more adequate support in dealing with their experiences. 
 
Although further research is required to determine the extent to which cyber-harassed 
victims experience PTSD-like symptoms, the findings in this study suggest that treatment 
offered to those severely impacted by cyber-harassment may be similar to those treated for 
PTSD. This would be particularly relevant to clinicians and general practitioners who may 
be contacted by victims of cyber-harassment. 
 
Future researchers who wish to conduct online interviews need to consider their processes 
of disengagement from participants, particularly if they intend to investigate sensitive 
issues. Researchers need to consider how they will end their relationship with participants 
whilst adhering to their moral and ethical code. 
 
5.4.2 Limitations 
 
A limitation of this study may have been analysing data collected online using IPA. This is 
because rich, in-depth data is required to fulfil the aim of IPA to explore, in-depth, 
participants‟ lived experience of a phenomenon (Smith, 2004). Whilst involved in an 
online interview, extra demands are placed on participants as they have to read and 
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interpret questions, formulate and type their responses. These extra demands on 
participants may have yielded less rich data. Furthermore, the researcher found during data 
collection that a greater degree of probing was required to fully explore the meanings 
participants attached to their experiences. This contravenes Smith and Osborn‟s (2008) 
caveat that too many prompts may render data unsuitable for IPA. In part, the effects of the 
medium used to gather data and the higher degree of probing was evident in amount of 
superordinate themes that emerged from the data. However, care was taken with the 
interview schedule prior to data collection, and questions were in accordance to Smith and 
Osborn‟s guidelines. During data collection, the researcher aspired to ensure that 
interviews did not exceed 1.5 hours in an attempt to minimise fatigue experienced by 
participants. However, participants were enthusiastic in telling their story, and often 
requested a longer period of time for the interview to tell their story in greater depth. For 
instance, one participant‟s interview lasted 4.5 hours, during which the researcher‟s probes 
were minimal. The data yielded was rich and in-depth, and suited to IPA. Whilst Smith and 
Osborn caution over the amount of probes used, their guidelines apply to research 
conducted in face-to-face settings. If IPA researchers wish to use online methods of data 
collection, probes are required to gather in-depth data and to increase social presence. By 
doing so, researchers can re-assure participants that their story is interesting to the 
researcher and increases self-disclosure. With thorough preparation prior to data collection, 
online methods of data collection are suited to IPA.   
 
Due to the retrospective design of the study, participants‟ recall may have been influenced 
by memory biases. Memory biases may have been further confounded among participants 
who reported PTSD-like symptoms, and the research medium. Memory biases have been 
found among samples which have included participants suffering from PTSD. For 
example, in a matched participants design, Paunovic, Lundh and Oest (2002) found that 
crime victims suffering from acute PTSD showed longer response latency in a stroop task 
for trauma related words compared to controls. This effect was not found for non-
threatening words. In the current study, the research medium may have produced memory 
biases if participants who reported PTSD-like symptoms perceived the research medium as 
threatening as a consequence of their experiences of cyber-harassment. 
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As IPA is an idiographic approach, it is concerned with individuals‟ perceptions of their 
experiences but does not attempt to explain why individuals differ in their perceptions 
(Willig, 2001). Participants initially participated in an online survey and indicated during 
the survey the types of cyber-harassing behaviours they had experienced. At this initial 
stage, participants‟ experiences may have appeared similar. However, the interviews 
highlighted that participants varied in their experiences, and the meaning they attached to 
those experiences. However, the research does not explain the mechanisms by which 
individuals differ when interpreting their cyber-harassing experiences.  
 
Participants in this study did not define themselves as victims and this may impact on the 
perceived criminality of cyber-harassment. Whilst some of the participants experienced 
cyber-harassment, not all participants‟ experiences can be described as cyber-harassment. 
As such, they were unlikely to describe the perpetrator‟s behaviour as criminal. This may 
have biased the research findings. In addition, self-defined victims may be more aware of 
anti-harassment legislation in the UK. 
 
5.4.3 Future Research 
 
Researchers are not immune to the effects of computer-mediated communication. 
However, little research has been conducted on researchers‟ experiences in conducting 
online interviews, and the effects the research medium on their interpretations of data 
collected. As the Internet continues to evolve, and as researchers increasingly turn to 
online methods of data collection, future research would be beneficial in exploring the 
effects of the research medium on the researchers‟ interpretations. Such effects include the 
effect of uninhibited behaviour, disembodiment, and self-disclosure whilst conducting 
online interviews and these effects may be different when conducting research via email 
compared to via IM. For example, in this study, the researcher found that greater self-
disclosure was required for email interviews compared to IM interviews to encourage 
participants‟ disclosure. Furthermore, increased self-disclosure was required during IM 
interviews to re-assure participants that they were not being judged by the researcher. 
Whilst self-disclosure is necessary to establish rapport and make participants feel 
comfortable when discussing sensitive issues, researchers‟ disclosure directly involves 
researchers in the interview process, and may create bias when interpreting findings. 
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Conducting research in this area will provide researchers with clearer guidelines on how to 
conduct research using online methods, without compromising the validity of research 
gathered.  
 
The current research has provided some insight to the mean-making processes among 
individuals who experience potentially cyber-harassing behaviours. As IPA is an 
idiographic approach, it is not concerned with the generalisability of findings. However, in 
keeping with the mixed methods approach to conducting research, future research would 
be beneficial in further exploration of cyber-harassed victims‟ experiences. For instance, 
quantitative research could measure the effects of disembodiment in perceptions of the 
credibility of threats made online. 
 
The findings of the current research suggest that cyber-harassed victims who felt affected 
by their experiences reported symptoms that appeared to fall along the PTSD spectrum. 
Future research would be beneficial in measuring PTSD symptoms, using a standardised 
measure, among victims of cyber-harassment to further substantiate this finding.  
 
Furthermore, social isolation was one of the more prevalent symptoms reported by 
participants following their cyber-harassing experience. Social isolation was often 
accompanied by symptoms of depression. The social support available to victims of cyber-
harassment may serve to minimise feelings of isolation and depression. However, there is 
little research investigating individuals‟ perceptions of cyber-harassment. Future research 
would be beneficial in addressing this gap in the literature as individuals‟ perceptions of 
cyber-harassment may influence the social support available to victims. 
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Chapter 6: Non-Victims’ Perceptions of Cyber-Harassment 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The primary objective of this study is to expand the findings from the first two studies of 
this thesis. Study 1 illustrated that undergraduate students perceived some online 
behaviours associated with cyber-harassment (CH) (such as sending malicious software or 
harassing messages) but were unsure about other behaviours (such as behaviours 
associated with deception/disclosure). Study 2 illustrated that CH can have a detrimental 
impact on some undergraduate students. Importantly, the quality of social support (SS) 
may play an important role in minimising the impact of cyber-harassment on victims and 
helping them to cope with their experiences. This study explores undergraduate students‟ 
perceptions of CH, including perceptions of cyber-harassed victims, criminality, and police 
involvement. 
 
Just world beliefs may affect individuals‟ perceptions of cyber-harassed victims and 
perpetrators. Based on observations that individuals engage in victim-blaming strategies, 
Lerner and Miller (1978) describe the „just world‟ hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, 
people have a need to believe that the world is just, and people get what they deserve. 
Belief in a just world is adaptive because it allows individuals to perceive their 
environment as controllable and safe. If individuals are faced with injustice, cognitive 
dissonance motivates them to address the imbalance between their belief in the just world 
and the injustice. This is achieved by either compensating the victim or convincing 
themselves that the victim is responsible for their own fate. 
 
According to the hypothesis, when victims are perceived to suffer without compensation, 
perceivers are motivated to devalue the victim by attributing blame to the victim‟s 
character or behaviour. Jones and Aronson (1973) recruited 234 undergraduate students to 
participate in a vignette study in which a hypothetical perpetrator raped or attempted to 
rape the victim. The victim‟s respectability was manipulated by presenting her as a virgin, 
married, or divorced. Participants perceived the victim as more responsible for the rape if 
she was portrayed as a virgin or married compared to a divorcee. When the victim is 
portrayed as innocent, the perceiver perceives a greater threat to her or himself that a 
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similar event may happen to them (Lerner & Miller, 1978). To minimise the perceived 
threat, individuals devalue the victim and blame their behaviour and/or character. By doing 
so, the perceiver distances themselves from the likelihood of the event happening to them. 
 
The just world hypothesis has also been investigated in relation to perceptions about 
offline stalking. Sheridan, Gillett, Davies, Blaauw and Patel (2003) recruited 168 
undergraduate students to participate in a vignette study. Participants were presented with 
one of six vignettes, that varied in terms of the gender of the target (male or female) and 
the prior victim-perpetrator relationship (ex-intimate, acquaintance, or stranger). The 
findings supported the researchers‟ hypotheses, suggesting the vignette was perceived to be 
stalking when the perpetrator was a stranger or acquaintance. Victims were perceived to be 
more responsible for being stalked when the perpetrator was an ex-intimate or 
acquaintance compared to a stranger. Police intervention was perceived as necessary if the 
stalker was a stranger or male, and bodily injury was perceived more likely if the 
perpetrator was male as opposed to female. In relation to just world beliefs, the authors 
concluded victims were perceived as more to blame if they had a previous relationship 
with the perpetrator as they had the opportunity to give the perpetrator some cause for 
instigating stalking.  
 
The just world hypothesis may have particular relevance to the current study. Participants 
may perceive victims of CH as responsible for their harassment experiences. Empirical 
research suggests undergraduate students are likely to use the Internet on a regular basis 
(Dutton & Helsper, 2007). Participants‟ online usage may heighten the threat of becoming 
a victim of CH. To minimise any perceived threat, participants may attribute responsibility 
of CH to the victims‟ behaviour and/or character. 
 
Just world beliefs may contribute to secondary victimisation of victims. Secondary 
victimisation occurs when crime victims fear stigmatisation and negative other-evaluations 
following their experiences of crime (Kenney, 2002). In conjunction with just world 
beliefs, the virtual nature of CH may increase the likelihood of secondary victimisation. It 
is necessary to explore perceptions of CH as secondary victimisation may deter victims 
from reporting their experiences to the police or seeking support from their peers to help 
them cope with CH. 
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As CH occurs in a virtual world, the impact of CH may be trivialised. The second study of 
this thesis suggested that some participants perceived cyber-harassing behaviours as an 
Internet norm. If there is a general perception that CH is an Internet norm, this will 
contribute to the trivialisation of CH. If CH is trivialised, the impact of CH may not be 
recognised by participants. Thus, victims of CH may be stigmatised and suffer secondary 
victimisation. 
 
However, online behaviour may not be perceived as having consequences offline. Alexy, 
Burgess, Baker and Smoyak (2005) reported that 30% of participants did not label a 
vignette as cyberstalking, even though the vignette depicted a genuine, severe case of 
cyberstalking. Furthermore, 7% did not perceive the vignette as depicting CH. Whilst this 
study raises concerns regarding perceptions of cyberstalking, the majority of participants, 
at least, considered the perpetrator‟s behaviour as CH. Drawing from object relations 
theory, Whitty (2007) proposed that people „split‟ their online behaviour from the offline 
world. As such, individuals may not perceive online behaviours as constituting harassment 
as they may not believe online behaviours can impact on peoples‟ offline lives. 
 
It has also been suggested that gender may also contribute to individual differences in 
perceptions of CH (Cupach & Spitzberg, 2004). Some evidence suggests that females are 
more sensitive to privacy intrusions and harassment than males (e.g., Agatston, Kowalski 
& Limber, 2007). In contrast, Sheridan, Gillett and Davies (2002) compared gender 
differences in perceptions of offline stalking in a sample of 210 participants. They reported 
that males and females do not differ in their perceptions of the types of behaviours 
considered to constitute offline stalking. This suggests that whilst gender differences exist 
in sensitivity to harassing behaviours, when considering the behaviours associated with 
harassment, gender differences may dissipate.  
 
The current study may provide important insights about the SS available to cyber-harassed 
victims. Study 2 of this thesis suggested that the quality of SS was an important factor for 
helping individuals cope with their experiences of CH. The buffering hypothesis explains 
that social support „buffers‟ the effect of stressful events, thereby minimising the impact of 
stress and promotes well-being (Yap & Devilly, 2004). However, the combination of the 
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virtual nature of CH and potential trivialisation of the impact of CH may reduce the social 
support available to victims. 
 
Evidence suggests that victims of both offline (e.g., Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998) and online 
harassment (e.g., Finn, 2004) are reluctant to report their experiences to the police. This 
was further evidenced in the second study of this thesis. This may, in part, be due to 
peoples‟ perceptions of CH. At present, there is little research investigating whether CH 
should be reported to the police, or the stage at which the police should become involved. 
This is important as not only is it an indicator of perceived criminality, but may also 
indicate the level and type of SS available to victims. 
 
Peoples‟ perceptions of CH will have particular relevance if a perpetrator is being 
prosecuted for their behaviour. If a case involving CH is brought before court for 
prosecution, the perpetrator would be judged by their peers. It is therefore necessary to 
explore people‟s perceptions of CH so further understanding of how jurors may react if 
they are to judge a case involving CH.  
 
6.1.2 Rationale 
 
There is a need to gain an understanding of undergraduate students‟ perceptions of cyber-
harassment, and in particular their perceptions of cyber-harassed victims. Participants‟ 
perceptions are of relevance as they will provide some insight to the social support 
available to cyber-harassed victims who turn to their peers for help in coping with their 
experiences. Furthermore, participants‟ perceptions of cyber-harassed victims will provide 
some insight to the possibility of cyber-harassed victims facing secondary victimisation. 
 
6.1.3 Research Aims and Objectives 
 
This study aimed primarily to explore undergraduate students of CH, including their 
perceptions of victims and police involvement. Key objectives were to: 1) provide in-depth 
accounts of participants‟ perceptions of CH; 2) explore how and why participants judge 
cyber-harassing behaviours as criminal; 3) explore participants‟ perceptions of police 
169 
 
involvement in cases involving CH; and 4) determine whether participants recognise the 
impact CH can have on victims, and explore their reasons behind these perceptions. 
 
6.2 Method 
 
6.2.1 Participants 
 
Seventeen undergraduate students from Nottingham Trent University participated in this 
study, consisting of 14 females and 3 males aged between 18 and 40 years (M = 22, SD = 
6). All participants were self-selected volunteers, and were not intended to form a 
representative sample of undergraduate students. As participants were recruited via email 
(see Appendix 6), it is not possible to provide response rates as it is not clear how many 
participants received, and read the invitation (Joinson & Reips, 2007). Participant 
recruitment continued until data saturation was reached (Marshall, 1996). 
 
Table 23: Participants' Demographic Information for Study 3 
Participants’ pseudonyms Age 
Ann 19 
Ava 19 
Christine 18 
Edith 18 
Emma 40 
Hazel 21 
Heather 21 
Jack 18 
Janet 19 
Megan 24 
Molly 19 
Patricia 33 
Rachael 18 
Richard 18 
Ruth 20 
Seamus 25 
Susan 19 
 
6.2.2 Measures 
 
Online semi-structured interviews were used to explore participants‟ perceptions of CH. 
Considering the exploratory nature of this research, qualitative methods were deemed most 
appropriate as quantitative research would be restricted to issues conceived of by the 
researcher, and do not allow the freedom for participants to offer data not previously 
considered. As the research investigated a sensitive, novel topic, care was taken with the 
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ordering of questions to minimise socially desirable responding and increase disclosure. 
The interview consisted of four main sections about participants‟ perceptions of: 
 
1) CH and why CH occurs. 
2) Their attitudes towards victims and the impact CH can have on victims. 
3) Criminality and suggestions of legislation that could be used to prosecute CH. 
4) Police involvement. 
 
6.2.3 Procedure 
 
An email invitation was sent to groups of undergraduate students in Nottingham Trent 
University. The invitation briefly described the study and provided a URL link to 
Surveymonkey.com. Upon clicking the link, participants were provided with more detailed 
information about the study. As the data gathered via email for the second study in this 
thesis was less rich than data gathered via Instant Messenger (IM), participants were 
informed they would require the use of IM software to participate in this study. After 
reading the study information, participants could provide some demographic information 
and complete informed consent. Following consent, participants were asked to provide an 
email address through which they could be contacted to take part in the interview. After 
participants provided their consent, participants were contacted via email to arrange a 
suitable time for the online interview. As with the second phase of research, care was taken 
to establish rapport with participants during initial emails. This was achieved by discussing 
upcoming exams, current projects and coursework participants were completing, shared 
experiences, and Christmas preparations. 
 
The interviews were conducted over a six-week period and lasted between 45 to 75 
minutes, dependant on the depth of participants‟ responses and the issues that arose 
requiring further probing. Prior to, and immediately following the interview, all 
participants were asked if they still wanted to participate in the study, and were reminded 
of their right to withdraw. Finally, participants were asked if they had any questions about 
the research, which were answered and participants were debriefed. 
 
171 
 
6.2.4 Analysis 
 
Following data collection, the transcripts were prepared for analysis by transferring the 
data from IM chat logs to Microsoft Word. The font for all transcripts was changed to 
Times New Roman, size 12 with 1.5 line spacing, and the transcripts were fully 
anonymised. In this format, the transcripts ranged from 5-13 pages (M = 8.1; SD = 2.3). 
 
The data were analysed using thematic analysis as described by Miles and Huberman 
(1994) as this method of analysis is appropriate to explore a topic when knowledge is 
limited. Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was not appropriate for this study 
as IPA focuses on participants‟ „personal lived experiences‟ (Smith, 2004, p.40). As 
participants were did not experience cyber-harassment, IPA was not an appropriate 
analytical tool for this study.  
 
Table 24: Analytical process used for thematic analysis 
Stage Process 
1 Familiarity with the data was gained by reading all of transcripts several times.  
 
2 Initial coding of the data had a broad focus and consideration was given to the 
research questions. Recurring themes and patterns across the data set were 
identified. 
 
3 The data was organised by grouping the data into themes. Extracts were taken 
from the data and kept in separate Microsoft Word files reflecting each theme 
identified. 
 
4 All of the extracts in each theme were analysed to ensure how they related to 
the over-arching theme and subtle differences were noted. This stage involved 
the refinement of themes and gave themes meaning and depth. 
 
5 The themes were named and extracts were re-read to ensure the theme 
accurately reflected the extracts of data. 
 
6 The themes were tabulated and extracts were organised in preparation for 
reporting. 
 
7 All transcripts were re-read to ensure the themes accurately reflected 
participants‟ views and opinions. 
 
 
Table 24 describes the analytical process used for this study. The thematic analysis 
involved the identification of patterns of views, and meanings discussed by participants 
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with specific reference to the research questions. The themes identified were organised in a 
coherent manner that provided meaning to the data. To increase validity and reliability, the 
supervisory team were provided with anonymised transcripts of the interviews, and they 
provided their comments on the themes identified. 
 
6.3 Results 
 
Three themes were identified during data analysis: „anonymity‟, „social support‟, and 
„victim blame‟. Each of the themes will be considered, and excerpts from the transcripts 
are provided to allow for the assessment of interpretations. 
 
6.3.1 Theme 1: Anonymity 
 
„Anonymity‟ was the first major theme identified in this study. Participants explained the 
perpetrator‟s anonymity contributed to the ease of engaging in CH. Anonymity was 
perceived to reduce the perpetrator‟s sense of vulnerability and accountability. Often 
participants described the complex interplay between the perceived prior relationship with 
the victim and the perpetrator‟s desire to remain anonymous. 
 
At the most fundamental level, participants perceived CH to be „easy‟ because the Internet 
is accessible to many. Engaging in CH was perceived as „easy‟ because it required the 
perpetrator to use fewer resources than would be required to harass someone offline: 
 
It‟s easier because the person cannot be seen...because the internet is more 
accessible and it doesn‟t take a lot of energy I think. Megan 
 
Whilst the ease of engaging in CH does not imply anonymity, participants clearly 
perceived anonymity as playing a central role in CH, making it easy to engage in it: 
 
It must be easier to harass someone online because there‟s the element of 
anonymity...I‟d probably go for on the Internet for convenience. Emma 
 
Christine highlighted social networking sites as a method through which perpetrators could 
access a variety of information about a potential victim. As she noted, people place a lot of 
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personal information (such as their age, address, information about their friends, and 
photos) in one location, making it easy for someone to engage in CH: 
 
It‟s so easy – for example, most people‟s profiles on Facebook and Bebo 
aren‟t set to private or they don‟t hide any of their personal information, so 
you can see how old they are, where they live, who they‟re friends with 
and then look through all their photos. Christine 
 
Two participants explained visual anonymity allows the perpetrator to deny the existence 
of the victim, in a sense dehumanising the victim. In this respect, the computer acts as a 
barrier to the victim‟s reaction to CH. Ava perceived that it is the lack of social cues 
available in CMC contributes to the perpetrator‟s unregulated behaviour. As perpetrators 
cannot see the victim, or their reaction, perpetrators cannot gauge the impact of their 
behaviour on the victim. Consequently, they may not know their behaviour constitutes 
harassment and fails to stop. In this respect, the lack of social cues available in online 
communications leads to a failure in self-regulation of perpetrators behaviours. 
 
It‟s an easy way to contact someone and they don‟t have to face the person 
that they‟re doing it to, which, if they did, and saw that person‟s reaction 
and how they felt about it they‟d probably think twice. It‟s also that people 
seem to be braver in emails and don‟t seem to care how bad things are that 
they are saying because they don‟t have to see that person. Ava 
 
Anonymity was perceived to remove accountability of the perpetrator‟s actions. The lack 
of accountability for one‟s online behaviour was perceived to produce feelings of 
invulnerability. In turn, invulnerability was perceived to spur individuals to engage in 
behaviours online that they would not engage in offline, including behaviours associated 
with CH.  
 
It‟s not face to face and things can be fabricated...people do things that 
they wouldn‟t necessarily do in person...people can change things and tell 
lies about themselves and never really be found out...people can lie about 
themselves and be someone different. Someone who they might not be 
able to be in real life as they don‟t want to be judged. Susan 
 
That would be easier for them as there‟s no repercussions so to speak 
whereas if their identity is out in the open then obviously 
police/parents/schools dependent on ages can get involved. Emma 
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As Susan highlighted, online anonymity allows individuals to play with their identity and 
create new identities. Online personas disguise the perpetrator‟s identity from other 
Internet users, making them less easy to identify and thus, harder to make accountable for 
their behaviour.  
 
As individuals enjoy anonymity on the Internet, participants perceived the perpetrators of 
CH to be anonymous in the majority of CH cases. As such, participants reported 
perpetrators cannot be held accountable for their actions. The only repercussion perceived 
by many participants was banning from Internet sites (such as social networking sites or 
chat rooms). However, banning was associated with an online identity, rather than an 
individual. This lack of accountability was perceived to provide perpetrators with a sense 
of power that they could not enjoy in face-to-face communications as they cannot hide 
their identity. 
 
I think that the people who bully them enjoy the fact that there aren‟t really 
that many repercussions. If at school someone is a bully they could face 
exclusion. Although you can ban people from certain websites, they could 
always make another account and come back online. It gives them a sense 
of power they may not be able to achieve in everyday life. Ann 
 
It gives people power...cos [because] they can say anything they want with 
few consequences, and know that it will still hurt the person on the other 
end, they can type it instead of saying it which is easier anyway. Janet 
 
Many participants perceived the lack of bodily presence in CMC as a crucial factor when 
discussing the lack of consequences for online behaviours associated with CH. As with the 
computer acting as a barrier to the victim‟s reaction, the computer also acts as a barrier to 
the perpetrator who may face a physical altercation with the victim: 
 
They [threats] could be carried out but it‟s easier to make a threat online 
without the intention of following through with it because you‟re hiding 
behind a computer screen. Ruth 
 
They [perpetrators] can‟t get a whack. No consequences...nothing is 
personally identifiable as there is a physical barrier. Richard 
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Whilst participants acknowledged that victims and perpetrators of CH may have had some 
sort of relationship prior to the onset of CH, the majority of participants expressed that 
strangers were more likely to engage in cyber-harassing behaviours.  
 
Seamus: You could also be harassed not only by a stranger but by 
someone you have come into contact with b4 „meeting‟ on the internet. 
Interviewer: which do you think is more common? 
Seamus: Strangers 
 
However, two participants perceived that a prior relationship is likely to exist between the 
perpetrators and victims of CH. Heather explained she had read about cases involving CH 
between individuals who had a prior relationship, and perceived the perpetrator‟s motive to 
be associated with revenge. She further qualified her perceptions by arguing that the victim 
has to provide the perpetrator with their contact details, allowing the perpetrator to engage 
in CH. 
 
I would probably guess that the majority of harassment online is by 
someone they know somehow. Emma 
 
I would imagine, from the few cases I have seen or read about, that it is 
linked to personal disagreements and arguments that have occurred 
previously...CH suggests that the parties have previously exchanged 
contact details (for example email addresses, phone numbers etc) which 
make it possible. Obviously, there will be cases where they may not know 
the offender but I would imagine that in most cases it does occur between 
people who know each other. Heather 
 
When considering a prior relationship between the perpetrator and victim, participants 
perceived the depth of friendship involved prior to CH to be an important factor. The level 
of friendship was also associated with the level of detail the perpetrator may know about 
the victim. As can be seen from Ruth‟s comments, theory of mind was invoked to 
understand how a victim of CH would be perceived. 
 
If it was someone who I spoke to often or who was close friends with one 
of my friends chances are they would already know where I worked or 
where I went in my spare time but if it was someone who I only vaguely 
knew, or knew through friends then it would be a bit weird to think that 
they knew more about me than I do about them! Ruth 
 
176 
 
Molly was the only participant who indicated that anonymity was more likely to be desired 
by perpetrators when the perpetrator was a friend or family member of the victim. 
However, Molly associated strangers who engage in CH with paedophilia and this 
perception may have influenced her perceptions about the prior relationship between the 
perpetrator and victim. In such a case, the perpetrator would maintain their anonymity, 
presumably whilst grooming the victim but then „reveal themselves‟ when they intended to 
meet the victim. Other participants associated strangers engaging in CH with paedophilia 
but did not elaborate on this during their discussions about the prior relationship. 
 
I think if it were a friend or member of the family harassing a person they 
knew then they would like to keep it anonymous, however if it were a 
stranger, or a paedophile even, I think they would like to reveal themselves 
to the victim. Molly 
 
All participants considered the impact CH may have on victims. Whilst the majority of 
participants acknowledged that CH would have a negative impact on victims, Ruth 
considered the impact to be reduced in comparison to offline harassment. Ruth argued the 
victim could not suffer physical harm as a consequence of CH and thus, the impact should 
be less when compared to offline harassment.  
 
I think because it‟s easier to delete them or ignore it, it doesn‟t have as 
much as an impact of people as harassment in person...i don‟t think it‟s as 
bad as other types of harassment but it can definitely have some sort of 
impact on their lives and the decisions they make on the internet...you 
can‟t really be physically hurt directly from harassment online so it seems 
less serious. Ruth 
 
However, the majority of participants believed CH could impact negatively on victims. At 
the very least, participants considered that CH may make victims less likely to use the 
Internet following their experiences: 
 
I think it could stop people doing what they would normally do like maybe 
use the internet less. Hazel  
 
You have to be online – to keep in touch with people – to do your work 
etc. and if every time you do something on your pc someone annoys you – 
you get paranoid and afraid of doing things on the pc. Patricia 
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I think that it can make people scared of using internet sites...because I 
think they would feel that any kind of information they write even a 
comment to a friend could be read by someone who would then use that 
information to try and talk to them...if they were scared enough then I 
guess that would continue in their offline lives too as they may feel that the 
person trying to add them knows where they live. Edith 
 
However, other participants reported that victims may suffer psychological harm following 
CH. The types of psychological harm identified by participants included stress, anxiety, 
fear, and rumination. As can be seen from Seamus‟ transcript, death was also considered to 
be a potential consequence of CH. However, Seamus did not elaborate whether a victim 
would commit suicide or be murdered by the perpetrator. Furthermore, Janet connected the 
perpetrator‟s anonymity whilst online to increasing the victim‟s fear and mistrust offline as 
the victim does not know who their harasser is. 
 
It can cause emotional distress and anxiety, just like any other sort of 
harassment...they will constantly be thinking about what has been 
said/done online. Jack 
 
It can cause them a lot of stress. It might make the person scared to go out 
in case they see this person. They might be reluctant to use the computer. 
Susan 
 
It can have many outcomes from embarrassment, fear and even the 
extreme – death. Seamus 
 
I think they would suffer as you can harass someone online anonymously 
and so offline they might be scared to speak to people they know or trust 
people as fear it could be those people doing it. It would be hard to know 
that you didn‟t know the person but they know all of your details they may 
become very anxious people. Janet 
 
Interestingly, Ann considered the degree to which victims use the Internet prior to their 
cyber-harassing experiences as having particular importance to how the experience would 
impact them. Whilst Ann commented that CH can be „just as negative on mental health as 
offline harassment‟, she implied the degree to which victims use the Internet prior to their 
experiences may correlate with the degree to which the experience impacts them. 
 
It would probably depend on the person and how invested they were on the 
website. If they just went on a website for fun and not to talk to others, 
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they‟d probably not take much notice. If they spent a lot of time on it then 
it could be hurtful and perhaps even cause them to become as depressed as 
someone who was bullied offline...I think the consequences can be just as 
negative on mental health as offline harassment. Ann 
 
CH was perceived to have a greater affect on victims when the perpetrator remained 
anonymous. Participants perceived victims to be „paranoid‟ and constantly searching for 
(or avoiding contact with) the identity of the unknown perpetrator. Paranoia was associated 
with mistrust, with victims unable to trust people on the Internet or in offline contexts. 
 
You don‟t know who you are dealing with therefore anyone in your 
surrounding could be the harasser – which makes it stressful and living a 
“normal life”. You always wonder who it might be and if eg someone 
looks at you longer you might think that this is the harasser. Patricia 
 
I think it may make you feel more vulnerable when you‟re out alone, 
possibly paranoid from not knowing who to trust, and may be even not 
wanting to make new friends online because of a bad experience with a 
harasser. Molly 
 
It may make them more wary of who they talk to, websites they visit etc 
offline they may become paranoid that people they bump into are the ones 
harassing them online...i think they could become paranoid because 
they‟re wondering whether those around them could be the ones bothering 
them online. Emma 
 
Some people would feel intimidated by someone adding them who they 
don‟t know and feel they have put too much information on their profiles 
so would be scared into deleting it. Or people that accept friend requests 
when they don‟t know the person may feel scared that this person now has 
access to personal details about themselves. Edith 
 
Whilst the majority of participants believed an anonymous perpetrator would impact 
greater on victims, three participants suggested a non-anonymous perpetrator would have a 
greater impact on victims.  
 
I think they [victims] could become paranoid if the bully starts to scare 
them about, particularly if the bully knew who they were before like knew 
their routine and stuff and I think this could lead to paranoia if the victim 
and bully were friends before. Megan 
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6.3.2 Theme 2: Social Support 
 
Participants considered the quality of social support (SS) they could provide a friend, if 
that friend experienced CH and approached them for help. All participants stated they 
would help a friend who had suffered CH. However, participants considered various 
factors that would influence whether SS could be given, the depth of SS, and there were 
limits to the amount of SS they could provide. 
 
Some participants indicated the level, or depth, of friendship they shared with a cyber-
harassed victim would play an intrinsic role in determining whether SS was offered.  The 
depth of friendship implied participants‟ knowledge of the victim. If the victim was a close 
friend and was perceived as „genuine‟ and not attention-seeking, participants were more 
likely to offer SS. 
 
Depending on friends proximity within my social circle of course, a good 
friend I would talk through getting their IP address and giving it to me to 
dish out punishment. Richard 
 
If I could see someone was genuinely afraid...and they weren‟t just putting 
it on to get attention or whatever you would be able to see it was true and 
they weren‟t overreacting. Christine 
 
Whilst participants indicated they would believe the victim was suffering CH, participants 
required proof that this was actually the case. Both Ava and Heather suggested that proof 
of emails and/or text messages would justify their offer of SS. Heather commented that 
should proof be available, she would „believe them without question‟. This is interesting as 
the requirement of proof is itself questioning the victim‟s experience. Heather‟s indicated 
that the ability of victims to provide evidence of CH would be evaluated in conjunction 
with prior knowledge of the victim. Despite these caveats, both participants maintained 
they would help someone experiencing CH. 
 
It depends upon my relationship with them and also the nature of the 
harassment. If they had still got the messages on their phone/computer and 
they were clearly upsetting then I would believe them without question. If 
they were unable to support their story with any evidence and were also 
generally known for telling tall stories then I may think twice about how 
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serious the harassment was but would probably still try to help them 
anyway. Heather 
 
I‟d probably check the emails in case but if a friend had come to me in 
confidence about it I‟d take it seriously, especially if that‟s how they felt. 
Harassment affects people in different ways so what might not affect one 
person might terrify another. Ava 
 
When participants considered being approached by a cyber-harassed victim, five 
participants spoke in emotive terms about how this would impact on themselves. 
Participants indicated they would be shocked, or upset, to hear about a friend suffering CH. 
Edith focused on the possible implications of depression, and showed empathy with 
someone feeling depressed, rather than focusing on the trigger. Both Hazel and Molly 
indicated feeling pity for a cyber-harassed victim. 
  
I would need to know why they were that afraid but from personal 
experience if you really are that depressed and no-one believes you it 
makes you ten times worse and I could never do that to someone. Edith 
 
The friend I wouldn‟t think any different of because they haven‟t done 
anything wrong really. You‟d feel sorry for them I suppose. Hazel 
 
I would probably feel sorry for them and ask them to share what had 
happened. Molly 
 
Participants discussed advice they would give to someone experiencing CH. Often (as can 
be seen from Ruth‟s comments below) participants advised that victims should try to 
ignore the perpetrator by using the „block‟ feature of email, messenger, or social 
networking sites. Edith said she would help a victim to set up new homepages on the 
Internet, restricting the amount of information the victim would place on it. These forms of 
advice suggest encouraging victims to use the Internet in safer ways. 
 
I‟d probably initially tell them just to block the person and ignore it but if 
it got too much I‟d think that they should contact the police...if it was 
really getting to the person, like if the harassment was constant and had 
been going on for months. Ruth 
 
I would understand why they felt like that but encourage them to speak 
about it and help them re-set up a page that ensures that no-one could gain 
too much personal details from it. Edith 
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However, Janet and Ava suggested they would offer more extreme forms of advice to 
cyber-harassed victims. Janet implied the victim should retaliate against the perpetrator. In 
her transcript she described that „it doesn‟t become bullying anymore it becomes a fight‟, 
which implies victims should be encouraged to stand up for themselves.  
 
I do know I would probably try and help them and be horrible to the 
person back so it doesn‟t become bullying anymore it becomes a fight. 
Janet 
 
In contrast to other participants, Ava suggested victims should simply avoid online spaces 
where they have experienced CH. She concluded by stating that victims should not use the 
Internet at all.  
 
Probably tell them to delete whatever accounts they were being contacted 
on, tell them not to go on the internet at all. Ava 
 
Providing emotional support to cyber-harassed victims was the most commonly reported 
method of helping victims. Participants reported they would encourage cyber-harassed 
victims to talk about their experiences, which was believed would provide comfort to 
victims. During such conversations, participants explained they would advise victims to 
talk to other people (such as parents, counsellors, internet service providers, the police, or 
helplines), or to formulate a strategy to end cyber-harassment. 
 
I‟d want to help them, I‟d talk to them but then I‟d maybe advise them to 
talk to someone like parents, and maybe get rid of their online account? 
Rachael 
 
I‟d try to comfort them and find out what had been going on. Then I‟d get 
them to report the user to the website‟s admin and block the users, if 
possible. Ann 
 
I would support/advise them to the best extent of my knowledge and try 
and get it stopped. I don‟t think it should be considered any different to 
any other form of harassment. Heather 
 
Like there are family and friends to begin with, and I think the police 
would help and there are helplines and things to get in touch with. Rachael 
 
182 
 
Two participants indicated they would adopt a „tough love‟ approach towards victims. 
Janet reported that she would tell a victim to „grow some balls‟, which may trivialise the 
impact of CH. Jack also trivialised CH as he perceived it not being „not true‟ and not 
occurring in „real life‟. This emphasises the virtual nature of CH, implys that it cannot 
impact on one‟s „real life‟.  
 
I‟d tell them to grow some balls and do something about it. I‟d obviously 
feel horrible for saying that but you can‟t let it take over your life. Janet 
 
I would try and explain to them nothing will happen, and they are 
safe...tell them it doesn‟t matter whatever happened online/tell them it‟s 
not true, just show that their „real life‟ friends and people are there for 
them. Jack 
 
Alternatively, Susan said she would offer reassurances that the perpetrator probably lives a 
long distance from the victim. By offering such advice, she implied the perpetrator would 
probably not be able to physically harm the victim. Importantly, she acknowledged this 
advice could be deceitful as there may be no way to know where the perpetrator lives.   
 
I wouldn‟t probably try to reassure them and say that the person probably 
lives miles away but in reality they could be from anywhere and live just 
around the corner. Susan 
 
Upon talking with victims of CH, participants imagined they would seek further 
information about CH in a bid to help victims. Whilst none of the participants were able 
(during the interview) to identify organisations devoted to helping cyber-harassed victims, 
they indicated they would seek such organisations to obtain advice on how to help a friend 
suffering CH. As can be seen from Jack‟s transcript, he viewed it as his „responsibility‟ to 
not only seek advice from other sources, but to inform others of the victim‟s experiences. 
 
I would feel it was my responsibility to help them, seek advice, inform 
someone else. Jack 
 
I‟d probably say to like block them off all your stuff on your computer like 
MSN, delete them from any social networking sites etc but then I wouldn‟t 
really know what to do next. Probably find out if there‟s some sort of 
charity/helpline and see what they suggest. Christine 
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Whilst participants reported offering SS to victims, participants felt they could not help 
victims who experienced severe CH. In an attempt to qualify the severity of CH, 
Christine‟s transcript demonstrated that CH is severe if it incorporates „proper‟ bullying, 
which she defined as offline bullying.  
 
I guess the harassment would have to be serious...um like proper bullying, 
or well anything that‟s not just „stalking‟ on the internet alone. Christine 
 
Assuming the severity of CH is measurable by the impact it has on victims, participants 
discussed being unable to help victims if they felt seriously impacted by their experiences. 
Seamus considered the help he could provide if a cyber-harassed friend was afraid to leave 
his/her home following their experience. Seamus is clear that helping such a friend would 
be beyond the help he could provide. 
 
Interviewer: What would you think if a friend told you they were afraid to 
leave their home because they had been cyber-harassed? 
Seamus: They will need professional and more qualified help, perhaps the 
police, a psychologist. 
 
6.3.3 Theme 3: Victim Blame 
 
Despite awareness of the impact of CH on victims, and indications that participants would 
provide some degree of SS to victims, participants displayed tendencies to attribute blame 
to victims for their experiences. Victim-blaming tendencies included perceiving the 
victim‟s online behaviour as an invitation to perpetrators of CH, and attributing the degree 
to which CH impacts on victims to their personality. In contrast, perpetrators were 
perceived more sympathetically compared to victims. Finally, all participants believed that 
victims should be responsible for preventing CH, and stopping it when it occurs. However, 
these views were held towards adult victims and not teenagers or children. 
 
Victims were perceived to invite CH because of their online behaviour. In this respect, 
participants believed that it is the individual‟s „fault‟ for placing personal information 
online, especially on social networking sites. Participants noted there is awareness of how 
to be safe online, and cyber-harassed victims were perceived to have ignored such 
warnings. 
184 
 
 
At the end of the day it‟s all on a computer, you can change the person you 
are through the internet, it‟s all on screen none of it really matters and the 
people that actually matter are face to face with you...annnnddd you‟ve 
heard to be so careful when you‟re online... Mainly the individual person 
[is responsible] for knowing who they are adding in the first place. Janet 
 
It‟s your choice to put all your personal information on the internet in the 
first place...in a way it‟s your fault. Christine 
 
Edith noted that „a lot of blame is put on these people‟ but distances her from victim-
blaming tendencies by suggesting victims are blamed by others, and she is merely 
observing this tendency. This is in contrast to Christine‟s comments, as she explicitly 
stated „in a way it‟s your fault‟, confirming this is her own view. 
 
I think it can be a real problem but I think that a lot of blame is put on 
these people [victims] when sometimes they [perpetrators] may see you 
putting your personal information on a page as an invite into your life. 
Edith 
 
Edith also noted that females may be more vulnerable to CH because of differences in how 
females communicate online compared to males. Edith perceived females to place more 
personal information on the Internet compared to men. Additionally, she argued that males 
would not communicate with strangers on the Internet, and would find it easier to ignore 
CH compared with females. 
 
I‟m not saying it doesn‟t happen to guys as well but I think that more often 
its females who are prone to it. Especially those who are more open about 
their details on [social networking sites]...I think girls put down a lot more 
information about themselves than guys do...i think that guys wouldn‟t 
accept someone they don‟t know in the first place but if they did I think 
they would find it easier to ignore. Edith 
 
Some participants discussed the receipt of malicious software that could be used to access 
information held on one‟s computer, or to damage one‟s software or hardware. When 
malicious software was discussed in relation to CH, the majority of participants blamed the 
recipient for opening programmes or attachments which malicious software would be 
embedded in. In particular, Emma made a distinction between the maliciousness of sending 
such software but did not perceive malicious software as a behaviour associated with 
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harassment. It is noteworthy that participants did not perceive malicious software as 
particularly threatening. 
 
Probably they [victim] opened a wrong attachment and they are sensible 
but I would worry about them as there is little anyone can do to stop it. 
Patricia 
 
But you could just block them if that [receiving malicious software] 
happens so then they can‟t access information on your computer. Megan 
 
If it was a virus I wouldn‟t think much of it I‟d probably think it was my 
own fault for opening it...I would view it as malicious because it‟s a way 
to hurt others by getting what you want but I don‟t think I‟d view that as 
harassment. Emma 
 
In conjunction with blaming victims for „inviting‟ CH, participants blamed the impact of 
CH on victims‟ personality characteristics. For example, Richard suggested victims are 
„sensitive‟ if they are upset following a cyber-harassing experience. By describing the 
perpetrator as a „14 year old brain box‟ he trivialised the impact CH can have. However, he 
equated CH as occurring between strangers. 
 
I think you have to be rather sensitive in the first place to take cyber-
bullying seriously as options have been provided to block contact with the 
culprit...if you are that sensitive to get depressed cuz [because] a 14 year 
old brain box found out your city and said he is going to wipe your nose 
with a used nappy you should not participate in online communication 
with strangers. Richard 
 
In another example, Ann tried to understand the impact of CH by imagining how she might 
respond.  By stating that she would not get „that upset‟ over CH she implied that victims‟ 
personality characteristics play a role in how CH impacts on them. 
 
I don‟t think I‟d personally ever get that upset over it...if someone bothers 
me I tend to just ignore them. I don‟t try and let other people upset me that 
much offline or online. Ann 
 
Similarly, Ava suggested that shyness, lack of confidence, social anxiety, and prior 
experiences of harassment may confound the impact of CH on victims. However, she 
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noted that victims cannot change their personality and, in this respect, she was not blaming 
victims for the impact CH has on them. 
 
I think it can deeply affect people especially those that are less confident in 
dealing with those kinds of things and people that have had a difficult 
time, like, for example, people that were bullied at school, they are going 
to have a harder time dealing with it and it can affect their confidence in 
themselves as well as in other people...you get people that are confident in 
themselves generally and then there are those that are less confident and 
possibly less sociable and more shy just because that‟s how they are as a 
person, nothing made them that way but they may feel like they can‟t tell 
someone or no-one will take them seriously. Ava 
 
In general, victims were perceived to be at fault for their experiences of CH. However, 
perpetrators were perceived to engage in cyber-harassing behaviours because of their 
personality, and in some cases, CH was equated to illness or addiction. Edith, Ann and 
Emma suggested perpetrators are „sad‟ and lonely‟, implying they are simply seeking 
companionship. In addition, Edith believed the majority of perpetrators do not intend to 
cause harm to victims. This implies the impact of CH is accidental as it is unintended.   
 
I believe that in most cases they aren‟t meaning to cause harm... I think 
some people are just lonely and want the company of particularly females.  
Edith 
 
I think people who harass people on the internet are very sad people with 
no life at all...Alcoholics have to go to meetings so maybe online harassers 
should be “retrained” into online decency.  Emma 
 
Although bullying causes a lot of psychological damage to some people, I 
think that normal bullies don‟t really have much connection to other 
people. Ann 
 
Victims were perceived as responsible for preventing CH and trying all methods available 
to them for solving problems of CH before they should report their experience to the 
police, or other authorities (such as ISPs). Methods of preventing and stopping CH should 
it occur included making use of „blocking‟ features available on websites, keeping social 
networking profiles private, by not accepting friends‟ requests if the person is unknown, 
not opening email attachments from unknown senders, and changing their online contact 
187 
 
details should they experience CH. Adults were considered responsible for ensuring that 
children and teenagers are protected and safe whilst using the Internet. 
 
If it‟s older [than school aged individuals] I think the person should just 
delete the person, yeah why don‟t they just delete the fuckers? Janet  
 
Honestly, I think that the responsibility should kind of be with the victims, 
sites like Facebook have ways to keep your profiles private and don‟t 
accept anyone you don‟t know and with regards to viruses you should 
never click on links sent by someone you don‟t know. I think there are 
some nasty people out there and some lonely people too but that‟s 
unavoidable so you have to look after yourself. Edith 
 
On most things you can block the person who is harassing you so its easier 
to sort of „get rid‟ of the problem...i think the person needs to have done all 
they can to stop it, like blocking the person, changing details etc but if the 
person harassing them finds a way around that or persists for a long time 
then I think the police need to know. Hazel 
 
People who are harassed are unfortunate, but capable dependent on the 
harassment situation to prevent/stop it from happening... For 
children/teenagers parents can put restrictions on internet usage/pc usage 
for adults they should use their common sense and not open themselves up 
to anything which could cause them problems. Emma 
 
They can be careful about who they give information and contact details 
to, also they have to be careful about who they add on to their chat rooms, 
and always inform someone if they‟re being harassed and also change their 
email accounts or stop using the chat room/website. Megan 
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6.4 Discussion 
 
6.4.1 Anonymity 
 
Participants perceived the Internet as a barrier that protects the perpetrator from the 
victim‟s emotional reaction, and potential physical retaliation to CH. This barrier allows 
the perpetrator to dehumanise the victim, and protects the perpetrator by allowing them to 
believe they are not doing anything wrong to another individual (Kowalski & Limber, 
2007).  Participants explained the lack of social presence of the perpetrator and victim 
reduced the social cues available to perpetrators. This was important because participants 
believed if the perpetrators were able to see the victim‟s reaction, they would stop cyber-
harassing them. This explanation closely resembles Sproull and Kiesler‟s (1986) social 
context cues theory (SCCT) (see Chapter 2: „Anonymity as an Incentive to Engage in 
Cyberstalking‟ for a full discussion of the theory). In brief, SCCT postulates that 
individuals use static and dynamic social cues to regulate a person‟s own behaviour. An 
absence of social cues results in feelings of anonymity, which leads to self-focused and 
unregulated behaviour.  
 
Whilst some participants thought that victims of CH are likely to have a prior relationship 
with the perpetrator, the majority of participants believed the victim and perpetrator are 
likely to be strangers. Research indicates strangers are the largest single category of the 
prior perpetrator-victim relationship in instances of CH (e.g., Bocij, 2003; Finn, 2004; Li, 
2007) compared to other categories (such as ex-intimates, and acquaintances) indicating 
the victim and perpetrator knew each other prior to the onset of CH. Such findings have led 
Bocij (2003) to conclude that stranger-stalking is common. However, if divisions created 
for the known categories were collapsed, research indicates victims are more likely to 
know the perpetrator prior to CH. Recently, Sheridan and Grant (2007) found the prior 
victim-perpetrator relationship mirrors the findings of offline harassment, indicating that 
the majority of victims know their harasser prior to the onset of CH. Thus, participants‟ 
perceptions of strangers engaging in CH are distorted representations of what actually 
occurs, and may reflect stereotypical views of CH. 
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Participants‟ associations between CH and online sexual solicitation may have influenced 
their perceptions that stranger-stalking is more likely. Sexual predators that use the internet 
to locate and groom children are unlikely to know the victim prior to the onset of abuse 
(Dombrowski, Le Masney, Ahia & Dickson, 2004; Feather, 1999; Quayle & Taylor, 2001). 
Participants did not specifically discuss paedophilia in relation to stranger-stalking. 
However, their associations of CH with online paedophilia were discussed early on during 
the interviews, and perceptions of strangers engaging in CH may reflect priming effects. 
 
Participants believed that CH victims cannot be physically harmed by the perpetrator 
because they made a distinct separation between offline and online harassment. However, 
participants suggested victims may use the Internet less, and may experience psychological 
harm including stress, anxiety, fear, rumination, and paranoia. As participants generally 
held a stereotype that strangers engage in CH and want to maintain their anonymity, 
participants perceived the impact of CH to be heightened by the degree to which the victim 
uses the Internet and the perpetrator‟s anonymity.  
 
6.4.2 Social Support 
 
The findings of this study indicate the SS offered to victims of CH would depend on the 
victim‟s characteristics, and proof of CH occurring. If victims are perceived as attention-
seeking, the quality of SS may be reduced. Additionally, the requirement of proof may be 
problematic for victims seeking SS. Victims may not record every instance of CH 
perpetrated, and as harassment is often an accumulation of events (Meloy, 1998), victims 
may not be able to prove the extent of harassment they suffer. Also, as individuals differ in 
their perceptions of CH (see Alexy, Burgess, Baker & Smoyak, 2005), those who victims 
approach for help in dealing with CH may not perceive the perpetrator‟s behaviour in the 
same manner as victims.  
 
Despite factors influencing the offer of SS, participants discussed methods of helping CH 
victims. Methods included offering practical support to ensure the victim could use the 
Internet in safer ways by ensuring their own online anonymity. However, this method 
would only protect individuals from strangers cyber-harassing them, and would not protect 
them from CH perpetrated by an acquaintance or friend who already had access to their 
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online contact details. Additionally, participants who said they would explain to the victim 
that CH was „not real‟, may be trivalising the impact of CH on victims. 
 
One of the most concerning findings of this study was that participants reported they would 
not be able to help a victim of CH if CH was considered to be severe. Arguably, it is those 
victims who suffer severe harassment who are most in need of SS to help reduce the 
impact of CH. Participants indicated they would seek information and further help for such 
individuals. However, there is a wealth of psychological literature examining bystander 
intervention that indicates individuals are likely to assume that others will assume 
responsibility for helping victims (Latane & Darley, 1969). Indeed, in relation to 
cyberbullying, Agatson, Kowalski, and Limber (2007) conducted focus groups with 150 
adolescents, and reported they would be unlikely to report cyberbullying to others, and did 
not think adults could help victims. Arguably, whilst participants reported seeking help for 
victims of CH, research suggests this form of action may be unlikely. 
 
Issues relating to SS may have serious repercussions on victims. The quality of SS victims 
receive may not adequately equip them to deal with their experiences and may prevent 
them from seeking SS. As SS has a buffering effect on stress (Yap & Devilly, 2004), if SS 
is lacking, CH may impact on victims to a greater extent. 
 
6.4.3 Victim Blame 
 
This study illustrated that participants blamed victims‟ online behaviour for their 
experiences of CH. Victims were perceived to ignore warnings and advice relating to 
online safety, and were perceived to invite CH because of their online behaviour. One 
participant suggested that females may be more vulnerable to CH because they place more 
information on the Internet than males. Participants‟ language served to distance them 
from experiencing CH as they would not engage in behaviours (such as posting substantial 
amounts of personal information on the Internet) participants believed victims engage in. 
 
Receiving malicious software that can be used to access information held on one‟s 
computer, or to damage one‟s hardware or software is one example of a behaviour 
associated with CH and online paedophilia (Bocij, 2003; Dombrowski, LeMasney, Ahia & 
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Dickson, 2004). Whilst participants perceived malicious intent behind sending such 
software, participants did not believe sending malicious software constituted CH. 
However, participants believed that recipients of malicious software were responsible for 
receiving it as they opened a link which embedded the software or downloading the 
software. 
 
Contrasting perceptions of CH victims, perpetrators were perceived as sad, lonely 
individuals who were unable to control their behaviour, and were often perceived as not 
intending to cause harm to the victim. Spitzberg and Cadaz (2002) considered similar 
language used in the media to portray perpetrators of crime, and suggests that perceiving 
the perpetrator as lacking control over their behaviour reduces the perpetrator‟s 
responsibility for their behaviour. 
 
The findings of this study lend support to the just world hypothesis in relation to 
perceptions of CH victims and perpetrators. However, participants‟ perceptions that the 
CH victim is not likely to have a prior relationship with the perpetrator (i.e., they are 
strangers) may have complicated the findings. The findings of Sheridan et al. (2003) 
suggested participants are more likely to attribute blame to the victim when they have had 
a previous relationship (i.e., ex-intimates or acquaintances). The authors explained 
attribution of blame may be due to a presumed misdeed against the harasser, accounting 
for the onset of stalking. In contrast, participants in this study suggested CH was likely to 
occur between strangers. Thus, Sheridan et al.‟s explanation does not account for the 
attribution of blame to victims by participants in this study.  
 
However, Spitzberg and Cadaz (2002) suggest the media portray offline stalkers as 
strangers who premeditate stalking and are uncontrollable. This portrayal may be more 
pronounced in cases of CH, especially considering the anonymity afforded to Internet 
users. Perceptions that perpetrators of CH are strangers, protected by anonymity, may have 
heightened the threat that participants could be vulnerable to CH, and increased 
participants‟ need to make sense of such a situation. Consequently, presented with the 
potential threat, participants blamed victims‟ behaviour for their experiences of CH. By 
distancing their own behaviour from the perceived behaviour of victims, participants 
reassured themselves that they would not experience CH.  
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Lerner and Miller (1978) stipulate that individuals will not be concerned with injustices 
that relate to events that occur in environments that do not relate to their own life. 
However, participants in this study attributed responsibility to CH victims, rather than 
perpetrators, because of their online behaviour. Therefore, it is hypothesised that 
individuals who use the Internet to a high degree may be more likely to attribute 
responsibility to victims for their experiences of CH. 
 
6.4.4 Implications 
 
There are some implications arising from the findings of this study. In relation to victims 
of CH, the tendency to blame victims for their experiences of online harassment may have 
serious implications when prosecuting perpetrators. When defending perpetrators of CH in 
court, barristers and solicitors may emphasise victim responsibility for their experiences, 
whilst simultaneously portraying perpetrators as lonely, or mentally ill. Such defence 
tactics may encourage jurors to sympathise with perpetrators, and potentially render „not 
guilty‟ verdicts. 
 
The association of CH with cyberbullying and online sexual harassment may also prove 
problematic for victims. Both are specific forms of CH and may not equate to the majority 
of CH experiences. However, individuals may not recognise other forms of CH and as 
such, other forms of CH may be trivialised. As CH was perceived to be perpetrated by 
strangers, those who are harassed by someone they know may be especially vulnerable to 
trivialisation. Should trivialisation occur, victims of CH who do not fall under the umbrella 
of cyberbullying or online sexual harassment may not receive adequate support in dealing 
with their experiences. Trivialisation may also confound the distress experienced by 
victims.  
 
The findings of this study reinforce the need to better educate people about CH. 
Specifically, campaigns to raise awareness should focus on the diversity of forms of CH, 
methods used by perpetrators in their campaign of CH, and the potential consequences of 
cyberstalking-by-proxy. Such campaigns should also address issues relating to intent 
requirements in the law, and the credibility of threats made in online communications. 
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6.4.5 Limitations 
 
One of the strengths of this research was in gaining insights to undergraduate students‟ 
understanding and knowledge of CH without knowledge of anti-harassment legislation 
within the UK. However, this strength also contributes to a major limitation of this study as 
participants formed their own opinions about what CH is. As such, participants associated 
CH with cyberbullying, online sexual solicitation, and the use of the Internet by 
paedophiles. These early formed associations may have overshadowed subsequent 
questions about their perceptions of CH. As such, the themes generated in this study may 
relate specifically to these forms of CH. 
 
When asked to think about victims of CH, participants were not provided with any 
information about victims. Consequently, the characteristics of the victim reported by 
participants is unclear. Victim characteristics (such as age, gender, prior relationship with 
the perpetrator and behaviours experienced) play an important role in shaping perceptions 
of victims. As evidenced in this study, the victim‟s age was perceived to be important, as 
participants perceived victim‟s less than 18 years to be more vulnerable to CH than older 
participants. Also, if strangers targeting victims is perceived as the norm for CH, victims 
who share a relationship with the perpetrator prior to the onset of CH may be perceived 
differently. Whilst this study failed to address such issues in more depth, it provides an 
important platform from which these issues can be fully explored. 
 
6.4.6 Future Research 
 
As cyber-harassed victims choose to use the Internet, they are vulnerable to being blamed 
for their experiences of CH. However, further exploration is needed to identify the 
variables associated with CH. One possible investigation could focus on the role of gender 
in victim-blaming tendencies. Just world research suggests males may be blamed more for 
their experiences because they are perceived as less likely to become victims. In addition, 
future research may benefit from manipulating the gender of the victim and perpetrator to 
examine interactions with victim blame. Similarly, individuals who use the Internet to a 
great extent may be held more responsible for cyber-harassing experiences than those who 
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use the Internet less. Future research would benefit from exploring the relationship 
between these two variables. 
 
Furthermore, the conditions under which individuals are most likely to empathise with 
perpetrators are unclear. For example, it is logical to presume that ex-intimates who engage 
in CH may be perceived more sympathetically than strangers. However, such perceptions 
may not hold if ex-intimates try to conceal their identity. The interaction between 
anonymity and the prior victim-perpetrator relationship remains unexplored and also 
warrants further investigation. Such variables may be further confounded by the methods 
of CH used by perpetrators. 
 
Finally, this study highlighted participants‟ concerns about the ability of police officers to 
adequately investigate cases involving CH, and the subsequent prosecution of perpetrators. 
The paucity of research available relating to these issues limited the discussion of these 
issues in this study. The majority of research in this field has concentrated on victims‟ 
accounts of their experiences of CH. Future research would benefit by obtaining data from 
police officers about their perceptions and experiences of dealing with cases involving CH. 
By doing so, researchers can provide a more holistic view of the phenomenon. 
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Chapter 7: Police Officers’ perceptions and role in combating cyber-harassment 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Police officers‟ investigations of crimes are crucial in determining whether crime proceeds 
to the criminal prosecution of perpetrators. Despite anecdotal evidence from victims‟ 
accounts of police intervention in offline and online harassment, there has been little 
research exploring police officers‟ perceptions about cyber-harassment (CH). This study 
makes some attempt at addressing this gap by conducting semi-structured interviews with 
police officers to further understand their perceptions of CH, and their role in dealing with 
cases involving CH. 
 
Wall (1998) advocates the „transformation test‟ to establish whether cybercrimes are 
„fake‟, „hybrids‟, or „true‟. The „transformation test‟ involves assessing the degree to which 
cybercrime translates to offline crime. According to Wall, „fake‟ cybercrimes are offline 
crimes that masquerade as cybercrime; „hybrid‟ cybercrimes are offline crimes that evolve 
and incorporate online methods that cannot be translated to offline behaviours; and „true‟ 
cybercrimes that exist solely because of the Internet. CH is an example of Wall‟s „hybrid‟ 
crime and can be prosecuted in the UK using the Protection from Harassment Act (1997). 
However, Basu and Jones (2007) criticise Wall‟s „transformation test‟ on the basis that it 
has a „diluting effect‟ on perceived severity and impact of cybercrime. Furthermore, they 
note that the Act predates common usage of the Internet in today‟s society, and argue that 
it is unlikely to adequately reduce instances of CH. 
 
Whilst the Act is broad enough to allow for the prosecution of perpetrators of CH, it has 
been criticised because it does not define harassment, which can lead to ambiguity (Bocij, 
Griffiths & McFarlane, 2002). Furthermore, Salter and Bryden (2009) criticise the Act as a 
“blunt instrument, unwieldy and unsuited for a fast moving world” (p. 100). They argue 
that the Act does not provide protection against unidentifiable perpetrators, or perpetrators 
who live outside the jurisdiction of UK legislation. However, if CH is reported to the 
police, they investigate any allegations made against the perpetrator and forward their 
findings to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), who ultimately decide whether the case 
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should proceed to court. Whilst the Act does not define harassment (and, therefore, cyber-
harassment), the CPS has defined cyberstalking as follows: 
 
Cyberstalking generally takes the form of threatening behaviour or 
unwanted advances directed at another using the Internet and other forms 
of online communication. Cyberstalkers can target their victims through 
chat rooms, message boards, discussion forums and email. Cyberstalking 
can be carried out in a variety of ways such as: threatening or obscene e-
mail; spamming (in which a stalker sends a victim a multitude of junk e-
mail); live chat harassment or flaming (online verbal abuse); leaving 
improper messages on message boards or in guest books; sending 
electronic viruses; sending unsolicited e-mail; and electronic identity theft 
amongst others (O‟Connell, Price & Barrow, 2004, p. 3). 
 
At present, there appears to be no empirical research examining police officers‟ 
perceptions of cyber-harassment. However, Kamphius, Emmelkamp and deVries (2004) 
compared the views held by police officers and general practitioners from the Netherlands, 
Italy, Belgium, and the UK about stalking. They presented participants with 12 stalking 
vignettes that varied in severity, the prior victim-perpetrator relationship, intrusiveness, 
and frequency. They then asked participants to complete a 34-item attitudinal 
questionnaire. In relation to police officers‟ perceptions, they found that all the police 
officers normalised stalking behaviours and they suggested this was due to their exposure 
of criminal activity. Additionally, Dutch and English police officers were least likely to 
attribute blame to the victims of stalking, and English police officers were most likely to 
believe that dealing with stalking was part of their job. Whilst some vignettes depicted 
cyber-harassing behaviours, the authors did not distinguish officers‟ perceptions of offline 
harassment compared to online harassment. However, the results indicated that UK police 
officers may be sympathetic towards victims of CH, and may be likely to take reports of 
CH seriously. 
 
Evidence suggests that few victims of offline harassment report their experiences to the 
police (e.g., Budd & Mattinson, 2000; Fremouw, Westrup & Pennypacker, 1997; Tjaden & 
Thoennes, 1998) and that similar patterns are emerging among victims of CH (e.g. Finn, 
2004). Fremouw et al. (1997) reported that undergraduate students who experienced offline 
stalking were most likely to ignore or confront the stalker, with males more likely to 
confront the stalker than females. In another study using the vignette method, Hills and 
Taplin (1998) found that females were more likely to report offline harassment to the 
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police than males, and this effect was greater if threatening behaviours were depicted in the 
vignettes. In relation to CH, Alexy, Burgess, Baker and Smoyak (2005) found that just 
under a third of undergraduate students in their study (31.5%) reported their experiences to 
the police or Internet Service Providers (ISPs). These studies highlight more needs to be 
done to encourage victims to report harassment to the police. 
 
Many victims of offline harassment who do report their experiences to the police report 
dissatisfaction with the action taken by police officers (Pathé & Mullen, 1997; Sheridan, 
Davies & Boon, 2001a). Reasons for dissatisfaction include dismissal because the situation 
is perceived as a „domestic‟, police officers‟ refusal to help, disbelief and/or powerlessness 
of police officers, ineffectiveness of warnings, arrests, and restraining orders, and 
perceived inaction on police officers behalf (Blaauw, Winkel, Arensman, Sheridan & 
Freeve, 2002; Draucker, 1999; Morris, Anderson & Murray, 2002; Roberts & 
Dziegielewski, 1996; Tjaden & Thoenes, 1998). Similar reports have been given by 
victims of cyber-harassment, with reports that police officers have told victims to turn off 
their computer, or there is insufficient evidence to proceed with criminal proceedings 
(Burgess & Baker, 2002; Finn, 2004; Griffiths, 1999). Such reports indicate an 
ineffectiveness of police officers in dealing with offline and online harassment. However, 
the research that indicated police officers tell cyber-harassed victims to turn off their 
computer dates back to the early 2000s. The rapid evolution of the Internet and the 
corresponding evolution of attitudes and understanding of online behaviour may render 
such research outdated. Such findings highlight the need to further understand police 
officers‟ perceptions of CH, and explore problems they may encounter when dealing with 
such cases.  
 
Reports that cases involving CH have been dismissed on the grounds of insufficient 
evidence are of concern because it reinforces the invulnerability of perpetrators. One 
potential problem is the apprehension of perpetrators using evidence gathered via the 
Internet. Although the police can trace the perpetrator‟s IP address, evidence gathered 
leads to a computer, and it may not be possible to connect a specific person to the 
computer used to harass another individual (Bocij, 2004; Griffiths, Rogers & Sparrow, 
1998). In contrast, evidence-gathering may be easier if the perpetrator uses the Internet as 
Wall (1998) explains “the collection (and retention) of Internet traffic data is particularly 
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significant because records of every Internet transaction that takes place can now exist” (p. 
91). Furthermore, Salter and Bryden (2009) noted Internet Service Providers (ISPs), instant 
messaging (IM), and email providers are able to trace the physical addresses relating to the 
computer used to send cyber-harassing messages. They also provided an example that 
illustrates the possibility of tracing individuals who use anonymous email addresses and 
public computers. A barrister, Bruce Hyman, sent false legal documents to an individual 
his client had initiated legal proceedings against regarding visitation rights and residential 
matters of a child born to his client and the individual. When the father produced the false 
documents in court, Mr Hyman alleged the father was trying to mislead the court. The 
father discovered the emails were sent from a cyber-cafe and police officers identified 
Hyman using CCTV footage. Thus, the burden of proof may be easier to establish in cases 
involving cyber-harassment compared to offline harassment. However, tracing the 
perpetrator of CH may prove expensive, and as Basu and Jones (2007) warn, the police 
may not have the resources or technology to do so. 
 
Internet users may be required to utilise self-protective strategies when online to minimise 
vulnerability to CH. Cyber-harassed victims may be warned to avoid online spaces in order 
to avoid the perpetrator, or may be advised to „block‟ the perpetrator (O‟Connell, Price & 
Barrow, 2004). Whilst avoiding online spaces might infringe on the victim‟s right to use 
the Internet and online spaces (Bocij, 2004), individuals protect themselves on a regular 
basis in the offline world (Basu & Jones, 2007).  
 
Blocking the cyber-harassing perpetrator is a form of cyber-ostracism that Wall and 
Williams (2007) suggest may be effective in regulating Internet users‟ behaviour. They 
equate cyber-ostracism to shaming punishments recorded in the Middle Ages (such as 
putting a person in the stocks). They suggest that cyber-ostracism may invoke shame in 
perpetrators whereby they “are made to feel discomfort as a result of internal guilt 
triggered by classical conditioning” (p. 405). Wall and Williams were describing the 
process of shaming when perpetrators are involved in an online community. In a 
community setting, perpetrators may have a desire to remain involved in the community 
and cyber-ostracism may be more effective in such online spaces. A further caveat may 
apply to cyber-harassers who are infatuated with their target, whereby blocking 
perpetrators may encourage such perpetrators to find other means to communicate with the 
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target. Indeed, Salter and Bryden (2009) highlight the determined perpetrator is likely to 
find alternative methods to pursue the victim. Thus, cyber-harassment that has remained 
online may be forced offline in order to satisfy the perpetrator‟s obsession. 
 
7.1.1 Rationale 
 
The preceding overview highlights that empirical research is needed to ascertain police 
officers‟ perceptions of CH, and of its victims. Victims‟ accounts paint a bleak picture of 
the inability of police officers to tackle CH. However, some victims‟ reports may be due to 
frustration and lack of knowledge about police procedures. Few studies have investigated 
police officers‟ perceptions about this crime, their role in dealing with CH, and their 
perceptions of victims. By addressing this gap in knowledge, researchers will be in a better 
position to inform victims of police procedures, and victims can be made more 
knowledgeable about what they can expect if they report CH. Such knowledge may 
empower victims and may contribute to the crime being reported more. Furthermore, if 
police procedures are inadequate in dealing with the problem, researchers will be in a 
better position to inform the authorities about measures that can be taken to address any 
issues. 
 
7.1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
 
The key objectives of this study were to: 1) explore police officers‟ perceptions of cyber-
harassment, and in particular, their perceptions of victims; 2) explore how participants 
perceive their role in supporting and protecting individuals from cyber-harassment; and 3) 
evaluate the support given to victims of CH by police officers. 
 
7.2 Method 
 
7.2.1 Participants 
 
Eight police officers from the Nottinghamshire Police Force participated in this study, 
comprising of one female and seven males aged between 26 and 55 years (M = 38 years; 
SD = 10 years). Participants had an average of 14.1 (SD = 9.6) years of service within the 
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police force. All participants were self-selected volunteers, and were not intended to form a 
representative sample of police officers. Snowball sampling was used to recruit 
participants, and although this sampling method compromises the validity of research by 
introducing sampling bias, it proved a convenient way to recruit police officers who can be 
difficult to recruit. This was particularly relevant in this study as the research utilised semi-
structured interviews that can be lengthy. As letters and e-mails were sent to various police 
departments, it was impossible to provide response rates as there is no way to know who 
received the recruitment letters and emails. 
 
Table 25: Participants' Demographic Information for Study 4 
Participant’s pseudonyms Age Years of Service 
Adam 38 10 
Amanda 41 8 
Brendan 26 2 
David 26 6 
Declan 37 15 
Jake 55 29 
Joseph 36 17 
Thomas 47 26 
 
7.2.2 Measures 
 
Semi-structured interviews were used to explore participants‟ perceptions of CH. In a 
deviation from other studies in this thesis, interviews were conducted face-to-face or via 
the telephone. Considering the interview topic and participants‟ profession, it was felt that 
online interviews may not have adequately established and reassured participants of the 
researcher‟s identity. Police officers, because of their profession and experiences in dealing 
with CH, may be more cautious of discussing police procedures in an online space; such 
data may be recorded by other Internet bodies (such as ISPs) and may not meet the levels 
of confidentiality participants require. Furthermore, building rapport with participants prior 
to an online interview can be a lengthy process for which police officers may not have the 
time. The interview schedule consisted of five questions addressing their perceptions of 
CH, their role in dealing with cases involving CH, and how individuals can be protected 
from CH. Although there was an interview schedule, the interviews were semi-structured, 
giving participants the freedom to discuss issues they perceived relevant to the topic. 
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7.2.3 Procedure 
 
Various recruitment strategies were utilised for this study. First, police officers known to 
friends and associates of the researcher were approached to participate in the study. 
Second, the researcher visited branches of the Nottinghamshire Police Force to explain the 
study. Information about the study and the researcher‟s contact details were left with the 
branches but this strategy proved fruitless. Third, letters were sent to specific departments 
and officers within the Nottinghamshire Police Force that briefly explained the study and 
provided the researcher‟s contact details. All police officers who participated confirmed 
their interest by contacting the researcher to request more information about the study. 
When police officers agreed to participate, they were asked whether they would prefer to 
conduct the interview face-to-face or via the telephone, and a time, date, and place (where 
relevant) was arranged. Six participants chose to conduct the interview face-to-face and 
two participants chose to participate via the telephone. 
 
Recruitment and data collection took place over a 12-week period. For the face-to-face 
interviews, participants were provided with background and information about the study, 
and given the opportunity to ask the researcher any questions before providing their 
informed consent. Following consent, the interview began and following the interview 
participants were thanked and debriefed. 
 
For the telephone interviews, background and information about the study was sent to 
participants via email, along with a consent form. Participants read the information prior to 
the telephone interview, asked any questions they had about the study and provided their 
consent. When the researcher telephoned them, they were asked if they had any further 
questions, and consent was requested again. The interview then commenced and debriefing 
was given at the end of the interview. Contact was maintained with all participants via 
email throughout the data analysis period. 
 
7.2.4 Analysis 
 
Following data collection, the data was transcribed from the recorded audio to Microsoft 
Word. The font for all transcripts was maintained using Times New Roman font, size 12 
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with 1.5 line spacing, and the transcripts were fully anonymised. The transcripts ranged 
from 5-30 pages (M = 12; SD = 7.9). 
 
The data were analysed using thematic analysis as described in the previous chapter (see 
Table 24 for a description of the analytical process). Thematic analysis was deemed most 
appropriate as there is little known about police officers perceptions of cyber-harassment, 
and thematic analysis is appropriate for exploring novel topics. As police officers were not 
discussing their personal lived experiences of cyber-harassment, interpretative 
phenomenological analysis was not an appropriate analytical method for this study. 
 
7.3 Results 
 
Three themes were identified during data analysis: „accessibility, „threat‟, and „the 
unhelpful victim‟. Each of the themes will be considered, and excerpts from the transcripts 
are provided to allow for the assessment of interpretations. 
 
7.3.1 Theme 1: Accessibility 
 
„Accessibility‟ was the first theme identified in this study. Participants discussed the 
accessibility of the Internet which participants believed encouraged individuals to engage 
in CH, the accessibility of the Internet provided perpetrators with the means and 
opportunity to locate victims, victims‟ information, and their friends and/or family. 
Participants also discussed the accessibility to information and advice, should individuals 
be faced with cyber-harassment. Finally, participants discussed the accessibility of 
evidence which police officers could access to build up a case against perpetrators. 
 
There was consensus among participants that the Internet is becoming more accessible for 
people, and emphasised the rapid evolution of technology to assist individuals to be 
connected to the Internet regardless of where they are. David‟s transcript emphasises 
individuals‟ access to social networking sites, which participants believed were the main 
tools used by perpetrators in their campaign of CH against a victim. David also emphasised 
a digital divide between younger and older individuals. When David suggested older 
individuals „let things lie‟ and younger people „don‟t realise the consequences about doing 
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something‟, he implied CH is a consequence of offline confrontation that is continued in 
cyberspace. By assuming this position, David suggested younger individuals are less 
knowledgeable about the consequences their actions have. It was not clear whether David 
was alluding to consequences CH has for the victim, or the perpetrator. 
 
“I think, you know with the way mobile phone technology is going now, 
people have got these networking sites on the go, they‟re there at the touch 
of a button...older people tend to let things lie where young people they 
don‟t realise the consequences about doing something.” David 
 
Whilst discussing a specific case involving cyberstalking, Thomas described a perpetrator 
who accessed the Internet consistently, to the point it became all-consuming. The 
perpetrator‟s life consisted of working and using the Internet. Thomas‟ description began 
and ended with emphasis on the perpetrator‟s usage of the Internet, which may indicate 
some form of addiction. 
  
“He would literally go to work, come home switch the computer on, and 
stay on it all night and into the early hours of the morning, switch it off, 
get on the computer again, go out, because he works shifts, go on it till he 
goes to work. And that‟s all he ever did.” Thomas 
 
Accessibility to the Internet was associated with increased access to victims. Participants 
believed high levels of online disclosure of personal information leaves individuals 
vulnerable to abuse, including CH.  Joseph‟s excerpt illustrated that perpetrators can easily 
access information about the victim, and the victim‟s friends. Thus, cyberstalking-by-
proxy is made easier; particularly as social networking sites provide a central location from 
which perpetrators can get information. Importantly, Joseph noted individuals would not 
have been able to access personal information about another person if access to the Internet 
and in particular, social networking sites was not available. For Joseph, the amount of 
information individuals place on social networking sites increases vulnerability to being 
harassed offline, especially if victims are well-known in the area they live in.  
 
“As long as everyone can get access to it [Facebook], you know, looking 
at friends‟ profiles, seeing their friends with someone else, they can get too 
much off, on these sites. You wouldn‟t have that information. It‟s the 
friends as well...If it‟s in an area where you are known, if you‟re living in a 
small place or I just think you‟re just too easy to find, you‟re just leaving 
yourself wide open for anything really.” Joseph 
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Thomas also described how a perpetrator gathered information about his victim with 
relative ease. When describing the journal the victim placed on the Internet, Thomas said 
the victim „actually‟ posted the journal, and emphasised it was „really really in-depth‟. This 
use of language indicated Thomas‟ disbelief at the level of detail the victim disclosed 
online. Emphasis on the victim‟s online behaviour is further illustrated when he used the 
word „she‟ six times within one sentence. The perpetrator also engaged in cyberstalking-
by-proxy and Thomas described the perpetrator writing a suicide note for another victim, 
Y, which included a lot of information about Y‟s family. Thomas‟ excerpt concluded with 
questioning how the perpetrator got the information. However, Thomas answered this 
question previously in the excerpt by emphasising the victims‟ level of online self-
disclosure. Thus, Thomas is not pondering the answer to the question but tried to ensure 
the interviewer arrived at the same conclusion. That is, the attribution of blame lies with 
victims because of their online self-disclosure. 
 
“Ms. A. [victim] actually posted a journal which X [perpetrator] looks 
at...And it‟s like really really in-depth... what he [perpetrator] started to 
do...was, he‟d ask one person one thing... And he would get all of that and 
he‟d pull all of that information together and before you knew it, he knew 
everything about them...he knew he would‟ve found them because of 
looking through Google maps and other things and research on the 
Internet...He would have definitely found them. But, erm, he gets her 
mobile number off Facebook and again, she made a mistake, right, she, 
when she posted her things, she said, she tells us this, she says „I put it all 
on Facebook, I put everything on there and then and then he rings and I go 
whoops, hang on, mistake‟...X [perpetrator] writing a suicide note for Y 
[victim]...and the interesting thing about this and some of the scary stuff 
about it was that X knew „tell all my family I love them‟ but knew who all 
his family were „but especially Z‟ and Z is Y‟s brother‟s son. So his 
nephew. And how did he get all that information?” Thomas 
 
Like Joseph, Thomas believed individuals‟ online self-disclosure make it easier for 
perpetrators to locate their victim offline. However, Thomas did not focus on how well-
known the victim is in the area they live. Rather, Thomas described other methods 
perpetrators can use to locate their victim. The victims Thomas described were members of 
an online forum and had been „chatting‟ to other forum users for a period of time, and 
developed relationships with the forum users. The perpetrator was also a member of the 
forum and used the relationships he had developed with other users to collate information 
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about the victims he was pursuing. Thomas emphasised the perpetrator‟s intelligence when 
he explained the perpetrator asked „one person one thing‟. By restricting his questioning, 
the perpetrator ensured other forum users would not recognise that he was gathering 
information on the victims. The perpetrator was given the victims‟ address by another 
forum user but Thomas believed the perpetrator would, eventually, have found their 
address by researching the area in which the victims lived in conjunction with information 
he had obtained, and using Google Maps to find where they lived. This highlighted that 
divulging information to other Internet users and on social networking sites can ultimately 
give perpetrators access to large amounts of information on their victims. 
 
Joseph‟s excerpt (p. 203) included the interesting statement that „it‟s the friends as well‟ 
that can lead to vulnerability of being cyber-harassed. Although he did not elaborate on 
what he meant, David‟s excerpt served to further illustrate this point. 
 
“A lot of people are just getting friends and friends and friends for no 
apparent reason. And allowing every Tom, Dick and Harry to visit their 
site, to be able to leave things and to do this and to do that. It‟s just making 
yourself more of a, more of a target really.” David 
 
David believed that accumulating „friends‟ on social networking sites was associated with 
vulnerability to being cyber-harassed. In the first sentence of his excerpt, the repetitive use 
of the word „friends‟ indicated the large amounts of „friends‟ people gather on their social 
networking sites. By following „friends‟ with „every Tom, Dick or Harry‟, David 
emphasised that the friends gathered on social networking sites are not really friends of the 
individual. „Tom, Dick or Harry‟ is a cultural phrase that, in this context, highlighted the 
uncontrolled, unknown properties of social networking „friends‟ who are invited into 
individuals‟ lives on the basis of the individual trying to appear popular rather than an 
exclusive group of friends. 
 
Finally, participants believed the accessibility to victims via the Internet and mobile phone 
technology provided the opportunity for ex-partners to engage in harassing behaviours. In 
this respect, participants associated some instances of cyber-harassment with domestic 
violence.  
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“The ones that...I‟ve heard about or experienced have been emails 
where...it was an ex partner who was sending these emails through...and 
some of the content was rather unpleasant.” Declan 
 
“Text messages and things as well. Erm, they‟re about mainly when it‟s 
eh, a couple of have split up. They‟ll receive two hundred texts – where 
are you, what are you doing?” Joseph 
 
Declan emphasised the content of emails was upsetting for victims, whereas Joseph 
believed it was the quantity of messages received that upset victims. It may be the form 
(emails vs. text messages) that determines whether the quantity or content of messages is 
disturbing.  Many people have their mobile phone with them at all times, giving 
perpetrators immediate access to their victim. In contrast, individuals can choose to log on 
to their email account as often or as little as they desire. Via email, the perpetrator‟s social 
presence is reduced and they may have to send messages that are more abusive or 
threatening than they would via text message. The social presence of the perpetrator is 
increased in text messages because of the immediacy of access to victims. Thus, large 
quantities of text messages that are less threatening will have a severe impact on the 
victim. 
 
All participants emphasised that evidence can be recovered from the victim‟s computer 
despite the deletion of evidence. Jake began by focusing on his abilities but made it clear 
that his abilities do not cause problems for forensically examining computers. He 
mentioned the victim will have to wait for evidence to be recovered, but focused on the 
positive result of recovering evidence. Despite warnings by researchers the evidence trail 
ends with a computer and not a person, Jake was certain the perpetrator cannot abdicate 
responsibility for messages received by the victim. 
 
“I‟m not that technical with computers but I know we‟ve got technicians 
that can get all, it doesn‟t matter if you press delete, doesn‟t mean it‟s 
gone. So, our technicians can recover that information. If you seize it, 
obviously there‟s a waiting list, so you‟ll have to wait but they can recall 
that information and prove where it‟s come from. So the evidence is 
already there and that person can‟t deny, you know they could say „well I 
didn‟t send it‟ but you‟ve allowed someone to use your computer to send 
it.” Jake 
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David stressed that victims should delete their social networking profile and report abuse 
to the website owners. Like Jake, David emphasised the ease with which police officers 
can gather evidence in cases of CH. However, David explained the evidence would be 
retrieved from the website owners, rather than a computer, as keeping copies of all Internet 
traffic is a legal requirement. David‟s use of language suggested he perceived it possible to 
track anonymous perpetrators with this method of evidence gathering. Like Jake, David 
stressed the lengthy process of obtaining information from website owners, as he explained 
global requests may be received by a website owner which increases the website owners‟ 
workload. He repeated „the information is there‟ which solidified his perception that 
evidence can be sought, is retrievable, and cyber-harassing perpetrators can be brought to 
justice. However, victims must be aware of the lengthy process involved.  
 
“You can take steps yourself in the first instance, you know, completely 
wipe your profile, perhaps bar a particular person from contacting you, 
report the abuse, don‟t feel afraid to report the abuse. The thing is once 
somebody types it in, it‟s there, it‟s logged, Facebook and Bebo, they all 
log it. They have to by law... they‟ll provide us with the information to do 
with IP addresses things like that, or email addresses and we‟re then able 
to request the information to establish who that particular person is. I 
mean, its a long bit of work but it has to be done correctly for us to get that 
information...So it‟s all there, so it‟s not a case of you not being believed, 
it‟s all there... if you imagine it worldwide, all approaching Facebook from 
which ever country they‟re in, then obviously it takes time for that 
information to come through. But the information is there. The information 
is there, it‟s just a case of waiting for it. It‟s not like I can have it, say, 
within 48 hours, that‟s not going to happen.”  David 
 
The case Thomas discussed provided a working example of how police officers obtain 
information from individuals‟ computers. In the first sentence of his excerpt, he stated „we 
do it to death‟. This use of language emphasised the perpetrator‟s computer was 
interrogated „to death‟, meaning there was nothing left to find on the computer. The 
finality of this word is emphasised as he iterated the police knew „everything‟ the 
perpetrator had done using his computer. The use of the word „death‟ is particularly 
poignant in this case as the perpetrator murdered one of his victims (Victim B); suggesting 
the police ended the perpetrator‟s life, as the perpetrator had done to Victim B. 
 
“We know because we‟ve got X‟s [perpetrator] computer and we do it to 
death, and we know exactly everything that he does forensically, 
everything. He begins to look at her on Facebook and starts, and then he 
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starts to talking about her [victim A] journal that she‟s posted as 
well...what we know is he started to get pictures of her and he started 
talking to her about the fact...What we knew at that time, which was 
basically May was that he was in contact with two other women as well. 
One lived in Belgium and one lived in America and he was talking to both 
of them throughout all of this as well...These are like the one sided texts 
that A [Victim A] and C [friend of Victim A] send, and we only got them, 
we didn‟t get them off both phones, so we don‟t know exactly what she 
was saying but these are here... as part of the evidence trail, we researched 
all of the chat room stuff that went on over this period of time. If we had 
printed it off, it was 70,000 pages of stuff. We‟ve got lots of it but there‟s 
70,000 pages of chat room, and I‟ll show some in a bit. Its masses... our 
computer wiz kid found out is that while he‟s doing that [booking flights], 
he‟s also re-reading other letters, like they „Undying Love‟ letter. So, I‟m 
having a chat, I‟m booking the thing, I‟m re-reading stuff, all in there, in 
the middle of a heated debate [with Victim B]. So it‟s some good stuff 
there.”  Thomas 
 
Thomas‟ excerpt illustrated the behaviours used by a cyberstalking perpetrator and the fact 
that officers involved in this case were able to retrieve the perpetrator‟s behavioural 
patterns, and use this evidence to prosecute the perpetrator. Thomas described the early 
formation of the relationship between the perpetrator and Victim A. The officers retrieved 
information that the perpetrator was harassing two other women. By stating where the 
other two women lived, Thomas highlighted that victims do not have to live geographically 
close to the perpetrator to be harassed. Thomas also described obtaining evidence from 
mobile phones but officers could obtain information from one phone. The fact that 
information could not be obtained from both phones suggested police officers may face 
greater difficulties when retrieving evidence from mobile phones than from the Internet.  
 
Thomas continued to describe the retrieval of evidence from chat rooms. This point was 
interesting as the general public may not be aware that logs of „chats‟ are kept.  However, 
Thomas noted the evidence amounted to 70,000 pages if it was printed off, and confirmed 
it was „masses‟ of information. This alluded to the task of police officers faced with 
reading and selecting evidence relevant to a case.   
 
Finally, Thomas finished by describing the perpetrator‟s last computer usage prior to 
murdering Victim B. Police officers were able to ascertain the perpetrator was 
simultaneously organising travel, „chatting‟ to someone online, re-reading letters 
previously drafted, and having a „heated debate‟ with Victim B. There are four interesting 
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points relevant to this section of Thomas‟ transcript. First, Thomas‟ description changed to 
the first person when describing the perpetrator‟s behaviour. This lead to submersion in the 
perpetrator‟s world, and the rapid description of all the behaviours the perpetrator was 
engaging in created a chaotic feel, alluding to Thomas‟ perception of the perpetrator‟s 
mind at that particular point in time. Second, engaging in simultaneous behaviours 
distinguishes cyberstalking from offline stalking. It is unlikely, if not impossible, for the 
offline stalker to read letters, chat to someone, have a heated argument with another 
person, and make travel arrangements all at the same time. It may be that the Internet 
provides the perpetrator the opportunity to submerge him- or herself in their own world, 
during which time they can feed their obsession with readily available information they 
have gathered. Third, the transcript illustrated the accessibility to 1) victims, 2) information 
about victims, 3) tools the perpetrator may use in their campaign against a victim or 
victims, and 4) evidence. Finally, gathering evidence in cyberstalking cases requires a 
variety of skilled officers. Whilst evidence is accessible to police officers, retrieving and 
sorting through evidence would require considerable resources in terms of manpower and 
time.  
 
7.3.2 Theme 2: Threat 
 
„Threat‟ was second theme identified during data analyses. It included issues of safety, 
intent, carrying out threats, harm, severity and seizure of computers. 
 
Declan focused on the dichotomy of online versus offline safety, with particular attention 
to the safety of children in using the Internet. Using the example of parents wanting to 
know where their children are, and who they are with, David implied offline safety 
measures to protect children are common knowledge. David compared the knowledge of 
who children are with offline does not translate easily to their communications with other 
Internet users. Although David posed the questions of who children are talking to, and 
what information they are giving, the questions are rhetorical rather than genuine 
questions. The majority of participants shared the perception that individuals are more 
willing or aware of how to protect themselves offline but are not as knowledgeable when 
communicating with strangers via the Internet. 
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“A lot of parents probably don‟t realise the potential risks of it [the 
Internet]. It‟s like you wouldn‟t let your child go and stay somewhere over 
night at a house if you didn‟t know the people, to my mind. You‟d make 
sure you‟d know where they were going and who the people were, and feel 
comfortable with that. But, with the computer or on the phone, do parents 
really know who their kids are talking to? And also, what information are 
they divulging?” Declan 
 
The majority of participants considered the perpetrator‟s intention to cause harm to the 
victim as crucial when investigating cases involving CH. Jake noted that threats made by a 
perpetrator to the victim cannot be disregarded until intent has been determined. Adam also 
focused on intent by explaining that if a perpetrator is issued with a harassment warning, 
and then fails to stop harassing the victim, intent is established. The reasonable persons test 
is used by jurors to establish whether the perpetrator knew their behaviour amounted to 
harassment. Thus, issuing a harassment notice serves to prove, in court, that the perpetrator 
knows their behaviour amounts to harassment. However, rather than focusing on this 
purpose of the harassment notice, Adam considered the purpose of the harassment notice 
being to establish intent. 
 
“You can‟t take a threat as not a threat until you think it‟s totally totally 
explicit you know and you‟d find that out by working with that person and 
find out exactly what their intention is.” Jake 
 
“You go, serve this notice to them and then they knew „alright, this, what 
I‟ve been doing was harassment‟. So if they continue after that, then they 
can get reported for it and arrested and dealt with.” Adam 
 
Whilst the perpetrator‟s intention is not a requisite of the PfHA, Declan considered intent 
in relation to the Act. More severe instances of harassment can be prosecuted under section 
4 of the Act, and requires that the victim is fearful that acts of violence would be carried 
out against them. Thus, Declan considered intent to be required to establish that the 
perpetrator intended to put the victim in fear of violence, regardless of his/her willingness 
or ability to carry out acts of violence. 
 
“[For] some offences, the intent is to put a person in fear that other 
offences would be carried out. You may not necessarily ever intend to 
actually commit only through the commission of those offences but put in 
that thought into your intended victim‟s mind is enough.” Declan 
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Participants described perpetrators issuing threats to victims using the Internet and mobile 
phone technology. Thomas described a perpetrator who threatened to commit suicide in 
front of his victim. Throughout Thomas‟ description, he stressed the perpetrator threatened 
to do „silly‟ things to himself and „that‟s that‟. His use of language suggested he perceived 
the perpetrator‟s threats to harm himself as trivial. However, in the last sentence of this 
excerpt, this perpetrator murdered someone close to the object of his obsession. When 
reading some of the perpetrator‟s transcripts of „chats‟ to the victim, the perpetrator said 
„I‟m going to do something serious, something serious is going to happen, I have a knife‟. 
Although the perpetrator‟s explicit threats indicated he would harm himself, the suggestion 
of „something serious‟ happening and mentioning that he had a knife, in retrospect, allude 
to something more sinister and may be an example of a veiled threat against the victim. 
 
“They were threats to eh, he was going to come to the UK, he was kill 
himself in front of her, erm, erm, “you don‟t know what I‟m going to do, 
I‟m going to do something  serious, something serious is going to happen, 
I have a knife”, just things like that really. Never really directly threatened 
to seriously harm B [victim]. Never really that. More threatened to do silly 
things to himself and it‟d be their fault... on the 14th she [Victim A] finally 
blocks him, he threatens to come and kill himself and that‟s that. The only 
time, so that‟s the [date], that‟s four, five days before the murder.” 
Thomas 
 
According to participants, direct threats to harm victims were taken as „more serious‟ 
offences that are not dealt with under the PfHA. As David explained, he had not dealt with 
a case under section 4 of the Act, and threats to kill a victim are dealt with using other 
pieces of legislation. This is further illustrated by Adam‟s description whereby he treated a 
threat to harm a victim using legislation to prosecute strategies aimed at intimidating 
witnesses. This raises a fundamental question; if threatening violence against victims of 
harassment is dealt with using other criminal Acts, what is the purpose of section 4 of the 
PfHA? 
 
“So somebody gets a text saying “you know if you go to court” and “you 
would get”, and indirectly there were threats and basically they got scared 
and reported it to the police...we classed it as witness intimidation.” Adam 
 
“I‟ve never had section 4 before. I‟ve had threats to kill but there‟s other 
things that you can do. But, it‟s treated as a more serious offence.” David 
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Police officers‟ perceptions of cyber-harassment were discussed by some participants. 
David‟s excerpt appeared complex as he began with a hypothetical threat that could be 
directed at a victim via the Internet. The next sentence refers to „you‟ perceiving that 
differently compared to someone saying they are receiving abusive messages via the 
Internet. The „you‟ whom David was referring to appeared to be police officers who would 
interpret something the victim reports to them. Thus, the focus changes from threats a 
perpetrator might make to the way a victim describes such threats when reporting CH to 
the police. This indicated the manner in which victims report cyber-crime to the police 
directly impacts on police officers‟ perceptions of the crime, and whether and how the 
crime is dealt with. 
 
“It could be „I‟m coming round right now to kick your head in‟. Well you 
might read that in a completely different way than perhaps you would if 
someone said „look I‟m having problems on the Internet, I‟m getting 
messages, quite a lot of messages, they‟re just abusive‟.” David 
 
Thomas focused on how the police would have responded if the victim had reported 
cyberstalking to the police. When considering what the response of police may have been, 
Thomas believed that a perpetrator living in another country would be presumed by police 
officers as unlikely to harm a victim living in the UK. He further illustrated this point by 
suggesting that if the perpetrator lived in the same country, police officers would be more 
likely to offer the victim support and advice. The tone of Thomas‟ excerpt appeared 
uncomfortable which may reflect the difficulty he perceived in considering a hypothetical 
scenario. An alternative explanation is the possibility that police officers would not have 
acted to protect the victim contravenes police officers‟ ethos as protectors. He repeated 
twice in this extract that „young‟ police officers would be responsible for not acting on 
such a complaint. This emphasis on „young‟ highlights the lack of experience young 
officers may have, and served to distance him from such a scenario. 
 
“I don‟t want to shoot ourselves in the foot really but most PCs on the 
front counter come and see, would have not really have seen, like nobody 
would, but most of our young PCs would‟ve gone “alright, let us know if it 
gets any worse. Oh he lives in [another country], he‟ll never come”. So I 
anticipate that it wouldn‟t have been that great, I‟m speaking 
hypothetically here but you never know. And certainly, talking about 
giving people advice, if they had‟ve said “well I live here and he lives in 
Derby and whatever”, we‟d have said “right, get rid of your Facebook, 
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close your Facebook down, start a new Facebook as somebody else, don‟t 
post on the net, become anonymous, can we try and get your flat moved?” 
You know she was working and he was seeking. You know if he‟s been 
here, you‟d have gone through it. I‟m not too much, too sure, how much 
our young cops would‟ve done but at least we‟d have had an opportunity.” 
Thomas 
 
The accessibility of gathering evidence in cases involving CH relies on accessing the 
victim or perpetrator‟s computer. However, participants noted that seizing computers for 
interrogation and gathering evidence would depend on the perceived severity of cases. 
Joseph said issuing harassment warnings was offered for „extreme‟ cases of CH, and he 
had never dealt with a case whereby the seizure of computers was required. 
 
“In extreme cases we offer things like harassment warnings. I‟ve never 
actually had the extremes of seizing computers, find out IP addresses. No-
one has taken it that far.” Joseph 
 
Like Joseph, Adam considered the seizure of computers and the speed with which evidence 
would be gathered would depend on the severity of the crime. He stated that harassment is 
not a serious crime, and whilst seizing computers in cases involving CH was not ruled out, 
he conceded the focus of the unit in the police force that would deal with computer 
interrogation would be on more serious crimes. Whilst Adam thought the unit would take 
approximately six weeks to interrogate a computer, other participants perceived a lengthier 
timescale. For example, as can be seen in the following excerpt, Declan considered six to 
eight months a reasonable timescale for the interrogation of a computer. 
 
“Everything gets prioritised depending on what the crime is. For example, 
it it‟s something serious like murder, it gets dealt with a lot quicker than 
your, something minor, harassment type of a job. I‟m afraid it won‟t get 
put to the top of the list. Another job, one of the more serious jobs, you 
have to submit an application form to the department that interrogates 
computers and send it off and it does take, I would say, I think, a good six 
weeks for it to get looked at.” Adam 
 
“I know it‟s a good few months from submitting something for forensic 
analysis, you know you wouldn‟t expect to hear anything for 6 to 8 months 
maybe.” Declan 
 
All participants considered the severity of the perpetrator‟s behaviour as crucial in 
determining whether a computer would be seized. However, David noted an important 
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caveat – although computers can be seized and interrogated as part of evidence gathering, 
the seizure of computers cannot prevent individuals from being cyber-harassed. 
 
“We will seize computers if we need to on both sides as part of the 
investigation process. We just can‟t take them off them to prevent things 
happening.” David 
 
7.3.3 Theme 3: The Unhelpful Victim 
 
„The unhelpful victim‟ was the final theme that emerged from the data. This theme 
comprised of issues relating to the behaviour of the cyber-harassed victim which 
participants considered unhelpful, frustrating, and undermining of police officers‟ roles 
when dealing with perpetrators.  
 
Joseph‟s excerpt powerfully highlighted the unwillingness of victims to follow through 
with their complaint of CH against the perpetrator. He explained victims want their 
complaint logged but refuse to allow officers to investigate any incidents they report. His 
use of negative language served to emphasise the obstacles victims present to cases. 
Throughout his extract, the tone is one of frustration that implied he feels that victims are 
wasting police officers time. However, at the end of the extract he said that it caused him 
concern. 
 
“The majority of the time they [victims] won‟t take the complaint, they‟ll 
tell us about it but then they‟ll be unwilling to actually go forth their 
complaint. So they‟ll say I just want to make you aware of this, but I don‟t 
want to do anything about it. It is quite a hindrance in terms of well I then 
can‟t go and speak to this person because you‟re unwilling to go pen to 
paper, unwilling to back that information up. It makes it really informal, 
you know it‟s, it is worrying.” Joseph 
 
Like Joseph, Jake stated victims are unlikely to allow police officers to pursue their 
investigations of cases involving cyber-harassment between individuals who have, or had, 
a romantic relationship. Jake‟s explanation is closely aligned with descriptions of domestic 
violence. This indicated cyber-harassing cases that involve individuals who have, or had a 
romantic relationship, the victim will be less likely to follow through with their harassment 
allegations.  
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“You go to arrest them and sometimes they start to resist and the partner 
who has been harassed suddenly pleading with the police officer to leave 
them alone because you know they love them.” Jake 
 
Participants noted cyber-harassed victims are unwilling to change their online behaviour 
which they viewed as an important step in combating CH. Joseph‟s excerpt echoes the 
frustration from the last excerpt during which he discussed the unhelpful victim who would 
not follow through with their allegations of harassment. In this excerpt, Joseph‟s repetition 
of victims who he described as „unwilling to help themselves‟ highlighted his frustration 
with victims who are unwilling to leave social networking sites, change their mobile phone 
numbers, contact service providers, or block the perpetrator from contacting them. 
 
“The majority of the people are unwilling to leave the social networking 
sites...they‟re unwilling to help themselves. I know that sounds a bit harsh 
but they‟re unwilling to help themselves... They‟re unwilling to change, 
completely unwilling to change and they just want the police to speak with 
the other party and make them aware that the police are involved. In 
fairness in the majority of the time that does help a bit but usually perhaps 
when they are unwilling to block that person or to change their phone 
number, or to contact their service provider, such as a mobile phone 
service provider and get a number blocked, they just are unwilling to do 
it.” Joseph 
 
Like Jake, David also expressed frustration and annoyance with victims who refused to 
change their online behaviour following their experiences of CH. With further explanation, 
David illustrated that his frustration was based on the problems victims may face if their 
case proceeded to court. David imagined that the defence for the perpetrator would focus 
on the victim not changing his/her behaviour and using it as evidence that the victim was 
not upset by their experience of CH. By failing to change one‟s online behaviour, the 
victim‟s behaviour may undermine the work police officers have done to bring a case to 
court.  
 
“I find it really frustrating because I know that will be at the heart of a 
defence, the defence will be turning around and saying “you‟re not being 
entirely truthful” or “why did you not take yourself off Facebook. If 
you‟re saying you‟re so scared, why did you not take yourself off 
Facebook?” Yeah? It‟s that sort of thing. “Why did you not take yourself 
out of the situation, why have you carried on? I put it to you that you‟re 
not that scared at all, it‟s not causing you any problems, you‟re actually 
enjoying it and you‟re doing this to get at my client”.” David 
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The excerpt above provided by Joseph included reference to the act of „blocking‟ 
perpetrators from contacting victims. The majority of participants in this study argued this 
online feature is a powerful tool that can be used to prevent any unwanted contact whilst 
online. Thomas was the only participant who proposed that „blocking‟ may act as a catalyst 
for cyber-harassment to escalate and move it offline, increasing the threat posed to victims. 
The victim described by Thomas was reluctant to block the perpetrator‟s contact attempts 
because it would be „like lighting the blue touch paper‟, meaning it would invoke the 
perpetrator‟s anger. Using an offline analogy, Thomas compared blocking to ostracising 
individuals from contact with friends offline. He continues by stating that blocking a 
perpetrator fuelled the perpetrator‟s anger towards the victim. Thomas also noted the 
perpetrator found methods to get around blocking, by using other Internet users to forward 
messages to the intended recipient on their behalf. Finally, Thomas described how the act 
of blocking acted as a catalyst for the perpetrator to contact the victim using methods more 
aligned with offline harassment (i.e., phone calls). This example illustrated that victims 
should be aware that whilst blocking may end cyber-harassment, it may also escalate the 
perpetrator‟s behaviour. 
 
“They use the phrase blocking him where you know, but they don‟t really 
block him and A [victim] was explaining in court that she knew she knew 
“if I block him, actually that‟s like lighting the blue touch paper”. And 
what we‟d liken that to is this - I‟ve got a whole series of real friends and 
if every time one of my friends come round to where I work or where I 
live, right, you can all come into the room but you‟ve got to stay outside. 
So you know that everyone else is in there having a free and open 
conversation and you‟re like stuck outside...So like it‟s a complete diss and 
when you think that this was all his world... he‟s like on the ceiling...that‟s 
the first time that she blocks him. He then actively uses other people D 
[another Internet user] mainly, right so that so if you‟re A, I‟m X 
[perpetrator], I‟ll send a message to D but it wouldn‟t be to D, it‟ll be to 
you. Right? D would go “that‟s not for me” and he just copies it straight to 
you. You say “I don‟t want to talk to him” and he sent it back saying “she 
won‟t talk”... Eventually, because they‟ve blocked him now he uses the 
phone, he rings B [victim], X is absolutely gone, A can‟t even talk on the 
phone, B is absolutely livid, he‟s on the ceiling.”  Thomas 
 
The theme of the unhelpful victim continued when participants described the obstacles that 
victims put in their way when they are trying to deal with cases involving CH. The first 
issue participants had with respect to victims assisting police officers in their investigation 
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is that of information. Many participants explained they need as much information about 
any incidents of CH which they can use to gather further evidence that can be used when 
prosecuting perpetrators. As Amanda highlighted, police officers need information about 
the case and victims failing to provide information can impede their case. 
 
“We feed off intelligence, anything that‟s given to us we act on it, so the 
less information we get, the less we can do about it.” Amanda 
 
On occasion, victims may withhold information that they have retaliated back against the 
perpetrator. One explanation is that victims withhold such information because they are 
concerned that providing that information would reflect badly on them and the police may 
not pursue their case. However, David explained a victim‟s retaliation against the 
perpetrator provides evidence of the extent to which the victim is upset by the perpetrator‟s 
actions. David further elaborated if the police discover information has been withheld, the 
discovery would hinder the victim‟s case as they have allowed themselves to be labelled a 
liar. 
 
“Sometimes you‟ll get that they haven‟t sent anything back but this is not 
entirely true. We need to see everything in this context; the court needs to 
see everything in context if it‟s taken into court. At the end of the day, if 
you‟ve sent a message back that‟s abusive, I‟ve got no problems with that I 
can put in your statement because that shows how it‟s been for you over a 
period of time. But what you‟re actually portraying is that you‟re actually 
a liar by not telling us everything.” David 
 
Finally, participants explained that some victims do not assist police officers in gathering 
evidence against the perpetrator. Victims were perceived reluctant to allow the seizure of 
their computers and/or mobile phones that can be used to access evidence, as can be seen 
from Jake‟s excerpt. Jake‟s comment echoes Amanda‟s comment that if the victim refuses 
to provide police with information, or refuse to give permission to the police to interrogate 
their computer or mobile phone, there is little the police can do to pursue the perpetrator. 
 
“You start off by using the victim‟s computer, because the stuff is coming 
into the victim that you‟re looking at. So, it‟s them giving you permission 
to do that.” Jake 
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7.4 Discussion 
 
This study aimed to explore police officers‟ perceptions of cyber-harassment (CH), victims 
of CH, and their role in dealing with cases involving CH. Using thematic analysis, three 
themes emerged in the data – accessibility, threat, and the unhelpful victim. The 
accessibility theme revealed participants‟ views of the vulnerability of Internet users in 
falling victim to CH, and the ease of gathering evidence in cases involving CH. Threat 
illustrated participants‟ perceptions of their role as safety promoters, and participants 
considered intent, harm, severity and seizure of computers as indicative of the threat posed 
by perpetrators of CH. The third theme, the unhelpful victim, highlighted participants‟ 
frustrations with cyber-harassed victims who they perceived to be unwilling to assist them 
with their investigations of cyber-harassing cases. Participants perceived the unhelpful 
victim as undermining cyber-harassing cases, and made participants‟ jobs more difficult. 
 
7.4.1 Perceptions of Cyber-harassment and Victims 
 
Participants perceived increasing accessibility of the Internet, coupled with individuals 
levels of online self-disclosure as contributing to the vulnerability of individuals in being 
subjected to CH. Participants emphasised the evolution of technology has reached a stage 
that the Internet is accessible to anyone, and that perpetrators can access victims „at the 
touch of a button‟. Researchers have warned the prevalence of CH will increase as people 
incorporate technology in their lives (e.g., Cupach & Spitzberg, 2004; Salter & Bryden, 
2009), and participants‟ perceptions lend support to this.  
 
Furthermore, participants perceived younger individuals as more vulnerable to 
experiencing CH than older individuals which suggested an age-related digital divide. 
Granello and Wheaton (2004) suggested individuals under 35 years were more likely to 
use the Internet, and in a nationally representative sample, Dutton and Helsper (2007) 
found that students were one of the largest groups of Internet users. However, Gilleard and 
Higgs (2008) suggested the age-related digital divide was influenced by generational rather 
than stage of life influences. This means that whilst an age-related digital divide exists, this 
gap is likely to dissipate as younger people in today‟s society progress through their 
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lifespan. Thus, it is logical to think that, in years to come, older individuals will be 
vulnerable to CH to the same degree as young people in today‟s society. 
 
In conjunction with accessibility to the Internet, participants were simultaneously 
concerned about individuals‟ online self-disclosure, and the culture of „friending‟ (adding 
„friends‟ to a social networking profile) other people within social networking sites. In a 
series of studies, Joinson (2001b) found that visual anonymity plays a key role in online 
self-disclosure. Whilst all computer-mediated communication (CMC) theories attempt to 
explain visual anonymity, social identification mode of deindividuation effects (SIDE) 
theory provides the greatest explanation of why individuals self-disclose on social 
networking sites.  
 
According to SIDE theory, Spears, Lea and Postmes (2007) explain the context of CMC 
increases the saliency of either social or personal identity. When social identity is salient, 
individuals are expected to adhere to the group norms, whereas when personal identity is 
salient, individuals are expected to adhere to their own standards. Anonymity can be visual 
anonymity (anonymity of others to self) or lack of identifiability (anonymity of self to 
others) (Joinson, 2001b). Importantly, Spears et al. suggest that lack of identifiability can 
emphasise social isolation as they perceive themselves as separated from the group. 
However, visual anonymity produces heighted self-awareness and the salience of physical 
and affective states are increased which contributes to self-disclosure. Furthermore, Lea, 
Spears and deGroot (2001) found that visual anonymity increases attraction within the 
group. Arguably, social networking sites increase the salience of social identity, and SIDE 
theory predicts that individuals will adhere to group norms. In social networking sites, self-
disclosure and „friending‟ is encouraged and a norm within the sites (boyd, 2006; Tong, 
Van Der Heide, Langwell, & Walther, 2008). By self-disclosing in social networking sites, 
individuals solidify their place within the group, contribute to a sense of community, and 
self-disclosure increases their attraction within, and to, the group. 
 
Furthermore, SIDE theory predicts that when visually anonymous, individuals experience 
heightened self-awareness, are accountable for their behaviour, and become concerned 
with self-presentation. This may explain the process of accumulating friends within social 
networking sites that caused concern for participants in this study. In a study examining the 
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process of „friending‟ in social networking sites, boyd (2006) found that adding strangers 
as friends was not uncommon, and it was inappropriate to decline friend requests, and the 
number of friends on an individual‟s profile was an indicator of their popularity. 
Furthermore, Tong, Van Der Heide, Langwell and Walther (2008) found there are an 
optimal number of friends that led to positive impressions of profile owners. Individuals 
with too few friends were perceived as lonely and undesirable, and too many friends were 
indicative of desperation. These two studies highlight that adding friends to social 
networking sites is the norm, and desired by individuals who use social networking sites. 
 
The application of SIDE theory provides an understanding that the salience of social 
identity is increased in social networking sites. The increased salience of social identity 
promotes adherence to the established norms in these sites, which include the 
encouragement of self-disclosure and the process of „friending‟. However, individuals may 
be unaware of the dark side of engaging in such behaviours. By adding people who are not 
well-known to the profile owner, individuals willingly provide access to a wealth of 
information about themselves, their offline lives, and their offline friends and family. This 
indicates that people do not adhere to the safety standards they would normally apply in 
their offline lives, which was of concern to participants in this study. 
 
One of the most concerning findings of this study was that participants perceived victims 
of cyber-harassment as unhelpful in assisting their investigations of CH. Participants were 
concerned that victims are unwilling to follow through with allegations of CH against the 
perpetrator. For participants, this meant that victims wanted police officers to lodge the 
complaint but not take any action, and was particularly prevalent in cases that involved 
domestic abuse. 
 
The link drawn by participants between harassment and domestic abuse supports research 
suggesting that domestic violence plays a role in offline harassment. Coleman (1997) 
argued that leaving an abusive partner is ineffective and dangerous as the abused partner 
may experience harassment or stalking at the hands of the abuser. Burgess, Baker, 
Greening et al. (1997) recruited perpetrators who had been charged with battery and 
stalking. They found that stalking is a continuance of domestic violence, which supports 
Coleman‟s argument. Participants‟ perception that there is a link between domestic 
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violence and CH indicates that domestic abusers are embracing new technology to 
continue their abuse of a partner. Furthermore, as Coleman‟s research highlighted, victims 
of domestic abuse may be aware that pursuit of legal action against their abuser may prove 
dangerous and ineffective. An initial complaint may be made against the perpetrator as a 
means to cease immediate threats posed. However, victims may not wish to pursue their 
complaint because they fear further reprisals.  
 
Participants explained cyber-harassed victims were unwilling to change their online 
behaviour, which they viewed as an important step in minimising any further harassment. 
Behavioural changes recommended by participants included withdrawal from social 
networking sites, becoming more anonymous online, or blocking the perpetrator. Bocij 
(2004) argued that avoiding online spaces contravenes individuals‟ human rights. 
However, self-protection strategies are used in everyday life, and Internet users need to 
protect themselves whilst online (Basu & Jones, 2007; Salter & Bryden, 2009). 
 
Participants explained victims‟ unwillingness to protect themselves could be used as 
evidence against them if their case was brought to court. Defence for the perpetrator would 
be able to argue the experience did not impact on the victim to the extent argued by the 
victim. Furthermore, participants noted that victims minimise their behaviour (reactions 
and retaliation) towards the perpetrator. Without full disclosure, victims would be 
perceived as liars, thereby reducing their credibility. The unwillingness to change 
behaviour and withholding contextual information about cyber-harassing incidents 
undermines police officers‟ investigations of the crime. 
 
The failure to disclose information to police officers contrasted with victims‟ willingness 
to self-disclose via CMC. Whilst SIDE theory was used to explain why individuals self-
disclose in social networking sites, media richness theory explains why the same 
individuals are likely to lie in face-to-face (FtF) settings. Media richness theory stipulates 
that individuals prefer different forms of media to relay messages, dependent upon 
reducing equivocality and uncertainty (Daft & Lengel, 1986). In FtF communications, 
individuals have access to immediate feedback, body language, tone of voice, message 
content, and a variety of language. Arguably, Rice (1992) suggests media richness is 
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reduced in CMC. As lying is equivocal (Whitty & Joinson, 2009), individuals are more 
likely to lie in rich media, such as FtF.  
 
However, there are many reasons for lying to police officers when reporting CH. 
Participants noted that victims want to gain the support of police officers, and in this 
context, lying may be more indicative of impression management strategies. Despite 
reports of victims lying or withholding information about cyber-harassing incidents, 
participants explained they need to know everything about any incidents that have 
occurred. It is understandable that victims engage in impression management strategies, 
and thus, may not report their own behaviour (such as retaliation) because they fear that 
police officers will not take their complaint seriously. However, participants in this study 
explained that the victim‟s behaviour can further illustrate the impact the perpetrator‟s 
behaviour has on them, rather than damaging their case. 
 
Participants were divided in the perceived usefulness of blocking perpetrators from 
contacting victims of CH. Most police officers suggested blocking as a primary strategy to 
deter the cyber-harasser, and this advice is re-iterated in publications available to the 
general public (e.g., O‟Connell, Price & Barrow, 2004). However, the case described by 
one participant illustrated that blocking can be ineffective and may escalate the 
perpetrator‟s pursuit behaviour. There may be a threshold during a cyber-harassing 
campaign before which blocking is effective in deterring the cyber-harasser. Once the 
threshold is passed, the perpetrator‟s motives may be strengthened and blocking them may 
not deter them. However, this is purely speculative and more research is needed to 
determine what the threshold might be, and whether differing motivations have the same 
effect on the usefulness of blocking strategies. 
 
7.4.2 Police Officers’ Role in Combating Cyber-Harassment 
 
Participants all agreed that dealing with cases involving cyber-harassment formed part of 
their role as a police officer. Kamphuis, Emmelkamp and deVries (2004) reported that 
English police officers believed it was their job to deal with cases involving offline 
harassment. The findings of this study lends further support to these findings and illustrate 
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that CH is perceived by police officers as part of their job remit, despite the virtual nature 
of CH. Specifically, police officers perceived their role solely as evidence-gatherers. 
 
In relation to CH, participants perceived evidence-gathering to be accessible by contacting 
ISPs, website owners, or by seizing the victim and/or perpetrator‟s computers. 
Furthermore, because of the accessibility of evidence, participants believed it is possible to 
trace perpetrators despite attempts to remain anonymous. This finding contradicts the 
assumption of Bocij (2004) and Griffiths, Rogers and Sparrow (1998). One explanation is 
the evolution of technology and investigative techniques have developed since the authors‟ 
time of writing. The accessibility of evidence is a positive finding that may encourage 
cyber-harassed victims to report CH to the police. 
 
The accessibility of evidence led participants‟ suggestions that victims do not need to keep 
harassing messages. However, this contradicts Brown‟s (2000) recommendations for 
investigating CH. Two of the recommendations include not deleting messages received, 
and acting quickly to contact ISPs, as they retain information for a short period of time. 
However, when initially making a complaint, it is unlikely that police officers would 
pursue obtainment of evidence from ISPs without being able to see some evidence of the 
perpetrator‟s behaviour. Furthermore, the resources (such as time and financial) required to 
obtain such evidence decrease the likelihood of following these lines of investigation. 
 
Whilst the Protection from Harassment Act (1997) does not require proof of the 
perpetrator‟s intent to cause harm to the victim, participants regarded establishing intent as 
a pertinent aspect of their role in investigating cases. One method described by participants 
to establish intent is to issue the perpetrator with a harassment warning. In conjunction 
with establishing intent, a harassment warning contributes to ensuring the reasonable 
person‟s test is met. In relation to issuing harassment warnings, Brown (2000) states that 
harassment warnings „might be appropriate; however this is not obligatory” (p. 3). This 
recommendation is ambiguous as he does not explain whether harassment notices are not 
required for the most or least severe cases. Despite Brown‟s recommendation, participants 
in this study considered issuing harassment warnings as the first step in dealing with a case 
involving CH. 
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Whilst participants reported positive perceptions in how they can deal with CH, the 
severity of the case determined what they could actually do. For the most serious cases, 
police officers can issue harassment warnings, seize computers, and contacting website 
owners and/or ISPs to retrieve evidence. However, participants perceived serious cases as 
involving threats to the victim‟s life. According to Salter and Bryden (2009), the UK courts 
are limiting the coverage of the PfHA, and a precedent has been set to ensure that only the 
most severe cases of harassment proceed to court. As police officers are responsible for 
enforcing the law, participants‟ perceptions of severity reflect the precedent set in court. 
 
In this study, the severity of potential harm to the victim was associated with the credibility 
of threats made to victims. The credibility of threats made via CMC have been questioned, 
especially in cases whereby the perpetrator lives outside the UK (Burgess & Baker, 2002). 
The findings of this study illustrated if perpetrators live outside the UK, it is unlikely that 
police officers will take the victim‟s complaint as seriously as when the perpetrator lives in 
the same country. Despite the questionability of the credibility of threats made from an 
online harasser, a case illustrated by one participant demonstrated that perpetrators can 
travel from other countries to carry out threats made. However, Sheridan and Grant (2007) 
found cyberstalked victims are threatened to the same degree as victims of offline 
harassment. Thus, the view that such threats are minimised reinforces concerns made by 
other researchers (e.g., Bocij & McFarlane, 2003), and suggests that cyber-harassed 
victims may not be given the full protection from the law and law enforcers. 
 
Interestingly, participants noted that threats made to victims are likely to be dealt with 
using other pieces of legislation rather than the PfHA. Specifically, serious threats made to 
victims are treated as more serious offences that may fall under the remit of section 4 of 
the PfHA. Arguably, the practice of dealing with threats made to victims using other pieces 
of legislation renders section 4 of the Act as redundant. 
 
7.4.3 Limitations 
 
The findings of this study cannot be generalised due to the sampling strategy utilised. The 
sampling strategy included convenience sampling using the snowball technique, all 
participants were self-selecting volunteers, and all participants worked in the 
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Nottinghamshire Police force. The sampling strategy may have introduced bias as only 
individuals who believed they were knowledgeable in dealing with cyber-crime may have 
volunteered to participate. Furthermore, there are many different police forces within the 
UK, and different forces may have different procedures in dealing with crime. Thus, the 
findings of this study cannot be generalised beyond participants who actually participated 
in this study. A quantitative survey would be useful to expand and generalise the findings 
of this research. 
 
Participants focused on the threat posed by cyber-harassers to victims and the severity of 
cases. Whilst participants provided an example of a threat that was serious (e.g., threat to 
life), the notion of threat and severity is ambiguous. The study failed to ascertain the full 
spectrum threats posed to cyber-harassed victims that police officers regard as serious. 
Furthermore, the study did not investigate police officers‟ perceptions of cases involving 
CH whereby perpetrators implicitly threaten victims, or do not threaten victims. 
Consequently, the findings of this study may be most beneficial to victims who have 
experienced severe instances of CH, and who have been explicitly threatened by 
perpetrators. 
 
As semi-structured interviews were conducted, participants were identifiable by the 
researcher and any of their colleagues who were recruited using snowball sampling. 
Furthermore, the salience of participants‟ profession would have been increased in this 
study. Therefore, participants may have been reluctant to portray negative perceptions 
about their ability in dealing with CH, especially if participants were motivated to portray a 
positive image of the police force. If this occurred, the ecological validity of the research 
may have been compromised.  
 
7.4.4 Future Research 
 
Whilst ambiguity surrounded the perceived severity of cyber-harassing behaviours, future 
research is required to explore this issue. A vignette study which manipulates the type of 
threat and the credibility of threats made to cyber-harassed victims would be beneficial. In 
manipulating these variables, questions to participants could establish whether participants 
perceive police intervention as necessary. Questions posed to participants could include 
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whether officers should approach the perpetrator, issue harassment warnings, seize the 
victim or perpetrator‟s computer, and contact ISPs and/or website owners. Such a survey 
could be distributed to both Internet users and the police in an attempt to establish 
differences in perceptions, and would be useful in assessing gaps in participants‟ 
expectations. 
 
The findings of this study illustrated the „unhelpful victim‟, who is unwilling to change 
their online behaviour, or withdraw or change their social networking profile. Further 
research would benefit from recruiting social networking users and examining individuals‟ 
attachments to their social networking profiles, and to ascertain information they disclose 
and do not disclose and who they feel comfortable disclosing information to. By increasing 
understanding of these issues, researchers would be better equipped to offer suggestions to 
users of social networking sites regarding their safety. 
 
As an attempt to triangulate the findings from this study, research would benefit from 
recruiting cyber-harassed victims who have contacted the police about cyber-harassment. 
Such research could focus on the remedies offered by police officers when dealing with 
their case, and victims‟ perceptions of the usefulness of the remedies offered. 
 
7.4.5 Implications 
 
This research has several implications for social policy and for cyber-harassed victims. 
First, police intervention is dependent on the severity of the perpetrator‟s behaviour and 
threats made to cyber-harassed victims. However, Hills and Taplin (1998) noted that 
stalking often involves behaviours that appear benign unless they are taken in the context 
of a campaign against the victim. Furthermore, threats made may not be explicit, and may 
not be perceived as credible by police officers. In conjunction with the precedent set in the 
UK courts that ensures only the most serious of harassment cases proceed to court, police 
may not be able to offer support to the majority of victims of CH.  
 
If police officers cannot protect the majority of cyber-harassed victims, Internet users need 
to protect themselves more whilst online to reduce their vulnerability. This need for self-
protection is more pronounced with the increase in social networking sites, and the culture 
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of „friending‟. „Friending‟ strangers and individuals that Internet users do not know well 
can be a positive experience as it offers a unique way for individuals to increase their 
social circles. However, users who add strangers to their profiles need to be more aware of 
the dark side of allowing strangers access to information about their lives and other 
friends/family.  
 
The owners of social networking sites need to shoulder greater responsibility for users‟ 
knowledge of how to use their site, and in particular, privacy settings. For example, 
Facebook is a popular social networking site used in the UK. The highest privacy setting 
allows users to customise their privacy settings by choosing which „friends‟ can access 
information on their profile. Although speculative, many users may be unaware of this 
feature. Facebook owners could send all users an email which highlights this feature, and 
explaining why and how this can be used. Alternatively, online tutorials could be made 
readily available to users. 
 
Furthermore, the owners of social networking sites could take greater measures of control 
that can be used to assist police officers in investigating cyber-crime. For example, website 
owners could request details from potential (and current) users that can be used to confirm 
their identity before allowing access to the site. This would make it easier for police 
officers to trace perpetrators of any cyber-crime if perpetrators use social networking sites 
to commit crime. The owners of social networking sites could make it easier for police 
officers to contact them by issuing a contact email address or telephone number that is only 
available to police officers.  
 
The PfHA was deliberately intended to be vague and appears sufficiently broad to 
incorporate all forms of harassment. Furthermore, the Act does not require the burden of 
proof of the perpetrator‟s intent. However, application of the Act appears more 
complicated and precedents restrict the usefulness of the Act in prosecuting cyber-
harassment. Whilst section 4 allows for more serious forms of harassment to be 
prosecuted, police officers use other pieces of legislation to deal with more serious threats 
made to victims. This highlights the need for more detailed guidelines to be issued 
regarding the application of the Act to real examples of both offline and online harassment. 
This would provide both police officers and victims with clear ideas of what and when the 
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Act provides coverage. Furthermore, if the Act is less useful in cases involving CH, 
particularly when the perpetrator lives outside the UK, new legislation would be required 
that offers Internet users protection. However, the call for new and more specific 
legislation has been requested by other authors (see Salter & Bryden, 2009). 
 
Finally, police procedures in dealing with CH need to be more transparent to the general 
public. Participants in this study perceived cyber-harassed victims as unhelpful when 
police officers request the victim‟s computer and/or mobile phone to preserve and gather 
evidence, or to change their online behaviour. Additionally, previous research suggests that 
victims are dissatisfied with action taken by police officers (e.g., Finn, 2004). This 
dissatisfaction may be confounded with the time taken to fully investigate instances of CH. 
Police officers should clearly inform victims of what will be required from them, why, and 
investigative timescales upon first contact. This information may increase victims‟ 
satisfaction with how their case is dealt with, encourage victims‟ co-operation, and 
ultimately encourage victims to report CH to the police.  
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Chapter 8: General Discussion 
 
This chapter provides a discussion of the findings of this research in relation to the 
research questions and aims of the thesis. Particular focus is given to inconsistencies and 
similarities in findings of the four studies used to investigate cyber-harassment. The 
chapter begins with a discussion of findings relating to the perceived criminality of cyber-
harassment, and covers issues such as the tendency to blame victims for their experiences. 
The chapter proceeds with a discussion of victims‟ experiences of cyber-harrassment. This 
section includes discussion of the cyber-harassing behaviours individuals‟ experience, the 
prior victim-perpetrator relationship, and relationships in the context of causing cyber-
harassment and in being affected by cyber-harassment, the impact of cyber-harassment, 
and the issue of threats made by perpetrators. The third section deals with cyber-harassed 
victims and support, and focuses on support sought by victims, and factors influencing 
support from victims‟ peers. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of 
this research, and an overview of future research identified during the course of this thesis. 
 
8.1 Perceived Criminality of Cyber-Harassment 
 
This thesis aimed to determine whether undergraduate students perceived cyber-harassing 
behaviours as criminal. Perceptions of criminality were explored during the quantitative 
and qualitative studies that recruited undergraduate participants. The survey required 
participants to indicate whether they perceived 18 online behaviours (associated with 
cyber-harassment) as criminal. Factor analysis was conducted as a means of data reduction, 
indicating three factors underlying perceived criminality – malicious software, harassing 
messages, and deception/disclosure. Participants perceived malicious software as criminal, 
followed by harassing messages but were unsure about deception/disclosure. Conversely, 
Studies 2 and 3 revealed an online/offline dichotomy where cyber-harassment was 
perceived as „not real‟ because of the virtual nature of harassment. In contrast, harassment 
was associated with offline behaviours (such as telephone calls and following the victim). 
Furthermore, participants in Study 3 blamed cyber-harassed victims for their plight 
because of their online behaviour, whereas perpetrators were perceived as „lonely‟ and 
„sad‟ people who do not intend to cause distress to their victim. The findings of Study 1 
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contradict the findings from Studies 2 and 3, and appeared to highlight an inconsistency in 
this research. 
 
Methodological differences across studies may contribute to the inconsistency in perceived 
criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours amongst undergraduate students. Several authors 
have noted that explicitly asking participants about harassment or stalking may trigger bias 
in participants‟ perceptions. Spitzberg and Cadaz (2002) discussed stalking stereotypes 
created and reinforced by media portrayals of harassment. Furthermore, Meloy (1998) 
argued against labelling perpetrators of harassment as „stalkers‟, favouring the term 
„obsessional followers‟, to avoid stereotypical connotations associated with the stalking 
label. In this research, participants in Study 1 were asked to report whether they perceived 
18 online behaviours as criminal. However, participants in Studies 2 and 3 were aware that 
they were going to be interviewed about their experiences (where applicable) and 
perceptions of cyber-harassment. Therefore, by using the term „cyber-harassment‟ Studies 
2 and 3 may have been susceptible to priming effects. 
 
However, when the items that loaded on the factors found in Study 1 are examined, 
consistencies across studies begin to emerge. Items that loaded on the malicious software 
and harassing messages factors included behaviours that were threatening to the recipient, 
and could be prosecuted as single offences under the Computer Misuse Act (1990) and the 
Malicious Communications Act (1998). However, items that loaded on the 
deception/disclosure factor included behaviours that were ambiguous but indicative of 
cyber-harassment. Whilst participants in Study 1 perceived malicious software and 
harassing messages as criminal, they were unsure about deception/disclosure. However, 
these findings must be treated with caution as malicious software was not perceived as 
cyber-harassment by participants in Study 3. 
 
In Study 2, seven undergraduate students who had experienced cyber-harassing behaviours 
explained the perpetrator‟s behaviour was not criminal. Furthermore, two participants 
perceived cyber-harassment as criminal if the victim was a minor, whereas three perceived 
the perpetrator‟s behaviour as criminal. In Study 3, four participants perceived cyber-
harassment as criminal and two participants perceived it as criminal if the victim was a 
minor. However, nine participants did not perceive cyber-harassment as criminal, four of 
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which perceived cyber-harassment as criminal if it escalated to offline harassment, whilst 
two participants were unsure. The confusion among participants when considering the 
criminality of cyber-harassment suggests that priming effects did not affect the research to 
a significant degree. Furthermore, across studies, this research illustrates the virtual nature 
of cyber-harassment is problematic for judgements of criminality. 
 
Rather than perceiving the perpetrator‟s behaviour as criminal, Study 3 illustrated that 
cyber-harassed victims‟ online behaviour is blamed for their experiences, lending support 
to Lerner and Miller‟s (1978) „just world‟ hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, 
individuals need to believe the world is just to allow them to perceive their environment as 
controllable and stable. When judging whether an individual‟s fate is just, bystanders can 
either compensate the victim, or believe the individual got what they deserved. Sheridan, 
Gillett, Davies, Blaauw and Patel (2003) and Scott, Lloyd and Gavin (2010) found support 
for the „just world‟ hypothesis, as both studies reported that victims were more likely to be 
blamed for offline harassment if they had a previous relationship with the perpetrator than 
if the perpetrator was an acquaintance or stranger. Sheridan et al. explained that if the 
victim has a relationship with the victim, there is more opportunity to cause offence that 
may contribute to the onset of harassment compared to acquaintances or strangers. In 
Study 3, participants attributed blame to victims because they believed victims place too 
much personal information on the Internet that invites cyber-harassment. Conversely, 
perpetrators were perceived as „sad‟ or „lonely‟, simply seeking interpersonal contact, and 
do not intend to cause distress to the victim. However, contrasting Sheridan et al.‟s 
findings, participants in Study 3 believed strangers were likely to harass people via the 
Internet. Just world beliefs are perceived as adaptive as they allow individuals to believe 
their environment is safe and stable. In the context of cyberspace, communicating with 
strangers may be perceived as an Internet norm. By blaming the victim‟s online behaviour 
for being cyber-harassed by strangers, individuals feel they are protected against being 
cyber-harassed if they do not place a lot of personal information on the Internet. 
 
In addition to determining whether cyber-harassment is perceived as criminal, this thesis 
set out to determine whether gender and/or personality influenced judgements of 
criminality. Results indicated that females were more likely than males to perceive 
harassing messages and behaviours associated with deception/disclosure as criminal. This 
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lends further support to previous research that suggests females are more sensitive to 
harassment than males (Cupach & Spitzberg, 2004; Hills & Taplin, 1998; Phillips, Quirk, 
Rosenfield & O‟Connor, 2004).  
 
The links between personality and perceived criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours was 
less clear. High-agreeable individuals were less likely to perceive harassing messages as 
criminal, and individuals who scored high on Internet self-efficacy were more likely to 
perceive malicious software as criminal. However, the effect sizes for these findings were 
small, explaining 4.3% and 4.1% (respectively) of the variance. Furthermore, these 
findings were not consistent across other types of cyber-harassing behaviours. Therefore, it 
must be concluded that personality did not consistently predict individuals‟ judgements 
about the criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours. 
 
In relation to individuals‟ perceived criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours, this thesis 
suggests that cyber-harassment is unlikely to be judged as criminal. Rather than perceiving 
the perpetrator‟s behaviour as criminal, victims are more likely to be blamed as their online 
behaviour is perceived as inviting cyber-harassment. Gender significantly predicted 
individuals‟ judgements about the criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours. Personality 
predicted judgements about the criminality of some cyber-harassing behaviours. However, 
the effect sizes of significant findings were small, and the findings were not consistent. 
This indicated that other variables (such as just world beliefs) may better predict 
judgements of criminality. 
 
8.2 The Experience of Cyber-Harassment 
 
This thesis aimed to explore the experience of cyber-harassment and evaluate the impact 
on victims. Victims‟ experiences are likely to consist of the nature and extent of the cyber-
harassment itself, the attitudes of their peers, and the attitudes of police officers should 
they report their experience. Study 1 used quantitative measures to identify the types of 
cyber-harassing behaviours that victims experience, whilst Study 2 used qualitative 
methods to provide a more in-depth understanding of the nature, extent and impact of 
cyber-harassment on victims. Qualitative interviews were also used in studies 3 and 4 to 
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gain an insight into the attitudes held by victims‟ peers and police officers (respectively). 
Thus, each study contributed to addressing this aim.  
 
Study 1 illustrated that experiencing behaviours associated with cyber-harassment was 
common, with nearly half of participants reporting they had received malicious software 
that could be used to damage their hardware and/or software. Other frequently reported 
behaviours included receiving sexually explicit and/or obscene messages via the Internet, 
and someone changing their online identity to contact participants when their previous 
contact attempts had been „blocked‟. Such behaviours have been associated with cyber-
harassment in previous literature. For instance, Bocij (2003) reported that 40.5% of 
participants received malicious software, and Bocij, Bocij, and McFarlane (2003) 
described Mr X, who used different online identities to contact his victims when they 
blocked previous contact attempts, and who also sent victims malicious software 
embedded in emails to access information held on their computer. Despite the temporal 
difference between the studies mentioned and this thesis, this research supports previous 
research and illustrated that perpetrators of cyber-harassment use similar methods to 
contact their victims. 
 
Study 1 explored the relationships between personality, Internet self-efficacy, gender and 
the likelihood of experiencing cyber-harassing behaviours. Whilst some relationships 
between the variables arose, the study illustrated that gender, personality, and Internet self-
efficacy did not consistently predict the likelihood of experiencing cyber-harassing 
behaviours. This indicates that individuals are targeted by perpetrators of cyber-harassment 
regardless of victims‟ personality, gender, or Internet self-efficacy.  
 
Whilst Study 1 illustrated that individuals experience behaviours associated with cyber-
harassment, the study did not ascertain whether individuals who experienced the 
behaviours perceived them as harassing. Furthermore, harassment has been referred to as a 
„constellation of behaviours‟ (Mullen, Pathé, Purcell & Stuart, 1999, p. 1244), and Study 1 
failed to illustrate the complexity of cyber-harassing experiences as individual behaviours 
were investigated. Finally, the behaviours listed (e.g., receiving malicious software that 
could be used to damage hardware and/or software) are vague as they do not explain what 
those behaviours mean to participants. For instance, using the example of malicious 
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software, it was not possible to determine whether participants accidentally downloaded 
the software, or whether it was sent to them as part of a campaign of cyber-harassment.  
 
Individuals who reported experiencing cyber-harassing behaviours in Study 1 were 
recruited to participate in online interviews for Study 2. This was advantageous as 
alternative methods of recruitment may have been to recruit self-defined victims of cyber-
harassment. However, locating participants may have proved difficult, and victims may not 
be aware that they have been cyber-harassed. If individuals are not aware that they have 
been cyber-harassed, the study would have failed to provide insights to the experiences of 
such individuals. Furthermore, individuals who self-define as victims of harassment are 
likely to have experienced extreme forms of harassment, and research indicates that when 
individuals are allowed to self-define as victims of harassment, prevalence rates rise 
dramatically (see Tjaden, Thoennes & Allison, 2000). Prior knowledge of the behaviours 
experienced by participants reduced the need for lengthier interviews which may have been 
detrimental to online interviews. Furthermore, prior knowledge of participants‟ 
experiences enabled the researcher to explore experiences relating to a wide range of 
behaviours experienced by participants, to filter participants who reported high ratings of 
upset following their experiences, and those who indicated the same perpetrator had 
engaged in two or more of the behaviours experienced by participants. Thus, the resulting 
sample was expected to have experienced cyber-harassment as defined by the PfHA.  
 
Across the qualitative studies, victims and police officers held the opinion that cyber-
harassment was perpetrated by someone known to the victim. Ten out of twelve 
participants who took part in Study 2 knew the person who engaged in cyber-harassing 
behaviours against them. Of the two participants who did not know the harasser, one 
involved a company associated with the sex industry, who sent unsolicited messages to the 
recipient in an attempt to sell their services. The remaining participant who reported the 
perpetrator was unknown, indicated suspicion that the perpetrator may have been a peer 
but was reluctant to attribute blame as there was no way to prove who the perpetrator was. 
In Study 4, police officers considered that instances of cyber-harassment are an extension 
of school bullying or are related to domestic violence. One police officer described what he 
perceived to be a unique case which involved cyber-harassment perpetrated by a stranger.  
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Contrasting the views of victims and police officers, the majority of participants in Study 3 
considered that cyber-harassment was likely to be perpetrated by someone unknown to the 
victim. Spitzberg and Cadaz (2002) illustrated that stereotypical views of offline 
harassment include the perception that harassment occurs between strangers, and this view 
is created and reinforced by media portrayals of stalking. The discrepancy between 
perceptions of the prior perpetrator-victim relationship for online and offline harassment 
may reflect greater public awareness of offline harassment. Furthermore, Whitty and Carr 
(2006) suggest that individuals split online behaviour from offline consequences. The 
findings of this research suggest that compartmentalisation of online and offline behaviour 
goes beyond perceived consequences of online behaviour, and suggests that individuals 
compartmentalise their beliefs and attitudes towards the online and offline worlds.  
 
The finding that the majority of perpetrators of cyber-harassment are known to their 
vicitims contradicts Bocij‟s (2003) suggestion that perpetrators are likely to cyber-harass 
someone they did not previously know. Bocij reported that 42% of cyber-harassed victims 
did not know the perpetrator. He considered that whilst some of these victims may not 
have been able to identify the perpetrator, this explanation could not account for all of the 
cases. Bocij concluded that strangers engaging in cyber-harassing behaviours was more 
common compared to offline harassment. To further quantify his position, Bocij refers to 
Mr X (described by Bocij, Bocij & McFarlane, 2003) who targeted victims he located 
solely online, had never met, and selected his targets on the basis of a few demographic 
characteristics listed on the Internet. However, more recent evidence suggests that victims 
are likely to know the perpetrator (e.g., Sheridan & Grant, 2007), and this research lends 
further support to these findings.  
 
One explanation is that Bocij‟s (2003) findings are now outdated considering the fast pace 
of the evolution of the Internet. More individuals are using the Internet each year within 
Britain (Dutton & Helsper, 2007), and prior use of the Internet is associated with greater 
Internet self-efficacy (Eastin & LaRose, 2000). Therefore, individuals may be equipped 
with greater knowledge and more sophisticated software that help with the identification of 
other users who use the Internet. As such, victims of cyber-harassment may be more able 
to identify perpetrators of cyber-harassment than victims recruited by Bocij. Furthermore, 
Bocij may have prematurely concluded that cyber-harassed victims are likely to be targeted 
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by strangers. The caveat raised in this research indicates that quantitative surveys that aim 
to determine the prior perpetrator-victim relationship should distinguish between 
„unknown‟ and „stranger‟ categories. 
 
Table 26 provides an overview of the themes identified in the three qualitative studies of 
this thesis. The themes reflected participants‟ perceptions of cyber-harassment, the impact 
of cyber-harassment and perceptions of victims.  
 
Table 26: Themes identified in the qualitative research of this thesis 
 Victims’ accounts of cyber-
harassment 
Non-victims’ 
perceptions of 
cyber-harassment 
Police officers’ perceptions of 
cyber-harassment 
1 
It‟s all virtual, nothing is face to face 
confrontational 
Anonymity Accessibility 
  - The fantasy realm   
 
 - The mentally ill perpetrator: 
“psychos and nutjobs” 
  
  - “It was something silly”   
  - Embodiment of threat   
  - “I‟m not sure”   
     
2 PTSD-Like Symptoms Social Support Threat 
  - Re-experiencing the event   
 
 - Avoidance and Emotional 
Numbing 
  
     
3   Victim Blame The Unhelpful Victim 
 
Victims of cyber-harassment and police officers believed that cyber-harassment was likely 
to be caused by the initiation and dissolution of relationships. For victims, cyber-
harassment was the consequence of the dissolution of romantic relationships or friendships. 
Some victims reported a link between new romantic relationships and subsequent cyber-
harassment as the initiation of new romantic relationships caused ex-partners to be jealous 
of their new relationship and subsequently, participants suffered cyber-harassment. This 
latter category has been neglected in previous research investigating offline and online 
harassment, which has focused on the link between the dissolution of romantic 
relationships and the onset of harassment (e.g., Davis, Ace & Andra, 2002), and warrants 
further investigation. 
 
Whilst victims believed that cyber-harassment was related to their relationships, non-
victims believed that cyber-harassment is caused anonymously. For non-victims, visual 
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anonymity reduces perpetrators‟ vulnerability and accountability which increases feelings 
of power and encourages them to engage in cyber-harassing behaviours. In this sense, the 
Internet was perceived as allowing for identity play during which perpetrators might 
behave in ways they may not normally behave in the offline world. This view was shared 
by victims of cyber-harassment, who viewed the internet as a „fantasy realm‟ that allowed 
for identity creation and identity play. However, victims differed from non-victims as they 
perceived cyber-harassment as being a personal attack rather than a by-product of 
computer-mediated communication. 
 
Despite victims‟ perceptions that the Internet is a „fantasy realm‟, some victims felt 
threatened by the perpetrator. Interestingly, none of the cyber-harassed victims who 
perceived the perpetrator‟s behaviour as threatening were explicitly threatened. Despite the 
lack of explicit threats, cyber-harassed victims perceived the threat of physical violence as 
credible. As these victims feared that violence would be used against them, they meet the 
requirements of section four of the PfHA. Previous research indicates that perpetrators of 
cyber-harassment are more likely to issue threats to victims compared to offline 
harassment (e.g., Alexy, Burgess, Baker & Smoyak, 2005), or at least to the same extent as 
perpetrators of offline harassment (e.g, Sheridan & Grant, 2007). This research illustrated 
that individuals who were threatened reported the perpetrator‟s threatening behaviour did 
not cause them to fear violence would be used against them, whilst those who were not 
explicitly threatened reported they were fearful of being physically attacked. Whilst these 
findings are interesting, it is unclear why this finding occurred.  
 
The notion of threat was also perceived as important by police officers who were 
interviewed in this research. Police officers perceived serious cases of cyber-harassment as 
involving credible threats made to the victim‟s life. Police officers explained that when 
serious threats are made to cyber-harassed victims, they can trace the perpetrator and all 
evidence relating to the case, and arrest the perpetrator. However, this research indicates 
that victims may not be explicitly threatened by perpetrators yet they still fear violence will 
be used against them. The lack of explicit threats from perpetrators will be problematic if 
victims approach the police for help. This potential problem has been noted in cases 
relating to offline harassment (e.g., Draucker, 1999), and highlights the need to further 
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clarify the terms under which the Protection from Harassment Act (1997) offers protection 
to victims.  
 
Despite the threat perceived by cyber-harassed victims and consideration from police 
officers that threats made by perpetrators may be credible, non-victims (Study 3) believed 
the level of danger to the victim is diminished in cases of cyber-harassment. Non-victims 
explained that perpetrators were unlikely to be able to locate their victim offline, and the 
computer acts as a barrier which meant the level of threat was diminished. This finding 
may be attributed to the stereotypical view that victims are unlikely to know the perpetrator 
prior to the onset of cyber-harassment. Whilst this research suggests strangers engaging in 
cyber-harassing behaviours are uncommon, there is some evidence that if victims are 
targeted by strangers, they can locate their victims and the threat they pose can be credible. 
For instance, Bocij and McFarlane (2002) described the case of the Boehle family who 
were contacted by strangers attempting to solicit sex from their nine year old daughter, 
after their contact details were posted on the Internet by their neighbour. Furthermore, the 
finding that non-victims perceive the threat posed by perpetrators of cyber-harassment as 
less concerning compared to offline harassment indicates that non-victims trivialise the 
impact of cyber-harassment on victims. 
 
An interesting finding of this thesis is that whilst cyber-harassed victims had difficulty in 
establishing whether their experiences were „real‟, some reported their experiences had 
impacted on them greatly. When individuals maintained a distinction between online and 
offline experiences as being „not real‟ and „real‟ (respectively), the division of reality 
shielded some individuals from the impact of cyber-harassment. Despite confusion about 
whether their experiences of cyber-harassment were real, some participants reported a 
range of PTSD-like symptoms. It is stressed that this thesis does not claim that these cyber-
harassed victims had PTSD. Rather, the symptomology of PTSD provided a coherent 
framework to report on victims‟ experiences. Contrasting with victims‟ reports of the 
impact of cyber-harassment, the majority of non-victims believed that cyber-harassment 
can only impact on individuals if the perpetrator is anonymous. This highlights a 
discrepancy between victims‟ reports of cyber-harassment and non-victims‟ expectations 
about the impact of cyber-harassment. 
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Finally, non-victims and police officers held negative views about cyber-harassed victims 
which may contribute to victims‟ experience of cyber-harassment.  Non-victims believed 
that victims are responsible for inviting cyber-harassment because they may place too 
much personal information on the Internet. Similarly, police officers explained that the 
information people place on the Internet makes them more accessible to perpetrators, and 
may increase the risk of cyber-harassment moving offline. In contrast, non-victims 
perceived perpetrators as lonely, sad individuals who may suffer from mental illness, who 
do not intend to cause their victims fear, and are simply trying to make contact with other 
individuals. In conjunction with perceiving the victim‟s online behaviour as being a 
catalyst for online harassment, non-victims and police officers criticised victims‟ responses 
to cyber-harassment. Non-victims suggested that victims should avoid cyber-harassment 
by blocking the perpetrator‟s contact attempts or to retaliate. Similarly, police officers 
believed victims were unhelpful as they refused to change their online behaviour following 
cyber-harassment by avoiding social networking sites or criticised victims for retaliating 
against the perpetrator.  
 
Valor-Segura, Exposito and Moya (2011) explain that victim blame is characterised by 
attributing responsibility to the victim, minimising the severity of threats, or by mitigating 
the perpetrator‟s actions. These characteristics of victim blame are evidenced in the 
interviews conducted with non-victims and police officers as part of this thesis. It is argued 
that „just world‟ beliefs may account for victim-blaming tendencies (Lerner & Miller, 
1978). According to the „just world‟ hypothesis, individuals need to believe that their 
world is safe and controllable, and people get what they deserve. By attributing blame to 
victims for their cyber-harassing experiences, individuals can maintain the belief that they 
will not suffer cyber-harassment if they do not take online risks that they think victims 
have taken. However, this finding is concerning as it suggests that victims may suffer 
secondary victimisation by their peers which will contribute to the impact of cyber-
harassment on them (Keeney, 2002). 
 
8.3 Cyber-Harassed Victims and Support 
 
The support available to cyber-harassed victims will contribute to the impact of their 
experiences. As part of the quantitative survey (Study 1), participants were asked to report 
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who they imagined they would tell if they experienced cyber-harassing behaviours. 
Significant gender differences emerged, suggesting that (with a few exceptions) females 
were more likely than males to report cyber-harassing experiences to their family and/or 
friends. In contrast, males were more likely to report they would not tell anyone about 
cyber-harassing experiences. Previous research investigating cyber-harassment has often 
limited support seeking behaviours to the police and Internet service providers (e.g., Alexy, 
Burgess, Baker & Smoyak, 2005; Bocij, 2003). Therefore, this research adds to the current 
literature by expanding the support that victims may seek should they experience cyber-
harassment. Furthermore, this research supports previous research in relation to offline 
harassment, which suggests males are less likely than females to seek support following 
harassing experiences. However, these findings related to how people imagined they would 
react to cyber-harassing experiences, and do not reflect how individuals actually behave 
when faced with cyber-harassment.  
 
When faced with cyber-harassing experiences, this research suggests that victims do not 
report their experiences to the police, and may not tell their friends or family about their 
experiences. In this research, none of the individuals who experienced cyber-harassing 
behaviours reported their experiences to the police. It is likely that this finding was due to 
participants‟ confusion about the criminality of cyber-harassment because they did not 
consider their online experiences as „real‟. Some participants chose to tell their friends 
about their experiences, resulting for some in good support in dealing with those 
experiences. However, not all victims reported positive experiences from seeking social 
support to help them cope with cyber-harassment. In particular, one participant explained 
that telling friends resulted in unsympathetic responses, which was unhelpful and 
embarrassing. Another participant reported feeling isolated following cyber-harassing 
experiences, and feelings of suspicion contributed to feeling that no-one would listen or 
help with her experiences. 
 
In conjunction with not knowing who to turn to for help, non-victims in this research 
indicated they may not be able to offer support if a friend approached them about cyber-
harassing experiences. The findings of Study 3 indicated that several factors would be 
considered by non-victims before support would be offered to someone who has 
experienced cyber-harassment. Factors influencing social support included the level and 
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depth of friendship individuals would have with a friend experiencing cyber-harassment, 
knowledge about the victims‟ personality, and proof of their cyber-harassing experience. 
Requiring proof before offering help is concerning as victims may not be able to provide 
proof. Participants in Study 2 noted that cyber-harassment occurs „behind closed doors‟, 
and considered that one of the appeals of using the Internet to harass someone is the 
secrecy afforded in online communication. For instance, if a perpetrator uses a chat room 
to send threatening messages to their victim, the victim may not be able to save the 
communication. Consequently, providing proof of cyber-harassing experiences may not be 
feasible. 
 
8.4 Implications 
 
This research has serious implications for the type and quality of help available to cyber-
harassed victims in coping with their experiences. Despite the perception held by cyber-
harassed victims that their experiences are „not real‟ because they occur in a virtual world, 
cyber-harassment has a negative impact on victims. Arguably, peer support may be one of 
the most helpful forms of support available to cyber-harassed victims. However, victims 
may not be offered social support from their peers if their peers blame them for their cyber-
harassing experiences. The tendency to blame cyber-harassed victims for their experiences 
is an example of secondary victimisation (Kenney, 2002), which may cause further harm to 
victims. 
 
Furthermore, the tendency to blame cyber-harassed victims for their experiences will have 
a significant impact on the prosecution of perpetrators. For instance, barristers and 
solicitors for the defence may emphasise the victim‟s responsibility for cyber-harassing 
instances whilst simultaneously encouraging jurors to sympathise with the perpetrator. 
Consequently, jurors may find cyber-harassing perpetrators as „not guilty‟. 
 
In conjunction with victim-blaming tendencies, individuals hold stereotypical views of 
cyber-harassment. For instance, this research suggests that cyber-harassment is perceived 
to occur between strangers. However, if a case is brought before court that does not 
conform to stereotypical views of cyber-harassment, jurors may be more likely to find the 
defendant „not guilty‟ of harassment. If jurors are likely to find the defendant „not guilty‟, 
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the prevalence of cyber-harassment will increase, and despite the impact cyber-harassment 
can have, victims will have little remedy for their experiences. 
 
This research reinforces the need to better educate individuals about cyber-harassment. 
Education about cyber-harassment should focus on the diversity of forms of cyber-
harassment, the various methods used by perpetrators, explaining the notion of cyber-
harassment-by-proxy, intent requirements in relation to the Protection from Harassment 
Act (1997), and the credibility of threats made by perpetrators of cyber-harassment. In this 
research, victims of cyber-harassment and police officers expressed concerns that the ease 
of cyber-harassment has been increased with the introduction of social networking sites. 
Therefore, educational tools aimed at increasing individuals‟ awareness and knowledge of 
cyber-harassment should be made available to users of social networking sites. However, 
educational tools should not be limited to social networking sites but should be made 
available in all online spaces that can be used by perpetrators of cyber-harassment (such as 
providing links on discussion boards, newsgroups, and online forums). 
 
If perpetrators of cyber-harassment do not explicitly threaten victims, police officers within 
the UK may not be able to intervene to protect victims. This problem is confounded with 
precedents set in court which require serious threats to be made before the Protection from 
Harassment Act (1997) can be invoked (Salter & Bryden, 2009). Consequently, other 
measures need to be taken to protect victims from cyber-harassment. As the Act may not 
be effective in prosecuting perpetrators of cyber-harassment, new legislation (such as that 
proposed by Salter & Bryden, 2009) should be introduced to protect Internet users from 
abuse and victimisation. In the absence of adequate legal protection from cyber-
harassment, Internet users need to better protect themselves from unwanted contact and 
online abuse. Furthermore, website owners need to take more responsibility for abuse that 
occurs on their websites. For instance, website owners should provide clear instructions 
about how website users can deal with instances of cyber-harassment. Furthermore, if 
Internet users report cyber-harassment to website owners, there should be greater 
collaboration between website owners and the police, making it easier for the police to 
gain access to information about incidents of cyber-harassment. 
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The application of the Protection from Harassment Act (1997) is more complicated than a 
simple reading of the Act portrays. For example, whilst the Act does not stipulate the need 
to issue harassment warnings to perpetrators, police officers appear to use this as their first 
strategy in combating harassment. However, issuing harassment warnings may be more 
difficult, especially in cases where the perpetrator has concealed their identity. 
Furthermore, unless an incident of cyber-harassment explicitly threatens the victim‟s 
safety, it is unlikely that police officers will devote resources to tracing the perpetrator‟s 
identity. The complexity of the application of the Act to cases involving cyber-harassment 
may cause victims greater confusion, resulting in disillusionment with, and lack of faith in 
the criminal justice system. Ultimately, this may result in a greater likelihood that victims 
will not approach the police for help in dealing with instances of cyber-harassment. More 
detailed guidelines are required, stipulating the coverage of the Act and police guidelines 
and procedures should be more transparent to Internet users. This may increase satisfaction 
with the criminal justice system, and the likelihood that victims will contact the police for 
help in dealing with cyber-harassment. 
 
8.5 Future Research 
 
The following list presents potential avenues for future research that can expand on the 
findings of this research, and further understanding of issues relating to cyber-harassment. 
Future research should consider the following: 
 
 Following from the just world hypothesis (Lerner & Miller, 1978), individuals may be 
more inclined to blame male victims of cyber-harassment compared to female victims, 
as male victims do not conform to stereotypical views of cyber-harassment. Research 
would benefit by conducting a vignette study which manipulates the gender of 
perpetrators and victims and measuring the degree to which the perpetrators or victims 
are blamed for instances of cyber-harassment. 
 
 Victim-blaming tendencies may be associated with the degree to which victims use the 
Internet. Research would benefit from manipulation of the victim‟s internet usage and 
measuring the degree to which victims are blamed for their cyber-harassing 
experiences, and empathy for the impact of cyber-harassment. 
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 Research would benefit from exploring perceptions of perpetrators of cyber-harassment 
by manipulating the prior victim-perpetrator relationship. For instance, ex-intimates 
who engage in cyber-harassing behaviours may be perceived more sympathetically 
than strangers who engage in cyber-harassment. Furthermore, research should ascertain 
whether sympathy towards the perpetrator is affected by the perpetrator‟s attempts to 
conceal their identity. 
 
 Future research should focus on exploring the relationship between the type and 
severity of threats made by perpetrators of cyber-harassment, and the perceptions about 
the credibility of threats made. 
 
 Examining individuals‟ attachments to their social networking profiles and determining 
the types of information they are willing to disclose/not disclose, and who they feel 
comfortable disclosing information to. This research would contribute to identifying 
methods by which users of social networking sites could be educated about the 
potential risk of cyber-harassment. 
 
 Recruiting cyber-harassed victims who have contacted the police about their 
experiences, with particular focus on the remedies offered by the police, and the 
perceived usefulness of remedies offered. 
 
 Finally, as this research recruited undergraduate students, it is essential to widen the 
target population to include a more diverse range of Internet users, and explore their 
experiences of cyber-harassment. 
 
8.6 Summary 
 
This research produced apparently inconsistent findings in relation to the perceived 
criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours. Whilst some behaviours associated with cyber-
harassment were perceived as criminal (such as sending malicious software), participants 
were unsure about the criminality of other behaviours (such as behaviours associated with 
deception/disclosure). However, inspection of the factors that emerged in Study 1 and the 
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findings of Studies 2 and 3 suggest some criteria that need to be met for participants to 
perceive cyber-harassment as criminal. If the perpetrator‟s behaviour explicitly threatens 
the victim‟s computer, software, personal information and/or the behaviour could be 
prosecuted as a single offence, and/or the behaviour escalates into an offline form, the 
behaviour is likely to be perceived as criminal. If the perpetrator‟s behaviour is innocuous, 
ambiguous, has no obvious malicious intent, or threats are veiled, the behaviour is less 
likely to be perceived as criminal. Furthermore, victims may suffer secondary victimisation 
as their peers may blame their computer use or lifestyle for their cyber-harassment. 
 
This thesis also demonstrates that individuals do suffer from cyber-harassment. Victims 
and police officers believed cyber-harassment was likely to be perpetrated someone known 
to victims and was likely to be caused by the initiation or dissolution of romantic 
relationships. In contrast, non-victims held the expectation that perpetrators were likely to 
be strangers to their victims. Not all participants in Study 2 felt that their experiences 
equated to harassment. However, some felt their experiences had negatively affected their 
daily lives, and reported symptoms that appeared to fall along the post-traumatic stress 
spectrum. The findings reported here also suggest that cyber-harassed victims may not 
have reliable support networks to help them cope with their experiences. Non-victims 
suggested they would offer a cyber-harassed victim support but this was dependent on their 
knowledge of the victim and the availability of evidence of any incidences that had 
occurred. Furthermore, non-victims were likely to blame cyber-harassed victims for their 
experiences. Police officers showed willingness to help cyber-harassed victims but 
perceived victims as unhelpful and in some instances a hindrance to their own cases if they 
were reported. However, the availability of police support to cyber-harassed victims was 
dependent on the immediacy of physical threat to victims. This highlights the precarious 
position that cyber-harassed victims may face. The findings of this thesis make a 
significant contribution to this field of research, and highlights opportunities for further 
research so that cyber-harassment and the impact it has on individuals may be more fully 
understood. 
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Appendix 1: Recruitment Email for Online Survey (Study 1) 
 
To: [Insert relevant email addresses] 
 
Subject: Perceptions and Experiences of Online Behaviours – Short survey for anyone 
interested in participating. 
 
Dear Students, 
 
You are invited to participate in a short research study which seeks to examine 
undergraduate student experiences and perceptions of online behaviours. The purpose of 
the study is to explore whether people perceive some online behaviours as criminal. In 
addition, the study will assess whether people experience the behaviours described, and 
whether these experiences were upsetting. You will be asked to provide some demographic 
information and answer four questions relating to a number of online behaviours. 
Participation in the study is voluntary but your participation would be very much 
appreciated. 
 
The survey can be found using the following link (please click on the link and it will take 
you to the survey, which should take approximately 10-15 minutes to complete): 
 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=n71700y2PU4UJTySv_2fs_2bmw_3d_3d 
 
Please contact Catherine O’Neill at [insert email address] if you have any questions 
about the study, or you can contact Dr Belinda Winder at [insert email address], as her PhD 
supervisor. 
 
Many thanks for your help, and sorry for the additional email if you are not interested in 
participating. 
 
Catherine O‟Neill 
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Appendix 2: Perceptions and Experiences of Online Behaviours: Background 
Information, Informed Consent and Survey (Study 1) 
 
Background and Information Sheet 
 
If you are an undergraduate student, living in England or Wales, you are invited to fill out 
this survey.  The survey will examine your experiences and perceptions of negative cyber-
behaviours. 
 
Aims 
The purpose of this study is to explore whether people perceive some cyber-behaviours as 
criminal. In addition, the study will assess whether people experience the behaviours 
described and whether these experiences are or were upsetting. 
 
Funding 
This study is being funded by Nottingham Trent University as part of a PhD project. 
 
Procedures 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete an online survey that 
will take approximately 15 minutes. You will be asked to provide some demographic 
information and answer four questions relating to a number of online behaviours. You will 
be provided with the opportunity to take part in a second study which will be online 
interviews via an Instant Messaging service of your choosing. The data you provide will be 
combined with that from other participants. 
 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
The data you provide will be kept securely. You do not have to provide any information 
that could identify you. You will be asked to provide an email address if you wish to be 
considered for participation in a second study. Your email address will be held securely 
and separate from the survey data and will only be accessed by the researchers. All of the 
information you provide will be strictly confidential.  You do not have to provide any 
information that can be used to identify you.  Individuals will not be identified in any 
publication or presentation of the results. 
 
Voluntary Nature of Participation 
Participation in this study is voluntary and it would be appreciated if you try to answer all 
of the questions.  If you feel uncomfortable answering some of the questions or cannot 
answer some of the questions, any answers you provide will be helpful. You can withdraw 
from the study at any time prior to the data being analysed. To protect your anonymity, 
please note the number assigned to your survey as this will be used to withdraw your data, 
should you decide to withdraw after submission.  
 
Risks and Benefits of Participation 
Whilst there are no direct benefits to participating in this research, it is hoped that you will 
find participating an interesting experience. You will be asked to report on whether you 
have experienced some potentially upsetting behaviour. Whilst it is anticipated that you 
will not experience any distress from completing the survey, if you feel you are affected, 
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please call Nottingham Trent University Student Counselling services: City Campus 0115 
848 6487, Clifton Campus 0115 848 6623, Brackenhurst Campus 0115 848 6623 
(www.ntu.ac.uk/sss/counselling_service/). 
 
Contact Details 
The study is being conducted by Catherine O‟Neill, a PhD student at Nottingham Trent 
University, Nottingham.  If you have any questions about the research, you can email 
Catherine O‟Neill [insert email address]. Alternatively, you can contact Catherine‟s 
supervisor, Dr. Monica Whitty on 0115 8485523 or email [insert email address].  
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Declaration of Informed Consent 
 
If you have read the background and information about the study and would like to 
proceed, please complete the following. If you do not wish to proceed, please close the 
browser. 
 
1. I confirm that the purpose of the study has been explained to me prior to completing 
the survey, that I have been given information about it in writing, and that the 
researcher‟s contact details have been provided to me should I have any questions 
about the research. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I have taken part in the 
research of my own free will. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
3. I give my permission for the data I provide to be held securely by the researcher, on the 
understanding that the data will be destroyed at the end of the project. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
4. I agree that the data can be stored and used for scientific research and in presentations 
in scientific journals and conferences, but not for any other purpose and any 
publication or presentation that uses the material will edit out any personal information 
that might allow me to be identified. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
5. I understand that I can withdraw from this study at any stage prior to the data being 
analysed. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
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Withdrawal After Completion 
 
Please enter a word in the space below. Should you wish to withdraw from the study after 
you have submitted your answers, please quote this word to the researcher. 
 
Please note: you can withdraw up to the point of data analysis. 
 
_________________________________________ 
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Demographics 
 
1. Do you live in England or Wales?  
 
 Yes 
 No  (If No, take participant to the end of the survey) 
 
2. Are you an undergraduate student?  
 
 Yes 
 No  (If No, take participant to the end of the survey) 
 
3. Please give your age in years. (Drop down box from 18 to 100). 
 
4. What is your gender? (please select one) 
 
 Male 
 Female 
 
5. What is your sexual orientation? (please select one) 
 
 Heterosexual 
 Homosexual  
 Bisexual 
  
6. What is your relationship status? (please select one) 
 
 Single  
 Boyfriend/Girlfriend 
 Cohabiting 
 Married 
 Divorced 
 Separated 
 Widowed 
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Section A 
 
For the following items, there are phrases describing people‟s behaviours. Please use 
the rating scale provided to describe how accurately each statement describes you. 
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. 
Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of 
the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. 
 
 
Very 
Inaccurate 
Moderately 
Inaccurate 
Neither 
Accurate 
nor 
Inaccurate 
Very 
accurate 
Have frequent mood swings     
Am not easily bothered by 
things 
    
Believe in the importance of 
art 
    
Am the life of the party     
Am skilled in handling social 
situations 
    
Am always prepared     
Make plans and stick to them     
Dislike myself     
Respect others     
Insult people     
Seldom feel blue     
Don’t like to draw attention 
to myself 
    
Carry out my plans     
Am not interested in abstract 
ideas 
    
Make friends easily     
Tend to vote for liberal 
political candidates 
    
Know how to captivate 
people 
    
Believe that others have good 
intentions 
    
Do just enough work to get 
by 
    
Find it difficult to get down to 
work 
    
Panic easily     
Avoid philosophical 
discussion 
    
Accept people as they are     
Do not enjoy going to art 
museums 
    
Pay attention to details     
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Keep in the background     
Feel comfortable with myself     
Waste my time     
Get back at others     
Get chores done right away     
Don’t talk a lot     
Am often down in the dumps     
Shirk my duties     
Do not like art     
Often feel blue     
Cut others to pieces     
Have a good word for 
everyone 
    
Don’t see things through     
Feel comfortable around 
people 
    
Have little to say     
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Section B 
 
Using the scale provided, please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the 
statements.  
 
A rating of 1 indicates that you strongly disagree and a rating of 7 indicates that you 
strongly agree.  
 
Please select one response only for each statement. 
 
 
 Strongly  
Disagree 
Strongly  
Agree 
I feel confident in understanding 
terms/words relating to Internet 
hardware 
       
I feel confident in understanding 
terms/words relating to Internet software 
       
I feel confident in describing functions of 
Internet hardware 
       
I feel confident in trouble shooting 
Internet problems 
       
I feel confident in explaining why a task 
will not run on the Internet 
       
I feel confident in using the Internet to 
gather data 
       
I feel confident learning advanced skills 
within a specific Internet program 
       
I feel confident turning to an on-line 
discussion group when help is needed 
       
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Section C 
 
For each of the following items, please indicate whether you think each of the behaviours 
are criminal. 
 
 Please select one... 
Sending numerous, unsolicited messages over a period of time 
via email, instant messenger, chat rooms, or internet discussion 
boards that are sexually explicit or obscene 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say 
Sending numerous, unsolicited messages over a period of time 
via email, instant messenger, chat rooms, or internet discussion 
boards that are abusive and threatening 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Sending numerous, unsolicited text and multi-media messages 
to someone’s mobile phone that are sexually explicit 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Sending numerous, unsolicited text and multi-media messages 
to someone’s mobile phone that are abusive and threatening 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Sending another person’s friends, family, or work colleagues 
messages via email to embarrass that person or damage their 
reputation 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
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 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Sending another person’s friends, family, or work colleagues 
improper messages to their mobile phone to embarrass that 
person or damage their reputation 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Posting false information on the Internet about another person  Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Posting another person’s contact information on the Internet 
in a way that is soliciting sex 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Posting sexually explicit pictures on the Internet that have 
been changed to resemble another person 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Changing online identities/screen names to contact another 
person who has blocked their online contacts 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Telling someone information about the other person’s offline 
lives that he/she did not disclose 
 Definitely 
criminal 
278 
 
278 
 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Encouraging other Internet users to be abusive or threatening 
to another person 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Sending another person malicious software that can damage 
their software and hardware 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Sending another person malicious software that can be used to 
access information on their computer 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Telling someone in an online ‘chat’ that they had followed 
them offline 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Using an identity/screen name similar to another person and 
contacting their friends to destroy their reputation 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
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criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Subscribing another person to online services that they did not 
want 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
Spamming another person’s email in an attempt to disrupt or 
disable their email 
 Definitely 
criminal 
 Somewhat 
criminal 
 Not sure 
 A little bit 
criminal 
 Not at all criminal 
 Prefer not to say
 
 
 
Please indicate whether you have experienced the following behaviours. 
 
 Please select one... 
Have you ever received numerous, unsolicited messages over a 
period of time via email, instant messenger, chat rooms, or 
internet discussion boards that were sexually explicit or 
obscene? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Have you ever received numerous, unsolicited messages over a 
period of time via email, instant messenger, chat rooms, or 
internet discussion boards that were abusive and threatening? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Have you ever received numerous, unsolicited text and multi-
media messages to your mobile phone that were sexually 
explicit? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Have you ever received numerous, unsolicited text and multi-
media messages to your mobile phone that were abusive and 
threatening? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Have your friends, family or work colleagues ever been sent 
messages via email by someone who wanted to embarrass you 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
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or damage your reputation?  No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Have your friends, family or work colleagues ever been sent 
messages to their mobile phone by someone who wanted to 
embarrass you or damage your reputation? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Has anyone ever posted false information on the Internet 
about you? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Has anyone ever posted your contact information on the 
Internet in a way that solicited sex? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Has anyone ever posted sexually explicit pictures on the 
Internet that have been changed to resemble you? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Has anyone ever changed their online identities/screen names 
to contact you because you have blocked their attempts to 
contact you online? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Has anyone ever told you information about your offline life 
that you did not disclose to that person? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Has anyone ever encouraged other Internet users to be abusive 
or threatening to you? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Has anyone ever sent you malicious software that could 
damage your software and hardware? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Has anyone ever sent you malicious software that can be used 
to access information on your computer? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Has someone ever told you in an online ‘chat’ that he/she had  Not applicable 
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followed you offline?  Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Has anyone ever used an identity or screen name similar to 
yours and contacted your friends to destroy your reputation? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Has anyone ever subscribed you to online services that you did 
not want? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
Has anyone ever spammed your email in an attempt to disrupt 
or disable your email? 
 Not applicable 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
If you have experienced any of the behaviours described in the previous question, using the 
rating scale please indicate how upset you were by your experience(s). 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not           Extremely  
upset           upset 
at all 
 
 
If you experienced more than one of the behaviours described, do you think the same 
person carried out all of the behaviours? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don‟t know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Please imagine who you would report the following behaviours to if  you experienced 
them? Please tick all that apply. 
 
If you received numerous, 
unsolicited messages over a period 
of time via email, instant messenger, 
chat rooms, or internet discussion 
boards that were sexually explicit or 
obscene? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
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 Not sure 
 Other 
If you received numerous, 
unsolicited messages over a period 
of time via email, instant messenger, 
chat rooms, or internet discussion 
boards that were abusive and 
threatening? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If you received numerous, 
unsolicited text and multi-media 
messages to your mobile phone that 
were sexually explicit? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If you received numerous, 
unsolicited text and multi-media 
messages to your mobile phone that 
were abusive and threatening? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If your friends, family, or work 
colleagues were sent messages via 
email by someone who wanted to 
embarrass you or damage your 
reputation? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If your friends, family or work 
colleagues were sent messages to 
their mobile phone by someone who 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
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wanted to embarrass you or damage 
your reputation? 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If someone posted false information 
on the Internet about you? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If someone posted your contact 
information on the Internet in a way 
that solicited sex? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If someone posted sexually explicit 
pictures on the Internet that had 
been changed to resemble you? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If someone changed their online 
identities/screen names to contact 
you because you had blocked their 
attempts to contact you online? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
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 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If someone told you information 
about your offline life that you did 
not disclose to that person? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If someone encouraged other 
Internet users to be abusive or 
threatening to you? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If someone sent you malicious 
software that could damage your 
software and hardware? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If someone sent you malicious 
software that could be used to access 
information on your computer? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If someone told you in an online 
‘chat’ that he/she had followed you 
 Friends 
 Family 
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offline?  Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If someone used an identity or 
screen name similar to yours and 
contacted your friends to destroy 
your reputation? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If someone subscribed you to online 
services that you did not want? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If someone spammed your email in 
an attempt to disrupt or disable 
your email? 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Internet service provider/mobile phone 
provider 
 Internet moderator 
 Police 
 Doctor 
 University 
 No-one 
 Not sure 
 Other
If you have selected ‘Other’ for any of the responses, please specify who you would 
report the experience to 
 
__________________________________________________  
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Volunteers Required 
 
Following this study, you may be invited to take part in an online interview. The interview 
will be conducted using any Instant Messenger service of your choosing, at a time to suit 
you. During the interview you will be asked about some of the information you have 
reported in this survey. 
 
If you would like to be considered for this, please provide your email address.  Please 
remember that all information you provide in this survey will remain confidential.  If you 
do not want to be considered, DO NOT provide your email address. 
 
My email address is ____________________________ 
 
 
Please note:  If you do not want to take part in an online interview, you WILL NOT 
receive unsolicited emails from the researcher. 
 
If you do want to take part in an online interview, you WILL NOT receive emails from 
the researcher for any other purpose. 
 
 
 
 
Debriefing 
 
Thank you for completing this survey. 
 
If you would like to withdraw your data from the study, please email Catherine O‟Neill 
[insert email address] quoting the word you chose at the beginning of the survey. 
Alternatively, you can email Catherine‟s supervisor, Dr. Monica Whitty [insert email 
address]. 
 
Should you feel affected by completing the survey, please contact: 
Nottingham Trent University Student Counselling Services 
(www.ntu.ac.uk/sss/counselling_service). City Campus – 0115 848 6487. Clifton Campus 
– 0115 848 6623. Brackenhurst Campus – 0115 848 5292. 
 
Many thanks for your help with this research – I sincerely appreciate the time and effort 
you have invested. 
 
Catherine O‟Neill 
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Appendix 3: Recruitment Emails for Online Interviews with Cyber-harassed Victims 
(Study 2) 
 
To: [Insert participant‟s email address] 
 
Subject: Interview Invitation 
 
Hi [Insert participant‟s name if available], 
 
You recently completed an online survey about your negative online experiences, and 
indicated that you might be interested in taking part in an online interview. 
 
I would like to hear more about your experiences. If you are interested in telling me more 
about your experiences, please email me back and I can let you know more about the 
interview process. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask me and I will do my 
best to answer any of your questions. 
 
Many thanks for your help. 
 
Catherine O‟Neill 
 
Upon receipt of an email from the participant, the following email will be sent: 
 
Hi [Insert participant‟s name], 
 
Thanks for your reply. 
 
The survey you completed provided 18 online behaviours and asked if you thought the 
behaviours were criminal, whether you experienced them, and who you would tell if you 
experienced them. My interest for the interview is the behaviours you experienced. The 
interviews can be done via Instant Messenger or email and are very informal. If you want 
to do the interview via Instant Messenger, let me know what software you prefer to use and 
then we would arrange a time to chat online about your experiences. If you choose to do it 
via email, we would exchange a series of emails. 
 
Before the interview, you will be asked to provide your consent to take part. This can be 
done online and I‟ll send you an email the day before the interview starts. If, and when, 
you provide your consent, we can arrange when suits you to take part in the interview. To 
be honest, there aren‟t that many questions because I want the interview to be quite 
informal. So, I‟ll mostly be asking you questions about your responses. When the interview 
is finished and I‟m analysing the data, I might need to email you again to make sure I‟m 
interpreting the things you have said in a way that you agree with. I‟ll keep this to a 
minimum though. If you still want to take part, the interviews will be beginning from 
next week. Please let me know if you are interested. 
 
Hope to hear from you soon, and I apologise for the lengthy email. 
Catherine 
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Appendix 4: Experiences of Negative Online Behaviours: Background Information 
and Informed Consent (Study 2) 
 
Background and Information 
 
Upon completing an online survey, you expressed an interest in participating in an online 
interview, and are now invited to take part in an online interview about your experiences of 
negative online behaviours. 
 
Aims 
The purpose of this study is to gain an in-depth understanding of your experiences and/or 
perceptions of cyber-harassing behaviours. If you have experienced cyber-harassing 
behaviours, the interviews will assess the impact of these experiences on your life. In 
addition, you will be asked about social and/or professional support networks that you may 
have sought to help you deal with your experiences. If you have not experienced cyber-
harassment, you will be asked about your perceptions of cyber-harassing behaviours. You 
will also be asked about your attitudes towards individuals who have been cyber-harassed 
and how, and if, you think cyber-harassment should be dealt with. 
 
Procedures 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to take part in an online 
interview. The interview will take place at a time to suit you and using an Instant 
Messaging service of your choosing. The interview will last approximately 1 ½ hours. 
 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
The data you provide will be kept securely in password protected files. Should excerpts of 
your interview need to be printed, they will be stripped of all identifying information and 
kept securely in locked filing cabinets. Should the data need to be transported, it will be 
held on a password protected USB key and kept by the principal researcher. All of the 
information you provide will be strictly confidential and the researcher and her three 
supervisors will be the only people with access to the data held. The data will be held until 
the end of the PhD project, after which it will be destroyed. You do not have to provide 
any information that could be used to identify you. To ensure your anonymity, you can use 
an anonymous email addressif you choose to do so. As the interviews are conducted solely 
online, you do not have any face-to-face contact with the interviewer. All of the 
information you provide will be strictly confidential. Individuals will not be identified in 
any publication of the results. The results of the study will be published in the PhD thesis, 
in conference presentations and journal articles. However, all identifying information will 
be changed prior to any of the results being published. 
 
Voluntary Nature of Participation 
Participation in this study is voluntary and it would be appreciated if you try to answer all 
of the questions. If you feel uncomfortable answering some of the questions or cannot 
answer some of the questions, any answers you provide will be useful. If you do not want 
to answer any particular questions, you can use a codeword to pass on any question. You 
can choose the word at the beginning of the interview. You can withdraw from the study at 
any time. You will be asked to choose a pseudonym before the interviews and this can be 
used to withdraw from the study at any time. 
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Risks and Benefits of Participation 
Whilst there are no direct incentives for taking part in this study, it is hoped that you will 
find participating an interesting and rewarding experience. You will be asked to report on 
whether you have experienced some potentially upsetting behaviour. Whilst it is 
anticipated that you will not experience any distress from taking part in the interview, if 
you feel affected, please call Nottingham Trent University Student Counselling services: 
City Campus 0115 848 6487, Clifton Campus 0115 848 6623, Brackenhurst Campus 0115 
848 6623 (www.ntu.ac.uk/sss/counselling_service/). The university‟s counselling service 
will be notified of this study prior to the interviews taking place. They will not be given 
any individual‟s information will be told that the study has provided you with their contact 
information. 
 
Contact Details 
If you have any questions about the research, you can email Catherine O‟Neill [insert 
email address]. Alternatively, you can email Catherine‟s supervisor, Dr. Monica Whitty 
[insert email address]. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Declaration of Informed Consent 
 
If you have read the background and information about the study and would like to 
proceed, please complete the following. If you do not wish to proceed, please close the 
browser. 
 
I confirm that the purpose of the study has been explained to me prior to completing the 
survey, that I have been given information about it in writing, and that the researcher‟s 
contact details have been provided to me should I have any questions about the research. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I have taken part in the research of 
my own free will. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
I give my permission for the data I provide to be held securely by the researcher, on the 
understanding that the data will be destroyed at the end of the project. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
I agree that the data can be stored and used for scientific research and in presentations in 
scientific journals and conferences, but not for any other purpose and any publication or 
presentation that uses the material will edit out any personal information that might allow 
me to be identified. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
I understand that I can withdraw from this study at any stage prior to the data being 
analysed. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Your Information 
 
Please provide the email address you are using to communicate with Catherine O‟Neill for 
the interview. This address will allow for Catherine to ensure you have provided your 
consent prior to the interview. 
 
 
_______________________________________________ 
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Please enter a pseudonym for the interview. The name you choose will be used to identify 
your data when it is being analysed. If you do not choose a pseudonym one will be chosen 
for you. 
 
 
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank You 
 
Thank you for providing your consent for the interview. 
 
Catherine will contact you via email to confirm when your interview will take place. 
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Appendix 5: Experiences of Negative Online Behaviours: Interview Schedule (Study 
2) 
 
Hi, I‟m Catherine and I‟d like to thank you for agreeing to take part in this interview. 
 
Have you read the background information to the study and completed the consent form? 
 
Could you tell me the pseudonym you chose when you gave your consent to take part in 
this interview? 
 
During the interview I would appreciate it if you could answer as many questions as 
possible. If you feel uncomfortable and don‟t want to answer any particular question you 
can pass. Just let me know if this is the case. Is that OK? 
 
Because I can‟t see you during the interview, please tell me if you feel upset. I want to 
make sure you are feeling OK during the interview. Is that OK? 
 
I‟d like to remind you that you have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage prior 
to data analysis. You can do this by emailing me with your pseudonym and asking me to 
withdraw your data. Is that OK? 
 
Before we start, are there any questions you want to ask? 
 
When you completed the survey, you said you had experienced [insert behaviour(s) 
experienced]. Could you describe this experience to me? 
Prompts: Who perpetrated it? Duration of contact? How did it start? Has it ended and how 
did it end? Thoughts about or impressions of the perpetrator? Does participant think the 
perpetrator did it to anyone else? 
 
How did the incident(s) make you feel? 
Prompts: At the time? Did the participant think about it for any period of time afterwards? 
 
Why do you think it happened to you? 
Prompts: Because of participant‟s use of the Internet? Some characteristic or behaviour 
attributed to the perpetrator? 
 
What impact did it have on you? 
Prompts: Permanent/temporary changes of Internet use? Any impact on social/work life? 
Psychological or physical impact? Why did it impact on him/her this way? If it happened 
offline, would the participant have felt differently and why? 
 
Did you tell anyone about what happened? 
Prompts: Who? Why did the participant choose to tell or not to tell someone? Was their 
advice useful? How did their reactions make the participant feel? 
 
Instant Messenger/email is a novel approach to conducting an interview. How did you find 
the experience? 
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That‟s all the questions I have for you. I really appreciate you sharing your experience with 
me. Thank you again, and if you have any questions, feel free to email me. 
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Appendix 6: Recruitment Emails for Perceptions of Cyber-Harassment Interviews 
 
To: [Insert email address] 
 
Subject: What do you think of cyber-harassment? 
 
Hi, 
 
I'm a PhD student currently researching perceptions of cyber-harassment. I would be very 
grateful if you could spare some time to take part in an online interview. The interview will 
be conducted via Instant Messenger at a time to suit you. If you are interested in taking 
part, please use the link provided to give your consent. You will also be asked to provide a 
contact email address so I can contact you to arrange a time for the interview. Anyone who 
has taken part in the interviews have enjoyed the experience, and I hope you will too. 
 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=5wbZPvKauXgzT_2fNqKTVXsg_3d_3d 
 
Should you have any questions about the research, or if there are any problems with the 
link, please let me know. 
 
Thanks 
 
Catherine O‟Neill
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Appendix 7: Perceptions of Cyber-Harassment Interviews: Background Information, 
and Declaration of Informed Consent (Study 3) 
 
Background and Information 
 
Please take some time to read through the information about the study, and feel free to 
contact me [insert email address] should you require any further information. 
 
Aims 
This study aims to gain an in-depth understanding of your perceptions of cyber-
harassment. You will also be asked about your attitudes towards individuals who have 
been cyber-harassed, and how you think cyber-harassment should be dealt with. 
 
Procedures 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to take part in an online 
interview. The interview will take place at a time to suit you and using an Instant 
Messaging service of your choosing. The interview will last approximately 1 ½ hrs. 
 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
The data you provide will be kept securely in password protected files. Should excerpts of 
the interviews need to be printed, they will be stripped of all identifying information and 
kept securely locked in filing cabinets. Should the data need to be transported, it will be 
held on a password protected USB key. All of the data will be strictly confidential. The 
researcher and her three supervisors will be the only people with access to the data. The 
data will be held until the end of the PhD project, after which it will be destroyed. You do 
not have to provide any information that could identify you. To ensure your anonymity, 
you can use an anonymous email address. As the interviews are conducted online, you do 
not have any face-to-face contact with the interviewer. All of the information you provide 
will be strictly confidential. Individuals will not be identified in any publication or 
presentation of the results. The results will be published in the PhD thesis, in conference 
presentations and journal articles. All identifying information will be changed prior to any 
of the results being published. 
 
Voluntary Nature of Participation 
Participation in this study is voluntary and if you feel uncomfortable answering some of 
the questions, or cannot answer some of the questions, any answers you provide will be 
helpful. You can withdraw from the study at any time. You will be asked to choose a 
pseudonym before the interviews, which can be used to withdraw from the study at any 
time prior to data analysis. 
 
Risks and Benefits of Participation 
Whilst there are no direct incentives for taking part in this study, it is hoped that you will 
find participating an interesting and rewarding experience. Whilst it is anticipated that you 
will not experience any distress from taking part in the interviews, if you feel affected, 
please The Samaritans by phone 08457 90 90 90 or by email www.samartians.org . 
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Contact Details 
If you have any questions about the research, you can email Catherine O‟Neill [insert 
email address]. Alternatively, you can email Catherine‟s supervisor, Dr. Monica Whitty 
[insert email address]. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Declaration of Informed Consent 
 
If you have read the background and information about the study and would like to 
proceed, please complete the following. If you do not wish to proceed, please close the 
browser. 
 
I confirm that the purpose of the study has been explained to me prior to completing the 
survey, that I have been given information about it in writing, and that the researcher‟s 
contact details have been provided to me should I have any questions about the research. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I have taken part in the research of 
my own free will. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
I give my permission for the data I provide to be held securely by the researcher, on the 
understanding that the data will be destroyed at the end of the project. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
I agree that the data can be stored and used for scientific research and in presentations in 
scientific journals and conferences, but not for any other purpose and any publication or 
presentation that uses the material will edit out any personal information that might allow 
me to be identified. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
I understand that I can withdraw from this study at any stage prior to the data being 
analysed. 
 
 Yes 
 No 
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Appendix 8: Perceptions of Cyber-Harassment: Interview Schedule (Study 3) 
 
1. Can you think of any examples of cyber-harassment? 
 
2. What kinds of behaviours do you think constitutes cyber-harassment? Why? 
Prompts: malicious software that can be used to damage someone‟s computer 
hardware/software, or to access information held on their computer. 
Sending someone abusive/threatening/sexually explicit messages via the Internet or to 
their mobile phone 
Telling someone in an online chat information about their offline life that they did not 
disclose, or that they followed them offline. 
 
3. Why do you think people are harassed on the Internet? 
 
4. Do you think cyber-harassment can have a real impact on people‟s lives? Why or why 
not? 
Prompt: Online, offline 
 
5. What would you think if a friend told you they felt depressed or socially isolated 
because someone harassed them on the internet? 
 
6. What would you think if a friend told you they were afraid to leave their house because 
someone harassed them on the internet? 
 
7. What advice would you give to such a friend? 
 
8. Can you think of any laws that cyber-harassment violates? Why or why not? 
 
9. What do you think needs to happen for cyber-harassment to be criminal? 
10. If you were allowed to create a law to prosecute cyber-harassment, what would the law 
include? 
 
11. Do you think cyber-harassment should be reported to the police? Why or why not? 
 
12. Why do you think people do/do not report cyber-harassment to the police? 
 
13. Why do you think the police should/should not get involved with cyber-harassment 
cases? 
 
14. What do you think the police can do? 
 
15. What do you think the police cannot do? 
 
16. What do you think can be done to protect Internet users from cyber-harassment? 
Prompt: By Internet users, the government, ISPs etc. 
 
17. Thanks for taking part in the interview. Online interviews are different from face-to-
face interviews. How did you feel about doing the interview online? 
Prompt: more or less positive than FtF? 
299 
 
299 
 
Appendix 9: Interviews with Police Officers: Recruitment Letter (Study 4) 
 
5
th
 January 2009. 
 
To whom it may concern, 
 
I am a PhD student at Nottingham Trent University, currently researching victim and non-
victim perceptions of cyber-harassment. The last phase of my research involves 
interviewing police officers about their role in dealing with cases involving cyber-
harassment. To avoid issues of data protection, the interviews do not require officers‟ to 
provide specific details of such cases. Rather, the research focuses on discussing the issue 
of cyber-harassment, police officers‟ roles, and identifying ways to raise public awareness.  
 
As my research focuses on the perceived criminality of cyber-harassing behaviours, cyber-
harassment has been defined in accordance with the Protection from Harassment Act 
(1997). The Act stipulates that harassment involves a course of conduct (on at least two 
occasions) that causes the victim alarm or distress. In line with this, cyber-harassment 
involves a course of conduct that utilises the Internet or mobile phone technology. 
 
Unfortunately, I have had some difficultly in accessing police officers who would be 
interested in taking part in my research. I would be very grateful if you could help me with 
this by passing my contact details to any officers who would be interested. The interviews 
will be conducted at a time and place to suit volunteers and will take no longer than 1 hour. 
Alternatively, the interviews can be conducted via the telephone. In return, I will gladly 
send a report of my findings to your department. Should you be interested in this research, 
you can contact me via email at [insert email address] or by phone [insert contact 
number]. 
 
I greatly appreciate your time and any help you can provide. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Catherine O‟Neill 
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Appendix 10: Police Officers: Background and Information Sheet (Study 4) 
 
 
Perceptions of Cyber-Harassment 
Background and Information Sheet 
 
Catherine O’Neill (PhD Student) 
Nottingham Trent University 
 
Thank you for the interest you have shown in taking part in this research project.  Before 
you agree to participate, please read through the following information which explains the 
project in detail.  If you have any questions about the project, or the nature of your 
participation, feel free to get in touch with either myself or my director of studies (contact 
details can be found at the end of this document). 
 
Aims 
The purpose of this study is to gain an in-depth understanding of your experiences with 
and/or perceptions of victims of cyber-harassment. You will be asked about your role as a 
police officer in assisting victims of cyber-harassment. This will include any 
training/guidelines you would follow should a victim approach you for help. The aim is not 
to reflect negatively on your profession, but to learn of your views of cyber-harassment.  
 
Procedures 
Interviews will last for 1hour and will be held at a time and place to suit you. Interviews 
will be digitally recorded and transcribed following the interview.  
 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
The data you provide will be kept securely in password protected files, and will be stripped 
of all identifying information. Should the data need to be transported, it will be held on a 
password protected USB key and held by myself. The information you provide will be 
strictly confidential and the researcher and her three supervisors will be the only people 
with access to the data held. The data will be held until the end of the PhD project, after 
which it will be destroyed. The results of the study will be published in the PhD thesis, in 
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conference presentations and journal articles. However, any identifying information will be 
changed prior to any of the results being published. 
 
Voluntary Nature of Participation 
Participation in this study is voluntary and if you feel uncomfortable answering or cannot 
answer some of the questions or, any answers you provide will be helpful. You can 
withdraw from the study at any time by contacting me. Should you withdraw; any data you 
have supplied will be destroyed.  If you have been notified about this study by a superior 
officer, your participation will be treated confidentially and will not be reported back to 
your superior officer. 
 
Risks and Benefits of Participation 
Whilst there are no direct benefits in taking part, it is hoped that you find the experience 
enjoyable. When the data has been analysed, a report will be submitted to the police 
constabulary. The submission of the report does not eliminate your right to withdraw from 
the study, and does not mean force you into taking part. 
 
Contact Details 
If you have any questions about the research, you can email Catherine O‟Neill [insert 
email address]. Alternatively, you can email Catherine‟s supervisor, Prof. Mark Griffiths 
[insert email address]. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix 11: Interviews with Police Officers: Declaration of Informed Consent 
(Study 4)  
 
 
Perceptions of Cyber-Harassment 
Declaration of Informed Consent 
 
Catherine O’Neill (Principal Researcher) 
Nottingham Trent University 
 
 
Signed: _____________________________  Date ___________ 
 
Researcher: _____________________________  Date ___________ 
 Yes No 
 (Please tick) 
I confirm that the purpose of the study has been explained to me 
prior to taking part in the interview, that I have been given 
information about it in writing, and that the researcher‟s contact 
details have been provided to me should I have any questions about 
the research. 
 
  
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I have 
taken part in the research of my own free will. 
 
  
 
I give my permission for the data I provide to be held securely by 
the researcher, on the understanding that the data will be destroyed 
at the end of the project. 
 
  
 
I agree that the data can be stored and used for scientific research 
and in presentations in scientific journals and conferences, but not 
for any other purpose and any publication or presentation that uses 
the material will edit out any personal information that might allow 
me to be identified. 
 
  
 
I understand that I can withdraw from this study at any stage by 
contacting the researcher. 
 
  
 
I give my permission to the interview being digitally recorded.  
  
 
I give my permission for the researcher to identify the police force 
in any publication of results, and I understand that individual police 
officers and/or branches will not be identified. 
 
  
 
 
303 
 
303 
 
Appendix 12: Interviews with Police Officers: Demographic Information Sheet 
(Study 4) 
 
Demographic Information Sheet 
 
 
Please give your age in years:   _________ 
 
 
 
What gender are you? (please circle)  Male   Female 
 
 
 
How many years have you been a police officer? ___________ 
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Appendix 13: Interviews with Police Officers: Interview Schedule (Study 4) 
 
1. What do you think about cyber-harassment? 
Prompts: professional views, personal views 
 
2. What is your role as a police officer in dealing with cases involving cyber-harassment? 
 
3. What guidelines do you follow if you were presented with a case involving cyber-
harassment? 
 
4. On a practical level, why do you think the guidelines are/are not useful? 
 
5. Do you think cyber-harassed victims report their experiences to the police? Why or 
why not? 
 
6. Why do you think cyber-harassment can/cannot be successfully prosecuted? 
 
7. What do you think can be done to encourage victims to report their experiences to the 
police? 
 
 
